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Abstract 
 
 
The financial crisis which began in 2007/2008 remains the most severe since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.1 It exposes the inherent dangers of unregulated markets and highlights 
the weaknesses of the corporate governance system that has been constructed and determined 
by the shareholder primacy theory.2 
The crisis sparked an intense debate on the causes and the reforms needed to correct the largely 
dysfunctional governance, legal and regulatory regime that has characterised the pre-crisis 
corporate governance landscape. In response, governments in the US and the UK embarked on 
different governance and regulatory reforms ostensibly to contain the damage and possibly 
prevent future occurrence. 
This Thesis argues that corporate governance failures merely triggered the crisis and that the 
underlying cause of the crisis is the idea that the sole purpose of the corporation is shareholder 
value maximisation. The reforms merely provide immediate and temporary solutions but leave 
intact the problem of how to deal with the issue of shareholder primacy in the long-term. Thus, 
the thesis contends that the reforms in the US and UK are at best ad-hoc and cosmetic measures 
that only treat the symptoms and not the causes of the crisis. 
An original contribution of this thesis is that it may lead to a reconceptualization of the nature 
and purpose of the corporation and the emergence of a more long-term governance model. It 
has wider implications as it will be useful not only for students and researchers but also provide 
insights for policy makers and business managers to enable then make informed decisions.
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
The prolonged Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which began in 2007/2008 is seen by many as 
having been triggered by corporate governance failures.3 It is considered the most severe 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s exposing the inherent dangers of 
unregulated markets and undermined the reasoning behind the efficient market hypothesis. 
Above all, it raises important questions about the long-held assumptions regarding the 
shareholder primacy theory. The crisis calls into question the way the public corporation is 
conceived, its nature and purpose in society.4 The United Kingdom (UK) Turner Review 
characterises it as ‘the greatest crisis in the history of financial capitalism’.5 According to Davis, 
it remains the greatest shock to the world financial system for nearly eight decades.6  
Financial crisis is here defined as ‘a disruption to the financial markets in which adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable 
to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities’.7 
Arguably, the effects of financial crisis go beyond those resulting from bank panics. It also 
interferes with the process of long-term economic growth.8  
                                                          
3  Thomas Clarke and Jean Francois Chanlat, European Corporate Governance: Readings and Perspectives 
(Routledge 2009) 1. 
4 Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly, ‘Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK’ (2001) 9 (2) 
Corporate Governance 113. 
5 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis’ (March 
2009) <www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf > accessed 20 September 2016 
6 Kevin Davis, ‘Regulatory Reform Post the Global Financial Crisis: An Overview’ ( APEC Finance Centre Report 
2010)< www.apec.org.au/docs/11_con_gfc/regulatory%20reform%20post%20gfc-%20overview%20paper.pdf > 
accessed 12 0ctober 2013 
7 Frederic S. Mishkin, ‘Anatomy of a Financial Crisis’ (1992) 2 Journal of Evolutionary Economics 115. 
8 ibid 
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Although the crisis originated in the United States of America (US), its repercussions are 
widespread and in fact global.9 It led to the collapse of financial markets and institutions 
worldwide, triggered a dramatic fall in industrial output, an increase in unemployment, a 
reduction in foreign direct investments (FDI) and a sharp economic decline.10 Obviously, all 
these have serious political, economic, social and security implications for countries around the 
world. Nearly eight years after the crisis, the effects are still evident in various shapes, forms 
and at multiple levels.11 
The GFC has impacted both the developed and emerging economies albeit in different degrees. 
Several financial institutions including some of the world-renowned corporations have either 
collapsed or have been bailed out by governments across the world. In the United States (US) 
for instance, the Treasury Department was compelled to initiate a rescue package for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in July 2008 and intervened on March 10 the same year to save the US 
investment bank, Bear Stearns from imminent collapse.12 Similarly, in the United Kingdom 
(UK), the crisis led to the collapse of Bradford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester and the 
subsequent nationalisation of Northern Rock Plc and the Royal Bank of Scotland.13 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that worldwide losses arising from the crisis, 
measured in terms of write-downs on assets in the US, Japan and Europe could be as high as 
$4.1 trillion while global gross domestic product (GDP) contracted to its lowest in 2009 since 
World War II.14  In its 2009 report, the IMF further reveals that the total cost of the GFC 
                                                          
9 John C. Coffee, Jr. ‘The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank’ in Eilis Ferran, Niamh Moloney and Jennifer G. Hill 
(eds), The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2012) 302. 
10 Stavros Vourloumis, ‘Reforming the EU and the Global Financial Regulation: Crisis, Learning and Paradigm 
Shifts’ (A Paper Presented at the 4th Biennal ECPR Regulatory and Governance Conference, 27-29 August 2012)   
11 Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami, ‘Towards a New Corporate Governance after the Global Financial 
Crisis’ (2011) 22(8) International Company &Commercial Law Review 237.  
12 ibid 
13 ibid 
14 IMF, ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risk’ (April 
2009) <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01> accessed 22 August 2014       
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including cash injections into failing banks, bank guarantees and the purchase of toxic assets 
amounted to $11.9 trillion.15 This represents one-fifth of the world’s annual economic output. 
Europe did not escape the devastating effects of the GFC. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
reveals that the write-downs on securities and loans by banks in the Eurozone amounted to 
$64916 billion between 2007 and 2010.17 Similarly, the European Commission admits that 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across the European Union (EU) dropped by an estimated 4 per 
cent, making it the first recession in the EU since the early 1990s and the worst performance on 
record.18 
The GFC highlights the weaknesses in the edifice of the corporate governance system that has 
been constructed and determined by the shareholder primacy theory. According to Vourloumis, 
the crisis has exposed the ‘flaws and fault lines’ of the pre-existing architecture of corporate 
governance.19  It is an architecture in which the dominant paradigm has been one of shareholder 
primacy, over-emphasis on profit maximisation and a misguided over-reliance on the 
superiority of the efficient market hypothesis.20 The underlying assumptions of the current 
corporate governance model not only proved faulty and inadequate in dealing with the systemic 
challenges sweeping through the corporate landscape, it also challenges a host of conceptions 
about the theories of corporate governance.21 
The crisis sparked an intense debate regarding the causes and possible remedies. Consequently, 
academics, politicians and journalists have all joined the fray and have been engaged in the 
                                                          
15 ibid 
16 Edmund Conway, ‘IMF Puts Total Cost of Crisis at £ 7.1 Trillion’ The Telegraph (London, 8 August 2009) 
<www.marketsnaps.wordpress.com/2009/08/09/imf-puts-total-cost-of-crisis-at-7.1.trillion> accessed 22August 
2014  
17 ECB Press Release, ‘Financial Stability Review’ (15 June 2009) 
<www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/html/summary200906.en.html > accessed 20 June 2014      
18 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Economic Forecast’ (3 March 2009) 
<www.ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication15048_en.pdf > accessed 20 June 2014 
19 Vourloumis (n 10) 23. 
20 Mishkin (n 7) 115. 
 21 ibid 
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discourse regarding the origins, causes and triggers of the crisis. Many studies examining the 
causes of the crisis have been undertaken by various writers in different jurisdictions but 
reaching a consensus has remained elusive. While there is a general agreement on the list of 
contributory factors, there is less agreement on which of the factors are the most important and 
the consequent implications for the necessary reforms.22 
Following the GFC, countries across the globe have initiated several corporate governance 
reforms in an attempt to contain the damage and address the defects in the current corporate 
governance regime to prevent future occurrence. These initiatives, notably in the US and UK 
entail various corporate governance reform proposals intended to curb excessive risk taking and 
empower shareholders in the belief that shareholder-empowerment in particular, would 
constraint reckless risk managers in the future.23 As a result, US authorities introduced   
significant corporate governance reforms such as the Dodd Frank Act 2010, the American 
Recovery and Emergency Act 2009, the Economic Stabilisation Act 2008 and the Shareholder 
Bill of Rights Act 2009. In the UK, authorities embarked on several legislative and regulatory 
measures to reform the banking sector and the financial markets. Notable among these 
initiatives are the Banking Act 2009, Financial Services Act 2010, Financial Services and 
Banking Act 2010 and the Combined Code of 2010 and 2014. 
Reforms in the EU have focused mainly on the harmonisation and integration of company law 
and corporate governance across and within member states.24 The EU reform efforts include: 
the enactment of the Transparency Directive (Directive 2009/109/EC)25 and the passage of the 
Capital Requirement Directive (Governance and Remuneration) (Directive 2013/36/EU).26 
                                                          
22 Gamble and Kelly (n 4) 114. 
23 Christopher M. Bruner, ‘Corporate Governance Reforms in a Time of Crisis’ (2010) 36(2) J. Corp. L 34. 
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On the face of it, some of the corporate governance reforms that have been initiated and passed 
into law seem progressive and forward-looking. Ostensibly, they are designed to correct the 
corporate governance failures and shortcomings that have created the greatest GFC in recent 
times.27 But the question becomes whether these legislative initiatives, regulatory changes and 
corporate governance reforms are the appropriate responses in the first place.  Second, to what 
extent do these policy initiatives address the underlying cause(s) of the GFC? 28 The answer is 
largely unclear, highly contentious and remains unanswered. Against this backdrop, the 
questions that this thesis intends to address are:  
(a) What is the nature of corporate governance reforms that have occurred in the US and UK 
post the financial crisis?  
(b) Do the current reforms differ from previous ones?  
(c) To what extent do such reforms address the fundamental issue of shareholder primacy theory 
that have influenced and dominated corporate governance thinking and practice?  
(d) What are the differences and similarities between the reforms in the UK and US? 
Therefore, the bigger question that this thesis seeks to answer is ‘Do the corporate governance 
reforms post the 2007/2008 financial crisis address the underlying cause/causes or are they 
merely treating the symptoms?’ 
In answering these questions, the thesis pursues three distinct but inter-related aims. First, it 
examines the shareholder primacy theory which, this thesis argues, is the underlying cause of 
the GFC. Consequently, the thesis interrogates the various corporate governance reforms that 
have been initiated in the US and UK following the GFC.  Such a critical examination will help 
                                                          
27 Bruner (n 23) 37. 
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Citygroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation’ in P.M Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), Corporate 
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inform and determine how far and to what extent these reforms are able to resolve the 
fundamental problem of the shareholder primacy theory.  Arguably, these reforms reflect a 
growing consensus that the current corporate governance system is defective in many respects. 
The central message therefore, is that the underlying cause of the financial is the unquestioning 
acceptance of the shareholder primacy theory whose basic assumptions have proved to be 
fundamentally flawed. Thus, this thesis submits that the role and purpose of the corporation 
should go beyond the narrow confines of shareholder interests and focus on its long-term 
survival.29 
Secondly, it explores the causes of the financial crisis and situates it within the shareholder 
primacy context. The central argument is that there is a direct link between recent corporate 
governance failures and the shareholder primacy theory. From this perspective, the thesis 
evaluates the theoretical foundations, evolution and assumptions of the shareholder primacy 
theory and explains how it has influenced and shaped present day corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the thesis takes a comparative look at the major reforms in the US and the UK. 
Such a comparative approach facilitates an understanding of the forces driving the differences 
and similarities and the subsequent reforms that emerged. Although the policy frameworks 
differ significantly on both sides, there are also important commonalities between the two 
countries. These differences and similarities are driven by domestic agendas largely because 
the responses in the two jurisdictions express the interaction of economic preferences and 
political institutions.30 
Finally, it seeks to highlight the lessons that can be drawn from the GFC and makes 
recommendations that will bring about the necessary legislative and regulatory reforms. These 
                                                          
29 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors (Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers 2012) 21. 
30  Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of 
Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press 2007) 5. 
Chapter 1 
7 
 
include a tighter regulatory regime, the introduction of ‘covenant’ banking principles, and more 
importantly a redefinition and reconceptualization of the ultimate role and purpose of the 
modern corporation in society.31 
1.2 Relevance and contribution 
The thesis is particularly relevant for several reasons. First, it contributes to knowledge by 
offering a systematic framework for analysing the shareholder primacy theory and its role in 
the current GFC. It contextualises actual policy responses following the GFC and justifies the 
policy choices using theoretical tools that have shaped and influenced corporate governance 
discourse and practice in recent times. 
Moreover, it provides new perspectives on the long-standing debate regarding the purpose and 
role of the corporation by questioning the validity of the shareholder primacy theory of 
corporate governance.32  In so doing, the thesis refutes the mistaken assumptions of the 
shareholder primacy theory and sheds light on the debate thereby promoting a better 
appreciation of the critical issues surrounding corporate governance. 
Furthermore, it addresses key philosophical and methodological issues in corporate governance 
thinking and more importantly moves beyond the constraints of traditional mode of thinking. 
In that respect, a significant contribution of this research is the proposition that reliance on the 
shareholder theory which is characterised by profit maximization, short-termism and efficiency 
of the markets is not just flawed but under pines the current financial crisis.33 Therefore, the 
need to explore alternative governance architecture and make proposals for reforms has never 
                                                          
31 Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn ‘The Marketization of Corporate Control: A Critical Political Economy 
Perspective’ (2007) 12 (2) New Political Economy 211. 
32  Leonard I. Rotman, ‘Re-evaluating the Basis of Corporate Governance in the Post, Post-Enron Era’ in P.M 
Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), Corporate Governance After the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2012)101. 
33 Thomas Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance Causes of the Financial Crisis’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David 
Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (CUP 2011) 31. 
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been more urgent.34 Hence, the proposals and recommendations contained in this research  
provide insights and direction in the corporate governance debate regarding the causes of the 
crisis and the appropriate policy responses to be adopted. 
Finally, the thesis is policy-relevant as it contributes to policy development in the corporate 
governance domain particularly post the 2008 GFC. Although, some research work has been 
done in this area of study, this is the most comprehensive doctrinal work undertaken to compare 
the legislative, regulatory and governance responses in the US and UK post the GFC. Indeed, 
the more forensic approach provides a deeper and clearer understanding of the power relations 
and struggles fuelled by different perceptions of the role and purpose of the public corporation 
in society. It is envisaged that the outcome and subsequent recommendations will be of 
immense benefit policy makers, practitioners and business managers as it provides them with 
the vital tools to make informed decisions. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
Basically, research is a systematic, thorough and rigorous process of investigation that increases 
knowledge.35 This process of investigation requires a research methodology- which is defined 
here as a set of rules about the way research is conducted and the rules governing their 
application and validity. This thesis adopts a mixed methodological approach that is mainly 
doctrinal, partly socio-legal and to a lesser extent comparative. This mixed approach has 
become necessary because focusing exclusively on the doctrinal approach cannot adequately 
explain the theoretical foundation and evolution of the shareholder primacy theory and the 
governance model that emerged from it. 
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Moreover, corporate governance systems and models are ‘path-dependent’ and have been 
shaped and determined by cultural experiences, social norms, and political beliefs within a 
certain legal, economic and historical context. For these reasons, it becomes imperative to 
situate the discourse within the socio-legal approach. 
The research also adopts a comparative approach by comparing the regulatory and legislative 
responses in the UK and the US. The object is to investigate whether and to what extent the 
differences and commonalities are due to domestic considerations and local circumstances or a 
specific governance model. Therefore, this study justifies the need to employ a combination of 
doctrinal, socio-legal and comparative research methodology to ensure relevance and cure some 
of the inherent weaknesses of doctrinal research. 
1.3.1 Doctrinal Research 
Doctrinal research is defined as research that aims to give systematic exposition of the rules, 
principles and concepts that govern a particular field or institution.36 It analyses the relationship 
between these principles, rules and concepts in order to resolve the uncertainties and gaps in 
the existing law.37 According to the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD), ‘Doctrinal 
research involves rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of connections between 
seemingly disparate doctrinal strands and the challenge of extracting general principles from an 
inchoate mass of primary material’.38 
                                                          
36 Jan M. Smits, `What is Doctrinal Research? :  On the Aims and Methods of Legal Dogmatic Research in Rob 
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37 ibid 
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Therefore, doctrinal research concerns itself with textual analysis of documents, legislations, 
rules and regulations. In effect, doctrinal research is not merely asking what the law is on an 
issue, but also concerns itself with the development and application of the doctrine.  
Doctrinal research methodology serves three main goals namely; description, prescription and 
justification. First, it describes the existing law (situation) in a specific field of study or in 
respect of some institutions. This, however, requires neutrality and consistency to inform 
audience on how the law operates. While it is difficult to imagine how the law would function 
without a systematic description, it should also be remembered that in doctrinal research, the 
law is considered a system and not a mere description of existing legislation and case law. 
Consequently, this research provides a comprehensive description of the causes of the GFC, the 
shareholder primacy theory and the policy responses in the US and UK.  
Second, doctrinal research is not limited to the mere description and perhaps, understanding of 
existing law but also entails a search for practical solutions that best respond to the challenges 
posed. More often, description is complimented by a more prescriptive approach that guides 
the search for best outcomes. Against this backdrop, the thesis goes beyond the description of 
the causes and responses to the financial crisis but suggests practical solutions in the form of 
recommendations. 
Doctrinal research, otherwise referred to as pure theoretical research focuses on the analysis of 
doctrine, its development and application. It can either take the form of a simple research 
focusing on a specific issue or a more complex one demanding an in-depth analysis and critical 
examination of the underlying theories behind a substantive issue.39 This thesis justifies the 
approach from three perspectives. First, it argues that doctrinal research remains the most 
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accepted approach to research in law as it helps in systemising the present law.40 This 
systemisation enables the law to accommodate new developments in relation to legislation and 
case law against the backdrop of societal changes.  The ability to respond to such changes makes 
it ‘a living system capable of achieving both consistency and change in the development of the 
law’.41 
Furthermore, doctrinal research sets the standard in terms of the intellectual and practical skills 
needed to engage in the critical analysis of primary and secondary sources and provides 
solutions to challenging questions.42  Arguably, the doctrinal approach is in many respects, a 
prerequisite for undertaking any meaningful legal research and remains the most important type 
of research in which legal scholars engage.43 
But doctrinal research has its own weaknesses and has come under attack for several reasons.44 
The major criticism is that it tends to over-emphasise normative questions while neglecting 
substantive issues. Critics argue that the attention seems to focus on ‘shaping legal reasoning 
and less towards influencing policy and practice’.45 As a result, doctrinal research remains 
largely theoretical and very abstract. According to Hillyard ‘It demonstrates a preponderance 
of purely theoretical and textual analysis rather than theoretically informed empirical 
research’.46  Thus, it is submitted that doctrinal research is more about theoretical discourse and 
less about bringing effective policy changes in practice. 
                                                          
40 CALD, ‘CALD Standards for Australian Law Schools’ (17 November 2009)< www.cald.asn.au/docs/CALD%20-
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42 ibid 
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Second, doctrinal research is considered too narrow from an interdisciplinary perspective.  
Arguably, the culture of doctrinal legal research has been characterised by a ‘lone researcher’ 
working on his/her own and not accustomed to being part of a team.47 This inevitably, leads to 
what has been described as ‘silo mentality’ which makes legal scholars both physically and 
academically isolated from other researchers in the social sciences. 
Another methodological pitfall of doctrinal research is that it tends to be too provincial and 
focuses on just two jurisdictions (UK and US) instead of adopting a transnational approach. 
Critics further contend that doctrinal research is not creative enough from an academic 
perspective. In recognition of these methodological challenges, it is submitted that main stream 
doctrinal legal research needs to be less national, more interdisciplinary and less old-fashioned 
in its approach. This explains why this thesis adopts a multi-dimensional approach which 
combines doctrinal, socio-legal and comparative research to situate the discussion in the right 
context.  
Arguably, such an approach moves the discourse from a purely abstract and theoretical 
perspective to a more practical level in terms of policy formulation and development. As 
indicated earlier, the aim of this thesis, among other things, is to make recommendations with 
the view to marking a radical departure from the present shareholder-oriented model. Against 
this backdrop, it has become imperative to incorporate socio-legal and comparative research 
into the overall research methodology so to provide the proper context and ensure a fuller 
engagement in the discourse. 
1.3.2 Socio-Legal Research 
Researchers are often inclined to invoke the concept of socio-legal research, but clear 
definitions tend to be rare and elusive. In practice, however, the definitions tend to fluctuate 
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between broader and narrower conceptions. Thus, socio-legal research is defined in this context 
as an inter-disciplinary approach to analyse law, legal phenomena and the relationships between 
these disciplines and the wider society.48 Patterson defines socio-legal research as ‘theoretical 
work which leads to the development of grounded theory as well as more policy-oriented study 
which feed directly into the policy-making processes’.49 Similarly, Cottrell defines it as ‘the 
systemic study of the field of social experience’ and notes that socio-legal research goes beyond 
the orthodoxy of doctrinal legal commentary and debate.50  
Socio-legal research has its theoretical foundation in the social sciences and thus, seeks to 
understand law as a social phenomenon. In that respect, it considers the law in the context of 
broader social and political theory by exploring how the law is implemented and enforced, the 
exercise of discretion, the nature of disputes and disputing.51 
A distinguishing feature that binds the socio-legal community together is the multi-disciplinary 
approach in which the theoretical perspectives and methodologies are informed by research in 
other disciplines. Traditional socio-legal research has helped bridge the gap between law and 
sociology, social policy and economics. Indeed, the past two decades have witnessed a growing 
interaction between law and other disciplines within the field of humanities. 
Apparently, recent developments in socio-legal research indicate that the methodology may be 
predominantly empirical but not necessarily exclusive. This is because socio-legal research has 
developed and become diverse both in theory and methodology. It has become less empirical 
as evidenced in recent attempts to define the aims and disciplinary boundaries of socio-legal 
research.52  With this growing diversity, socio-legal study is now defined not so much in relation 
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to empirical research but in terms of academic contribution to the development of law. As 
Wheeler and Thomas point out, socio-legal study has emerged as an interdisciplinary alternative 
and a challenge to traditional empirical research.53  They argue that socio-legal research 
‘represents an inter-face with a context within which the law exists’.54   Indeed, law is after all, 
a social institution like religion, medicine or education and can be studied by situating it within 
the context in which it exists. From this standpoint, socio-legal research represents a truly 
interdisciplinary field open to theoretical diversity and innovation.55 The theoretical diversity, 
as already mentioned, involves how best to incorporate the social, political, economic and 
historical insights into the corporate governance discourse and to encapsulate the origins, 
existence and consequences of corporate governance theory and practice. 
Corporate governance systems are path-dependent and thus reflect the social, legal, political 
and economic settings in which they exist and operate.56  Path dependence, according to 
Pierson, means ‘what happened at an earlier point in time will affect outcomes at later point in 
time’.57  Hence, it is difficult to understand the significance of a particular social variable or 
phenomena without understanding how it got there (the path it took).58  Consequently, corporate 
governance models, systems and structures should be seen as politically and culturally unique 
phenomenon arising out of specific historical circumstances.59 
In view of the close relations between corporate governance, social norms, history, ideological 
beliefs and legal traditions, a complex system of laws, rules and regulations have evolved under 
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different corporate governance models. For instance, the American model of corporate 
governance is a result of specific legal tradition, economic system and political orientation 
coupled with its own historical experiences. These past events have eventually influenced 
outcomes and trajectories as reflected in banking, labour, tax laws and a single tier board of 
directors.60  Moreover, the American culture emphasises individualism, entrepreneurship and a 
strong belief and inclination towards a market-driven economy and minimal government 
regulation of business. Thus, the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance emerged 
as the logical outcome and perhaps, the inevitable consequence of specific past events.61  On 
the other hand, the corporate governance models in Germany and Japan are characterised by a 
different set of banking, tax, labour and competition laws. As Guillen explains, these 
arrangements ‘facilitate routine interactions between managers and owners, promote extensive 
collaborative ties between financial institutions and firms, or between firms themselves’.62  The 
two-tier corporate governance model which allows labour to participate in the supervisory 
boards of corporation is a distinct feature of the German corporate governance model. It both 
reflects social and cultural values and defines the society’s understanding and expectation of 
the role and purpose of the corporate entity. Thus, it may be argued that ‘the choice of corporate 
governance practices in any country expresses the interaction of economic preferences and 
political institutions’.63  
Against this backdrop, this thesis justifies the adoption of the socio-legal research methodology 
for three reasons. First, it is multi-disciplinary encompassing various fields and open to 
‘theoretical diversity’.64  Indeed, corporate governance is a product of the interaction of diverse 
disciplines including law, economics, accounting and management among others. It therefore, 
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becomes imperative that the study and appreciation of corporate governance theories, principles 
and models is undertaken from a socio-legal perspective. 
Secondly, socio-legal research gives a more balanced view by incorporating different insights 
and perspectives into corporate governance scholarship. Moreover, corporate governance as a 
social phenomenon can only be understood within that social context; as such socio-legal 
research provides that understanding and meaning to corporate governance within the context 
of the broader social, legal, political and cultural environment. 
Another justification is that by contextualising the concept of corporate governance, socio-legal 
research helps bridge the gap between law, economics, sociology and social policy. Arguably, 
socio-legal research effectively widens the lens through which diverse factual situations and 
sources are considered and brought to bear both in theory and practice.65 
For these reasons, this thesis recognises the importance of locating research within the social, 
political, cultural and historical contexts by considering the social construction of these 
contexts. This is because corporate governance systems and their theoretical underpinnings do 
not exist in a vacuum.66 In fact, they reflect certain economic, political and ideological 
positions; as such the inherited instincts, the acquired convictions and the resultant outlook to 
a large extent determine the corporate governance choices to be made. As Webley rightly notes 
‘we may try to see things as objectively as we please, nonetheless we can never see them with 
any eyes except our own’.67 The import is that ‘we cannot understand the significance of a 
social variable or phenomenon without understanding how it got there’.68 This thesis, therefore, 
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combines doctrinal, socio-legal and comparative approaches as each approach compliments the 
weaknesses of the other 
1.3.3 Comparative Legal Research 
As earlier indicated, the research also adopts a comparative methodological approach by 
comparing the responses of the US and UK governments to the GFC. Comparative legal 
research is: ‘an attempt to formulate the presuppositions, the preoccupations, and the frames of 
action characteristic of one sort of legal sensibility in terms of those characteristic of another’.69 
Comparative research is based on similarity and differentiation and does not follow a single 
exclusive method or route. Rather, it adopts several methods by which the comparisons are 
carried out. For instance, the comparison could be historical, functional, evolutionary, 
structural, thematic or empirical. Any of the methods identified can be carried out from the 
micro or macro point of view depending on the nature and objectives of the research and the 
research question.70 For the present purposes, this research adopts the functional comparative 
approach. But before delving into detailed discussion of the functional approach, it is important 
to justify the need for the comparative methodology. 
The need to compare and differentiate phenomena, events and institutions seems pervasive and 
in some respect, indispensable in decision-making. It would be  seriously flawed, if issues had 
to be analysed and evaluated from a single perspective because such one-sided approach often 
leads to distortion. Against this background the thesis uses comparative legal research to serve 
as (a) an instrument of learning and knowledge by providing information and promoting better 
understanding of   law in other jurisdictions (b) instrument of evolutionary change in terms of 
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common evolutions and legal families (c) contribute to an understanding of one’s own legal 
system and, (d) a means of harmonising the law.71  
In effect, comparative legal research, through the process of comparison, strengthens and 
expands the role of law in practice. Swanson reaffirms the importance of comparative legal 
research and argues that ‘thinking without comparison is unthinkable: and, in the absence of 
comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research unthinkable’.72  
As mentioned earlier, this research adopts the functional comparative approach in the analysis 
of the governance, regulatory and legislative responses in the two jurisdictions under study. 
Functional comparison is defined as: ‘the study of how the same thing may be brought about, 
the same problem may be met by one legal institution or doctrine or precept in one body of law 
by another and quite different institution or doctrine or precept of another’.73 
Functional comparative method by refers to the context in which problems of society can be 
resolved and by what legal construction. It is often used on the assumption that the issues giving 
rise to the problems are likely to be the same everywhere and may be true in many cases in 
countries with similar historical and socio-economic experiences.74 In this context, the 
functional comparative methodology is justified on the grounds that solutions to the general 
corporate governance problems and the GFC in particular are largely similar in the US and the 
UK.75 Indeed, the US and UK may diverge in terms of the different legal constructions, 
historical experiences and the evolution of the corporate governance framework.76 That 
notwithstanding, their responses to the crisis seem similar or even identical. In this respect, it is 
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submitted that the functional methodology is a better approach as it is more interested in 
interrogating the ‘functional equivalence’ at the level of solutions.77 
The functional comparative method is characterised by four important elements. First, it is 
factual and relevant in the sense that it focuses on the effects and outcomes of events and not 
rules or doctrinal structures. Second, the functional comparative approach combines the factual 
approach with the theoretical framework that requires the objects to be understood in view of 
their factual relations to law and society in situations thought to be separable but related in other 
respects. Third, it provides the basis for comparison by serving as tertium comparationis. In 
other words, legal and non-legal institutions that differ doctrinally can be compared if they are 
functionally equivalent or fulfil similar functions. From the functionalist perspective, the 
outcome is what matters; as such the functional approach does not compare primary rules but 
focuses on offering solutions to practical problems.  In that respect, the object of comparing the 
responses in the US and UK is to investigate the underlying reasons for such responses to the 
GFC. 
The fourth critical element is that functional comparison serves an evaluative purpose and has 
become what Hoecake calls ‘better-law comparison’78 because it fulfils its functions much 
better than the others for two reasons. First, by looking at developments in other jurisdictions 
through comparison, the functional approach enables a reconstruction of a better appreciation 
of one’s own system. Second, it helps in the formulation and evaluation of concepts and their 
relationships with other disciplines. 
The functional comparative approach has been criticised on different grounds. A critique that 
has been influential within the functional comparison discourse is that each legal culture, 
regulatory regime or governance model is unique. According to Hecke, these are ‘culturally 
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contingent products’79 which can only be understood within the surrounding social context. 
Thus, the claim by advocates of functional comparison to understand the legal culture, 
regulatory tradition and governance model of another country or jurisdiction is difficult to 
validate.80 
Further, functional comparison has been strongly criticised for the lack of objectivity. It has 
been argued that in seeking to compare legal cultures, regulatory traditions or governance 
models, it is important to first reconstruct their socio-economic origins and the path along which 
they have evolved. The challenge however, is that more often, the researcher is unable to divest 
him/herself from his/her own framework of embedded conceptions and adopt an outward-
looking approach with a detached eye.81  In the end, it allows the researcher to superimpose 
his/her own values and perceptions on the issue being discussed and thus make it impossible to 
achieve complete objectivity. To minimise the loss of objectivity, it is suggested that 
researchers should as much as possible, detach themselves from their own preconceptions. 
Finally, the functional comparative method has been described as ‘a triple misnomer.’82 First, 
there is not just one functional method but many and second, not all allegedly functional 
methods are functional at all.83 Thirdly, some research projects that claim to adhere to the 
functional method cannot be said to be following any recognisable methods. Notwithstanding, 
these weaknesses, the functional comparative method remains relevant for the purposes of this 
research.  
Having identified the methodological approach, this section now explains how the material is 
to be gathered and analysed.  But before proceeding to analyse the material there is the need to 
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first, find and locate it. Thus, the thesis makes use of the relevant literature on corporate 
governance. This includes primary sources such as legislations, case law, policy documents, 
parliamentary and congressional documents. Furthermore, secondary sources, especially text 
books, journal articles, legal and academic commentary, working papers and press releases by 
government institutions and non-governmental organisation will be another important resource 
for the thesis. 
In addition to the above, the thesis will also make extensive use of online resources.  The 
challenge associated with the use of such material is the difficulty in ascertaining the reliability 
of such literature. This is an important limitation since not all the material published online can 
be verified or deemed reliable. In fact, some online material tends to lack credibility and 
authenticity, hence needs to be treated with caution. To overcome some of the challenges 
identified, the online source will be put under intense scrutiny and proper evaluation by looking 
at the currency of the source, author’s credentials and how the source aligns with the research 
question. 
In evaluating the materials to be included in this research, three parameters, namely, credibility, 
relevance and reliability will be applied. The relevance and credibility will be considered in 
respect of the author’s credentials in terms of expertise in the field of corporate governance, the 
quality of the material and date of publication. The date of publication is importance because 
corporate governance has been shaped and influenced by circumstances at certain specific 
periods in history and can thus, be likened to a moving target which changes and adapts to the 
changing circumstances. Hence, the time frame within which these changes occur, and the 
scholarly work produced can be better appreciated when situated within that specific period. 
As already noted, the approach is systematic, and the design will draw its material mainly from 
primary sources. Therefore, the analysis and evaluation of the existing literature will be 
structured along the following lines. 
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a) Identification and location of the relevant literature. 
b) Systematic gathering and collection of the literature. 
c)  Review and evaluation of the literature. 
d) Draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the analysis and evaluation. 
The review of the literature will be partly descriptive, analytical and partly prescriptive. The 
first part which is mainly descriptive explains and provides an overview of the concept of 
corporate governance, its evolution and theoretical underpinnings. The rationale and 
justification for adopting such an approach is that it facilitates a deeper understanding and better 
appreciation of the context in which corporate governance models have evolved and taken roots 
in certain jurisdictions. Similarly, the last section will be mainly prescriptive as it intends to 
make recommendations aimed at reforming corporate governance thinking, policy and practice. 
1.4 Jurisdiction 
The research will focus on two jurisdictions namely, the United States of America (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK) for good reasons. The first reason is that the epicentre of the current 
crisis lies deep in the developed economies of the US and to a lesser extent the UK.  Also, 
although the crisis originated in the US, it quickly spread to the UK and other countries and 
economies due to increasing technology, information flows and interdependence in terms of 
trade and finance.84 
Moreover, for historical reasons, the shareholder primacy theory was developed and used much 
more extensively in the US and in the UK than in other countries. In fact, the theoretical and 
methodological perspectives dealing with the historical roots of corporate governance and 
shareholder primacy have their origins in the US. The explanation is that corporate systems are 
closely linked to the legal and regulatory traditions, as such the corporate governance system 
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(i.e. shareholder primacy model) which evolved in the US and UK reflects a specific economic 
thinking, political history and legal tradition.85  Indeed, much of the theoretical basis of the 
shareholder primacy concept were developed here, and this concept has held sway in corporate 
governance thought for several decades. Hence, a fuller understanding of the present crisis 
requires an examination of what happened in these jurisdictions and their respective responses.  
1.5 Limitations 
This research is however, not without its limitations. It focuses exclusively on western 
economies namely US and UK while excluding emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (BRICS) all of which have become important players and 
powerful actors in the global economy. This exclusion can however, be justified because 
corporate governance practices in these countries to a very large extent follow the shareholder-
oriented Anglo-America model. This has been made possible through the influence of 
international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD. 
That notwithstanding, globalisation and the integration of countries into the global economy, 
coupled with the increased role of international investors make it imperative that corporate 
governance reforms in the developed west consider the likely impact and effects in other parts 
of the world. Against this backdrop, the thesis intends to make recommendations and proposals 
which go beyond these two jurisdictions and possibly, have universal application. While 
admitting that corporate governance is path-dependent, this thesis maintains that the 
institutional notions of transparency, accountability, effective supervision and the need for 
government intervention through regulation are equally applicable in both developed and 
developing economies.  
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Another limitation is the difficulty in accessing research material and relevant information. 
Although vast amount of literature exists in respect of corporate governance in general, this 
cannot be said of this research topic. The thesis addresses this limitation by focusing on major 
works undertaken by established writers, scholars and academics of corporate governance. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Admittedly, some studies have been done by writers mainly from economic and finance 
background, who have attempted to analyse the causes of the GFC from that perspective. It is, 
however, doubtful whether this approach addresses the fundamental problem of the shareholder 
primacy theory. The goal of this study therefore, is to contribute to the discourse and help bridge 
the existing knowledge gap in respect of the critical role of the shareholder primacy theory in 
the GFC. Accordingly, the research adopts a three-way methodological approach namely 
doctrinal, socio-legal and comparative. Apart from being both descriptive and prescriptive, the 
thesis is also comparative and analytical. At face value, the adoption of a multiple 
methodological approach seems to contradict conventional/orthodox research methodologies. 
But this approach reflects the multi-disciplinary character of corporate governance. 
 Moreover, and perhaps, more crucially, this approach helps provide answers to some of the 
important questions that this research seeks to interrogate. In that respect, the research makes a 
significant contribution by exploring new directions and locating the GFC within the 
shareholder primacy context. Thus, it provides an entirely new perspective to the corporate 
governance discourse regarding the causes of the GFC. In effect, a significant contribution of 
this research is the extent to which it renders obsolete the traditional belief in the shareholder 
primacy maxim and the need for a redefinition and reconceptualization of the corporate 
purpose. 
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises of seven chapters. Chapter one gives a broad overview of the GFC, 
examines its consequences and implications for the global economy. It argues that corporate 
governance failures merely acted as triggers and cannot be said to be the cause of the GFC. 
Chapter two evaluates the presumed causes of the GFC and contends that these alleged causes 
are, in fact, events that merely triggered the crisis. The chapter provides a chronology of the 
crisis, examines the causes and discusses the debate surrounding it. It recognises that other 
factors such as the subprime mortgage crisis, deregulation, lax risk management regimes and 
excessive incentives were important triggers of the crisis. That notwithstanding, the central 
argument of the thesis posits that the underlying cause of the GFC can be traced to the 
shareholder primacy theory and not corporate governance failures per se.  
Chapter three focuses on the theories of corporate governance with emphasis on the shareholder 
primacy theory. The chapter begins with a definition of the theory, its evolution and the 
historical circumstances that have influenced and shaped it. It situates the discussion within the 
context of the Berlet-Dodd debate regarding the role and purpose of the corporation in society. 
The discussion challenges some of the underlying assertions and assumptions of the theory and 
argues that the GFC has undermined the basic assumptions underpinning the theory. It refutes 
the arguments that shareholders ‘own’ the corporation as such the corporation should be run 
and managed for their benefits. It concludes that although the justification for the theory have 
been found to be flawed and therefore undermines the very foundation of its reasoning, the 
shareholder primacy theory continuous to hold sway as the dominant governance model. 
Chapter four traces the genesis of crisis in the US and interrogates the immediate and long-term 
responses initiated by the US authorities. Consequently, the thesis evaluates the major corporate 
governance reforms introduced following the crisis. These measures were mainly legislative 
and regulatory in nature, aimed at minimising and preventing future reoccurrence. As it is 
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practically impossible to assess and critique all the post-crisis corporate governance response 
in the US, the chapter limits itself to the most important and relevant legislative initiatives and 
regulatory changes. Therefore, the focus is on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act 2010, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009, the 
Emergency and Economic Stabilisation Act 2008 and the Economic Stimulus Act 2008. All 
these laws were passed with the purpose of reducing similar corporate failures to the barest 
minimum while strengthening corporate governance in that jurisdiction.   
Similarly, chapter five reviews and analyses how the crisis occurred in the UK and the 
government response. To put it in context, the thesis explores the evolution of the UK corporate 
governance and how the current model has been shaped and determined by that evolutionary 
process. 
In addition to massive government bailouts and the outright nationalisation of some financial 
institutions, the UK government initiated several legislative, regulatory and governance 
reforms. The Banking Act 2009, the Turner Review and the Walker Review are some of the 
major policy and regulatory reforms to be examined in the discussion. Admittedly, these 
measures have brought some improvements into corporate governance, but the main argument 
of the thesis is that the fundamental problem that led to the crisis has not been addressed. 
Apparently, the undue emphasis and indeed, the over-reliance on the shareholder-oriented 
conception of the corporation remains largely unchanged. It concludes that most of the reforms 
have been geared towards shareholder empowerment. 
Chapter six draws a comparison between the responses in the US and UK by examining the 
initial responses that were meant to slow down the GFC. The study also evaluates the regulatory 
and legislative measures that sought to provide long-term solutions to the crisis. Consequently, 
it argues that despite major differences, especially the fact that while the US adopts the rule-
based approach and the UK the principle-based approach, one thing common to both 
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jurisdictions relates to the unquestioned belief in and continuous adherence to the shareholder 
primacy theory. 
Chapter seven concludes that despite the numerous legislative and regulatory interventions, the 
reforms have remained largely cosmetic. This arises from the narrow understanding and 
appreciation of corporate governance as conceived and defined by the shareholder primacy 
theory.86 Effectively, the governance model which subsequently evolved made management 
more responsive to shareholder interest and demands with serious ramifications. The outcomes 
of the increasing shareholder pressure on management were twofold.  First, it led to substantial 
decline of CEO tenure and created a situation where managers were no longer considered as 
skilled professionals but simply as agents for shareholder value maximisation. 
Second, the governance model it produced confronted corporate managers with far more 
complex governance issues and challenges. These challenges include: performance-based 
rewards, pressure to meet targets, the expectation by owners to boost the market value of firms 
and de-diversification of industrial conglomerates. Consequently, the drive to meet the varying 
demands, expectations and pressures inevitably led to a pervasive risk culture as well as flawed 
risk perception. Indeed, this flawed risk perception and the attendant corporate governance 
model which subsequently emerged is what fomented the recent global financial global 
financial crisis. This final chapter makes recommendations by advocating an alternative 
corporate governance that takes a long-term view of the corporation, emphasises a more 
stringent regulatory approach and suggests further direction for future research. 
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                                                             CHAPTER 2  
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
2. 1 Introduction 
The GFC which began to unfold in the US financial markets and quickly spread throughout 
the global economy remains the worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.87 
Following the crisis, the entire global economy experienced the worst financial turmoil since 
the past eighty years.88  The UK Turner Review Committee set up to review the causes of the 
crisis and make recommendations, characterised it as ‘the greatest crisis in finance 
capitalism’.89 The crisis exposes the inherent dangers of unregulated markets, undermines the 
reasoning behind the shareholder primacy theory and more importantly, reveals the abysmal 
failure of corporate governance model it created.90  
Obviously, when financial crises occur in concentrated outbursts and within short time frames, 
they raise serious questions and concerns.91  Thus, the GFC has generated concerns about the 
corporate governance systems, their theoretical underpinnings, the policy measures, legislative 
and regulatory responses that have been initiated to minimise such crises.92  The aftermath of 
the crises witnessed the introduction of several legislative, regulatory and policy measures 
across the globe all in an attempt to redesign corporate governance and make it more responsive 
to future crisis.93  Rightly or wrongly, sections of the general public and some experts recognise 
and indeed, identify corporate governance failures as the principal cause of the recent GFC.94 
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This thesis, however, argues that corporate governance failures alone cannot be the cause of the 
GFC. Rather the crisis is the result of a corporate governance model based on shareholder 
primacy in which corporate managers focused exclusively on maximising shareholder value 
and thus became accountable to the markets. Corporate governance failures are not new and 
this is not the first time these failures have been recognised as important contributory causes to 
the institutional malaise that have come to be associated with the recent GFC.95 Available 
records indicate that the world had witnessed 139 financial crises between 1973 and 1997, 95 
of which occurred in emerging economies.96  Corporate governance failures have therefore, 
been blamed for previous financial crisis at both the regional and at the level of individual 
institutions.97 In the US there was the S & L failure in 1989 and the WorldCom and Enron 
collapse at the beginning of the decade during which billions of dollars were lost.98 
It is now widely acknowledged that ineffective corporate governance was responsible for the 
Japanese Banking crisis of the late 1990s.99 Kanaya and Woo confirm this proposition and 
blame weak corporate governance100 as the main factor that had impeded Japan’s speedy 
economic recovery for nearly a decade.101 They argue that apart from consistently misallocating 
capital and mismanaging risk, weak corporate governance also distorts information and actually 
leads to inefficiency.102 Similarly, the Asian crisis of 1997-1999 which originated from 
Singapore and later spread to Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, was also blamed on 
corporate governance failures. Important among these failures are lack of transparency and poor 
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quality information resulting in markets having an inaccurate and distorted view of the true 
state of affairs.103 The challenges that the current crisis poses are almost similar to what 
transpired during the Japanese and the Asian crisis.104 Despite some similarities, it should be 
stressed, however, that the current GFC is far greater and definitely more complex than previous 
ones in terms of its severity and the global character of the consequences.105 
Incidentally, the GFC originated in the US, the epicentre of capitalism and home to some of the 
most advanced corporate law and governance regimes. Clearly, the frequency of financial crisis 
in both emerging economies and a well-developed economy such as the US leads critics to 
contend that the underlying conditions giving rise to the past and current crises have not being 
addressed but have at best been deferred and at worst gone unchecked.106  
While acknowledging that certain questionable board practices, defective risk management 
systems, and excessive remuneration policies encourage short-termism, this research contends 
that the causes of the crisis go much deeper than the above-mentioned factors. It argues that the 
problem arises from the wholesale acceptance and unquestioning belief in the shareholder 
primacy principle which views profit maximisation as the primary driving force of 
corporations.107 As already indicated, the underlying reasoning considers shareholders as 
having an entitlement that the corporation be run and managed for their sole and exclusive 
benefit.108  It is now widely recognised, however, that corporations are independent and distinct 
legal entities that own property by themselves. Their relations vis-à-vis the company is 
contractual which confers rights and obligations on both parties. As such the shareholders hold 
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no rights over the tangible or intangible assets of the company.109 Moreover, in line with the 
‘nexus of contract’110 theory, participants in a corporate venture own their respective inputs and 
‘no single party owns the totality’.111  Indeed, once invested, the money becomes the property 
of the company.112  At best shareholders can only claim ownership over their shares in the sense 
that the exercise of this ownership right is limited to the use, benefit and disposal of such 
shares.113  Consequently, the concept of shareholders as legal owners of the company has come 
under serious challenge and possible displacement. 
According to Blair, the right of ownership consists of the right to possess, use, dispose of, 
exclude others, manage and control.114  The corporate concept divides these rights into bundles 
giving the shareholder limited rights under very limited circumstances. In practice, however, 
the right to possess, use, manage and control is exercised by the managers of the corporation.115 
That notwithstanding, the concept of shareholder ownership continues to remain the ‘central 
doctrinal explanation’116 for shareholder supremacy.  
This research, however, argues that this underlying theory and its mistaken assumption which 
views shareholders as owners having an entitlement and in whose interests the company should 
be operated, accounts for the GFC. Against this background, the research posits that the 
2007/2008 GFC is the ‘natural’ and logical outcome of a corporate governance system that has 
compelled corporate managers to be accountable to the markets and shareholders.117  As Stout 
                                                          
109 Christophe Clerc, ‘Questioning the Legitimacy of Shareholder Power’ in Jean-Phillippe Touffut (ed), Does 
Company Ownership Matter? (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 94. 
110 This is idea that the firm is a series of implicit and explicit contractual relationship among various individual 
managers, shareholders, employers and creditors. This was first propounded by Jansen and Meckling. 
111 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 (4) Journal of Financial Economics 305, 324. 
112 ibid 
113 ibid 
114 Margaret M. Blair ‘Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty- First Century’ 
in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 175. 
115 Stout (n 29) 37. 
116 ibid 
117 John C. Coffee Jr, ‘What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s’ in Thomas 
Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 333. 
Chapter 2 
32 
 
explains, the ‘mantra’ that compels directors to maximise shareholder value often leads to 
reckless and excessive risk-taking which not only harms the corporation but the public as well 
as investors.118 Similarly, Key suggests that managerial short-termism with its emphasis on 
stock prices and quarterly earnings are the inevitable outcome of the desire to meet shareholder 
expectations and demands.119 Other academics including Dogman argue that a corporate 
governance system that mistakenly characterise shareholders as owners and thus encouraging 
excessive risk-taking is unsustainable in the long-term and constitutes a danger to itself and 
society at large.120 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it describes the events that occurred before and during 
the crisis. The purpose is to recount the chronology of the events as they unfolded with the view 
to demonstrating how these events are interlinked. Secondly, it explores not just how corporate 
governance failed in averting the crisis, but why it failed in the first place.121  In so doing, the 
chapter focuses on both the remote and immediate causes of the crisis because present events 
can be better appreciated by examining what had already transpired. Therefore, it is important 
to revisit the debate that has been generated among academics, corporate governance scholars, 
practitioners, policy makers and the public regarding the underlying causes of the GFC.122 
2.2 The Debate 
For over three decades corporate governance issues have attracted a lot of media attention. A 
topic once considered arcane and very technical had suddenly attained critical importance and 
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attention across the world.123  Corporate fraud, corporate failures, abuse of managerial power 
and excessive remunerations became topical in media reports, public forums, academic debates, 
governmental policy and regulatory agendas.124  Financial scandals involving major firms such 
as Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, Royal Arnold and Pamela led to loss of confidence 
and millions of Dollars.125  Arguably, many of the corporate governance issues would not have 
gained much prominence and exposure but for the GFC of 2007/2008.126 As a result, many 
scholars, policy analysts and practitioners have linked the nature and severity of the current 
GFC to corporate governance failures, be they systemic, functional or technical.127 
Thus, the question whether and to what extent corporate governance failure played a part 
remains a subject of continuous debate. The causes of the GFC are rather complex involving 
several actors and different factors including institutional, regulatory and policy failures that 
shape and inform the corporate governance system.  Basically, there are three different views 
regarding the role and contribution of corporate governance failures to the GFC.128 These are; 
the unlikely relations hypothesis, ineffective implementation hypothesis and the systemic 
failures hypothesis. 
2.2.1   Unlikely relations hypothesis 
The first view as advocated by Adams, a finance and corporate governance expert at the School 
of Business, University of South Wales, is that the GFC was unrelated to or at best had very 
little connection with corporate governance.129  She argues that since the early 1970s, corporate 
governance in the US and other developed economies have witnessed remarkable 
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improvements in all aspects.130 These improvements, according to Adams, are evidenced in the 
introduction of independent directors, separation of the positions of board chairmen and CEOs, 
the establishment of independent audit and risk committees, incentive-driven executive pay to 
deliver value for shareholders and the protection of shareholder rights.131 All these measures, 
she argues, were introduced to ensure effective monitoring and instil discipline into corporate 
management.132  
This school of thought further contends that many countries across the globe have since the 
1990s adopted corporate governance codes, principles and guidelines provided by international 
Organisations such as the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF133As a result, these multilateral 
organisations have in various ways shaped and channelled corporate behaviour towards greater 
accountability and responsibility.134  Furthermore, research carried out by Adams reveals that 
171 governance codes and principles have either been introduced or updated in the years 
between 1993 and 2010 by 195 countries world-wide.135 According to Adams, the significance 
of the findings is that more countries instituted or adopted corporate governance reforms in 
2002 than the preceding ten (10) years.136 
Admittedly, these developments were not isolated events but prompted by the corporate 
scandals involving Enron137, WorldCom and One-Tel138 among others. Therefore, the reforms 
constitute a recognition of the defects in the current corporate governance model and the need 
for reform. Moreover, the fact that many countries have embarked on these reforms indicates 
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and indeed, confirms that the corporate governance regime at the time was fraught with 
difficulties. But Adams insists that corporate governance standards were very high in the US 
just prior to the 2007/2008 GFC. According to her, the fact that the US was viewed as having 
a robust corporate governance regime explains why many people could not predict the crisis.139 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002140 is cited as having strengthened corporate governance by 
making best practices such as board independence, transparent and independent audit 
procedures mandatory. For example, the new listing rules require a company listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE)141 to have majority independent directors, a three-member 
independent audit committee which must include one financial expert,142 independent 
nominating committee (corporate governance) and compensation committee.143 From this 
perspective, Adams concludes that corporate governance both in the US and across the globe 
has significantly improved since the 2002 crisis. In view of that, the causes of the financial 
crisis, she argues, could not be attributed to corporate governance failures.144  
Similarly, Shinn posits, that the financial crisis is not a story of ‘wholesale corporate governance 
failure’,145 but a challenge limited to a small number of listed firms in the financial sector.146  
He suggests that corporate governance in listed firms in most developed countries has been 
improving over the last decade and this improvement continued right through the crisis of 
2007/2008 albeit with some divergence between developed and emerging economies.147  A 
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notable proponent of this view is Christopher Cox, the then Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) who while speaking to the US Congress notes that ‘We have 
come a long way since 2002. Investor confidence has recovered. There is greater corporate 
accountability. Financial reporting is more reliable and transparent. Auditor oversight has 
significantly improved’.148 
Mukwiri and Siems share this view and explain that corporate governance failures cannot be 
blamed for the GFC arguing that the causes seem to lie in risk management which according 
to them is a ‘question of judgement for the directors’.149 They insist that the divergent views 
illustrate the challenges involved in blaming corporate governance for the GFC.150 According 
to them, a possible explanation is that the relevant causes of the crisis are closely linked and 
dependent of each other. It is therefore, difficult, they argue, to single out deficiencies in 
corporate governance as the cause of the GFC adding ‘the 2008 financial crisis was not a 
verdict on corporate governance’.151 
 It can be counter argued, that risk management is a governance issue and that the failure to 
identify, evaluate and monitor and properly manage the risk is in fact a serious corporate 
governance failure. Moreover, risk management is a vital function that cannot be separated 
from corporate governance and any attempt to suggest otherwise undermines the very 
foundation and essence of corporate governance.152  
Cheffins agrees with the proposition that public corporations were in general satisfactorily 
governed both before and during the crisis.153 According to him, no significant correlation 
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exists between corporate governance and the GFC that erupted in 20007/2008.154  Based on an 
empirical study of thirty seven firms taken from the S & P 500 Index in 2008, Cheffins 
concludes that the sharp decline of the stock markets in 2008 was not necessarily related to 
corporate performance.155  In his view, governance in those firms functioned ‘tolerably’ well 
and did not cause the crisis as being suggested. He insists that in contrast with the corporate 
scandals that occurred in the early part of 2000s, even companies that were over stressed in 
2008 remained largely solvent indicating the resilience of the governance regime.156 While 
admitting that mistakes were made by some key corporate governance players in 2008, 
Cheffins contends that the overall corporate governance arrangements in place were able to 
respond well to the challenges posed157 and wonders whether a different corporate governance 
regime would have reacted differently to the GFC. He therefore, criticised any attempt to link 
the GFC with corporate governance as lacking in sufficient precision to establish any possible 
linkages between corporate governance, risk- taking and the GFC.158 
Convincing as these arguments may appear, they are based on a faulty proposition that cannot 
stand the test of scrutiny for two reasons. First, if indeed, corporate governance functioned 
‘tolerably well’ as Cheffins claims, the question that remains unanswered is why the system 
failed to contain or prevent the crisis from happening? Indeed, in the face of the numerous 
corporate failures that occurred during the period under consideration, it will be misleading to 
suggest that corporate governance worked well. A closer look at the corporate scandals 
involving Enron, WorldCom, Pamalat, Maxwell Communications, Polly Peck and One-Tel 
reveals that the corporate governance system was defective. Arguably, these reforms are a 
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recognition and a tacit admission of the weaknesses and failures of the prevailing corporate 
governance model. 
Second, the issue is not whether countries and companies have adopted these codes and 
principles; rather it is the effective implementation and enforcement that is important and 
indeed, makes the difference. The OECD draws a similar conclusion as the next section 
demonstrates. This thesis recognises the severe lapses in corporate governance preceding the 
GFC and acknowledges that such lapses played a role. It argues, however, that at the centre of 
the GFC is the wholesale acceptance of the shareholder primacy theory and its focus on short-
termism which led to a corporate governance system that made the crisis impossible to avoid 
and the consequences difficult to mitigate.159  
Also, the methodology and the sample size used in the research have been questioned. While 
not discounting these findings, it is important to note that a study sample of thirty-seven firms 
from S & P 500 Index to conduct research cannot be a fair and accurate representation of firm 
behaviour across the US. Apart from the sample being too narrow and unrepresentative, the 
research focuses on a particular type of corporate governance model that emphasises 
shareholder primacy, deregulation, market efficiency and a rigid adherence to an outdated 
conception of ownership rights that bears little resemblance to the reality.160 The corporate 
governance model that formed the focus of the study emerged from a specific legal and 
political traditions constructed by certain beliefs, values, ideological and social conventions.161 
It reaffirms a neoliberal economic thinking and represents ‘an ideological legitimation 
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underlying the American world view that has dominated corporate governance discourse and 
practice for the past three decades’.162   
2.2.2 Ineffective implementation hypothesis  
The second proposition in the debate is that the GFC is not caused by corporate governance 
failures per se. Instead, the crisis is closely associated with insufficient implementation of 
corporate governance codes and principles both at the national and international level.163 A 
leading proponent of this school of thought is the OECD, which argues that there is nothing 
wrong with the current corporate governance framework. In its report of 29 June 20009 the 
OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance identifies four major weaknesses in 
corporate governance which, the organisation insists, contributed to the GFC.164  These 
weaknesses include: excessive executive compensation schemes, ineffective risk management, 
board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights.165  It asserts that the various principles 
of corporate governance as agreed among most OECD countries prior to the crisis had 
adequately addressed these governance issues and concerns.166 It concludes that ‘the major 
failures among policy makers in corporations appear to be the lack of implementation of the 
principles’.167 According to the OECD, the key issue is the lack of effective implementation 
of the existing corporate governance arrangements, codes and principles.168 
Several reasons explain this lack of effective implementation. First, the existing codes and 
principles are much too broad in scope and lack precision.169  Consequently, corporations have 
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been allowed too much scope for interpretation and sometimes misinterpretation as well. 
Moreover, some of the principles and codes have proved very complex and difficult to 
implement; as such they have become mere formalities/box-ticking exercise leaving no room 
for qualitative assessment.170 Another issue is the apparent lack of clarity in terms of the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities which often makes it difficult to determine who is 
responsible for implementing these codes and principles. It raises the question whether the 
corporations themselves should ensure implementation or an independent regulatory body 
should be assigned that responsibility.  
The problem of implementation is further complicated by the non-binding nature of the 
principles and codes. Indeed, because these principles are not legally binding, corporations 
often ignore them without any consequences. This explains why the implementation of such 
corporate governance codes and principles has remained largely ineffective and in some 
respects defective.171  
The OECD is, however, sceptical of the use and effectiveness of legislation and regulation to 
implement corporate governance principles, preferring instead voluntary codes which it 
argues, would be more effective in terms of implementation and have better outcomes. The 
OECD therefore recommends more efficient implementation and enforcement mechanism but 
opposes any substantial revision of the current governance regime.172  
 Examples of these voluntary corporate governance codes include the OECD Principles173 of 
corporate governance 1999 and 2004 which were subsequently reviewed in 2010 and 2013, 
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the Basel Committee Guidelines174 relating to enhanced governance of banks issued in 1999 
and later revised in 2006. Obviously, the advantages of voluntary codes and principles cannot 
be denied but the reality is that the self-regulatory governance regime (codes and principles) 
that characterised the corporate governance system before and during the crisis was found 
wanting when the crisis struck. The system proved to be inadequate and ill-prepared to meet 
the challenges and complexities of the modern corporation.175  
Moreover, an effective corporate governance system depends on the corporation’s 
commitment to maintaining the needed governance standards and values as part of the 
corporate culture.176  On that basis, it is unrealistic to rely on state intervention alone to monitor 
complex corporations and the market.177 It should be pointed out that although the US had 
some of the most comprehensive rules and regulations governing the conduct of corporations, 
a highly developed legal system, an advanced corporate governance framework and a 
sophisticated corporate culture, these alone were not enough to prevent or avert the GFC. Thus, 
it is submitted that effective and enforceable regulatory regime, a strengthened legal system 
combined with a focus on disclosure and transparency become inevitable.178 But these 
measures alone are not enough to resolve future crisis without adopting a long-term approach 
and redefining the role of the corporation in society regarding whose ‘interest is to be 
recognised as the object of corporate activity’.179  
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 In the UK, similar claims were made to the effect that there were no major problems with 
corporate governance codes prior to the crisis.180  Like the OECD, the FRC concedes that the 
main challenge is with the implementation of the already-existing codes and principles.181  The 
UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010, formerly called the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance which has undergone several revisions is cited as example of the constant 
evolution of corporate governance codes and principles.182  These codes are characterised by 
a self-regulatory regime with minimal government involvement and strict adherence to the 
principle of comply or complain.183 Under this model, codes of corporate governance 
principles or good practice are what determine board responsibilities and not the rule of law.184 
Companies are therefore, required to either comply with the codes and principles or provide 
reasons for non-compliance. The outcome is that self-regulation becomes the guiding principle 
and compliance remains voluntary.185  The voluntary nature of compliance coupled with the 
absence of effective controls, arising from the lax regulatory regime was a significant factor 
in the build up to the GFC.186  According to Chambers, the self-regulatory regime in the UK 
was not sufficient to stop the collapse of Northern Rock when the crisis occurred.187  Despite 
these obvious shortcomings, proponents of self-regulation and their unwavering attachment to 
the efficient market hypothesis continue to hold onto the deeply entrenched belief in the 
inherent superiority of self-regulation. As noted in chapter 1, this system was idolised and 
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promoted as the ideal model to which other countries could aspire.188  Proponents argue that, 
the UK system provides more flexibility than what pertains in rule-based jurisdictions such as 
the US.189  Dallas affirms this position by pointing out that reliance on rules and regulations is 
fraught with danger and could be counter-productive in terms of good corporate governance.190 
From this perspective supporters of the UK model continue to insist that the cause of the GFC 
is not about the corporate governance model itself but linked to the defective implementation 
and lack of enforcement of  the existing governance codes and principles. 
Admittedly, corporate governance reforms in both developed and developing countries have 
witnessed significant improvements and generated some fruitful outcomes in the form 
independent boards, shareholder rights, independent audit committees and appointment 
committees among others. The fact, however, still remains that the GFC still occurred 
notwithstanding these developments. This can be explained by the over-reliance on a corporate 
governance model that is largely driven by profit maximisation for shareholders and short-
termism. The model not only failed to prevent the crisis, it encouraged and permitted the 
creation and taking of excessive risk for short-term profit maximisation.191  Invariably, the 
GFC is a product of a corporate governance system that compelled corporate managers to 
focus on maximising shareholder value to the detriment of other stakeholders. 
2.2.3 Systemic failure hypothesis 
The third position in the debate and probably the most popular is that the GFC was caused by 
systemic failure of corporate governance. Perhaps, few people would disagree with the 
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OECD’s identification of some aspects of corporate governance failures. The consensus 
among many critics is that the failure of corporate governance during the GFC may not be 
purely an issue of implementation but it is more of a fundamental systemic failure of 
institutional arrangements. These arrangements are underpinned by increasingly popular but 
mistaken assumptions that shareholders ‘own’ the corporation hence it should be run for their 
benefit.192 This approach, according to Keay, leads to short-termism arising from shareholder-
pressure and the emphasis on quarterly earnings.193 These represent an abysmal failure of the 
broad governance movement underpinned by market fundamentalism that gained momentum 
at the beginning of the decade.194  Indeed, it is a collective failure by the invisible hand of the 
market and the visible hand of management made possible by shareholder value thinking that 
account for the crisis.195 Clearly, the reliance on the shareholder primacy theory and its 
propositions- profit maximisation, efficiency of the markets and short-termism have all proved 
to be faulty and misplaced.196 
 The crisis, is undoubtedly, a creature of human failure, hence it is only rational that the role 
of corporate managers and their perception of the corporate purpose takes centre stage in the 
discourse.197  It would, however, be unfair to blame management alone for the crisis because 
management itself was ‘hijacked’ by ideology. As caulking rightly points out ‘the corporate 
governance framework since the 1980s has largely been shaped by “Reaganomics”; a version 
of market fundamentalism that has been influenced by neoclassical economics’.198 
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Corporate governance models and practices are path-dependent and reflect the social, legal, 
political, economic and ideological milieu in which they exist. Indeed, the present Anglo-
American corporate governance model is a product of specific political, economic and 
ideological forces that swept through the UK and the US in the late 1980s. For example, the 
continuous dominance of the shareholder primacy theory can be explained in the context of 
specific economy thinking and ideological position fuelled by the struggle to define the 
corporate purpose. Within that context Gourevitch and Shinn argue that: 
[T]he choice of corporate governance practices in any country expresses the interaction of economic 
preferences and political institutions. Corporate governance arises from incentives created by rules and 
regulations that emerge from a public policy process, reflecting the power of alternative political 
coalitions.199 
Contrary to the common narrative, the GFC reflects an unsustainable global economic 
imbalance and an indictment of a corporate governance model that produced and maintained 
policies which encourage corporate managers and financial markets to engage in excessive 
risks-taking for short-term purposes. Driving the often unnecessary but excessive risk-taking is 
the desire to maximise shareholder profits as espoused by the shareholder primacy theory. This 
model is in turn, premised on an ideological legitimation arising from the prudential, functional 
and moral claim hypothesis as earlier mentioned.  
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) agrees with this proposition and   
attributes the recent crisis to the weaknesses in the edifice of corporate governance model that 
has been constructed and propagated by the private sector in recent times200. This market-driven 
agenda allowed the control of corporate governance to be done through private ordering instead 
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of public ordering.201 The model altered the incentive system and thus, enabled shareholders to 
influence and change regulations of corporate governance through the political process.202  
Similarly, the International Corporate Governance Network reports that poor corporate 
governance has been a significant cause of the GFC.203 According to ICGN, poor supervision, 
lack of accountability and transparency, ineffective risk management system and a general 
systemic weakness, account for an otherwise avoidable crisis. Clearly, the current crisis raises 
questions about the accountability and responsiveness of the current corporate governance 
regime. This, coupled with the large public demand for reforms following the GFC provides an 
opportunity for a redefinition and reconceptualization of the role and purpose of the corporation 
and the current governance arrangements.204 
Following the GFC, many financial institutions have either collapsed or have been bailed out 
by governments worldwide.205 Observers including Erkens et al. are convinced that the root 
cause of the GFC lies in the breakdown of prudent corporate governance practice as evidenced 
by excessive managerial incentives, ineffective board oversight and insufficient risk- 
management practices among others.206  
An already explained, fallings in corporate governance have been faulted for exacerbating the 
GFC. But these failings are the symptoms and indeed, the inevitable outcomes of the wrong 
perceptions and definition of the role and purpose of the corporation. For nearly three decades 
corporate purpose has been defined exclusively by the shareholder interests (shareholder 
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primacy) while ignoring the equally important interests of other corporate constituents.207  The 
crisis not only challenges these assumptions but more fundamentally, demonstrates that the 
unitary vision of corporate purpose founded on shareholder primacy is faulty in law and in 
fact.208  It is, thus, submitted that at the heart of the GFC lies the narrow definition of the role 
and purpose of the corporation with its emphases on the shareholder-oriented governance model 
which puts profit maximisation beyond any other interests.209 
After examining the various strands of the debate regarding the role and contribution of 
corporate governance failures to the GFC, it becomes obvious that, corporate governance 
failures may have triggered the crisis, but the primary cause is the overreliance on the 
shareholder primacy theory and short-termism. Apparently, the underlying assumptions and 
assertions have proved misplaced and must be replaced by an emerging model that takes a long-
term view of the corporation.210  
The next section examines the triggers and their cumulative effect on the financial crisis. But 
before proceeding, it is important to provide a brief chronology of the crisis with the view to 
answering some of the questions relating to what and how it happened and thus, help organise 
the discussion.211  More importantly, this will help contextualise the crisis and enhance a deeper 
understanding. After all, the purpose of this study is not just about how corporate governance 
failed in preventing the financial crisis, but crucially why it failed.212 
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2.3 Chronology of the Crisis 
The crisis originated from the US mortgage problems starting in 2007. It was triggered by the 
bursting of the housing bubble and became both a real estate and financial crisis marked by a 
sharp rise in mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures and a decline in the market values of 
subprime mortgage-backed securities.213 This was followed by a drop in the capital and liquidity 
of banks and other financial institutions which led to a tightening of credit in the US.214 The 
domino effect was a dramatic fall in the US and European housing market, the collapse of 
several large banks, financial institutions, financial markets and the global stock market.215 
2.3.1 United States of America 
The crisis in the US was hastened by government refusal to bailout Lehman Brothers. As a 
result, credit markets in the US and across the world seized up, and eventually accelerating the 
growing slump in the world economy.216 The failure/refusal by the US government to bailout 
Lehman Brothers has become a contentious issue and will remain so for a long time to come. 
Understandably, no issue has aroused more passion than the bailouts for financial institutions 
during the recent GFC. The standard argument for bailouts has been one of necessity and fear.217 
The justification is that some of these financial institutions and intermediaries are so critical to 
the economy that it would not be politically and economically prudent to let them fail.218  These 
are the so called ‘too big to fail’ institutions which governments and regulators alike deem too 
critical due their size, interconnectedness and relevance to the economy.219 Consequently, 
providing bailouts for such institutions becomes an economic necessity and socio-political 
imperative. 
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Opponents of government bailouts argue to the contrary that, the reasoning driving the policy 
is flawed because it sends the wrong signal that government would always come to the rescue 
in times of failure.  Critics maintain that bailouts are not the right mechanism for promoting 
and sustaining the safety and soundness of the financial system because bailouts tend to 
contradict and undermine the very foundation of the efficient market hypothesis and its self-
correcting mechanism.220 
Notwithstanding the merits or demerits of bailouts, the US government refused to rescue 
Lehman Brothers whose collapse was not entirely its making but had been one of the many 
intermediaries in a rather complex web of transactions which the system failed to correct or 
regulate.221 Under the circumstances, Lehman Brothers was compelled to file for chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection, making it the largest bankruptcy filling in US history.222  
 Realising that failure to rescue Lehman Brothers was major policy mistake with severe 
consequences, the US authorities decided to rescue the American Insurance Group (AIG) to 
prevent it from imminent collapse.223  Indeed, the government could hardly afford to allow AIG 
to join the league of failed American companies because of its strategic importance in the global 
insurance market for credit default swaps (CDS).224  
As credit dried up around the world, the credit default swaps still had to be paid out but without 
sufficient money to meet these immediate debt obligations would have made a bad situation 
even worse.225  This is what necessitated the Treasury Department’s intervention to save AIG. 
But critics argue that the intervention had proved to be too little too late to prevent the string of 
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corporate failures witnessed in UK, Germany and other parts of the world.226 This contagion 
effect can be explained by the process of globalisation, cross-border lending and the integration 
of capital markets that began in the 1980s.227 
The crisis also hit America’s biggest stockbroker Merrill Lynch compelling it into a takeover 
arrangement with Bank of America, the country’s second largest commercial bank.228 
Similarly, Wachovia, the fourth largest bank had to be rescued by Wells Fargo. Moreover, City 
Group, the world’s largest bank had to be propped up with tax payer’s money, effectively 
turning the American tax payer into ‘the proud owner of the largest bankrupt financial 
institution’.229 
After the failure of Lehman Brothers, its immediate rivals Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
turned themselves into commercial banks and thus, became subject to a myriad of new 
regulations in exchange for the right to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve just to stay 
solvent.  These new regulatory requirements are akin to what obtained under the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933230 which separated commercial banking from investment banking.231 
Paradoxically, the repeal of this Act in 1999 and its subsequent replacement with the Gramm-
Leach Bliley Act of 1999232  paved the way for investment banking, commercial banking and 
insurance business to be undertaken by a single institution. These changes reveal a new reality 
that the model of investment banking that had dominated capital markets on Wall Street, 
including mergers and acquisitions as well as stock and bond trading had come to an end.233  
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 As tension continued to mount in the US financial sector, the Fed had to broker a deal allowing 
the investment bank JP Morgan to acquire its troubled-rival Bear Stearns with a $138 Billion 
Federal Reserve-backed facility.234 Following the crisis, several commercial banks in the US 
and other parts of the world had to be nationalised by governments of all persuasions in direct 
contravention of the efficient market hypothesis. 
2.3.2 United Kingdom 
Financial institutions in the UK have suffered from the GFC although the extent to which they 
have been affected differs widely.235 The first indication of an impending financial crisis began 
to emerge in 2007 with an increase in the US subprime mortgage defaults and the rising cost of 
insuring these securities against default.236  
The initial stage of the GFC in the UK claimed its first high profile victim when government 
was forced to nationalise the mortgage lender Northern Rock after the banks had lost confidence 
in its ability to repay its loans.237 Northern Rock, which had relied heavily on wholesale money 
markets as its source of finance was confronted with serious liquidity problems following the 
crisis. Subsequently, it was compelled to apply to the BoE for emergency support on September 
13 2007.238  Government responded with a £10 billion package to stabilise Northern Rock and 
to restore shareholder confidence in the financial institutions.239 The measure was, however, 
not enough to reduce the massive withdrawals amounting to £ 1 Billion within a three-day 
period by panic-stricken depositors who seem to have lost confidence in Northern Rock.240  The 
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UK government then announced a full guarantee of depositors’ savings by revoking an earlier 
provision under which only 90 percent of deposits between £ 2,000 and £35,000 was 
guaranteed. Under the new regime, the UK had effectively lifted the ceiling on the deposit 
guarantee scheme from £35,000 to £50,000.241 This move came under serious criticism 
especially from the banking community who saw the measure as too little because it felt short 
of the guarantees on deposits recently announced in Germany and Ireland.242  By February 2008 
the UK had exhausted all attempts at finding private sector investors to buy the embattled 
Northern Rock. Thus, the government was left with no option than to embark on a full-scale 
nationalisation as the last resort. 
The underlying causes of the failure of Northern Rock, Goddard et al. argue, include the rather 
over-aggressive growth in mortgage lending, over-dependence on short-term wholesale funding 
and an ineffective risk management regime.243 From this perspective, it is submitted that 
regulatory failure was a significant factor in the downfall of Northern Rock.244  This was 
confirmed in the House of Commons Treasury Committee Report which notes that the FAS 
systematically failed in its regulatory duties to ensure that Northern Rock does not pose a 
systemic risk.245 The failure of Northern Rock was historic as it represents the first run on a UK 
bank since 1886 and raises questions about the principles-based, self-regulatory and 
shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance in the UK.246 
Northern Rock was not the only casualty of the GFC; the UK government was also forced to 
nationalise the mortgage division of Bradford and Bingley in September 2008. Under the 
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Banking Supervision Act247 of 1987, the retail branch was transferred to Abbey National while 
the remaining business came under public ownership.248 The fall of Bradford & Bingley, 
according the House of Commons Treasury Committee, stems from its business model which 
focused on self-certified mortgages and rapid expansion.249 Speaking before the Treasury 
Committee, Mr Pym, CEO of Bradford and Bingley admits ‘there is no denying that a mortgage 
bank with a large element of self-certified mortgages and a buy to-let book is not going to be 
an attractive asset in these markets.’250  
Similarly, the Royal Bank of Scotland, once a proud financial institution with a track record in 
prudential banking had to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money.251 A £20 billion capital raising 
programme in October 2008 failed to materialise as the terms of the share offer proved 
unattractive to shareholders and potential investors.252 This compelled government to inject £20 
billion into RBS and acquired majority stake in the bank albeit reluctantly.253 Sir Fred Godwin, 
former CEO of RBS admits that the bank’s failure was because it was over-optimistic about the 
economic situation while ignoring warnings from the BoE and the FSA. Another important 
issue that accounts for RBS’s failure is risk management policy particularly, in terms of risk 
control, the size, concentration, types and quantum of risk.254 
Testifying before the House of Common Treasury Committee, the CEO of RBS revealed that   
risk controls were inadequate and incorrectly designed.255 According to him, ‘there was an issue 
not about risk recognition but about how the risk was calibrated. The risk was recognised but 
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in the risk systems, it was quantified as being very small’.256  The demise of RBS was expedited 
by the acquisition of ABN AMRO and failure to recognise the scale of its indebtedness. 
According to the House of Commons Treasury Committee, RBS management failed to carry 
out due diligence on the transaction but chose to rely on very reassuring statements from ABN 
AMRO. Sir Godwin described the acquisition of ABN AMRO as a glaring miss-step and admits 
that the £ 10 Billion spent on ABN AMRO was ‘the wrong price, the wrong way to pay, at the 
wrong time and the wrong deal’.257 Incidentally, this complex and expensive acquisition had 
the unanimous approval and support of both the directors and shareholders of RBS.258 Against 
this backdrop the question that remains unanswered is whether the shareholders and directors 
were given full and accurate information regarding the financial position of ABN AMRO to 
enable them make informed decisions in respect of the acquisition. Alternatively, did the board 
of directors and shareholder allow short-term profit maximisation to over shadow their sense 
of judgement and best corporate governance practices? This is not surprising because 
shareholders of public companies are often more interested in short-term gains rather than long-
term sustainability of such firms.259 From this perspective the desire to maximise short-term 
profits as advocated by shareholder thinking was arguably what led to the GFC as the ABN 
AMRO case demonstrates.260 
Just as the UK government was announcing plans to provide protection to deal with toxic assets 
and to assist banks facing liquidity challenges, panic broke out in the financial markets.261  As 
a result, the share price of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), the biggest mortgage lender 
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dropped despite reassurances by the Treasury Department that the financial crisis was under  
control.262 This led TSB Lloyd to acquire HBOS at the cost of £12 billion thereby creating a 
merged entity that controls a third of the UK savings and mortgage markets in direct 
contravention of competition rules.263 Although it was a clear breach of competition rules, 
especially Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU264, UK competition authorities argued that preventing 
HBOS from collapse was far more important than any strict adherence to competition rules.265 
This measure was however, not enough to put the merged TSB Lloyds and HBOS on a sound 
financial footing; hence government had to announce a combined capital injection of £17 
Billion for the two entities266 leading to increased government stakes in the newly-created entity 
to 40 per cent making it the largest shareholder.267 According to Peter Cummings, CEO of 
HBSO, like many of the financial institutions affected by the GFC, the problems of HBOS were 
self-inflicted.268  He told the House of Commons Treasury Committee that the downfall was 
due mainly to the business model and the quality of risk management within the bank.269 The 
business model HBOS pursued was property based and relied heavily on wholesale funding.270 
The rapid growth of the bank especially in the area of commercial property and the over-reliance 
on wholesale funding left it in a vulnerable position when property prices began to decline.271 
In effect, the bank was over-exposed because they lent too much at the wrong parts of the 
cycle.272 
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In return for bailouts, recapitalisation and credit guarantees, the UK government established 
the UK Financial Investments Limited Company (UKFI) to manage banks such as Northern 
Rock and Bradford & Bingley that have come under public ownership.273  This raised concerns 
about the business model and undermined the underlying philosophy of the efficient market 
hypothesis that have influenced and shaped corporate governance thinking and practice in 
recent times.274 Effectively, such governmental interventions lead to the socialisation of losses 
and privatisation of profits. This clearly exposes the defects in the corporate governance 
arrangements and more importantly, questions the philosophical foundation and justification 
for the shareholder primacy theory and its proposition of   market efficiency and less 
government intervention.275 
Critics have also questioned and even rebuked government bailouts as inappropriate use of tax 
payer’s money to support entities that see their role as profit maximising organisations for their 
shareholders. The public outrage against bailouts was fuelled by reports of bailed-out financial 
institutions paying lavish bonuses to their executives at a time when the UK and the US public 
was faced with joblessness and repossessions.276 
It may be argued that, despite the legal justifications regarding economic stability and ethical 
obligations in the face of the crisis, government bailouts are not the antidote to the GFC.277 
Accordingly, government bailouts around the world raise questions as to whether capitalism in 
general and the efficient market hypothesis in particular have failed, not to mention the ethical 
dimension of bailouts and their long-term ramifications.278 Therefore, there are doubts as to 
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whether the bailouts address the underlying and reoccurring problem in the financial system 
and whether the classical economic theory still has any relevance.279  
Government bailouts of financial institutions are not without some support, which has largely 
come from policy makers, regulatory bodies, governments and the business community. 
Proponents insist the bailouts are necessary and indeed, unavoidable to prevent the entire world 
economy from going into a recession. Arguably, the decision by the US government to let 
Lehman Brothers fail aggravated an already stressed global financial system.280  This school of 
thought contends that the collapse of Lehmann Brothers made matters worse as markets were 
becoming more dysfunctional.281 Thus, the spectacular failure of Lehman created a new sense 
of urgency, leading to a rethink and change in government policy vis-a-vis bailouts. Meanwhile, 
governments across the world have had to grapple with the notions of ‘moral hazard’ on the 
one hand and ‘too big to fail’ on the other.282 In the end, it was recognised that some 
bankruptcies were too big for the economy, so it became economically necessary and politically 
imperative for governments to intervene with bailouts.283 
Significantly, the massive bailouts by governments across the world seem to be addressing the 
symptoms rather the causes of the crisis. This is not surprising because governments have 
misdiagnosed the cause of the GFC and have thus come out with the wrong prescription in the 
form of bailouts. Bailouts by themselves neither explain nor address the fundamental cause of 
the crisis. In this context, it is submitted that a clearer understanding and appreciation of the 
GFC requires an interrogation of the shareholder primacy theory and how it has shaped 
managerial thinking and practice in recent corporate history. 
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2.4 Causes of the Crisis 
Following the GFC, the process of attributing blame and finding out the cause of the greatest 
financial crisis since the great depression of the 1930s began in earnest. What continues to 
puzzle the minds of most people is why the marked improvements witnessed in corporate 
governance codes, principles and structures in the last two decades failed to restraint or prevent 
the crisis.284 The scale and depth of the GFC led governments, policy makers and business 
people around the world to question the effectiveness and suitability of the current corporate 
governance system to deal with financial innovation in a globalised world.285  Indeed, countries 
around the world have undertaken significant reforms of their corporate governance regimes. 
But it is now acknowledged that the governance framework in terms of risk management, 
supervision and regulation are inadequate and in some cases have been found wanting.286 The 
current GFC, as the Turner Review notes, goes beyond a mere failure on the part of corporate 
boards or the work of a few rogue traders.287 Rather, it highlights the weaknesses in the 
corporate governance system that has been constructed mainly by the private sector which over-
emphasised shareholder primacy and profit maximisation.288 
The causes of the GFC are very complex in nature and interconnected.289 While some causes 
are remote and have been brewing for several years, others are immediate and indeed, triggered 
the crisis. Whichever way one looks at it, it becomes obvious that the cumulative effect of both 
the remote and immediate causes are what account for the severity of the GFC. 
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Lastra and Wood identify and explain the causes of the crisis under ten ‘non-mutually-
exclusive’ groups.290 According to them, the causes include; macroeconomic imbalances, lax 
monetary policy, regulatory and supervisory failures, the doctrine of too big to fail, excessive 
securitisation, unregulated and lightly regulated firms, corporate governance failures, risk 
management failures, corporate greed and faulty economic theories.291 They divide the causes 
into three sub-groups and blame governments, regulators and central bankers for the first three 
while blaming the markets especially financial products, managers, risk, greed and leverage for 
the other five. The blame for the last group is put on economists for propounding faulty 
economic theories.292 Much as Lastra and Wood’s explanation throws some light on the causes, 
the categorisation itself is very artificial. Except the too big to fail doctrine and the faulty 
economic theories, the remaining causes that Lastra and Wood mention are all corporate 
governance issues.293 And as already mentioned, the issue of short termism also contributed 
significantly to the GFC.294  
Obviously, this is not meant be an exhaustive list of all the likely triggers; instead it is intended 
to draw attention to some of the salient ones and set the tone for discussion. Therefore, these 
factors are merely triggers rather than being the underlying cause. The underlying cause as 
mentioned earlier is the Shareholder-oriented governance model constructed by laissez-faire 
capitalism with the sole purpose of maximising shareholder profits at the expense of other 
corporate constituents.295 Indeed, the current corporate governance arrangement (shareholder 
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primacy) is based on social power relations that are inherently capitalist.296 This relationship 
underpins the shareholder primacy theory which advocates minimal external interference so as 
not to distort market efficiency by reducing the role of the state in economic decision-making.297 
The different triggers are discussed in the subsequent section.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 2.4.1 Securitisation 
The rapid growth in the securitisation market, encouraged by questionable accounting rules 
and financial innovation and a deliberate government policy aimed at encouraging home 
ownership among people who could otherwise not afford it (sub-prime) were the initial triggers 
(causa proxima) of the crisis.298  Questionable mortgage policies driven largely by profit 
motive coupled with lax credit ratings methods by rating agencies became substitutes for the 
due diligence required of financial intermediaries and institutions.299 Driven by short-term 
profit motives, mortgage originators particularly, mortgage brokers, home finance companies 
and commercial banks provided loans to people who did not qualify for conventional 
mortgages.300 Consequently, mortgage generation became riskier due to the massive 
deterioration in lending standards as most sub-prime mortgagees were unable to meet their 
debt obligations. 
As a result, securitisation became the viable option for such people to refinance their mortgages. 
Even homeowners who qualified for conventional mortgages were encouraged to accept non-
prime mortgages at an additional cost of $5222 per mortgage.301 Clearly, such practices had 
nothing to do with encouraging homeownership among the disadvantaged in society as has been 
alleged but about short-term profit maximisation. 
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To maximise profits, mortgage originators sold these mortgages to investment banks and other 
financial institutions at substantial fees. The institutions in turn sold these products to securities 
investors in the form of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs).302 In most cases, the 
mortgage brokers simply originated these subprime mortgages and lent it to households who 
neither had the income nor assets to continue to service such loans.303 Moreover, documentation 
of income and assets was not only weak but in some instances non-existent.304 This was by no 
means accidental but deliberate because most borrowers were also investors anticipating quick 
resale and huge profits on these properties.305 A key assumption underlying the rapid growth in 
the subprime market was that house prices would continue to appreciate. Such unrealistic 
expectation for future price increases, however, failed to materialise and defaults began to rise 
as most home owners were unable to fulfil their mortgage payment obligations.306 
Driven by the desire to maximise profits, banks hurriedly resorted to repackaging subprime 
mortgages to CDOs which they resold to unsuspecting investors.307 Unfortunately, too many 
investors accepted the triple AAA ratings provided by the rating agencies at its face value and 
packed their portfolios with these questionable financial products.308 This complex process of 
securitisation depended on demand for RMBSs and of course, the availability of money to fund 
them. But, when the financial institutions were unable to provide further funding due to liquidity 
problems, the entire edifice of securitisation started to crumble thereby triggering the GFC.309 
As Gladwell argues, ‘the tipping point in the GFC emerged as liquidity dried up and financial 
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institutions lost trust in the capacity of counterparties to meet their obligations to repay 
borrowing’.310 
Admittedly, the collapse of the housing market and the dramatic crush of the credit markets 
contributed to the depth and severity of the GFC.311 It would, however, be too simplistic to 
accept the securitisation hypothesis as the cause of the GFC although its role cannot be 
discounted. Arguably, what motivated financial institutions to finance these products, mortgage 
brokers to sell mortgage to people who could not afford and CRAs to provide first grade ratings 
can be explained by the desire to maximise short-term profits to satisfy shareholder demands. 
2.4.2 Lax monetary Policy  
The causes of the global financial crisis went beyond the US housing problems and can be 
explained from the point of view of both long-term and short-term factors.312 After the 
2000/2001 dot com bubble, governments around the world became fearful of another 1934 type 
of recession.313 To avoid this, the US government injected money into the money market in 
order to stimulate demand and jump-start the economy.314 Consequently, the FED reduced 
interest rates to 1 per cent, the lowest in forty five years thereby flooding the market with cheap 
credit which in turn created the incentive to borrow.315 As a result, credit became available for 
all manner of purposes such as student loans, car loans, mortgages, luxury goods and 
consumables.316 
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Second, the shadow banking system317 in the US became another major source of easy credit 
for the purchase of capital assets especially mortgaged-backed securities. Major players in the 
shadow banking industry included well-known financial firms and investment banks like Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, hedge funds, structured investments and nonbank mortgage 
lenders.318  
Either by design or omission, the necessary regulatory safeguards were not in place to control 
or even limit the excessive leverage319 in which these institutions were engaged.320  The failure 
to regulate these financial institutions created a regulatory gap and represents a key corporate 
governance failure that exacerbated the GFC.321  
Indeed, excessive leverage distorts the entire financial system especially in situations where 
institutions are less regulated as happened prior to the GFC.322 Moreover, excessive leverage 
creates the illusion that the financial sector is adding more value to the entire global economy 
which in fact is not the case. In effect, this illusion of value creation in fact, triggers excessive 
compensation packages to reward market players whose activities generate and encourage the 
use of more debt.323  
Equally important to the discourse is the demand for US investments and the subsequent influx 
of foreign capital especially sovereign wealth funds324 into the American economy. This led to 
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an increase in the easy accessibility to credit and loans.325 It is estimated that nearly thirty 
percent (30%) of all sub-prime mortgage-related products were purchased by foreign 
investors.326  Finally, this period saw a significant decrease in yields from more conventional 
assets due largely to the demand and appetite for more risky but profitable (short-term) 
investments in the form of sub-prime mortgage backed-securities.327  
A combination of the above factors created the ideal conditions for the GFC which finally 
erupted in the summer of 2007. Undoubtedly, the ready availability of credit helped US 
businesses to recover earlier than expected following the dotcom bubble and the Enron failure 
in 2000/2001.328 The downside, however, is that the cheap credit was not channelled into 
production but went into the financial services and housing sectors, thus triggering the most 
dramatic speculative bubble in recent times.329  
2.4.3 Deregulation 
Regulating corporate entities particularly financial institutions is critical to the operation and 
functioning of every economy. Seabrooke and Tsingou, define regulation as ‘the set of rules 
and standards that govern financial institutions; their main objective is to foster financial 
stability and to protect customers of financial service’.330 Unfortunately, regulatory standards 
and requirements before the GFC proved insufficient in some areas and ineffective in most 
sectors of the financial services industry.331 The period preceding the GFC was characterised 
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by a ‘light touch’ regulatory regime made possible by the deregulatory movement of the 1980s. 
As a result, regulations that safeguarded economic stability after the 1932 Great Depression 
witnessed gradual erosion and were finally dismantled.332  
In the US, President Reagan championed the deregulatory crusade by enacting the Garn St 
German Depository Institutions Act which deregulated the savings and loans Industry.333 Also 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 by the Clinton Administration in 1999 paved the way 
for regulatory loosening in the US financial system.334 Under the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act, retail 
banking and investment banking were separate and could only be undertaken by separate 
financial intermediaries. The repeal of the Act in 1999 and its replacement with the Gramm-
Leach Bliley Act in 1999 introduced changes allowing retail banking, investment banking, 
insurance and real estate business to be carried out by a single institution under one roof.335  
Consequently, these regulatory changes enabled commercial banks to engage in speculative 
business practices in the financial markets with its attendant excessive risk-taking.336 The 
enactment of this act marks the ‘death of gentlemanly capitalism and a new era of casino 
capitalism’.337 The situation was further exacerbated by the passage in 2000 of the Commodity 
Futures Modernisation Act 2000 (CFMA).338 This Act allowed for self-regulation of the futures 
and derivatives market and also made any attempt at regulating these markets illegal.339 The 
CFMA 2000 deregulates Over the Counter (OTC) financial products as was the case under the 
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Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.340 Instead Congress opted for what it calls ‘modernized 
regulation’, a term that has remained as ambiguous as is misleading.  
Further, the introduction of the new Securities Exchange Commission rules lowered the capital 
requirements, eased the calculation of counter-party risk and enabled brokers to assign their 
own credit ratings to unrated business entities thereby preparing the grounds for the GFC.341 
The justification for removing the controls, be they regulatory or legislative, arises from the 
over-reliance on and unquestioned faith in the efficient market hypothesis. This hypothesis 
views the markets as the most efficient and rationale mechanism to allocate resources, monitor 
corporate activities and discipline corporate inefficiency and misbehaviour.342 These 
assumptions simply re-echo the ideological premise of laissez-faire economic theory, the 
foundation of which has proved shaky over the years.343  As the GFC demonstrates, defending 
this key assumption has been found to be too simplistic and unsustainable at best. Effectively, 
the apparent lack of effective regulatory mechanism saw financial excesses permeate through 
nearly all aspects of the financial services industry.344 In the end, nobody could imagine or 
envisage the scale of the tragedy that befell many investments banks on Wall Street.345 
In fact, regulatory failure in the financial market is not new to governments and regulators 
across the world. After the earlier corporate failures including Enron, WorldCom, Pamalat and 
Arnold, there was widespread recognition that this regulatory failure could not be allowed to 
continue any longer. The OECD for example raised its concern in 2001 and 2007 and called for 
greater prudence and effective regulatory enforcement regime.346  Similarly, Stiglitz  derides 
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the lack of regulation, which he argues, allowed the financial crisis to erupt in the US and later 
spread to Europe and across the world.347 According to Stiglitz, both the US and UK rejected 
proposals to regulate hedge funds and CRAs adding ‘it was said for a long time that let the 
markets take care of themselves, now even America and Britain realise the need for 
transparency and better standards’.348  
From this perspective, the GFC crisis can be explained and understood in terms of regulatory 
failure at both the market and firm level.349 It may be argued, however, that lax regulation 
cannot be faulted for the crisis.350 The fundamental problem stems from the failure and lack of 
adequate economic analysis by private sector actors and regulatory agencies coupled with the 
over-reliance on the profit maximising concept of the corporation.351 The failure to understand 
the risks of subprime mortgages and to foresee the declining house prices might be a mistake; 
but is it an inexcusable mistake with catastrophic consequences as the GFC reveals. 
2.4.4 Masters of the Universe 
A major contributory factor of corporate failure that eventually led to the financial crisis is what 
Clarke describes as the ‘master of the universe’ mind-set that became prevalent in the financial 
services industry.352 This mind-set created an indulgent culture that encouraged and supported 
excessive risk-taking and inflated rewards leading to the emergence and explosion of new 
financial products and innovations in the financial sector.353  
The complexity of these new products allowed derivative dealers and hedge fund managers to 
manipulate trillions of dollars while charging excessive fees on unsuspecting clients and 
                                                          
347 Joseph Stiglitz, FREEFALL: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy (Allen Lane 2010)  
348 ibid 
349 Tomasic and Akinbami (n 11). 
350 Poole (n 259) 38. 
351 ibid 
352 Clarke (n 33) 35. 
353 ibid 
Chapter 2 
68 
 
customers.354 Complexity by itself, constitutes risk but was not factored into the business model 
in the build up to the crisis.355 In the face of the growing complexity of these new financial 
products, industry operators rather choose not to recognise the threats but convinced themselves 
they had everything under control.356 As these new financial instruments were developed, not 
only did individual financial institutions become more vulnerable to shocks from the underlying 
risk factors, but more importantly, the entire financial system became less resilient.357 As 
Buchheit rightly concludes ‘when history looks back on the crisis, a big culprit will be the 
astonishing complexity of modern financial instruments and the drafting of contracts’.358  
 In fact, these questionable business practices and models did not go unchallenged. Some 
critical voices including Warren Buffet raised serious reservations regarding the complexities 
of these financial products as far back as 2003 describing them as ‘financial weapons of mass 
destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent are potentially lethal’.359  The excessive 
risk culture combined with the apparent lack of effective regulatory mechanism saw financial 
excesses permeate through nearly all aspects of the financial system. It thus, became obvious 
that financial innovation had out-paced regulatory responsiveness.360 
Against this backdrop, the question that remains unanswered is why was it allowed to happen 
just a few years after the Enron and WorldCom failures? The answer lies, first, in the failures 
and weaknesses in the corporate governance arrangements which did not safeguard against the 
indulgent and excessive culture of risk-taking in the financial services industry.361 Second, and 
more importantly, these failures can be traced to the shareholder-oriented model of corporate 
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governance which encourages short termism and excessive risk taking.362  From this perspective 
it is submitted that the financial crisis was not a spontaneous event but a time bomb that has 
been building over the years and waiting to explode. 
2.4.5 Risk Management Failure 
Risk remains part and parcel of every business enterprise and can only be avoided by choosing 
to do nothing.363  The challenge is to strike a balance between the risk and the acceptable 
outcome, to understand the level of exposure to risk and determine the appropriate risk 
management strategy.364 Against this backdrop, it can be argued that the failure to get the 
balance right has remained a major contributing factor to the current GFC because most 
financial institutions failed to recognise or even neglected the basic rules of risk management 
and control.365  Risk management according to Tricker is: 
[A] Process effected by the entity’s board of directors and management and other personnel, applied in 
strategy    session and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage the risk so that it is within the appetite to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievements of objectives.366 
Corporate risk arises at every level in organisations and could be operational, managerial and 
strategic.367 The risk management failures witnessed before the GFC were not firm specific but 
systemic and cut across different industries in different countries.368 Corporate governance 
failures arising from unacceptable and risky business practices have been recognised at all 
                                                          
362 ibid 
363 Tricker (n 184). 
364 ibid 
365 EC (n 169) 
366 Tricker (n 184) 204. 
367 Erkens et al. (n 206) 
368 ibid 
Chapter 2 
70 
 
levels preceding the crisis as evidenced by the inadequate risk management practices that have 
characterised the corporate governance regime prior to the GFC.369  
Reviewing, guiding and ensuring effective risk management policies and practices are the key 
functions of the board in every corporate entity. But a complete lack of board oversight and 
robust risk management contributed to the weaknesses and failures of the pre-crisis corporate 
governance arrangements.370  
First, information flow between management and board of directors on risk management issues 
was neither effective nor adequate. Often, vital information concerning risk exposures did not 
reach boards or management to ensure evaluation and the appropriate risk management 
response. Thus, inadequate information about the quality of loans, especially, sub-prime 
mortgages and their affordability were major risk factors that were overlooked by most lending 
institutions.371  
Second, lending institutions applied faulty estimates of default rates while rating agencies 
backed their ratings with wrong estimates of the underlying default risk based on short credit 
history.372 Until recently, sub-prime borrowers were expected to make a down payment of at 
least 20 per cent of the purchase price of a house but the new finance model did away with this 
important risk management tool. As a result, default rates increased and default on mortgages 
was no longer an isolated event but as systemic phenomenon.373 The failure to observe some 
of the basic risk management practices and the general decline in credit standards provided a 
fertile ground that triggered the recent GFC.374  
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Furthermore, because risk management issues seldom reached board level, the management of 
such risk became piecemeal and undertaken at business unit level. This led to a risk-
management approach where each unit within an organisation was left to stand on its own 
without coordination throughout the entire organisation.375 Consequently, risk management 
became an activity rather than an enterprise-based system.376 Furthermore, most of the risk 
management policies were reluctantly complied with or simply ignored. 
A recent OECD report on the GFC indicates that boards had established and approved risk 
management strategies, but most did not establish metrics to monitor implementation; thus, 
neglecting an essential aspect of the governance function.377  A critical function of the board of 
financial institutions is to undertake a constant review of its risk management policies;378 but 
boards in most institutions failed to perform this crucial function. 
 In the case of Enron, the board failed to realise that the company had moved from being an 
energy supplying company to a business engaged in financial derivatives. Clearly, as financial 
institution with an entirely different risk management needs, it failed to develop the necessary 
risk management policies commensurate with its new status.379  Similarly, Northern Rock 
focused on revenue generation rather than risk management, traded in sub-prime mortgage 
products with different risk management needs and requirements.380 Apparently because the 
board of Northern Rock did not appreciate the scale of the risk involved, it failed to monitor 
what was happening in the company. This has been confirmed by the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee which identifies lack of effective risk management regime as one of the 
serious flaws that led to the collapse of Northern Rock.381  The committee notes that 
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management of Northern Rock failed to ensure the solvency of the bank and its ability to 
provide against the risk involved382 The Observer Newspaper was rather blunt on its 
assessment of Northern Rock and describes it as ‘a bit like putting a Ferrari engine into 
Micra’.383  
Clearly, the GFC has revealed the catastrophic failures in risk management practices on the 
part of financial institutions in most parts of the developed world.384 For the past two decades 
the financial services industry in particular has witnessed growth both in size and 
complexity.385 Risk management techniques have, however, failed to keep pace with the 
sophistication of financial products and services on the market.386 As a result innovation in the 
financial services industry far exceeded the capacity of risk management measurement and 
monitoring tools to gauge risk.387 The failure to measure, monitor and manage risk was not 
industry or firm specific but widespread and endemic prior to the GFC.388  
2.4.6 Wrong Incentives 
Excessive executive compensation schemes explain why most corporate entities, especially 
financial institutions engage in extreme risk-taking, while neglecting risk management 
practices, governance principles and ethical conduct. Failures of risk management systems in 
major financial institutions were made worst by an incentive culture that encouraged and 
rewarded high and often reckless risk-taking in the short-term.389  
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Such wrongly-designed remuneration policies and compensation schemes emerged from the 
desire to align the interest of management and shareholders as part of the attempt to resolve the 
agency problem.390 In the process, executive compensation shifted from a cash-based system to 
an equity-based system391 Thus, it engendered an excessive risk culture and ‘short-termist 
approach’ that has characterised managerial behaviour in recent times. 392  
The abrupt changes in compensation were however, not accompanied by the needed regulatory 
changes in corporate governance to control the predictably perverse incentives that reliance on 
stock options creates.393 A study by Hall reveals the changes that have occurred over the 
decade for a chief executive officer (CEO) of an S&P company.394 According to the study as 
of 1990, a CEO earning $ 1.25 m received 92 per cent of that amount in cash and only 8 per 
cent in equity.395 The scale and composition of executive compensation changed dramatically, 
and by 2001 the CEO of an S&P industrial company was earning in excess of $6.m of which 
66 per cent was in equity and 34 per cent in cash.396 The impact of this change is that it creates 
pre-mature recognition of revenues using stock price as the basis for such decisions. 
Obviously, the new payment regime for CEOs using stock options creates incentives for short-
termism and financial ‘manipulation and gamesmanship’.397  
 A similar study by Cheng and Warfield confirms that corporate managers with high equity 
incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods, and are more likely to report earnings to meet 
or exceed forecast and projections.398 Increase in manager’s equity ownership corresponds to 
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his stock options which in turn, increases the need to diversify the high risk associated with it. 
The down-side to stock options-based executive compensation especially in an environment of 
weak regulatory regime, is that it leads to excessive risk-taking, poor risk-management and 
short-termism, all of which are driven by the desire to maximise shareholder returns in the 
shortest possible time. 
Changes in US tax laws also account for the shift towards using stock options to compensate 
executives. The amendment of US tax laws in the early parts of the 1990s restricting the 
corporate deductibility of high cash compensation induced corporations to resort to the use of 
equity instead of cash.399 
Another explanation is the immense pressure by institutional investors who see executive 
compensation as probably their most potent tool to exert control and to align managerial 
incentives with shareholder interests.400 Indeed, changes in US tax law coupled with 
institutional pressures produced a shift to equity compensation which in turn compelled 
managers to seek to maximise not just share price but shareholder value as well.401 What these 
institutions failed to recognise and anticipate, however, is that such aggressive use of 
incentives tends to encourage manipulative techniques and practices to maximise stock price 
in the short-term.402 This distorted incentive system accentuates risk-taking and encourages 
financial institutions to ignore the long-term risk inherent in their governance models as well 
as in their products.403  
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2.4.7 Gatekeeper Failure 
 Failure by Gatekeepers and the subsequent breakdown in the systems of internal control and 
external monitoring is a critical trigger of the financial crisis.404 The role of the Gatekeeper is a 
key means of ensuring effective corporate governance both within and outside of the 
corporation.405 Within the broader corporate context, a Gatekeeper is an independent 
professional with two distinct roles.406 First, the Gatekeeper’s role is to prevent wrong doing by 
withholding cooperation or consent and second, acts as a repeat player providing verification 
and certification to investors and vouch for other people with greater incentive than the 
Gatekeepers themselves.407  The most widely accepted definition of a Gatekeeper is provided 
by Coffee in which he states that ‘a gatekeeper is an agent who acts as a reputational 
intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the signal sent by corporate issuer’.408 
Gatekeepers can either be internal or external. Internal Gatekeepers include: the board of 
directors, CEO, and the general meeting of shareholders; while external gatekeepers refer to 
auditors, credit rating agencies, attorneys, investment analysts and other regulatory agencies.409  
As a reputational intermediary, the Gatekeeper performs by pledging his/her reputational capital 
to the corporation which enables the markets or investors to rely on the corporation’s own 
disclosure or assurance.410 Auditors for instance, certify that the corporation’s financial 
statements comply with generally acceptable accounting principles while the investment 
analyst delivers a fair opinion in a merger or takeover bid.411 Also investment analysts, 
corporate attorneys and CRAs upon whom investors have come to rely, failed to raise the red 
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flags and in fact seemed ‘to have wilfully shut their eyes’.412 In that regard, it can be argued 
that the corporate failures such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock can be 
understood as a variety of gatekeeper failure.413 Obviously, the desire by management of 
Northern Rock to show immediate earnings and growth while concealing liabilities seems a 
direct consequence of how its management was compensated.414 Like many of the corporations 
that collapsed following the crisis, the management of Northern Rock was incentivised to 
manage for the short term and not surprisingly they did, with devastating consequences.415 In 
that regard it is submitted that failure by the Gatekeepers to perform their functions played a 
vital role in triggering the GFC.416  
While admitting that Gatekeeper failure played a role, it should be noted that acquiescence of 
Gatekeepers to management pressure was driven by the fervent desire to maximize 
corporation’s stock price and satisfy shareholder interests.417 Moreover, the failure by 
Gatekeepers to perform their roles effectively is not surprising and can be viewed from three 
perspectives namely: conflicts of interests, over-concentration and complexity of financial 
products.418 
2.4.8 Conflicts of interest 
The failure by Gatekeepers to perform their roles as watch dogs can be explained by the issuer-
pay- model of governance which inevitably creates conflict of interest situations. The issuer-
pay-model is where the party paying the Gatekeeper is the party the Gatekeeper is expected to 
monitor.419 The situation prior to the crisis was that the auditors, rating agencies, investment 
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analyst were all paid by the corporation that had hired them, as a consequent their independence 
and neutrality was compromised. 
Furthermore, the Gatekeepers often took on the additional duties of providing lucrative 
consultancy services for the very corporate entities they were required to monitor and watch. 
The impact of such a relationship is that it creates a fertile ground for capture by clients’ interest. 
In the end, these bodies that were expected to act as Gatekeepers compromised their 
independence and neutrality and effectively became junior partners in the very entities they 
were expected to supervise and regulate.420 This cosy relationship led to acquiescence on the 
part of the Gatekeepers who failed to raise the alarm but wilfully shut their eyes when it 
mattered most. 
2.4.9 Over-concentration 
With the rapid expansion of the international financial markets, the role of these bodies has 
become critical in maintaining the stability of the international financial system. According to 
Coffee, the corporate governance failures were to a large degree a product of over-
concentration and the lack of competition in the credit rating market.421 Currently, Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch seem to have a monopoly over the market for credit ratings.422 
As to be expected, the lack of competition made possible by governmental actions and entry 
restrictions have enabled these three organisations to make huge profits without a 
corresponding investment in upgrading their services to meet the new challenges.423  
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2.4.10 Complexity of financial Products 
Equally important to the discourse relates to the constant introduction of new products into the 
financial markets and the failure of Gatekeepers to keep pace with such innovations.424 The 
scandals at Northern Rock, Lehman, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for example reveal several 
instances of complex frauds including fabricated earnings, differed earnings and off-balance 
sheet transactions.425 Arguably, the scandals indicate a breakdown of both internal and external 
controls and monitoring mechanism.426 Apart from these problems, the challenges posed by the 
new business models and practices were not properly understood by a large section of the gate 
keeping community. As the International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) 
explains, the role of CRAs among others, is to assess the credit risk of corporate or government 
borrowers and issuers of fixed income securities.427 Unfortunately, such assessments to 
ascertain the credit worthiness of real or potential creditors failed to materialise. Consequently, 
the question being asked after the crisis has erupted is how could asset-backed securities that 
contained subprime mortgages with high risk debts possibly be given AAA ratings by the 
CRAs? The answer according to Coffee, are three-fold namely: (a) the complexities of the new 
financial products, (b) the fact that financial innovation has outpaced regulatory prowess, (c) 
conflict of interest that has overcome good governance practices.428 
 Admittedly, self-dealing was evident, but it cannot be said to be the underlying motive. As 
Tomasic explains ‘driving the principal actors in these scandals was the fervent desire to 
maximise the corporation’s stock by any means necessary’.429 Indeed, corporate governance 
cannot function effectively, and management held accountable when Gatekeepers fail to live 
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up to their responsibilities as corporate watch dogs.430 In an editorial, the Business Weekly sums 
up the failure of the Gatekeeper and concludes: ‘The financial crisis has disclosed that every 
component of the corporate governance infrastructure was dysfunctional: Company accounts 
were misleading, their auditors conniving, lawyers conspiring, rating agencies asleep and 
regulators inadequate’.431 
2.5 Conclusion 
The failure of so many major international corporations following the GFC highlights the 
centrality and importance of corporate governance issues. And when put to the test corporate 
governance routines failed to serve the purpose of safeguarding excessive risk-taking and this 
became apparent during the GFC. Indeed, the risk management regime failed in many cases 
due to flawed corporate governance theory and the inadequacy of what Kirkpatrick calls 
‘computer models’ of risk management.432  
In analysing the financial crisis five key areas that stand out include: (a) critical weaknesses in 
risk management of most financial institutions (b) excessive remuneration policies (c)   
excessive securitisation and (d) specific breaches of basic corporate governance principles (f) 
failure on the part of Gatekeepers.433  
While admitting that all the above factors may have played some role in triggering the GFC, 
this thesis maintains that these were just manifestations and mere symptoms of the shareholder-
oriented model of governance. Hence the central argument is that the underlying cause of the 
crisis stems from the wrong assumptions and misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of 
the corporation in society. Such misconceptions and the exaggerated emphasis that have been 
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placed on short-term profit maximisation at the expense of long-term sustainability of the firm 
is what accounts for the GFC.434  
As already indicated, the shareholder-oriented corporate governance system has increased 
investor pressure for greater returns on short-term investments.435 Such short-term investors 
rarely engage with corporations on long-term basis in view of the drive to raise stock price and 
maximise profits in the shortest time possible.436 Against this backdrop, it can be concluded 
that the financial crisis and the subsequent corporate failures can be traced not to flawed 
individuals or faulty corporate governance arrangements; but to a flawed idea.437 This is the 
idea that corporations are managed well when they are managed to maximise share price for 
shareholders in the shortest time possible.438 Arguably, this overly- simplistic mantra is, in 
effect, the underlying cause of the GFC, with corporate failures as mere manifestations of this 
deep-seated but flawed conception of the corporation. Indeed, the entrenchment of the 
shareholder primacy theory led to a corporate governance system and a management culture 
that made company managers more accountable to the market. But sensitivity to the market 
poses problems especially when the market becomes overly euphoric and unethical as happened 
in the pre-crisis period.439 The next chapter explores the shareholder primacy theory, its 
evolution and how it has influenced and shaped management thinking and practices and argues 
that the underlying cause of the crisis cannot be divorced from the shareholder-oriented 
governance system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
3. 1 Introduction 
Corporate governance as a concept is laden with paradoxes. Prima facie, whilst it appears to be 
characterised by a set of practical concerns, it is also bedevilled by contested theories.440  
Secondly, while the concept has gained prominence in the last three decades, finding an 
acceptable definition has remained elusive and sometimes controversial. The third, and perhaps, 
the most difficult challenge is that the concept has been evolving and undergoing dramatic 
changes which can be likened to a moving target. Such constant changes often present major 
difficulties in developing and retaining a theoretical framework. 
The present theoretical debate on corporate governance and the accompanying controversy is 
very much about the role of the corporation in society, and how these assumptions and 
theoretical underpinnings have influenced and affected corporate governance models, practice 
and thinking. Admittedly, the theory that has had the greatest influence over the past three 
decades on corporate governance is the shareholder primacy theory, which emphasises 
maximising profits for shareholders. Therefore, the central argument in this chapter is that the 
GFC is the direct consequence of a mistaken idea about corporations.441 This is the idea that 
corporations ought to be managed with the sole purpose of maximising shareholder value as 
measured by the share price and quarterly earnings.442  
The greatest appeal of the shareholder primacy theory stems from how its proponents have been 
able to simplify a rather complex reality,443 which has, in turn, influenced the way corporate 
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governance is conceptualised and defined. Consequently, this chapter contends that the 
shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance is inherently flawed and that the GFC of 
2007/8 is a clear demonstration of such an inherent weakness.444 Arguably, the Anglo-American 
corporate governance model which is underpinned by shareholder primacy and its underlying 
assumptions has over the years proved to be the cause of and not a cure for corporate failures.  
Arguably, the recommended cures advocated by the shareholder primacy theory ‘are often 
worse than the disease’.445 
Before delving into the theoretical debate, it is crucial to understand the concept of corporate 
governance to guide the subsequent discussion. It is equally important to point out from the 
onset that corporate governance in this context is mainly concerned with public companies and 
not private entities or family owned companies. Thus, the definitions and discussions that 
follow will focus mainly on large public corporations with some form of stock market listing 
or those with several shareholders who are not involved in the day-to-day management of the 
company. 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  Section one looks at some definitions of corporate 
governance while section two examines the theoretical framework of the concept. Section three 
explores the Berle-Dodd debate, its relevance and implications for subsequent corporate 
thinking and practice. The final section evaluates the shareholder primacy theory and situates 
it within the Berle-Dodd discourse. It concludes that the underlying assumptions of the 
shareholder primacy theory are questionable because the premise upon which the theory rests 
has become increasingly difficult to justify and sustain. 
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3.2 Definition 
Corporate governance as a concept has several competing definitions and hence defies a single 
accepted definition.446 There is neither a statutory definition nor one set out through case law. 
Corporate governance has been influenced by various disciplines including: law, economics, 
accounting and business management. Consequently, the different definitions reflect the 
background of each author and more importantly, the theoretical underpinnings that have 
shaped and informed their perception and understanding of the corporate purpose.447  
The challenge of finding a common definition arises from the difficulty in navigating through 
the complex issues surrounding corporate governance and determining where the boundary lies, 
as no one knows where it begins and ends.448  This is further complicated by the global and 
globalising nature of corporate governance, which involves a plethora of complex legal issues, 
cultural differences and historical experiences.449  
Whereas some definitions are narrow and focus on just some aspects of the corporation, others 
are very broad, encompassing the entire corporate entity. Generally, the narrow definitions 
reflect the shareholder view of corporate governance which Bloomfield refers to as the ‘inward-
facing aspects of corporate governance,’ on one hand, while the much broader approach relates 
to the stakeholder view, that is, ‘the outward-facing aspects of corporate governance’.450 
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of the theories, this thesis will focus mainly on the shareholder 
primacy theory. 
Financial economists define corporate governance in terms of how markets function and 
influence the ability of business entities to achieve the maximum utilization of resources.451 
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From this perspective, the efficient functioning of the market remains the central theme of 
corporate governance because without capital markets the corporation as an organisational form 
would be unable to achieve its objectives and prominence.452 A prevailing view among financial 
economists is that the corporation exists mainly to meet the needs of shareholders, hence the 
idea of the corporation as a vehicle for investment and the production of goods and services for 
the public good is secondary.453 
To achieve this profit maximising objective, corporate governance attempts to align as much as 
possible the interests of managers with that of shareholders. In line with this narrow approach, 
Nordberg defines corporate governance as ‘a mechanism of economic utility, a construct whose 
main aim, is the maximisation of profit for a given amount of resources’.454  In a narrow sense, 
corporate governance looks at the mechanisms employed to guide and monitor the financial 
performance of companies. Consequently, the focus is on the internal arrangements of the 
company while the role of the board is to oversee the processes to achieve the greatest share 
value creation and profit maximisation.455  
Similarly, Schleifer and Vishny adopt the narrow shareholder approach when they state 
‘corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investments’.456 To them, the bottom line is the returns in terms of 
profit that the shareholders can derive from their investments. This is not surprising because as 
financial economists, their primary concern and indeed, preoccupation is the protection of 
shareholder interest and the needed legal protection to be accorded investors in terms of 
returns.457  Hence, their view of corporate governance is primarily about return on investments 
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as evidenced in high share prices which remains the main motivation behind their investment 
decisions. 
Another narrow definition that has influenced corporate governance thinking around the world 
is the one by the Cadbury Committee458 set up by the UK Financial Services Authority in 1992 
to investigate the financial aspects of corporate governance.459 It was a response to the corporate 
scandals involving Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Robert Maxwell 
Communications and Polly Peck.460  Arguably, the setting up of the committee was an 
admission that corporate governance in the UK was defective and needed to be improved. 
Interestingly, the shortcomings which the Cadbury Committee sought to resolve failed to 
materialise as the governance failures post Cadbury seem to have become even more frequent 
with devastating consequences.461  The Committee defines corporate governance as ‘the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled’.462  This definition is rather limited in scope 
as it focuses only on the internal workings of companies while ignoring other corporate 
constituencies who affect or are affected by the activities of the company. Apparently, the 
narrow shareholder approach adopted by the committee underscores the fact that it was 
‘reporting not on corporate governance in general but on good financial corporate governance, 
with a focus on the control and reporting functions of boards and the role of auditors’.463 Such 
narrow definitions tend to mirror the shareholder-oriented view of corporate governance and 
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concentrate on the internal management of the company while ignoring the wider implications 
for society at large. 
 Interestingly, Sir Adrian Cadbury who chaired the Cadbury Committee reviewed his stance in 
2000 when he broadened the definition of corporate governance.464 In a foreword, he provided 
a much broader stakeholder-oriented definition of corporate governance which states that: 
 [C]orporate governance is concerned with holding the balance of power between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals. The corporate governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of 
those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and 
society.465  
This widened definition, which recognises the interests and concerns of other stakeholders, is 
gradually gaining currency in recent corporate governance discourse. Stakeholders by 
definition, refer to all the groups that affect and are affected by the activities of the 
corporation.466 They include shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors and customers 
collectively referred to as primary stakeholders.467 The media, courts, the local community and 
government make up the secondary stakeholders.468 
The increasing interest in the stakeholder theory reflects the gradual changes occurring in 
corporate governance theory and practice469 particularly the emergence of compelling new 
literature challenging the traditional shareholder primacy theory. Writers including Romano, 
Bhagat and Martins not only expose the pitfalls but also denounce the shareholder primacy of 
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corporate governance as ‘quack governance’470 because the theory, they argue, lacks empirical 
support for its supposed superiority.471  
The shareholder-oriented theory was further weakened by the dot-com bubble of 2000/2001 
and the 2008 crisis both of which have their origins in this flawed theory and its underlying 
assertions.472 These developments indicate that corporate governance is not static  continues to 
evolve in response to the changing perceptions and understanding of the role of the corporation 
in society.473 As Nordberg rightly notes ‘it is a moving target and a subject that has been at the 
centre of serious public debate across the globe.’474  
Following these developments, commentators such as, Blair, Monks, Tricker and Demb 
advocate the broader (stakeholder) approach in their definitions and discussions of corporate 
governance. From the stakeholder perspective Demb et al. state that ‘corporate governance is 
the process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of 
stakeholders’.475 Obviously, this stakeholder view of corporate governance seems more 
progressive and inclusive of the various corporate constituents that collectively make up the 
corporation. The challenge, however, is in finding the right balance between the often-
conflicting interests of the different stakeholders.476 
On his part, Tricker maintains that corporate governance is about the exercise of power over 
corporate entities but admits that taking an overarching position does not help in understanding 
the boundaries and process of the concept.477 Tricker is more in favour of the stakeholder 
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perspective which takes a much broader approach by including other stakeholders apart from 
shareholders, board of directors and management.478  The central proposition of the stakeholder 
theory is that the corporation exists to cater for the interest of shareholders and also serve a 
larger social purpose.479  The definitions by Djembe and Neuberger reflect this approach.480  
This perspective of corporate governance had a significant influence on the definitions provided 
by Blair and Sir Cadbury in 2000. As already indicated, Blair takes the stakeholder approach 
when she defines corporate governance as:  
 [T]he whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how the control is exercised and how the risks and returns 
from their activities they undertake are allocated.481  
The institutional arrangements occur at three levels and consists of regulatory governance, 
market governance and internal governance.482 Regulatory governance refers to the public 
control over corporations by statutes, through regulations, government policies, governmental 
bodies and professional associations.483 Market governance, on the other hand, refers to the use 
of market mechanisms, particularly demand and supply, competition, entry and exit conditions 
to control and discipline corporate behaviour and actions. Internal governance on the other hand 
defines the interaction between the participants and how they relate to and interact with each 
other.484 It should be stressed that the ability of a corporation to exercise control is limited to 
internal governance while regulatory and market governance fall outside its remit. 
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The definition of corporate governance has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the 
OECD initially took the narrow approach but later broadened its definition by adding the 
relationship and operational aspects which are gradually gaining grounds in much of the 
corporate governance discourse.485. The revised corporate governance definition by the OECD 
states that: 
 [T]he corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the 
different participants in the organisation-such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders; and lays down the rules and procedures for decision making.486  
Despite the attempt to broaden its definition, the OECD’s pro-shareholder position has 
remained unchanged.487 Indeed, the OECD has been at the forefront of promoting and 
advocating the shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance across the world for the 
past two decades. It has done so by enacting and propagating various corporate governance 
codes and principles which have been embraced by both developed and developing countries 
alike.488 
From the above discussion, one theme that runs through all the definitions is that corporate 
governance is concerned mainly with the processes, systems and procedures governing 
institutions, and how those rules are enforced or followed.489 Thus, corporate governance 
focuses on how the rules and regulations determine, create, facilitate or hinder those 
relationships. But corporate governance is not just about rules and regulations; it has an ethical 
dimension as some governance decisions by boards or management may not necessarily be 
covered by law or regulation.490 For instance, accounting principles and capital markets 
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dynamics fall outside the legal or regulatory framework and thus, allows management a margin 
of discretion to decide whether a course of action is ethically acceptable or not.491  
Apparently, a new and much broader agenda of corporate governance is emerging in respect of 
how corporations relate to the wider society in which they exist and operate and from which 
they derive their legitimacy.492 This emerging approach, whether one calls it corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), sustainability, ethics or corporate responsibility has significantly changed 
the way corporate governance is conceptualised and defined.493 These developments constitute 
an integral part of a broader movement that seeks to redefine the role and purpose of the 
corporation against the backdrop of the recent GFC.  
The definitions examined in this chapter whether they adopt the narrow shareholder approach 
or the broad-based stakeholder perspective of corporate governance, revisits an issue that has 
for decades dominated the corporate governance debate- the role of the corporation in society. 
Having examined some definitions, the next section assesses the theories that under pine the 
definitions. 
3.3 Theoretical framework 
Without theories, it would be difficult for researchers and scientists to carry out any meaningful 
research, be it empirical or doctrinal.494 Consequently, researchers use theories to help define 
what needs to be studied and to guide researchers in shaping research questions and in deciding 
the necessary evidence in support of their arguments and propositions.495  Porter defines theory 
as ‘a set of logical propositions about how the real world is structured, or the way in which it 
operates.’496  Thus, corporate governance theories refer to a set of ostensibly logical 
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propositions which aim at, and tend to explain how corporate governance as a concept has 
occurred, the thinking that has shaped its evolution and how it should occur in the future.497  
There are several theories of corporate governance ranging from the shareholder, stakeholder, 
stewardship, agency to resource dependency theory. But they fall under two broad categories 
namely the shareholder and the stakeholder theories.  
The discussion will centre mainly on the shareholder theory for two reasons. First, the 
shareholder theory has dominated corporate governance thinking and practice for the last three 
decades. Secondly, its underlying assumptions, albeit flawed and lacking in empirical evidence 
are what account for the GFC.498 
3.3.1 The Theories 
The classical shareholder theory considers the corporation as a vehicle to maximise profits for 
the shareholders who, it is wrongly claimed are the ‘owners’ of the corporation and the residual 
claimants. According to proponents of this theory, the ‘ownership rights’ provide grounds and 
justification for the corporation to maximise profits for the shareholders.499  
The stakeholder theory, on the other hand, views the public corporation as a creation of the state 
as such its role goes beyond the satisfaction of shareholder interests through profit 
maximisation.500 Consequently, stakeholder theorists insist that the corporation recognises the 
interests of the wider group who are affected by the actions and operations of the corporation 
rather than focusing on shareholders alone.501  
Apart from the shareholder and stakeholder theories which form the main strands of corporate 
governance theories, there exists also the stewardship theory, the agency theory and the 
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resource dependency theory all of which are minor variations and form part of either of the two 
major theories.502 
The stewardship theorist takes the view that managers are stewards of the corporation and 
would act in its best interest and thus rejects any suggestion of managers being opportunistic 
agents acting in their own interests.503 It posits that no conflict of interest exists between 
managers and shareholders and cautions against accepting agency theory ‘as a given.’504  It may 
be argued that stewardship theory, is in effect, an alternative approach to corporate governance 
vis-à-vis the agency theory.505 
 The agency theory emerged from the writings of Jensen and Meckling who view the firm as a 
nexus of contracts between management and shareholders.506  This contractual relationship they 
argue, is that of an agent and a principal with the managers acting as the agents of the 
shareholders who are considered principals.507  The central proposition of the agency theory is 
that it views the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ between the various factors of production each 
of whom aims at maximising its own utility.508  In that regard, managers end up with substantial 
power and control over the use of corporate resources. Arguably, because managers are 
considered self-interested individuals acting on bounded rationality, their actions may not 
necessarily be in the best interest of the corporation.509  But the separation of ownership from 
management often creates agency costs510 and puts the shareholder in a pre-eminent position as 
the principal in whose interest the corporation should be managed.511  
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The resource dependency theory considers the role of the directors as essentially providing the 
necessary resources and securing linkages with the external environment.512 As Hillman et al 
admit, the role of the board under the resource dependency theory, goes beyond reducing 
uncertainty; but also brings resources such as legal, banking, accounting and financial skills all 
of which are essential for the effective and efficient management of the corporation.513 By 
providing access to certain key constituents, these boards are helping to reduce the corporation’s 
dependency on its environs.514 
In view of the multiplicity of corporate governance theories, this section will examine just one 
of the theories namely: the shareholder primacy theory, its emergence, development, 
transformation, relevance and its central role in the GFC. 
 3.4 Corporate Purpose 
As already mentioned, the present debate on corporate governance theories is very much about 
the role of the corporation in society.515 While some argue that the main and probably the sole 
purpose of the corporation is to satisfy shareholder interests through increased share price, 
others contend that the role and indeed, the purpose of the corporation is to serve the larger 
society.516 This ‘shareholders versus stakeholders’ and ‘shareholders versus society’ debate is 
what has been driving the corporate governance discourse in the last decades and influenced 
the current corporate governance theory and practice.517  
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Undoubtedly, shareholder primacy continues to dominate corporate governance thinking 
among academics and the business community. But other critical voices argue that the 
corporation should serve a larger public interest not just that of the shareholders.518 
Understandably, much of the discourse articulated in the shareholder primacy theory arises 
from the commitment to orthodox ideas of the corporation (profit maximisation) that is arguably 
too deterministic and dogmatic.519  Evidence from the recent GFC undermines and  rejects the 
assumptions and presumptions underpinning the shareholder theory which eventually shaped 
corporate governance practice.520 
Corporate failures of major corporations such as Lehman Brothers, in the US and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Northern Rock, Halifax Bank of Scotland in the UK and the ongoing 
financial crisis in Greece have rekindled an age-old debate. Unfortunately, this debate has failed 
to answer the fundamental question regarding the role of the corporation in society which is: 
for what purpose does the corporation exist and whose interests must it serve? 521 
Indeed, the current debate between the shareholder and stakeholder theories is not new but a 
continuation of a century-old discourse that reflects the two opposing views of the corporation 
since its inception in the nineteenth century.522  The debate underscores the power relations 
within the company in terms of the corporate purpose and in whose interest it should be 
managed, and also reflects economic and ideological preferences.523 These economic 
preferences reinforce the proposition that the shareholder-oriented governance model is a 
construct of power relations that is ‘inherently capitalist’.524  
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Before evaluating the shareholder primacy theory, it is important to examine the debate and 
discussions that have shaped the present conceptions and to some extent misconceptions of the 
shareholder-stakeholder dichotomy.525 Arguably, there can be no meaningful discussion in 
respect of the purpose of the corporation without revisiting the Berle-Dodd debate which 
occurred in the US in the 1930s.  
 3. 5 The Berle-Dodd Dialogue 
To fully appreciate the import of the Berle-Dodd debate requires a clearer understanding of the 
corporate management practices and the general economic environment at the time, both of 
which were significant in triggering the debate. First, the domination of the American economy 
in the 1920s by a few large corporations created a situation where management of these 
corporations exercised enormous power vis-a-vis their stockholders.526 It is estimated that the 
200 largest business corporations owned and controlled nearly 49 per cent of all corporate 
wealth in the US at the time.527 With this enormous wealth came power and influence. Cases of 
the arbitrary use of power became very frequent and pervasive, making it necessary for 
aggrieved shareholders to seek redress in courts. For instance, in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 
(1919)528 the complainants (shareholders) resorted to legal action to address an alleged abuse 
by management against shareholders. In its ruling, the court held that the defendant company 
must pay dividends to its shareholders, rather than keeping the money to offer lower prices to 
consumers and pay employees higher wages.529  The court stated amongst other things: ‘There 
should be no confusion that a business corporation is organised and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end’.530 
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Nearly a century later, the ruling in Dodge is routinely cited to support the idea that shareholder 
primacy is a requirement under American company law.531 It should be noted, however, that 
the statement was in fact mere dicta with no binding effect in law, hence future courts are at 
liberty to uphold or disregard it.532  
Moreover, the growth of these corporations was financed through the issuing of securities, 
corporate pyramid-building and investment trust most of which turned out to be worthless.533 
A typical example is the sale of nearly a billion securities by Goldman, Sachs & Co in 1929 
which turned out to be valueless.534 The dispersed nature of the stockholders made it virtually 
impossible for them to exercise control or have an oversight role over management and 
directors.535 
Added to this, was the lack of a uniform regulatory system within and across states and an 
ineffective enforcement regime.536 The lack of uniformity was further exacerbated by the 
relatively little inter-state traffic in securities and other financial products.537 In addition, the 
provision of information to shareholders, which is today taken for granted was voluntary and 
not mandatory at the time of the debate.538 For example, corporations in Delaware were required 
to provide annual reports but were not compelled to disclose information regarding their 
financial transactions.539 Companies incorporated in Arizona for instance, were not obliged to 
present any reports or statements either to stakeholders or the public.540  
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Obviously, this lack of corporate accountability, coupled with the widespread dispersion of 
stockholders, gave management complete control over corporations.541 Unsurprisingly, the 
extent of corporate power and the total absence of accountability generated apprehension 
among the stockholder community and further caused disquiet among academics like Berle who 
denounced the way shareholders had been marginalised and relegated to the background by 
management.542  
Indeed, Berle’s pro-shareholder position becomes understandable when one looks at the 
prevailing conditions which seemed to have put stockholders in a very disadvantaged position. 
These conditions included the shortcomings of the corporate law regime, the financial practices 
of Wall Street and the lack of control over corporate management.543 The debate, therefore, 
arises from Berle’s conviction of the need to harmonise the different corporate law rules and to 
improve management practices that were thought to undermine the interest of stockholders. 
Thus, it was during this time and under those circumstances that the Berle-Dodd debate took 
place. 
3.6 The Debate 
Of all the controversies surrounding the new economic creature called the corporation, none 
has been more fundamental as the Berle-Dodd debate regarding its purpose and place in 
society.544 The formal origins of the debate can be traced to two articles published in the 
Harvard Law Review in 1931. In an article entitled ‘Corporate Powers as Powers of Trust’ 
Professor Adolf Berle of the Columbia Law School examined the powers granted in law to 
corporations and argued that the exercise of such powers should be for the sole benefit of 
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shareholders. He likened the situation to that of individuals acting towards other people in a 
trusteeship relationship adding: 
[A]ll power granted to a corporation or to management of a corporation, or to any other group with    
the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times, 
exercisable only for the rateable benefit of all shareholders as their interest appears.545 
The publication of this article and the subsequent controversy it generated sought to answer the 
same question but from different perspectives. First, should management of public corporations 
focus just on maximising profits for the benefits of the shareholders? Alternatively, should the 
public corporations have a broader purpose that goes beyond and above making profits for the 
shareholders? These two opposing views of the public corporation have inevitably created 
tensions within the corporate governance community. The controversy surrounding the 
shareholder and stakeholder view of the public corporation is not new. It has, in fact, been in 
existence since the establishment of the modern corporation in the nineteenth century and 
reflects the two opposing views of the corporate purpose.546 These opposing views regarding 
the purpose of the corporation led to the emergence of two theories: the shareholder value also 
known as the shareholder primacy theory and the stakeholder theory.547  But, it was the 
exchanges between Adolf Berle and Merick Dodd that gave the debate the prominence and 
currency that it has gained. 
Berle holds the view that because the responsibility of managing the corporation has been 
delegated by shareholders to management, corporate managers have the responsibility to 
exercise those powers to advance the interest of the shareholders.548 According to Berle ‘all 
powers granted to a corporation or management are at all times exercisable only for the rateable 
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benefit of the shareholders’.549 In effect, corporate performance should be measured through 
what Stout calls the ‘single metric of share price’550 and profit maximisation for shareholders. 
Accordingly, Berle posits that corporations are simply vehicles for the advancement and 
protection of the shareholder interest, hence, corporate law should reflect this both in 
application and interpretation. Berle further argues that any other account of corporation’s 
function and purpose would defeat the very object and nature of the corporation itself’.551  He 
declared:  
                 [ I] n every case, corporate action must be tested twice: first, by the technical rules having to do with 
the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those 
which apply in favour of a trust created for a beneficiary.552  
To strengthen this position, Berle made a comprehensive analysis of corporate governance and  
concludes that the exercise of corporate power should revolve around the principles of equity.  
This, he insists, is to ensure that management acts in utmost good faith towards all shareholders  
arguing ‘corporate law is in substance a branch of the law of trusts.’553  He admits, however,  
that corporate power should be less rigorously applied than in a trust situation as more flexibility  
is required in running a business corporation.554  
 Berle’s position represents the shareholder school of thought which views the corporation as 
the property of the shareholder whose interest the corporation exists to serve. From this 
perspective, corporate managers are viewed as agents acting upon the instruction and direction 
of the shareholders. Berle opines that because managers derive their authority and legitimacy 
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from the shareholders, it becomes imperative that their actions should aim at advancing 
shareholder interest. This contrasts sharply with the position adopted by Dodd, who argues that 
corporate managers as representatives of the corporation are required to seek and promote the 
interest of all the corporate constituents and not just the shareholders.  
Exactly a year after the publication of Berle’s article, Professor Merrick Dodd of the Harvard 
Law School challenged Berle’s assertion in an article entitled ‘For Whom are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?’ Dodd rejects the traditional view as advocated by Berle that a corporation 
is an association of stockholders formed for private gains and to be managed by the board of 
directors for the sole purpose of making profits.555 He further argues that the corporation 
becomes a distinct legal entity upon incorporation and cannot be regarded as the mere 
aggregation of the shareholders adding ‘our legal tradition is rather in favour of treating it as an 
institution directed by persons who are primarily fiduciaries for the institutions rather than for 
its members’.556 
According to Dodd, the contractual relationship between the managers of the corporation and 
the shareholders is that of agency rather than trusteeship.557 He opines that because the 
corporation is considered a distinct legal entity separate from its shareholders, it is in fact, the 
corporation and not the shareholders who contract with outsiders.558 Therefore, the management 
as agents and indeed, representatives owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and not its 
shareholders.559 To this end, he argues that the law should ensure that corporations are 
accountable to the society in which they exist and operate saying: 
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[T]here is in fact a growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that 
corporate managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal compulsion 
manage it in such a way as to fulfil those responsibilities.560 
To buttress this point, Dodd referred to the Supreme Court decision in Mum v. Illinois where 
the court held that the State of Illinois had the power to set maximum prices for grain storage 
because such businesses were ‘affected with a public interest’.561 This ruling had two major 
implications. First, it made it possible to extend the proposition that public interest 
considerations need to be factored into corporate managerial decisions and actions. Second, as 
Dodd points out, the law is gradually moving towards the view that all businesses affect and 
are also affected by the environment and the society in which they operate. Indeed, the 
enactment of the Adamson Act of 1916 to specifically cover the rail road industry was intended 
to increase the wages of workers; and exemplifies how workers’ economic security have been 
prioritised over and above shareholder profits.562 
Dodd points out the significant shift both in terms of the law and public opinion in the direction 
where the corporation is seen as ‘an economic institution which had a social as well as a profit-
making function’.563  Dodd cites Owen Young, the then CEO of General Electric as an example 
of the growing public opinion that is gradually shifting towards the stakeholder paradigm.564  
According to Young, corporate managers were no longer just attorneys for stockholders but 
have become trustees for the corporations they manage, adding ‘I am a trustee of the institution 
and not merely an attorney for the investor’.565   This admission is quite significant because it 
underscores a shift in public opinion towards the stakeholder theory of corporate governance 
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and that business leaders and management of corporations were beginning to accept albeit 
reluctantly, that their obligations extend to constituents other than shareholders.  
This voluntary assumption of social responsibility was gradually manifesting itself in matters 
such as contributions to charity and other socially responsible acts. Berle’s response to this 
proposition was prompt but not unexpected. In his view, giving management that much freedom 
to use corporate resources for charitable purposes could lead to possible abuses and managerial 
absolutism.566 Social responsibility, he argues, cannot be justified for two reasons.  
First, most managers, with a few exceptions do not subscribe to the idea that corporations have 
social responsibilities.567 Secondly, the mechanism to ensure enforcement and compliance did 
not exist and thus, dismissed that proposition as an avenue for managerial abuse. Against this 
backdrop, Berle rejects the suggestion that corporations had any responsibility to consider 
outside those of shareholder-interests noting ‘responsibility to stockholders should not be 
weakened except for a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone 
else’.568 
The final aspect of the Berle-Dodd debate centres on how effective the law can be in ensuring 
that the directors act in the best interest of shareholders. Considering the reality of the situation 
in the 1930s, Dodd takes the position that the law should enable corporate managers to assume 
larger social responsibilities in view of the pervasive influence of corporations on society in 
general. Berle, on the other hand, feared that such a proposition would further confer legitimacy 
on uncontrolled and excessive corporate power.569 
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3. 7 Discussion and Analysis 
The Berle-Dodd debate has generated a lot of interests, provided insights and to some extent, 
questioned some of the ideological assumptions underpinning the purpose of the firm. In this 
context, it provides a detailed exposition about some of the long-held propositions, conceptions 
and perhaps misconceptions regarding the two main contested theories of corporate governance 
namely shareholder theory and stakeholder theory. The eighty-year old debate concerning the 
corporation and its purpose goes beyond mere historical interest but has current relevance and 
significance as well. 
The issues raised in the debate were very clear and unambiguous. Arguing in favour of 
shareholder primacy, Berle explains that corporate management should be required by law to 
act in the utmost good faith towards shareholders.570 This relationship, he argues, should be 
defined and mandated by law along the lines of trusteeship where the power is exercised for the 
benefits of shareholders.571  
It is important to stress that this is not the first time Berle had expressed this proposition. While 
examining the position of management in 1926, Berle contends that the best way to hold 
management accountable is through disclosure of information adding ‘courts cannot act, and 
public opinion cannot act unless the facts are disclosed’.572 According to Berle, because 
individual shareholders are incapable of exercising any meaningful and effective control over 
corporate management, control should be imposed by law.  
Moreover, the dispersed nature of shareholders coupled with the cost involved in enforcing 
their rights and the difficulty in obtaining information, explain why shareholders are unable to 
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exercise any effective control over management.573 Berle’s propositions have however, been 
criticised as flawed and defective. 
First, Berle fails to demonstrate in concrete terms how these laws are to be fashioned, what 
forms they should take, how they can be enforced, and more importantly, who takes charge of 
the enforcement. Secondly, it is important to point out that merely having legislation in place 
is not enough. Indeed, as the recent GFC demonstrates, legislations per se do not guarantee 
prudent conduct on the part of corporate management just as voluntary codes alone cannot 
ensure good corporate behaviour. 
Dodd adopts a more extreme position by relying on the managerial principle which states that 
in a situation where shareholders are dispersed, management should not be accountable to any 
specific group. Rather, the responsibility, he argues, should be the protection of the interest of 
all stakeholders including shareholders. Against this backdrop, Dodd maintains that such 
responsibilities should be made mandatory, saying ‘any substantial assumption of social 
responsibility by incorporated business through voluntary action on the part of managers cannot 
be reasonably expected’.574  
In this context, Dodd proposes the concept of ‘managerialism’ as a principle of corporate law 
since doing so would enable both the law and public opinion to influence the conduct of those 
who direct and control corporate affairs.575 It is equally important to note that the conduct of 
corporations is affected not just by the laws that regulate them but by the force of public opinion 
and the attitude of business towards their social obligations. It is submitted that corporate law 
and indeed, corporate governance must reflect this shifting public opinion regarding the purpose 
of the corporation in society. 
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Like in many debates, the views of Berle and Dodd were surprisingly compatible576 particularly 
concerning the lack of corporate accountability and the extensive powers and influence 
management have acquired at the expense of shareholders. These powers were often so arbitrary 
that the two protagonists recognised the need to have a mechanism to curb these managerial 
excesses. Moreover, they both agree on the need to hold management accountable for the proper 
discharge of their duties according to law. It is however, doubtful whether the imposition of 
legal requirements is enough to make corporate managers accountable. In the same breath, 
giving corporations a free hand to operate without certain minimum legal requirements is also 
not viable option.577 
As already indicated, the debate exposes some serious disagreements regarding the role of 
corporate management and what should be their position vis-à-vis the shareholders.578 The 
major difference between Berle and Dodd is whether managers should be required to act merely 
as fiduciaries towards stockholders or accept a greater role by acknowledging that their duties 
and relationship extend to other stakeholders. 
There is now a growing recognition, particularly in the US and other jurisdictions that the 
responsibilities of corporate management towards other stakeholders should be mandatory as 
these powers are held in trust for the entire community.579 The justification being that 
corporations are legal entities created by the state for public benefit, hence they should 
necessarily have a much broader purpose beyond making profits for their shareholders.580 
Dodd provides several interpretations of his view on the need for the law and explains that 
social responsibility requires that corporate managers pay attention to the needs and concerns 
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of their employees and customers as this would ultimately benefit stockholders.581  For instance, 
Dodd opines that although corporate charity does not immediately increase stockholder wealth, 
it could generate goodwill in the community.582 Such goodwill could be beneficial both to 
stockholders and the entire company in view of the favourable image and perception customers 
have about such an entity. In the end, it accomplishes two goals by increasing both profits and 
growth while at the same time contributing to the well-being of society.583 
Berle however, rejects this proposition and argues that any extension and broadening of the 
responsibilities would rather lead to greater powers being vested in the corporate management 
who may be tempted to abuse such powers.584 He maintains that the only way to avoid this is 
to require the ‘publicizing’ of their activities by putting in place a full disclosure regime.585 
While agreeing with Berle for a full information disclosure regime, it is unclear whether such 
disclosures should be legally required or simply embodied in voluntary codes.  Each of the two 
approaches to information disclosure has its own merits and demerits.586 For instance, although 
the US had some of the strongest and legally-binding disclosure regimes in the world, that alone 
could not stop the managerial abuses and excesses that led to the failure of Enron, WorldCom, 
Arthur Anderson and Lehman Brothers.587 Similarly, the UK prides itself of the superiority of 
its voluntary codes under the principle of comply-or- explain. Yet it could not prevent the fall 
of Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland to name but a few.588 
Against this background, it is submitted that the success or otherwise of information disclosure 
requirements will to a large extent depend on the readiness of corporate management to comply 
with both the letter and spirit of the legal requirements and disclosure regime. 
                                                          
581 ibid 
582 ibid 
583 Bakan (n 343) 47. 
584 ibid 
585 Bainbridge (n 105) 48. 
586 ibid 
587 Clarke (n 33) 77. 
588 ibid 
Chapter 3 
107 
 
Interestingly, with the passage of time, the parties to the debate have tended to shift and even 
changed their positions.589 Nearly ten years after the debate had begun; Dodd openly 
acknowledged and admitted in 1942 that some of his earlier views and concerns about the lack 
of corporate accountability had been addressed by certain specific legislations granting 
statutory labour rights such as the right to organise and the right to bargain with management 
on equal terms.590 
Moreover, many of the policy changes including unemployment, insurance and social security 
had been incorporated into federal laws and unemployment policies in the US as well as in 
Germany.591 Further, Dodd changed his earlier position and admits  that the new federal 
securities laws have dramatically and successfully affected the balance of power between 
shareholders and managers.592 This sudden retreat by Dodd from his earlier stance is in 
recognition of the reassurances provided under the various governmental interventions under 
the New Deal.593 Also, contrary to his earlier proposition, Dodd became increasingly sceptical 
of managers and their willingness to act in the interests of shareholders. He therefore, questions 
whether and to what extent managers can be trusted to protect shareholder interests, arguing ‘A 
situation in which the shareholders have to depend rather on the conscience of the management 
than on their own legal rights is a dangerous one’.594  This statement contradicts and indeed, 
represents a fundamental shift in Dodd’s earlier assertion that most managers could be trusted 
to act in the best interest of shareholders. These developments can be explained by the changes 
in the legal, political and economic landscape. Indeed, the passing of the new federal securities 
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laws and the fact that the economic crisis that engulfed America had almost come to an end 
attest to the new reality. 
Similarly, in 1954, Berle altered his position in response to changes in American society 
following the introduction of the minimum wage, antitrust laws and other legislative 
initiatives.595 This is quite understandable considering the fact that it was the absence of these 
socially-oriented policies that provided the epilogue to the debate in the first place.596  Clearly, 
Berle’s more recent optimism and to a large extent the willingness to accept some level of 
controls appears diametrically opposed to his previous assertions.597 Berle, had by this time 
overcome, albeit reluctantly, the hitherto misgivings he had in respect of the lack of a clearly 
defined legal framework for wider corporate responsibilities.598 He admits that: 
[T]wenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor Merrick Dodd, of Harvard 
Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers were trust for shareholder while Professor Dodd 
argued that corporate powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument has been 
settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favour of Professor Dodd’s contention.599   
Berle’s admission although very significant does not repesent a complete shift or reversal of his 
earlier position. There is no doubt that he acknowledges and accepts Dodd’s point of view but 
Berle still remains unconvinced when he insists that ‘It is one thing to agree that this is how 
social fact and judicial decisions turned out. It is another to admit that this was the ‘right’ 
disposition: I am not convinced that it was’.600 Clearly, this statement does not give any 
indication or provide evidence of surrender by Berle in this debate.601  That notwithstanding, 
Berle in the latter part of his writings accepts that the corporate purpose goes beyond 
shareholder value maximisation. He declares: 
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[I]t seems almost essential that if the corporate system is to survive, the control of the great corporations 
should develop into a purely neutral technology, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the 
community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream based on public policy rather than 
private cupidity.602 
Despite the change in his positions, the earlier proposition advocated by Berle remains the 
prevailing theory that has dominated corporate governance theory and practice up to date. This 
thinking has given rise to a governance model that compels executives to prioritise the interest 
of shareholders above all others.603 Indeed, the assertion that corporations exist solely to 
maximise returns to their shareholders has in the words of Kelly ‘become the law of the land’604 
universally accepted as a kind of divine, unchallengeable truth. 
3.8 Relevance and Implications 
Often, general propositions do not decide specific cases, but future predictions and 
developments are hardly possible without them. It may therefore, be argued, that the Berle-
Dodd debate goes beyond just mere intellectual disagreements between two renowned 
academics.605 The debate and its relevance has been demonstrated by the legislative initiatives 
adopted in response to the widespread demand for accountability, transparency and the need to 
reform the way companies are directed and controlled.606  
Despite the importance of the issues raised by the debate, it was a Senate Committee 
investigation into security dealings of the New York Stock Exchange that finally prompted 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to establish a committee to draft new bills to address the 
concerns raised in the Berle-Dodd debate.607 The Committee uncovered massive tax avoidance 
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by stock market dealers, the sale of bad investments to an unsuspecting public, the manipulation 
of stock prices and insider trading.608   
Following these revelations, it became necessary to enact legislations to rein in these 
unacceptable practices and bring them under control. Pressure was thus, brought to bear on the 
government which in turn responded by setting up a committee to review such business 
practices. Critics however argue, that this action though progressive at its face value was,  
simply a confidence-building measure aimed at restoring public confidence and                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
more importantly, avoid another stock market failure as happened in 1929/30.609  
Whatever the motivation, the work of the committee led to the enactment of the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934.610  The 
Securities Exchange Act (1933) required full and complete disclosure of information by dealers 
in new securities and imposed heavy penalties for failure to state or deliberately misstating any 
material fact in their prospectus.611  Accordingly, the Federal Trade Commission was set up to 
administer the Act and given the additional responsibility of prescribing the form and contents 
of the financial statements by firms listed on the NYSE.612   
Furthermore, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act 1933 was also passed to resolve the challenges 
confronting the banking and the financial industry.613 This Act specifically requires the strict 
separation of commercial banking from investment banking activities so as to avoid the abuses 
that have engulfed the banking industry prior to the market crash of 1929.614 In effect, the Act 
was designed to provide for safer and prudential use of bank assets, regulate internal bank 
                                                          
608 Collin Mayer, Firm Commitment (OUP 2013) 32. 
609 ibid 
610 Merrick E. Dodd, ‘The Modern Corporation, Private Property and Recent Federal Legislation’ (1941) 54(6) 
Harvard Law Review 927. 
611 ibid 
612 ibid 
613 Bratton (n 562) 738. 
614 ibid 
Chapter 3 
111 
 
control and prevent the abuse and diversion of funds into speculative activities. The general 
belief was that separation would lead to a much healthier financial system. 
Another important innovation of the Act was the introduction of the federal guarantee of bank 
deposits which created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).615 Under this 
scheme, the FDIC insured deposits up to $2,500 which was thereafter increased to $5,000 a 
year later.616 The passing of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and the subsequent establishment 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission was yet another important outcome of the Berle-
Dodd debate.  
Unsurprisingly, government presented these legislation amidst much fun-fare as responding to 
public interest and satisfying the demands of the American public for more transparency and 
greater corporate accountability.617 From this perspective, it is submitted that the “New Deal” 
represents an important milestone in the evolution of corporate governance because it 
introduced major regulatory reforms designed to restore economic stability and curb the 
excessive powers of corporations. Notwithstanding the strong resistance and outright hostilities, 
the spirit of the “New Deal” along with many of the regulatory regimes prevailed.618 
These legislations were greeted with scepticism by critics who questioned the motives and 
intentions of government in passing these laws.619 Questions were raised as to whether the 
passing of the legislation regarding full information disclosure was indeed, a genuine attempt 
to rectify the shortcomings in the existing corporate law regime.620 Or were these just cleverly-
designed ploys to placate investor needs and satisfy the political mood of the time? Arguably, 
the introduction and the eventual passing of the securities legislations were politically motivated 
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and self-serving.621 Apparently, the legislations followed what is often referred to as the 
‘justification demand’ or ‘public interest’ approach to regulation.622  This method of regulation 
is used merely to facilitate wealth transfers: including the imposition of higher taxes and tariffs 
by using the public interest argument as the main weapon. Such policies are usually advocated 
under the pretext that it is in the public interest to do so, or everybody is made better off or that 
the action is fair.623  In view of this, it can be argued that the legislations had very little to do 
with safeguarding or promoting public interests.624 Later events tend to support this view as it 
became obvious that despite the widespread expectation generated by the passing of the 
securities legislations, very little had been achieved in terms of exerting greater control on 
corporations and ensuring that management maintain the high level of accountability and 
transparency envisaged under the Act.625  In fact, the Securities Act for example, only applies 
to the issuing of new securities but fails to address one of the main issues raised by Berle; which 
is that corporate management should be required by law to act in a fiduciary capacity towards 
the shareholders.626  
Furthermore, although the legislations received widespread acceptance at the level of 
government, they failed to address the underlying philosophy of ‘publicizing’ corporate 
affairs.627 As a result, financial reporting by corporations in the US remained largely 
unregulated till the late 1960s due mainly to the absence of a full and complete disclosure 
regime.628  Until then, corporate reporting in the US was based on the notion that the reporting 
system should reflect the principle of managerial supremacy and control over corporate assets 
                                                          
621 Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman ‘The Demand for and Supply of Accounting Theories: The Market for 
Excuses’ (1979) 4 The Accounting Review 135. 
622 ibid 
623 ibid 
624 ibid 
625 One-Tel scandal (n 137). 
626 Macintosh (n 526) 152. 
627 ibid 
628 ibid 
Chapter 3 
113 
 
and the ability of the corporation to discharge its duty to shareholders.629 This made corporate 
managers to focus on share price and quarterly earnings on the assumption that corporate 
purpose must be viewed solely from the perspective of the shareholder.630 
The Securities Exchange Act that was passed ostensibly to address the issue failed to live up to 
expectation. Instead of conforming to its stated goals and objectives, it applied different 
reporting requirements in respect of filing reports to shareholders and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).631 The dangers of different reporting requirements and standards 
became apparent following the failure of the Atlantic Research Corporation to report its 1968 
annual losses to shareholders  although such losses had earlier been reported in the fillings 
submitted to the SEC.632 Admittedly, the Securities legislations that have been enacted between 
1933-34  provide legislative and administrative checks on corporate management in America.633  
Dodd however, insists that these were considerably different from what was envisaged at the 
beginning of the debate.634 
Berle on the other hand was more concerned about the inadequacies of the legislative measures 
(Securities Acts). In his view, nothing in the Act could have actually prevented the misuse and 
abuse of corporate powers which sparked the debate in the first place.635 He argued that the act 
only prohibited speculation by management; hence, the securities legislation had essentially 
little to do with the conduct of the corporation’s affairs beyond requiring regular publication of 
                                                          
629 ibid 
630 Stout (n 29). 
631 ibid 
632 George J. Benston’ Public (U.S) Compared to Private (U.K) Regulation of Corporate Financial Disclosure’ 
(1976) 51 (3) The Accounting Review 483. 
633 Edward Mason, ‘Foreword’ in Adolf A. Berle Jr, Corporation in Modern Society (Harvard University Press 
1960) 4. 
634 Bratton (n 562) 17. 
635 ibid  
Chapter 3 
114 
 
information considered accurate by accounting standards.636 These criticisms are, however, not 
justification to consign the Berle-Dodd debate to the ‘scrap heap of irrelevant texts’.637 
 The Berle-Dodd debate helped draw attention to the issue regarding the purpose of the 
corporation, the extent of its responsibilities and to whom corporate managers should be held 
accountable. Moreover, despite the differences regarding a corporate accountability, there was 
a consensus that in the absence of effective shareholder control, a full and complete disclosure 
of information remains the most effective way of ensuring that corporate managers act in the 
interests of the corporation. This laid the foundation for the full disclosure philosophy that has 
become an integral part of the corporate governance regime in the US. 
Moreover, the concerns expressed by Berle and Dodd on the lack of corporate accountability 
had significant influence in the drafting of the subsequent securities legislations. Of relevance 
is Berle’s assertion that the most effective way to control corporate management is to require 
them to publicise their activities. The need for full disclosure of information as advocated by 
Berlet became an integral part and indeed, the focus of the securities legislation enacted in 1934.  
Similarly, the views expressed by Dodd were equally important in providing an alternative 
conception of corporate purpose which stresses greater accountability on the part of corporate 
management towards the larger community and not just shareholders. Arguably, the Berle-
Dodd debate went beyond being a mere intellectual exercise. In fact, it played a critical role in 
shaping corporate governance thinking and the evolution of corporate governance rules and 
legislation in America over the years. 
 It is worth mentioning that the debate, though very important, did not represent a major 
conceptual shift in the shareholder primacy view of the firm.638  The shareholder view of the 
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firm continues to be the dominant theory in both business and academic circles. It has also 
attracted a rather disproportionate attention of laymen, journalists, economist and legal scholars 
who passionately propagate the superiority of this corporate governance model.639 
Subsequently, the perceived superiority of the shareholder primacy theory became embedded 
in corporate governance practice and inspired a legion of academics and practitioners to find 
ways to perpetuate a governance model that compels managers to focus more on maximising 
shareholder value.640  
To fully appreciate how the shareholder primacy has assumed such prominence in the corporate 
governance discourse, the next section of this chapter evaluates its evolutions, development and 
the forces that continue to drive and sustain it. 
3.9 Shareholder Primacy Theory 
The debate between Berle and Dodd on corporate governance scholarship has continued till 
present date among those who favour shareholder primacy.641  Shareholder primacy is based on 
the idea that shareholders ‘own’ the company and hence its primary purpose is to maximise 
profits for the shareholders.642  The theory assumes that corporate purpose must be viewed from 
the perspective of the shareholder whose only interest and concern centres on the share price of 
the company.643  On the other hand, there are those who subscribe to the view that because of 
the immense power it exercises over society, the corporation has an obligation to serve the 
interest of society as a whole not just those of shareholders.  
Among these competing ideas, it is the shareholder primacy theory that has gained traction and 
prominence in corporate governance practice.644  Since the early 1990s corporations have come 
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under considerable pressure to adopt the shareholder primacy orientation as a central policy as 
well as the driving force of corporate governance.645  The pressure was more intense in the US 
where the concept had its origins and is alleged to have transformed the economy. 
Similarly, businesses in Europe began to follow suit so as not to be left out or put into a 
competitive disadvantage.646  This partly explains why the rhetoric of shareholder primacy647 
and its supposed ability to enhance the earnings of shareholders gained prominence in major 
European economies like Germany, France and Sweden traditionally associated with the 
stakeholder-oriented model of corporate governance.648  
The spread of the shareholder primacy model into Europe and other parts of the world was 
further facilitated and promoted by the IMF, World Bank and OECD through the various 
corporate governance codes and principles.649 Accordingly, standards such as fairness, 
transparency accountability and responsibility were touted by the OECD as ‘universal 
standards’ that can be applied across board irrespective of differences in the political, economic 
or legal environment.650 The guidelines derived from the OECD standards with its Anglo-
American shareholder-oriented governance became the benchmark against which to measure 
good corporate governance.651  Apart from the IMF, World Bank and OECD, Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRA) also played a significant role in propelling the shareholder primacy model into 
becoming such a pervasive and deeply entrenched concept in corporate governance circles.652 
At this juncture, it is important to have a clear understanding of the terms shareholders and 
ownership as applied in this thesis because the entire debate regarding the role of the corporation 
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and whose interest it is meant to serve hinges on the concept of ownership and the rights arising 
thereof. 
In general terms, shareholders refer to those who own shares in a company and the concept of 
shareholding is synonymous with membership.653 Shares of a company can be acquired through 
subscription to the memorandum and articles of association of the company at its formation; 
purchase of shares directly from the issuer company; purchase and transfer of shares from an 
existing shareholder and finally the transmission of shares on the death or bankruptcy of a 
shareholder.654 The acquisition of shares by the shareholder confers contractual and statutory 
rights on the shareholder vis-à-vis the company.655 
Ownership denotes a legal right or any legally protected interest that one may have in a 
particular property.656  According to Waldron, ‘ownership expresses the abstract idea of an 
object being correlated with the name of an individual’.657  Blackstone on the other hand, takes 
a more cynical view of ownership, and defines it as ‘the sole and despotic dominium which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world in total exclusion of the rights 
of any other individual in the universe’.658  All the above definitions consider ownership as the 
ultimate property interest and the means by which society signifies the person or persons with 
primary, but not necessarily exclusive control over a thing.659 
Ownership remains the foundation on which all other rights in property depend.660 This right 
of ownership comprises three elements namely: the right to use, the right to regulate the use by 
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others and the right to transfer the rights to another on agreed terms.661 These three fundamental 
elements of ownership will form the basis of assessing if shareholders ‘own’ the company. 
The central argument and perhaps, justification for shareholder primacy is the ownership rights 
that have been ascribed to shareholders. But as Ireland rightly argues, whichever way one looks 
at it, whether form the nexus of contract or the agency theory perspective, shareholders do not 
own the company but the capital.662 According to Ireland, by the close of the 19th century, the 
concept of shareholder no longer involved ownership of corporate assets due mainly to the 
principle of limited liability which has made holding more diverse and less risky.663 Arguably, 
with the passage of time, shares came to ‘exhibit debt-like features’664 as shareholders get more 
‘passive, functionless and without appreciable risk’.665 These developments and changes in the 
ownership structure render the justification for their residual ownership rights untenable.666 
Similarly, Pennington contends that shares ‘are simply bundles of contractual and statutory 
rights which the shareholder has against the company’.667 Therefore, the relationship between 
the shareholder and the company is that of creditor and debtor.668 This reaffirms the position in 
Blight v. Brent as far back as 1834 when the court held that ‘shareholders had no direct interest, 
legal or equitable in the property owned by the company, only a right to dividends and a right 
to assign their share for value’.669 This ruling reinforces the proposition that the tangible assets 
are owned by the company, whilst the intangible share capital of the company remains the 
property of the shareholders.670 As Ireland rightly notes, ‘a vital legal space has emerged 
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between companies as owners of the property and shareholders as owners of shares’.671 In this 
respect, it would be wrong to confuse ‘ownership of capital with ownership of the firm’.672 
Moreover, ownership rights, especially the right to use, appropriate and dispose of are absolute 
and imprescriptible; hence shareholders cannot claim ownership rights when they do not have 
direct rights of control over such companies. In fact, it is only the company, as a legal entity 
that can exercise the right to use, appropriate the returns and dispose of them in accordance 
with management decisions.673 The paradox however, is that although the shareholder 
ownership arguments have been debunked, the idea continues to shape the corporate 
governance discourse and put shareholders at the centre of the governance stage.674 
It is worth mentioning that the discussion regarding the relationship between the shareholder 
and the company predates the Berle-Dodd debate. Prior to the Berle-Dodd debate, it was 
postulated that shareholders own the company and that companies were established to maximise 
profits for their benefit.675 This proposition, however, obscures the fundamental power 
asymmetries in the political economy of the corporation.676 The discourse is about power 
struggle that has been fuelled by the different perceptions of the nature and role of the modern 
corporation.677  
The proposition as mentioned earlier, is credited to Robert Lowe, the then Vice President of 
Board of Trade (UK) who, whilst introducing the Joint Stock Companies Bill of 1856 in the 
House of Commons, set out the principles to serve as blue prints for future legislations. The 
underlying principle embedded in the Lowe’s company legislation of 1856(Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856)  explains that companies are economic entities and owe their 
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responsibilities to their shareholders even if by so acting, ‘the company may be acting contrary 
to broader social interests’.678  The idea was given legal recognition and became enshrined in 
the company legislation of 1856 and later reinforced in the subsequent legislation of 1862.679 
This created not only the social framework within which the modern company now exists and 
operates but more importantly it laid the theoretical and philosophical foundation for the 
shareholder primacy as we know it today.680 Indeed, section 172 of the UK’s Companies Act 
2006 affirms this position when it states ‘the primary duty of directors is to run the firm in a 
way that promotes the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders’.681 This 
provision effectively endorses and reaffirms the primacy of shareholder under UK Company 
Law. In the words of Keay, ‘section 172(1) does not introduce a new duty, it is rather a statutory 
restatement of established Law’.682  
In their attempt to justify shareholder primacy, advocates make certain influential but 
questionable claims which unfortunately, have become acceptable on the bases of the perceived 
superiority of the theory.683 These claims have led to a situation whereby maximising 
shareholder profits have become the main and perhaps the only corporate objective.684 
Basically, proponents make three claims to justify this proposition including: the functional 
claim, moral claim and prudential claim.685  
Proponents of the prudential claim argue that shareholder primacy ensures greater control over 
management and promotes the efficient allocation of capital and other resources.686  This school 
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of thought considers the rate of return as a measure of superior performance and for that reason 
maximising shareholder value becomes a creed to uphold and defend687`by  prioritising the 
interest of shareholders above all others.688  Advocates of the functional claim hypothesis 
contend that shareholder primacy and control rest on their contribution of risk-carrying 
capital.689 It has been argued that because shareholders provide the risk-carrying capital while 
other claimants are covered by contracts, shareholders deserve to be rewarded by maximising 
their share value.690  
The moral claim on the other hand is based on the liberal doctrine of property rights.691  The 
main thrust of this argument is that ownership is simply an extension of fundamental rights 
which gives the owner full and absolute right of disposition over the object. Shareholders should 
therefore be rewarded in keeping with the ‘principle of reward according to contribution’.692  
A closer examination of these claims reveals however, that they are as weak as they are 
unconvincing. First, the efficient market hypothesis depends first and foremost, on an even flow 
of information among and between the market players.693 Disclosure and transparency are 
prerequisites for the operation of an efficient market which has not been the case as far as 
shareholders and corporate management are concerned.694 
According to Clarke, ample evidence exists to suggest that in the recent crisis, the relevant 
information regarding risk management was not made available either to the boards or the 
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public.695 This was acknowledged by the then UK Financial Services Authority (FSA)696 which 
admits that information asymmetries between management and uninformed ordinary investors 
‘resulted in price inefficiency’ and market distortion.697  
Information asymmetry apart, there is also the problem of information failure/deficit inherently 
embedded in the complex systems and structures of most of the corporate entities. This 
reinforces Stiglitz’s assertion that ‘when information is imperfect, markets do not often work 
well, and information imperfections are central in markets’.698 
Also while share pricing, supposedly, remains the objective standard of managerial efficiency, 
in practice, share prices of most financial institutions preceding the 2008 financial crisis did not 
reflect or demonstrate any of the presumed efficiencies.699  Moreover, the idea that the market 
for corporate control is the optimal governance model was also brought into question as there 
were no opportunities to easily acquire most of the failing financial institutions.700 Arguably, 
shareholder primacy approach characterised by deregulation and short-term profit 
maximisation has proved to be unsustainable in the long-term.701 This is because the 
fundamental prerequisites namely, perfect information, competition and rational markets for 
the operation of market to act as a disciplining mechanism were absent.702  
Finally, the moral claim argument becomes untenable in the face of incontrovertible evidence 
that shareholders are after all not ‘owners’ of corporations.703 Advocates of shareholder value 
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are asserting a moral claim which upon closer examination is inconsistent with the overall 
notion of ownership as defined by law.704 
Indeed, the shareholder primacy concept is not monolithic in terms of ownership. Two 
competing variants namely the principal-agent model and the myopic market model can be 
identified; the difference being in the nature and type of ownership with respect to the 
company.705  
The principal-agent model operates on the basic assumption that the purpose of the corporations 
is to maximise shareholder wealth since they are the residual claimants to the company’s assets 
and earnings.706 Two problems arise from the principal-agency relations. The first, is how to 
ensure and also verify what the agent is doing and whether such action serves the interest of the 
principal.707 Secondly, the preferences of the principal and agent may differ both in terms of 
actions and attitude toward risk.708 As Letza et al. 709 point out, these two problems have led to 
agency costs as the principal attempts to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s best 
interests.710The paradox however, is that in trying to resolve the agency problem, the current 
governance approach uses stock options to reward managers under the guise of aligning 
management and shareholder interest. This unfortunately, leads to excessive risk-taking and 
short-termism. To overcome these challenges, it is submitted that a more inclusive governance 
model which takes a long-term view and considers the interest of other equally important 
corporate constituents should be adopted. This must be backed by an optimal incentive scheme 
that will balance the various competing interest not just that of shareholders.711 
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The myopic market model takes a common position with the principal-agent model which 
believes that the corporate purpose is to serve shareholders’ interests.712 It however, remains 
critical of the preoccupation with short term gains, immediate returns on stock prices and other 
performance indexes as determined by market pressures.713 
Advocates of this model contend that the problem with corporate governance arises from its 
tendency to encourage short-termism at the expense of the long-term view of the corporation.714  
This has become possible because financial markets often compel corporate managers to behave 
in a way that may not necessarily ensure the maximisation of long-term wealth for the 
shareholders.715 The solution, it is submitted, lies in radical reforms in corporate governance 
thinking and practices whereby managers are encouraged and where necessary, mandated to 
adopt long-term horizons rather than short-term profit maximisation.716 
Whichever way one looks at it, shareholders occupy a privileged position within the firm often 
with ownership-like rights.717 In a bid to assert this ‘ownership right’ proponents insist that 
increasing share value, whether for normative or efficiency reasons remains the ultimate goal 
of every corporate governance regime.718 According to them, share value  reflects growth and 
profitability of shareholders’ investments and also indicates overall firm performance and 
wealth.719  Hence, management should maximise shareholder value, first, to align the interests 
of management and shareholders: and second, because financial markets are deemed to be more 
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efficient at deploying corporate resources than managerial discretion.720  For these reasons it is 
imperative that the corporation is run and managed in their interest.721 
Another argument that has been used to justify the shareholder primacy is the consequentialist 
hypothesis. According to proponents of the shareholder primacy theory, it is not just 
shareholder interest that is enhanced but rather the entire economy benefits.722 Supporters of 
the consequentialist hypothesis argue that as the firm maximises its value, everyone including 
workers, consumers, suppliers and society become the ultimate beneficiaries.723 Advocates 
opine that job creation and revenue generation by particular firms constitute critical functions 
of shareholders with huge socio-economic benefits for the larger society.724   
Adherents cite the stock market boom of the 1990s and the general prosperity of the American 
economy in the late 1990s as ample evidence of the economic benefits of shareholder 
primacy.725 To the consequentialists, ‘theory has been borne out by practice’ and that the 
shareholder value remains the path to the long-term sustainability of the corporation.726 These 
claims and assumptions have provided the theoretical justification for the emergence and 
eventual dominance of the shareholder-oriented governance model which focuses on protecting 
and advancing shareholder interests to the neglect of other corporate constituents.727 
3.10 Mistaken Assumptions 
Shareholder primacy has undoubtedly, attained world-wide prominence and influence over the 
last four decades.728  But this rosy view of shareholder primacy and its ability to deliver superior 
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economic performance is premised on certain faulty assumptions.729 Such assumptions, to a 
large extent, tend to overestimate the efficiency, importance and relevance of the shareholder 
primacy theory. In fact, these assumptions ignore the inherent weaknesses of the theory as 
manifested by the devastating events of 2008.730 In both theory and practice, the arguments for 
maximising shareholder value are premised on three basic assumptions, which upon critical 
examination have proved untenable.731  
The first mistaken assumption often made by laymen, economists and in some instances legal 
scholars is that shareholders are the owners of corporations. Prominent economists such as 
Milton Friedman often assert that shareholders ‘own’ corporations without providing empirical 
evidence for their assertions. Writing in the New York Times Milton argues that the sole purpose 
of the corporation is the maximisation of shareholder value to the exclusion of other 
constituents.732 Similarly, Hansmann and Kraakman in their ‘End of History for Corporate Law’ 
thesis posit that the shareholder model of corporate has triumphed over other models and it 
would not take long for the other models to converge towards the Anglo-American model.733 
Interestingly, Hansmann and Kraakman’s claims about the superiority of the shareholder model 
began to look increasingly suspect as a number of American companies started crumbling under 
the weight of corporate scandals.734  
Aside the lack of empirical evidence to support this proposition, the legal basis cannot be 
substantiated. From the legal perspective, shareholders cannot be said to own corporations 
because ‘corporations are independent legal entities that own themselves, just as human beings 
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own themselves’.735 As a ‘juridical person’ a corporation can hold property in its own name, 
enter into binding contracts and can be held liable for committing tortious acts or acting 
negligently in respect of product and employer liability. For instance, in March 2013, Lamprell 
Plc, an Engineering company was fined £2,428,300 by the FSA for breaching the listing rules 
as contained in the Financial Services and Market Act of 2000.736 
 Indeed, the relationship that exists between the shareholders and the company is purely 
contractual and not that of ownership as shareholders are nowhere near to fulfilling the eleven 
ownership tests developed by Honore`.737 Honore’ defines ownership as the ‘greatest possible 
interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognises’.738 In analysing jurisprudence in 
property, Honore’ set out eleven standard tests to determine ownership. This comprises the right 
to possess, the right to manage, the right to the income, the right to the capital, the right to 
security, the right to transfer, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution and the 
incident of residuality.739  
Moreover, the recognition of full ownership rights requires that the entity or individual must 
meet most of these standards or tests. The ownership claims by shareholders when put to the 
test reveals that it only satisfies two out of eleven, hence any claim of such ownership becomes 
untenable.  This suggests that ‘while many individuals and groups [customers, shareholders, 
lenders, employees and directors] have rights and obligations around public companies, none 
of these claims can plausibly be described as ownership’.740  
Shareholders own shares of stock which is simply a contract between the shareholder and the 
corporate entity, which gives the shareholder some limited rights and under certain 
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circumstances.741 Hence, the position of shareholders/stockholders with respect to the company 
is no different from that of bondholders, suppliers and employees; all of whom have contractual 
relationships with the corporation. Once it is recognised that shareholders and companies 
contract with each other, the ‘ownership’ arguments become untenable and disintegrates in the 
face of economic theory according to Black and Scholes.742 In their work on option pricing 
which formed the basis of modern options theory, they note that, once a corporation issues 
debts, the debt holder has purchased the right to the company’s future profits but at the same 
time provides for option that allows him/her to avoid any losses in the company’s value below 
a certain point.743  
Thus, from the option theory perspective, it is untenable for shareholders to lay claim to 
ownership rights. Corporations according to Stout, ‘own themselves, and enter into contracts 
with shareholders exactly as they contract with debt holders, employees and suppliers’.744 
Moreover, it should be noted that ‘ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership 
of the firm.’745 Arguably, each factor in a firm is owned by somebody; as such the firm is ‘just 
a set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from 
outputs are shared among inputs’.746  Thus, the claim of ownership becomes irrelevant in this 
context and cannot be the justification for shareholders to demand that the company be run for 
their benefit. 
Another assumption that has persuaded many experts to accept the normative desirability of 
shareholder primacy is the assertion that shareholders are the ‘residual claimants’.747  In both 
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legal and economic terms, a residual claimant refers to the party entitled to keep the residual 
profits after the business entity has fulfilled its legal and contractual obligations. These 
obligations include: the payment of interest due creditors, wages due to employees, statutory 
payments and taxes due to governments. The underlying principle is that there is a ‘voluntary 
association’ in which the shareholder is regarded the weakest of the parties and whose only 
right is the right to the residual claim.748 Per this reasoning, shareholders are the only residual 
claimants in public corporations while other constituents such as employees, customers, 
creditors and suppliers are entitled to what the law and their formal contracts allow. The 
contention is that because the interest of other constituents/stakeholders are fixed and 
determinate, whatever is left after all the contractual and other statutory obligations have been 
met, becomes the residual claim to which shareholders are rightly entitled.749 According to 
Clerc, this represents the ‘crumbs which must be protected so that those crumbs are not taken 
away by those who have the right to the comfort of fixed payments’.750 The way to increase the 
level of residual claim the argument goes, is by increasing the value of the corporation itself.751 
Although very appealing at its face value, the justification for the residual claim hypothesis 
appears to be faulty and unconvincing for several reasons.  
First, the proposition that shareholders are the residual claimant has its origins in bankruptcy 
laws, where the courts in the course of distributing  assets of liquated companies  are required 
to pay stockholders last after claims of employees, debt holders, creditors and statutory 
payments have been settled.752 Even under bankruptcy proceedings, courts often require 
creditors to share in the losses suffered by equity holders to some extent.753 Hence,  the claim 
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that shareholders are the residual claimants as proponents of shareholder primacy seem to 
suggest, is factually and legally inaccurate. 
Moreover, the concept of residual claimants is in relation to companies that are being liquated 
in bankruptcy proceedings in court and not companies that are still operating as going 
concerns.754 It is therefore, untenable to equate the function of a living, profit-generating 
company with that of a business entity under liquidation.755 This is because living corporations 
differ fundamentally from corporations under bankruptcy in terms of their purposes; as such 
any reference to shareholders as residual claimants becomes a distortion of the reality.756 
The reality, and indeed, the legal position under company law is that shareholders can only 
receive money from a functioning public corporation under two conditions.757 The first 
condition is that only directors are legally mandated to declare and pay dividends to 
shareholders when company is financially sound. Second, the decision to pay dividends only 
becomes effective when the board decides to exercise that authority and mandate.758 Essentially, 
none of the above conditions can be fulfilled unless the board so decides as the ultimate decision 
will be contingent upon the financial viability of the firm as well as the willingness and legal 
ability to pay dividends.759  
Even in situations where corporations make enough profits, increase their retained earnings and 
can pay dividends, directors still retain a wide margin of discretion under the business 
judgement rule. The business judgement rule is a corporate law doctrine in the US which holds 
that absent evidence of fraud, illegality or conflict of interests, the courts will not second guess 
the board’s decision in respect of what is best for the company including the payment of 
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dividends.760  The doctrine was applied in Paramount Communications, Inc. vs. Time Inc.761  
where the court ruled that the decision by the board of Time Inc. (Respondent) to reject a 
takeover bid from the Plaintiff Company was an action covered by the business judgment 
rule.762 A similar situation pertains in the UK where the courts are very much reluctant to 
interfere with management decisions. As a result, directors are not obliged to pay dividends 
even if the corporation has accumulated enough profits or increased its retained earnings.763 
From the above analysis, it is submitted that, it is indeed, a misnomer and mischaracterisation 
of reality to describe shareholders of a public corporation that continues to operate as a going 
concern as residual claimants.764 
Advocates of the shareholder primacy theory further assert that shareholders are principals 
while directors are agents.765 The principal-agent relationship evolved following the growth in 
the size and complexity of modern corporations which made it necessary to engage professional 
managers to oversee the day to day running of these corporations.766 Legally, a principal 
normally refers to someone who hires another person; called the agent to represent and serve 
his/her interests.767 In line with the principles governing principal-agent relationships, the 
principal exists prior to and independent of the agent. But under the present scenario, when a 
company is formed, it first appoints directors who will later be mandated to issue shares and 
contract to acquire stockholders.768 Logically, both the corporation and the board of directors 
must necessarily exist prior to and independent of the shareholders.769 Under the principal-agent 
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relationship, the principal retains the right to control the actions of the agent. But a fundamental 
principle of corporate law is that corporations are controlled by management under the 
supervision of the board of directors instead of shareholders.770 In fact, the ability of 
shareholders to directly influence managerial decisions is rather limited. The very limited 
instances in which shareholders can directly influence or exercise any right of control is the 
right to vote during annual general meetings, the right to sue and the right to sell their shares 
under certain limited conditions. It can be argued however, that these rights have very little 
practical effect as the right to vote is severely limited while shareholders’ right to sue has 
remained but illusory.771 Under the shareholder primacy theory, it is expected that shareholders 
will carefully monitor the activities of management and possibly intervene where genuine and 
legitimate concerns exist.772 The reality, however, is that rather than monitoring management, 
there appears to have been widespread acquiescence and a culture of apathy especially among 
institutional investors (shareholders). Möslein for example, contends that institutional 
shareholders were particularly impotent, and indeed, apathetic in respect of the sale of ABN 
AMRO to the Royal Bank of Scotland in October 2007.773  There is ample evidence to suggest 
that both individual and institutional shareholders failed to provide any effective counter-weight 
to poor managerial decisions of companies and financial institutions prior to the 2008 GFC. 
This explains why Myners refers to shareholders as absentee landlords before and during the 
GFC.774 
Similarly, Hector Saint accuses shareholders of being ‘too reliant and unchallenging in respect 
of the companies under their stewardship despite having the right to directly or indirectly 
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influence the governance process’.775  In the face of this, the suggestion that shareholders are 
principals who have control or leverage over the management (agents) is not supported by 
empirical evidence. Indeed, the reality tells a different story. 
3.11 Conclusion 
For nearly eighty years there has been an interesting but often controversial debate about the 
purpose of the public corporation in society. The long-running discourse which culminated in 
the Berle-Dodd debate centres on whether the public corporation’s main and indeed, sole 
purpose is to serve the narrow interests of the shareholders through profit maximisation. The 
alternative view is whether the corporation should concern itself with serving the interests of 
other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and creditors. The outcome of this 
debate and the subsequent discussion is the emergence of the shareholder and stakeholder 
theories of corporate governance. A few decades after Berle had surrendered to managerial 
supremacy, shareholder primacy began to resurface as the new model of corporate governance.  
By the close of the 20th century, shareholder primacy had become the dominant paradigm of 
corporate purpose due largely to influential writers including: Michael Jensen, William 
Meckling, Milton Friedman and other writers from the Chicago school of thought.776 It was 
through the influence of their writings that the shareholder primacy assumed the central place 
in law and economics school of legal jurisprudence.777  
The shareholder primacy movement was further given impetus at the international level by 
multilateral organisations such as the OECD, IMF and the World Bank. These organisations 
devoted considerable attention to the subject and have on several occasions introduced models, 
                                                          
775 Hector Saint, ‘The Financial Crisis: The Role of the Investors’ (Speech delivered at the NAFT Investment 
Conference, 11 March 2009) 
776 Palmer (n 70) 312. 
777 ibid 
Chapter 3 
134 
 
codes of conducts, principles and standards which reinforced the shareholder-oriented model 
of corporate governance.778  
The significance of the shareholder primacy theory in shaping corporate and securities laws in 
the US and other parts of the world is obvious and cannot be denied.779 Interestingly, although 
the shareholder primacy has lost most of its theoretical credit, it continues to be expounded in 
practice with astonishing frequency.780 It is, thus, fair to say that support for shareholder 
primacy may have waned but not completely eroded. 
Apparently recent events, especially the GFC, has challenged and to some extent, undermined 
this perspective of corporate governance.781 In fact, the theory has come under attack after the 
Enron debacle in 2001, and has also been severely criticised and blamed for being the 
underlying cause of the 2008 GFC. Central to this, is the proposition that shareholder primacy 
gave birth to a corporate governance model that compels executives and management to 
prioritise the interest of companies and their shareholders above all other interest. In this 
respect, meeting short-term profit targets became the main pre-occupation of executives and 
management. Consequently, corporate managers who failed to meet the value maximising 
demands of shareholders were replaced through the market mechanism, which proponents 
assert, is the most efficient control mechanism. From the above discussion, it is submitted that 
the corporate scandals of the past three decades and the recent GFC are emblematic of the 
shareholder oriented capitalism that evolved and developed in the 1980s and 1990s.782 
As already indicated, the shareholder primacy concept has turned out to be a mistaken belief 
based on the fundamentally-mistaken economic theory of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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Markets by themselves, as Stiglitz explains, do not produce desirable outcomes or results.783 
Indeed, the GFC which compelled governments in the US and the UK to use tax payers’ money 
to bail out failing financial institutions contradicts the efficient market hypothesis and its 
propositions.784 Thus, the GFC has in so many ways exposed the inherent weaknesses, dangers 
and failures of the markets to self-correct.785 
Unlike in the UK where company law makes some provision for shareholder primacy in section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006, US corporate law neither requires nor makes it mandatory for 
managers of public corporation to maximise shareholder value.786 Interestingly, although it is 
yet to adopt a uniform approach to the shareholder primacy theory, there is a general acceptance 
that shareholder primacy forms the basis of company law in the UK.787 Secondly, as this chapter 
demonstrates, an examination of the economic structures of public corporations reveals that 
shareholders are neither owners nor residual claimants nor principals as the theory seems to 
suggest. Indeed, the ownership rights of shareholder become even less convincing when viewed 
from Honore’s ownership test. Out of the eleven (11) requirements that must be fulfilled before 
one can claim right of ownership, shareholders at best fulfil not more than two (2).788 This leads 
to the conclusion that the idea of ‘share is a misnomer, for shareholders no longer share any 
property in common’.789  As a result, Ireland dismisses the idea of shareholder ownership and 
describes it as ‘transcendental nonsense’.790 
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Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that shareholder-oriented 
approach is superior in terms of economic performance. On the contrary, shareholder primacy 
with its focus on short term profit maximisation undermines the long-term interests of 
shareholders, the corporation itself, other constituents and the larger society.791 
This chapter has provided an overview of the shareholder primacy theory, its evolution, flaws 
and weaknesses. It has explored the complex interactions between shareholders, management 
and boards and places the current GFC in its proper context. It thus, explains and concludes that 
shareholder primacy is not just a mere theoretical abstraction or concept totally unrelated to 
reality and practice. Against this backdrop it is useful to understand that the emergence and 
dominance of the shareholder primacy is of conceptual importance and profound practical 
significance.792  
Arguably, the theory not only manifests itself in the way corporations have been perceived and 
governed, but it has also has been influential in shaping the laws, codes and conventions that 
govern the conduct of corporations. A combination of these developments created a vision of 
corporate purpose founded on shareholder primacy which focuses on profit maximisation, 
short-termism and market fundamentalism. Moreover, rules concerning executive 
compensation, disclosure, protection of shareholder rights and risk management practice all 
tend to tilt towards satisfying shareholder interest and empowerment. 
Clearly, the GFC has tested the fragility of shareholder primacy thinking and rendered most of 
its assertions obsolete as it failed to fulfil the functions on which its legitimacy is premised. 
Indeed, the functional claim, the prudential claim and the moral claim hypothesis underlying 
the shareholder primacy have all been proven to be misleading and faulty.793 The inherent flaws 
of this governance model in combination with the management practices that emerged as a 
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result, account for the 2008 GFC. Having examined the theoretical underpinnings of the crisis, 
the next chapter explores the how the US government responded to the crisis and questions 
whether such responses address the underlying cause of the GFC.        
Chapter 4 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Corporate Governance Reforms in the US Post the Financial Crisis. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 As already explained in the previous chapter, the GFC is rooted in the shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance model with its emphasis on profit maximisation and the relentless pursuit 
of short-term gains regardless of the harmful consequences.794 The ineffective risk management 
practices, excessive compensation schemes and the failure on the part of Gatekeepers are 
symptomatic of the shareholder primacy governance model which compels executives to 
prioritise shareholder interest above all others.795  
A combination of the above factors triggered the US housing bubble followed by the collapse 
of large financial institutions around the world.796 The conditions that created the potential for 
the crisis were years in the making and relate to the shift of emphasis in terms of the corporate 
purpose where the corporation has become a vehicle for the promotion and perpetuation of 
shareholder interest. The desire to maximise profits coupled with low interest rates, easy 
availability of credit, lax regulatory regime and toxic mortgages provided a perfect mix that 
simply ignited an already volatile situation.797 
The crisis peaked in September 2008 with the failure of Lehman Brothers and the impending 
collapse of American International Group (AIG).798 Panic followed, first, due to lack of 
transparency in the balance books of major financial institutions and, second, the 
interconnectedness among financial institutions deemed too big to fail. Unsurprisingly, the 
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failure of these two systemically-important institutions caused the credit market to seize up and 
compelled trading activities to come to a stand-still. The repercussions of the crisis were 
widespread, leading to the collapse of financial markets and institutions, sharp decline in 
industrial output, a drop in foreign direct investments, job losses and a general economic down 
turn.799  At the peak of the crisis more than 26 million Americans were out of work, 4 million 
families have lost their homes and another 4.1 million have slipped into foreclosures.800 
Furthermore, $11 trillion household wealth had vanished while retirement accounts and life 
savings were swept away.801 
The financial crisis has highlighted what should have been apparent all along: that without clear 
rules, transparent and accountable governance systems, crisis become unavoidable. This is 
because financial institutions when left to self-regulate will inevitably engage in practices that 
tend to maximise profits for short-term gains and place shareholder interest above any other 
interest.802 The events of 2007 were not mere accidents but what analysts have come to expect 
of a free market economic system.803 Against this backdrop, it is submitted that most of the 
problems confronting the corporate sector and the larger American economy are the unintended 
consequences not of the corporate governance failures per se, but of a mistaken idea that 
corporations ought to be run ‘to maximise shareholder value as measured by share price’.804 
Clearly, the underlying assumptions which have dominated corporate governance thinking and 
practice for the last thirty years have proved to be faulty, misplaced and unsustainable.805 
Indeed, the GFC and its attendant repercussions have rendered obsolete the prevailing 
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intellectual assumptions regarding the supposed superiority, the legal bases and justification for 
the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance.806 
Consequently, this thesis argues that the current shareholder-oriented governance model   must 
give way to an emerging governance process that takes a long-term view of the corporation.807  
This emerging governance model entails a redefinition of the corporate purpose to satisfy the 
interest of all corporate constituents as distinct from shareholder interest. In effect, the corporate 
arrangements must provide a setting where powers are balanced and the diverging interests 
synthesized.808 Arguably, a redefinition has become imperative as the GFC has rendered the 
current governance arrangements obsolete.809 In that respect, the GFC provides an opportunity 
to redesign and rethink an alternative governance model which has relevance both in theory and 
practice.810  This shift in the definition and conceptualization of the corporate purpose becomes 
more urgent because despite the obvious flaws and the dangers it possess to both the 
corporations and society in general, the shareholder primacy maxim still represents the 
mainstream theory in today’s corporate governance.811  
What is perhaps, surprising though, is that the policy reforms undertaken by the US authorities 
and governments around the world after the GFC seem to be addressing the symptoms and not 
the causes. Arguably, the reforms are considered a return to business as usual as they fall short 
of sustained intellectual engagement with the underlying causes of the GFC.812  This section 
examines the policy responses of the American government in terms of legislation, regulation 
and governance in the face of the financial crisis. In so doing, the thesis evaluates the post-crisis 
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policy initiatives in the US and questions whether they constitute the appropriate responses to 
the GFC.  
4.2 US Government Response 
The 2008 GFC was obviously a major policy challenge for the government of the US as some 
of the nation’s largest financial institutions were headed towards collapse while the entire 
economy was under the threat of recession.813 To prevent this, the federal government adopted 
a variety of measures, some conventional, others nonconventional and some even contradictory 
to traditional government position and orthodox economic thinking.814 Arguably, the 
inconsistency in government response was a major policy mistake which added to the 
uncertainty and panic in the financial system.815 For instance, the initial decision to rescue Bear 
Stearns and then place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship was hailed as a 
determined attempt by government to stem the effects of the crisis. But a policy reversal saw 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers only for government to turn around and rescue American 
Insurance Group (AIG). This demonstrate inconsistency and lack of policy coherence on the 
part of the US authorities to manage the crisis. 
The initial response of the US authorities consisted of slow-paced ad-hoc measures ostensibly 
designed to mitigate the crisis.816 This later gave way to a series of legislations, the outcomes 
of which have not been particularly coherent.817 The Federal Reserve Bank was the first to 
response to the crisis by lowering the discount rate from 100 to 50 basis points to ensure that 
inter-bank lending transactions are not disrupted.818  The action had very little effect as financial 
institutions were still unable to borrow or lend; leading to the downward spiral of the US 
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financial system.819  As a result, the administration introduced new policy initiatives including 
the Economic Stimulus Act 2008 (ESA), the Emergency, Economic Stabilisation Act 2009 
(EESA), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009 (ARRA) and the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act 2010. This section examines these legislations and 
evaluates whether, and to what extent they address the causes of the GFC. 
4.2.1 Economic Stimulus Act 2008 (ESA) 
Nearly two years into the crisis, it became evident that the traditional monetary policy approach 
had its limitations. As a result the US government turned to fiscal policy to help stabilise the 
economy by enacting the Economic Stimulus Act 2009 (ESA).820  The legislative intent of ESA 
is to boost the US economy and avert a possible recession through increased spending and tax 
rebates.821 Accordingly, the Act provides tax rebates to low and middle income tax payers such 
that single individuals received between $300 and $600 while couples were paid between $600 
and $1200 in the form of tax rebates.822 In addition, households also received $300 per child in 
the form of child tax rebates.823 The stimulus payments in 2008 were historically larger- 
amounting to about $100 billion in real terms and twice the size of the 2001 rebate 
programme.824 The Treasury Department disbursed $79 billion in the second quarter of 2008- 
corresponding to 2.2 per cent of GDP, while $15 billion were disbursed in the third quarter of 
2008 representing 0.4 per cent of GDP.825 Furthermore, tax incentives were introduced under 
the Act to encourage and stimulate business investments.826 A total of $266 billion million was 
appropriated under the Act, 50 per cent of which was spent on the payment of tax rebates for 
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individuals while the other part offered one-time incentives for investment in new equipment 
and write-off for tax losses.827 Supporters of ESA argue that in times of financial crisis, fiscal 
policy measures in the form of tax rebates and transfer programmes respond quickly and 
successfully to economic slowdowns. From this perspective, it may be argued that the stimulus 
programme not only boosts the spending of households receiving tax cuts and transfers or 
businesses receiving investment incentives, it has other critical indirect effects. For instance, it 
has a multiplier effect as higher household spending invariably encourages firms to hire more 
workers which further boosts their incomes and spending. Moreover, the additional incomes in 
the form of tax cuts and transfers to families/households are likely to be spent on consumption 
thus, helping to protect families from the effects of the economic down turn while increasing 
economic activity at the same time. But critics argue that the Act is not the appropriate response 
and does not go far enough considering the severity of the crisis.  
First, it fails to include long-term policy objectives such as permanent tax cuts but focuses 
narrowly on stimulating the economy through business and consumer spending.828 Arguably, 
the Act only serves the present purpose of making modest contribution to the economy by 
raising consumption but the long term impact has been negligible and to some extent 
negative.829  In fact, the stimulus programme under ESA increased the budget deficit by $152 
billion in 2008.830 Against this backdrop, ESA becomes difficult to justify because the cost of 
the programme far exceeds its purported social and economic benefits as has been argued by 
its proponents. 
Second, it is debatable as to whether the Act did in fact stimulate consumption in the American 
economy. Apparently, no significant increase in spending has been recorded following the 
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introduction of the tax rebates. As Tailor rightly arugues, the programme has been wrongly 
targeted as it focused on providing tax cuts and incentives for businesses most of whom fall 
within the higher income bracket.831 Arguably, Households with higher incomes are generally 
able to handle their consumption during the business cycle and they do this either by reducing 
their savings or increasing their borrowing. Consequently, making additional resources 
available to such high-income households is likely to have no or very limited impact on 
consumption. According to Tailor ‘there was no statistically significant increase in 
consumption following the rebates because most people saved their funds and did not spend 
their rebate checks’.832  
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) acknowledges that under the current circumstances, 
the Act may serve a useful purpose but makes no lasting contribution to the economic growth 
and financial stability of America.833 According to the CBO, the outcome of the Economic 
Stimulus Act has not been particularly effective and coherent because by the end of the year, 
the impact on overall economic activity had disappeared.834 Moreover, the ESA is merely  an 
ad hoc measure designed to mitigate the immediate effect of the crisis rather than being a long-
term solution.835 Whichever way one looks at it, the ESA fails to address the fundamental cause 
of the GFC and in that respect, remains an inadequate policy response. In fact, the Act reinforces 
the shareholder value approach to corporate governance by incorporating several provisions 
that rather seek to empower shareholders. 
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Perhaps, it is these inadequacies that prompted the US government to seek more comprehensive 
legislation in place of the present Economic Stimulus Act. This is because the impact and 
outcome of the Act have not been particularly coherent and effective in resolving the 
fundamental cause of the GFC.836  Thus, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 
which is the focus of the next discussion was enacted in response to the inherent shortcomings 
and inadequacies of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. 
4.2.2 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 (EESA) 
As the economic situation continued to worsen, it became obvious that a much more robust   
response was required to stabilise the economy. This broader legislative response emerged in 
the form of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 (EESA). Section 101 of the Act 
establishes the Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) ‘to purchase, and fund 
commitments to purchase troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and 
conditions as are determined by the Treasury Secretary in accordance with the Act’.837 The Act 
defines troubled assets as: 
 [R]esidential or commercial mortgages and any other securities, obligations, other instruments that are based on, 
or related to such mortgages that in each case was originated or issued on, or before March 14, 2008, the purpose 
of which the Secretary determines promotes financial market stability.838 
The objective of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is first and foremost, to 
stabilise the economy through various policy initiatives. To this end, the Act establishes the 
$700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) under which the Treasury Secretary 
is authorised to purchase ‘troubled assets’ such as mortgages, securities and other related 
instruments. The secretary was further required to develop policies and procedures in relations 
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to the purchase of such toxic assets.839 In essence, the broader objective of EESA is to provide 
stability to the US financial system, prevent a further disruption in the larger economy and 
protect the taxpayer.840  Before delving into the detailed discussion, it is important to understand 
the structure of TARP, the powers and authority of the Treasury Secretary, the regulatory 
mechanism and the oversight framework.  
As earlier mentioned, the EESA empowers the Treasury Secretary to purchase, manage and sell 
assets held by financial institutions as defined in section 3(5) of the Act.841 It also allows the 
Treasury to repurchase or engage in other financial transactions in respect of troubled assets at 
any time and upon terms and conditions and at a price to be determined by him. Furthermore, 
the Act grants the Treasury Secretary a wide margin of discretion to determine the specific 
characteristics of assets that qualify as troubled assets, the manner of arriving at a price and the 
criteria for participation.842 
The rationale behind such broad powers is to enable the Treasury Department to develop wider 
but prompt responses to crisis rather than allowing different institutions to fashion individual 
institutional responses.843  It is thus, important to stress that these discretionary powers are not 
without limitations. First, the Treasury Secretary can only sell assets in a manner that is devoid 
of conflict of interest and with minimum negative long-term impact on the economy.844  Second, 
the exercise of these discretionary powers requires the Treasury Secretary to be guided by the 
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protection of taxpayer interest, the stability of the financial markets, preservation of 
homeownership and the long-term financial stability of the affected financial institutions.845  
Within the context of fulfilling its mandate and providing the appropriate policy framework, 
the Act establishes a number of offices (bodies) to implement TARP, oversee its operations as 
well as conduct investigations where necessary. These bodies include: Office of Financial 
Stability (OFS), Office of Special Inspector General (IG), Financial Stability Oversight Board 
(FSOB), and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP). Each of these bodies was given a 
clearly defined mandate and assigned specific duties, functions and responsibilities. The 
introduction of these stringent measures forms part of the checks and balances meant to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the management and operations of TARP.846 
In executing its mandate, TARP focuses on four main areas namely: economic stabilisation, 
preservation of homeownership, taxpayer protection and restrictions on executive 
pay/compensation.847 This section explores how far these measures achieve the goals set under 
the Act and most critically whether such taxpayer-funded purchase of troubled assets is the 
appropriate response to the GFC. 
 4.2.1.1 Stabilising the Economy 
As already indicated, the need to mitigate the effects of the crisis and stabilise the economy 
became the immediate concern and priority of the US government.  A cornerstone of the 
stabilisation effort was the government’s purchase of equity in financial institutions and 
insuring troubled assets against unforeseen future losses. Consequently, $700 billion were 
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provided under EESA allowing the Treasury Secretary to buy mortgages and other toxic assets 
on the balance sheets of most financial institutions in the US.848  
In fact, the capital levels of financial institutions in the US following the GFC were  depleted 
to the extent that it became difficult to raise new capital in the market so government capital 
injection to stabile the banks through public funding became the only viable policy option.849 
The $700 billion facility authorised by the Act was implemented in two stages of $350 billion 
each.850 First, the Treasury invested $250 billion directly in the equity of US financial 
institutions half ($125 billion) of which went to nine major American financial institutions 
namely: Citigroup, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, State Street, Bank of New York and Merrill Lynch.851  These recipients were chosen 
because they were considered ‘too big to fail’ due to their size, interconnectedness and systemic 
importance.852 As a result, these institutions were not subjected to the formal scrutiny and 
evaluation process required by the TARP guidelines.853 
As the crisis evolved, it became apparent that focusing on the toxic assets on banks’ book alone 
was not sufficient to resolve the problems in the industry. Consequently, the original mandate 
of TARP was expanded to include the provision of funds to strengthen bank capital through 
stock purchase.854 This measure enabled banks to resume lending to the private sector and 
helped reduce the pressure on banks to contract their lending.855 
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Supporters of TARP posit that the injection of $125 billion into the nine biggest banks in the 
US marked a turning point in government attempt to mitigate the effects of the GFC. This 
intervention helped to improve the liquidity of financial institutions and other entities whose 
operations have been hampered by difficulties in mortgage-related assets, thus avoiding an 
imminent collapse of the entire financial system.856  In that respect, TARP is considered an 
effective policy response because it enabled government to buy distressed assets from financial 
institutions, eased the credit freeze and encouraged such institutions to resume lending again.857   
The scope, authority and powers of TARP were broadly defined and went beyond capital 
injection into financial institutions. Although congress did not pass a specific legislation in 
respect of the automobile industry, the Treasury recognised the need to provide financial 
support for the automobile industry that was at the brink of collapse following GFC.858 In total, 
TARP funds provided an $80 billion assistance package to the automobile industry.859 The 
initial programme targeted General Motors (GM), GMAC/Ally Financial, Chrysler and 
Chrysler Financial in response to the immediate needs of these firms.860 This was followed by 
preferred share purchase in GM and Chrysler to ensure their long-term financial viability. Under 
the programme, GM received $50.2 billion while Chrysler got $10.9 billion.861 Similarly, 
GMAC/Ally and Chrysler Financial received $17.2 billion and $1.5 billion respectively.862 
The acquisition of majority shares in GM and minority shares in Chrysler raised serious 
corporate governance issues. The programme resulted in majority government ownership of 
GM (60.8 per cent) and minority government ownership of Chrysler (9.9 per cent).863 In return, 
the government not only exercised managerial control over these firms, it also designated ten 
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of the thirteen directors of GM and in the case of Chrysler government designated four of the 
nine directors.864 Consequently, government effectively became a reluctant but controlling 
shareholder in these firms; made possible by government’s ability to cause the removal of the 
CEO as well as effect changes in the composition of the board of directors.865 It must be 
acknowledge tha,t although exercising managerial control is not the stated goal of TARP, it is 
necessary to protect and compensate tax payers for the assistance given to these companies. 
Outlining the principles to guide the management of government ownership stakes, President 
Barack Obama explained that government had no desire to own equity any longer than 
necessary and will dispose of its ownership interests as soon as practicable, emphasising: ‘The 
financial crisis has put our government in the unwelcome position of owning large stakes in 
private companies for the simple and compelling reason that their survival and the success of 
our overall economy depend on it’.866 Admittedly, the revival and the long-term survival of the 
US economy depends on providing the necessary support for both financial and non-financial 
firms through   public-funded programmes.867 Unlike financial institutions whose bailouts were 
driven by fears of the impact on the financial markets, the decision to rescue GM and Chrysler 
was informed by the strategic importance of the automobile industry as a major employer.868 
From this standpoint, it becomes apparent that the motivation for the GM and Chrysler bailout 
is to protect American jobs especially in the industrial Midwest, an area hard hit by the GFC.869 
Indeed, one of the conditions for providing the financial support is the commitment by GM and 
Chrysler to produce a substantial portion of their cars in the US.  Government assistance was 
also made conditional on the company’s acceptance to reduce compensation paid to US 
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employees to levels comparable with compensation paid by other car producers such as Honda, 
Nissan or Toyota at their US facilities.870  
Administration officials view the bailout package for financial institutions and the automobile 
industry as necessary and appropriate, arguing, that but for this intervention the financial crisis 
would have degenerated into a full recession.871 It has further been argued that a worsening 
economy would have also imposed other costs such as providing unemployment benefits for 
displaced workers on taxpayers. According to the Treasury Department, a total of 700 
institutions and firms in the automobile industry have benefited directly from this 
programme.872   
In fact, US government ownership in GM has reduced from 60.8 per cent in 2008 to 33 per cent 
following public share offering in December 2010; an indication that the investment made in 
GM had started paying off.873 Also, by the middle of 2010, government’s investment (shares) 
in most of these bailed institutions had reduced dramatically as banks and firms that received 
TARP funding returned to profitability and repaid their loans before schedule.874 
The rescue package for the banking and automobile industry has several critics most of whom 
have expressed serious concerns not just about government intervention in the financial 
markets, but more crucially, the overall impact and efficacy of the programme.875  For example, 
Diamond and Rajan argue that propping up weak institutions with toxic assets through capital 
injections as a means of stabilising the economy is counter-productive.876 Rather than 
stabilising the economy, capital injections into failed/failing institutions tend to increase the 
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incidence of asset fire sales that can cause liquidity to dry up and worsen an already volatile 
situation.877 
Furthermore, government intervention with capital injection sends the wrong signal to both the 
markets and the financial institutions. Arguably, such intervention can create an increase in the 
market’s expectation of future intervention and regulatory seizures thereby potentially 
impeding recovery in the financial sector.878 As Hoshi and Kashyap explain, the goal of 
financial rescue plan is to assure investors that the institutions are financially sound.879 The 
reality however, is that more often, capital injection generates an adverse signal that the 
recipient institution is expected to experience future losses. This has a deterrent effect on 
potential investors which makes it more difficult to raise new capital from outside investors.880 
Finally, it raises the question whether the bailout package for these failing firms and institutions 
addresses the issue of corporate purpose and whose interest they should serve. Apparently, 
while government recognises the need to intervene with public money to rescue these firms, 
their purposes were defined in terms of maximising shareholder value.  Apart from the changes 
in the management and governance structures, there have been no fundamental changes in the 
underlying philosophy of the nature and purpose of the corporation. This is not surprising, 
because American corporate governance has become hostage to what Black describes as 
‘dictatorship of shareholder primacy’.881 
4.2.1.2 Preserving Homeownership  
With the onset of the crisis, it became apparent that the right of mortgage holders (homeowners) 
to stay in their homes came to depend on their ability to refinance the ever-increasing debts. 
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Banks and other financial institutions were unable to provide the credit at the time when it was 
most needed resulting in 4 million families losing their homes to foreclosures,882 while another 
4.5 million have slipped into the foreclosure process or are behind on their mortgage 
payment.883  
Therefore, the introduction of the Homeownership Preservation Scheme (HPS) under TARP is 
arguably, a timely intervention and appropriate response by government to mitigate the social 
and economic consequences of the housing crisis.884  The problems arising from the failure of 
financial institutions were so severe that it became necessary for the Treasury Department to 
act swiftly to reduce panic in the housing market and more importantly prevent foreclosures.885 
Consequently, congress enacted section 110 of EESA mandating the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) to develop and implement a plan of action aimed at providing the necessary 
assistance for homeowners.886  It further tasked these agencies to use their authority to 
encourage mortgage lenders to take full advantage of the newly-established programme for 
homeowners (HOPE) in order to avoid or minimise foreclosures.887 In the case of residential 
mortgage loans, such modifications included reduction in interest rates, reduction in the 
principal and other similar modifications.888  The Act thus, empowers these agencies to modify 
troubled loans many of which have been contracted under questionable circumstances, and to a 
large extent, predatory lending practices.889  It also directs federal agencies to modify their loan 
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agreements with homeowners and provides such agencies with funding to achieve these goals. 
For instance, in July 2008, Congress authorised the Treasury Secretary to provide financial 
assistance to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to enable them support home owners who would 
otherwise lose their homes.890 Under the homeownership preservation scheme, different models 
of assistance were initiated and implemented. For example, the Home Affordable Modification 
Programme (HAMP) supports the payment of mortgage-related services to reduce the financial 
burden of home owners.  Even though a total of $29.9 billion was earmarked for this programme 
only $2.85 was disbursed as at December 2010.891  Similarly, the Hardest Hit Fund (HHF) helps 
state housing finance agency programmes in States with very high unemployment rates or 
States that have experienced the steepest declines in home prices. Eighteen States have so far 
participated in the HHF under which just $ 0.9 billion has been disbursed out of the $ 7.6 billion 
set aside for that purpose.892  In addition to the above, the HOPE establishes the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) Short Refinance programme which aims at promoting refinancing of 
mortgages on the so called ‘underwater’ properties.893 These are properties on which the 
mortgage balance is far greater than the equity in the house. A comprehensive guideline of this 
programme was released in August to enable homeowners who owe more than the value of 
their homes to refinance through the FHA-insured mortgages.894 The caveat however, is that 
this is possible only if lenders agree to write-off part of the principal owed on the mortgage.895  
Despite the bipartisan consensus on the negative consequences of the housing bubble, there was 
less agreement as to the level of federal government involvement in preventing or minimising 
foreclosures.896 Proponents posit that enacting policies and using public resources to prevent 
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foreclosures was an economic necessity and a social imperative.897 Apart from assisting 
households experiencing difficulties, the measure helps to prevent further damage to home 
values and disruption to entire communities and has the additional benefit of stabilising the 
economy.898 
It can be counter argued, that such intervention is an infraction on the privity of contract 
principles which state that only parties to a contract can ensure its performance.899 In this 
respect, a case can be made that the issue at stake is that of a contractual relationship between 
the lender and the borrower. It should therefore be resolved between the two contracting parties 
without government involvement or intervention.900 There are also serious misgivings about 
possible abuse by people who may not really need or deserve help but want to take advantage 
of the programme. Furthermore, opponents object to the use of taxpayers’ money to support 
people who may be seeking to pass on their losses to the lender or taxpayer or people who 
knowingly took mortgages they could not afford.901 Despite the misgivings and controversies 
surrounding the HPS, the Treasury Department went ahead to commit an amount of $45.6 
billion to the programme but only $3.85 billion had been disbursed.902 
While acknowledging the need to protect and preserve home ownership, it is equally important 
to recognise that the idea was subject to several flaws which should have been obvious to the 
Treasury Department.903 Questions were raised as to the price the Treasury Department would 
pay for these toxic assets due to the lack of clearly defined guidelines on how much the Treasury 
is legally bound to pay. The dilemma the Treasury faces is that if it pays what was the true 
value, the programme would have been deemed to serve its purpose of assisting the banks to 
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recover.904  On the other hand, if the Treasury overpays, that would amount to a taxpayer’s gift 
to the banks in the midst of rising home foreclosures, increasing unemployment  and high public 
resentment towards banks.905  Notwithstanding the public anger, the US government proceeded 
to inject more than $200 billion into the banking industry alone, with an initial outlay of $125 
billion going to nine major American Banks: a measure that amounts to partial nationalisation 
never seen before in the US.906  But by taking semi-ownership of these entities, the Treasury 
ensured that the shareholder rights were well protected and not diluted.907 Clearly, this action 
significantly undermines the credibility of the efficient market hypothesis which has for decades 
dominated economic thought and practice in the US.908 In such circumstances, it becomes 
difficult to reconcile the free market system with government decision to rescue businesses that 
fail in that system.909 Admittedly banks seem to be more cautious than they were before the 
crisis but the reality is that the business practices, governance model and the incentives culture 
that triggered the financial crisis have not changed.910 This is not surprising because the 
philosophy of shareholder primacy as under pinned by free market capitalism still remains 
engrained in the US economic system.911 
 4.2.1.3 Taxpayer Protection 
The response to the crisis ignited the public-private debate regarding the use of taxpayers’ 
money to bailout privately-owned failing banks and other financial institutions.912 
Consequently, policy makers in the US acknowledge that public-funded bailouts, the 
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acquisition of toxic assets or mortgage-backed securities by the Treasury Secretary require 
some cost-benefits analysis in terms of the cost to taxpayer against the benefits to home owners 
and the economy.913  It was, however, recognised that promoting financial and market stability 
through the asset purchase programme should be done in a manner that ‘maximises the overall 
return to the taxpayer’.914  
Accordingly, section 113(d) of the Act requires companies selling ‘troubled assets’ to 
government to provide warrants so that taxpayers will benefit from any future growth that such 
a company will experience arising from participating in the programme.915 The Act further 
stipulates that the Secretary may not purchase, or make any commitment to purchase any 
troubled asset unless (a) the financial institution provides a warrant giving the Secretary the 
right to receive non-voting common stock or preferred stock,916 (b) provides a warrant for 
common or preferred stock or a senior debt instrument from the institution.917  By this provision, 
the recipient firms are required to give the Treasury stock or debt instruments which would 
provide for the reasonable participation by the Secretary for the benefit of the taxpayer.918  The 
import here is to guard against losses from sale of assets by the Treasury Secretary so as to 
protect taxpayer investment and maximise overall returns within competing constraints.919  In 
other words, the TARP recipient is expected to remain a competitive enterprise that should 
retain and recruit talented individuals who will contribute to the future success of the recipient 
company and ultimately be able to repay its TARP obligations.920 
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Obviously, section 11(d) reveals the continuous obsession with maximising overall returns for 
the benefit of the enterprise which most managers equate with shareholders. Moreover, the 
requirement to remain competitive reinforces the belief in market fundamentalism as espoused 
by the shareholder primacy. It is, thus, submitted that despite the attempt to portray a semblance 
of protecting taxpayer- interest, EESA is implicitly promoting the very idea that led to the GFC. 
Despite its imperfections, the TARP has largely protected taxpayers’ interest as most of the 
monies invested in these programmes have largely been recouped and in some cases profits 
declared.921 For instance, the Capital Purchase Programme (CPP) which was designed to assist 
financially viable institution through the purchase of preferred stock, enabled the Treasury to 
invest $205 billion in 707 financial institutions in 2009. By August 31, 2015, the department 
had received $227 billion as repayments and income from the investments made.922 
Moreover, by the middle of 2010 government investments in business reduced dramatically as 
many of the firms that received TARP funding made profits and repaid their loans before 
schedule.923 For instance, after divesting its shares in Citigroup in June 2010, the Treasury 
announced a TARP repayment of $ 194 billion exceeding the outstanding TARP funds of $190 
billion.924 Indeed, Bloomberg News captures how TARP not only protected but also benefited 
taxpayers in its headline: ‘Wall Street Bailout Returns 8.2 per cent Profit, Beating Treasury 
Bonds’.925 In other words, tax payer interest was better served by using public funds to rescue 
failing Wall Street banks than investing in government bonds during the crisis. This probably 
explains why the Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner calls the programme ‘the most maligned 
yet effective government programme in recent memory’.926 However, these optimistic 
assertions purporting to protect taxpayers obscure the inherent flaws requiring firms to give 
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stock or debt instrument the receipt of which would ‘provide for the reasonable participation’ 
of the Treasury Secretary.927  But deciding what is reasonable is discretionary which allows the 
Treasury Secretary to set the price, exercise the warrant and also determine the exceptions to 
these rules.928 Indeed, such vaguely-formulated provision gives too much power to the 
Secretary and undermines the very meaning, essence and effect of the warrants and the desire 
to protect the interest of taxpayers.  
Further, an evaluation of TARP seems to suggest that the programme was meant to save big 
banks at the expense of the taxpayer as evidenced by the enormous power granted the Treasury 
Secretary to determine which bank survived and which could fail.929 As it turned out, heavy 
toxic-loan infested banks like Citigroup and Bank of America were all supported irrespective 
of the cost to the taxpayer. Meanwhile, smaller banks numbering 132 went bankrupt costing 
the taxpayer over $1.2 billion. These banks collapsed either due to insufficient support or 
inability to compete with the bigger banks due to the implicit guarantees the bigger banks 
received from government with the attendant cheaper cost of borrowing. Admittedly, smaller 
banks may not posse a systemic risk to the financial system in terms of creating panic; but it 
does not mean that their failure has no cost to the taxpayer. In fact, the smaller banks in the US 
are the main source of loans for smaller and medium-sized businesses that create most of the 
jobs in America.  As such their failure has both direct and indirect consequences for the 
taxpayer.  
4.2.1.4 Executive Compensation   
Excessive executive compensation has been identified as one of the major triggers of the GFC. 
The wide-spread public outrage and criticism directed at the extravagant compensation 
packages for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of publicly-listed companies prompted congress 
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to respond in the form of legislation.930 In responding to these concerns, congress attached 
conditions to TARP assistance, the most important of which relates to executive compensation 
to ensure that senior executives are not rewarded by the bailout of these companies. 
Consequently, section 111 of ESSA restricts compensation for senior executives of financial 
institutions receiving TARP funding.931 Thus, entities receiving TARP assistance became 
subject to executive compensation requirements and corporate governance provisions.  These 
rules and requirements are, however, not uniform but differ depending upon whether the 
purchase was done under the Capital Purchase Programme (CPP)932 or under Troubled Asset 
Auction Programme (TAAP).933 
First, section 111 subjects financial institutions participating in CPP to a more stringent 
executive compensation regime so long as the TARP recipient has an outstanding obligation to 
the Treasury.934 This provision requires the institution to comply with guidelines on executive 
compensation as set forth in the Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and 
Corporate Governance.935 These standards include: a limitation on compensation and incentives 
regime that encourages senior executive officers (SEO) of financial institutions to engage in 
risky business practices which threaten the value and stability of such institutions.936  
It also prohibits the payment of golden parachute incentives to SEOs of financial institutions 
that access the TARP facility.937  Golden Parachute payment is defined as payment made to or 
for the benefit of an SEO on account of an applicable severance from employment to the extent 
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that exceeds or equals an amount three times the SEO’s basic pay.938 These payments are often 
made to SEOs on their departure from the company other than payments for services 
rendered.939 The Golden Parachute Rule as provided for in section 302(b)940 amends section 
280(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and restricts severance payments which occurs 
while TARP is still operational.941   
The Act further requires the return of unearned bonuses under the ‘claw-back’ clause.942  Claw-
back refers to the recovery of bonuses or other incentive-based compensation paid to SEOs 
based on earnings which are later proven to be materially inaccurate.943 The standards and 
requirements of the ‘claw-back’ under the CPP is significantly broader in scope in that apart 
from the CEO and CFO, they also apply to the three most highly compensated executive 
officers. Even more significant is the provision that the requirements apply to both public and 
private financial institutions and are not exclusively triggered by an accounting restatement. 
Finally, unlike previous provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2000 (SOX)944 which 
was limited to twelve months, the current provisions do not place a time limit on the period of 
recovery. 
To facilitate the effective implementation of these provisions, the Treasury created the Office 
of Special Master (OSM) for TARP executive compensation and charged it with the 
responsibility to review and approve executive compensation for TARP recipients. In carrying 
out these responsibilities, the OSM is guided by the two basic principles namely: the need to 
minimise risk and ensure taxpayer return.945 This is to avoid incentives that encourage 
employees to take unnecessary or excessive risks that are likely to threaten the value of the 
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TARP recipient. At the same time, the compensation structure must reflect the need for the 
TARP recipient to remain competitive to be able to fulfil its repayment obligations to TARP.946 
Critics have questioned the motives for the restrictions on executive compensation because 
section 111(d) could seriously restrict an institution’s ability to pay competitive salaries, cash 
bonuses or provide equity incentives. In effect, financial institutions burdened with government 
restrictions and close oversight after accepting TARP funds, would be unable to recruit new 
CEO because these restrictions constitute an obstacle to finding the best possible CEO 
candidate. 
Another worry is that the expansion of the limitation on tax deductibility under section 320 of 
ESSA947 has the potential to constrain corporate strategy.948 Arguably, the restrictions 
effectively direct the affected financial institutions away from performance-based incentives 
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Many of the financial institutions considered these conditions so overly burdensome that they 
found incentives to repay the TARP funds in order to get out of this restrictive regime.949  For 
example, as of June 2010, most large TARP recipients including Bank of America (Boa), 
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase & Co and Morgan Stanley repaid their TARP fund to 
extricate themselves of these restrictions.950 The Bank of America was more explicit by making 
it clear that the rationale for the repayment of the $45 billion bailout funds was to enable the 
Bank to have a free hand to recruit a new CEO.  This, according to the Bank, removes the 
stigma attached to the restrictions and makes the company more attractive to potential CEO 
candidates.951 
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These provisions may seem restrictive, but they should be understood within the context of the 
recent GFC and the attempt to prevent its reoccurrence. Arguably, the imposition of these 
additional requirements and restrictions were meant to protect the taxpayer and increase 
transparency. Indeed, this restrictive approach reflects congress and public anger over large 
compensations paid to executives of rescued/failed institutions; especially at a time of rising 
foreclosures and high unemployment in the US.952 
Moreover, as the GFC reveals, performance-based incentives encourage managers to engage in 
excessive risk-taking by focusing on stock price as a measure of performance. It thus, stands to 
reason that the restriction on executive compensation is intended to mitigate the culture of 
excessive risk-taking. This is to ensure that executives who make bad decisions are not allowed 
to take advantage of the TARP facility; dump their toxic assets on the tax payer and then be 
allowed to walk away with millions of dollars in bonuses.953 For instance, the decision by 
management of AIG to make retention payment totalling $ 600 million to its employees at a 
time when it was receiving TARP assistance reinforces the need for a more stringent executive 
compensation regime.954 Indeed, given the extraordinary situation where the US taxpayer has 
become a reluctant shareholder in these corporations in which government has acquired 
substantial equity interests, a responsibility is imposed on government to protect the public 
interest.955 
The adoption of TARP has without doubt, helped to reduce panic in the banking sector, 
stabilised the financial system and avoided a full recession. That notwithstanding, this thesis 
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argues that the changes introduced under TARP first, do not go far enough and second fail to 
address some of the crucial challenges posed by the GFC. 
First, a critical examination of the rules relating to executive compensation reveals that these 
rules are less restrictive in both content and application than originally envisaged. For example, 
with respect to golden parachutes, the ban would apply to the top five senior executives as 
opposed to ten. Further, instead of an outright and complete prohibition on golden parachutes, 
the Act provides that the amount received by company executives would be restricted to an 
amount not greater than one year’s annual compensation. 
Secondly, the law establishing TARP assigned too much power to the Treasury Secretary as a 
result congress lost control in the implementation of the law and thus, denied congress of its 
constitutional obligation to oversee and check the other branches of government.956 For 
instance, the initial mandate of the Treasury was the purchase of troubled assets, but the 
Treasury expanded this authority and quickly switched to recapitalising banks without violating 
ESSA. This indicates the breath of discretionary powers that the Treasury enjoys.957 In fact the 
Act authorises the Treasury Secretary to purchase any financial instrument that may, in his 
view, contribute to financial stability. This provision confirms the unrestrained discretionary 
power accorded the Treasury Secretary to execute TARP.  
Furthermore, although TARP was meant to provide relief and assistance to homeowners by 
addressing the problems of foreclosures, the programme failed to live up to its stated goals. 
According to Adler, TARP offers very little relief regarding the large numbers of foreclosures 
estimated at 140,000 per day till January 2009.958 It is further revealed that foreclosure fillings 
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were reported on 2.8 million properties in 2009 representing an increase of 81 per cent from 
2008.959  
The key reasons for the failure to come to the rescue of home homeowners are two-fold. The 
first is that the prices of the original mortgages exceed their present value. Unfortunately, both 
the Treasury and the banks holding these mortgages have so far failed to address this issue 
because they are unable to identify and give realistic prices to these mortgages.960 Secondly, 
majority of the mortgages have been re-engineered, repacked, securitised or sold as new 
complex financial products. Subsequently, it has become even more complex for banks and 
other financial institutions to identify which set of mortgages have been used as collateral.961 
This makes it difficult for both the Treasury and the banks concerned to engage in any 
meaningful negotiations in that regard.962 Interestingly, it is this very practice of securitisation 
and repackaging of complex financial products among other factors, that ignited the GFC 
although shareholder primacy remains the underlying cause. 
A major challenge hindering the effective implementation of TARP is the multiplicity of 
oversight bodies which raises the possibility of overlap in the execution of their duties and 
responsibilities. For example, there exists an overlap in the duties and responsibilities of FSOB 
and COB both in general and specific terms. Under the Act, the two bodies are specifically 
required to review and examine the actions of the Treasury Secretary and the effects of such 
actions on homeownership, financial markets, and costs to the tax payer. The overlapping 
functions and the accompanying turf wars not only create bureaucratic hurdles, but they also 
impose additional costs in terms of implementation. It is therefore, not surprising that some 
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TARP recipients complain about having to account to a variety of federal agencies with 
competing and conflicting demands. 
TARP is admittedly, the largest financial rescue plan in US history. But it is a plan that has 
turned out to have lost its focus and in the end failed to provide the vital policy response to the 
GFC. Instead of addressing the capital challenges of financial institutions according to their 
needs, TARP became a rescue package for a few selected banks, failed to mitigate foreclosures 
and became hostage to the dictates of financial markets. This is not surprising because the 
shareholder primacy with its proposition of the efficient market hypothesis and deregulation is 
so deeply engrained in the US economic system to the extent that it would have been 
unthinkable if TARP was implemented differently. With all its attempts at reform, the EESA 
has left untouched the shareholder primacy that has dominated corporate governance thinking 
and practice for many years. 
The short-comings identified particularly in TARP and EESA in general, prompted the 
introduction of new legislation to ‘promote systemic regulatory reform’963 that ensures more 
prudent governance and compensation regime and perhaps importantly, promotes long-term 
value and growth.964  The legislation became known as the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act 2009 which forms the next section of the discussion. 
4.3 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009965 (The Reinvestment Act) was signed 
into law on February 19 2009 ostensibly to remedy the deficiencies in the Emergency Economic 
Stabilisation Act of 2008.966 Like its predecessor, the Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provides a 
$787 billion economic stimulus package of which $288 billion was meant for federal tax cuts 
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while the remaining $499 billion was devoted to federal government spending.967  ARRA was 
designed primarily to stimulate the stagnant US by providing tax relief for individuals and small 
businesses.968 The Act also focuses on job creation, expansion of unemployment and social 
welfare benefits, assistance for education, health care, infrastructure and energy.969 Although, 
stimulating the economy remains the cardinal policy objective of ARRA, it nonetheless sought 
to address some of the deficiencies identified in the previous legislations.970 Consequently, 
beyond amending the Stabilisation Act, ARRA broadens the limits on executive compensation 
by introducing more comprehensive and stringent provisions.971 It adopts most of the 
restrictions suggested by the Treasury Guidelines and makes it mandatory for TARP 
beneficiaries to have a shareholder ‘say-on-pay’ vote.972 This vote is, however, non-binding 
and management are at liberty to accept or reject it. Nonetheless, it gave shareholders a voice 
and a sense of empowerment on how senior executives are compensated. 
Furthermore, it sought to minimise some of the questionable executive compensation practices 
associated with the pre-crisis period by reinforcing the Treasury Guidelines on claw-back 
provisions. This relates to the top five senior executives and the next top twenty most highly 
compensated executives.973 Under ARRA, the Claw-back clause is applicable to such 
executives irrespective of their knowledge of material inaccuracies upon which the payment of 
these bonuses or awards were based.974 It thus ensures the possible recovery of any excess 
payment received by executives whether or not there was misconduct.975 This provision may 
seem stringent, but it is a necessary and significant improvement on previous legislations in 
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which the claim of lack of knowledge was enough to exonerate senior executives. The danger 
however, is that some ‘innocent’ SEOs may be wrongly penalised for actions of which they 
have no knowledge. As Fried rightly argues, the inadvertent receipt of excess pay is quite 
common as such ‘excess pay is not always the result of misconduct’.976 
 ARRA further requires the establishment of company-wide policy on the approval of excessive 
expenditures by establishing a compensation committee made up entirely of independent 
directors.977 Their mandate is to develop compensation policies to ensure prudent use of 
corporate resources and reduce unnecessary and excessive risk-taking.978 Moreover, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) of publicly-listed companies are 
obliged under the Act to certify in writing that they have complied with these provisions in their 
annual reports to the SEC.979. 
Finally, the Act directs the Treasury Secretary to review bonuses, retention awards and any 
other compensation paid to senior executives including the next twenty most highly 
compensated officials. The purpose is to determine if such payments are inconsistent with the 
provisions of TARP or against public interest. After making such a determination, the Treasury 
Secretary is required to negotiate with the TARP recipient for the reimbursement of the monies 
paid.980  This, ostensibly, is to prevent manipulation by executives of TARP beneficiaries who 
may deliberately inflate earnings or other metrics to boost their own pay outs to the detriment 
of the taxpayer.981 
Collectively, these legislations have been marketed as having created 3 million jobs,982 helped 
to avoid full scale recession and introduced radical corporate governance reforms including 
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claw-back, pay-on-say and compensation committees.983  It has further been argued that beyond 
stabilising the US financial system, these interventions also fulfil the legislative intentions of 
preventing a disruption to the economy at large as well as the protection of the taxpayer.984 
Admittedly, these changes emanate from public anger towards excessive compensation 
packages for CEOs and other senior officials. They therefore, reflect the   determination of other 
corporate constituents to demand for transparency, accountability and prudent use of corporate 
resources. In that respect, it may be said represent government attempt to appease public 
opinion and not a sincere determination to radically reform the present shareholder-oriented 
governance model. Moreover, it can be argued that these rescue plans are big but unnecessary 
government intervention programmes that failed to prevent foreclosures and rising 
unemployment despite a massive expansion of the deficit.985 It is therefore, difficult to accept 
the argument that these initiatives were intended to serve the public interest. In fact, they amount 
to the nationalisation of failed institutions through the back door.986 As it turned out, the battle 
over the short-term rescue package obscures the long-term push to address the underlying 
causes of the GFC.987 
What is, perhaps, more problematic is that the legislative response to the crisis enabled the US 
government to exchange capital for equity in banks which, in effect grants government a stake 
in these private institutions. For example, the US under TARP injected more than $200 billion 
into the banking system with an initial outlay of $125 billion going to America’s nine largest 
banks in return for equity.  This arguably, represents a partial nationalisation never seen before 
in the US.988 Indeed, the decision to acquire significant stakes in banks particularly, Bank of 
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America and Citigroup makes government the largest shareholder underlies a reality which 
critics have referred to as ‘shadow nationalisation’.989 
Outside the banking industry, government also intervened in other sectors by taking control of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two important private mortgage companies in the US. By this 
takeover, the government of the US became the owner and guarantor of nearly 42 percent of all 
American mortgages, making it ‘one of the most sweeping government interventions in private 
financial markets in decades’.990  Similarly, government intervened in AIG by injecting as much 
as $178 billion into the trouble-ridden insurance company, following which government 
became nearly 80 percent shareholder in a private company. 
Under the auto plan, government acquired major shares in two auto companies where the stakes 
were equally substantial as those acquired in the banking sector. Following the de facto 
nationalisation of the auto industry, government placed restrictions on the payment of dividends 
and executive compensation. Consequently, CEOs of these auto companies were required to 
submit restructuring plans that have been agreed with stakeholders. It may be argued that the 
‘nationalisation of Detroit,’991 amounts to an implicit rejection of market-based solutions in 
favour of government-controlled responses. This invariably reflects a ‘preference for orderly as 
opposed to market solutions’.992 
Finally, the bigger question is whether the different stimulus packages were the appropriate 
responses to the GFC.993 It should be stressed that the stimulus packages failed to address, and 
conveniently avoided the issues relating to the systemic problems that have characterised the 
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banking system and entire economic architecture in America. Instead of providing solutions to 
the issues raised by the crisis, the responses have in fact, become rescue packages for ‘failing 
banks and automobile companies’.994 
Contrary to assurances by government, banks and other institutions that had received billions 
of public money to guarantee their liquidity still went ahead to pay huge bonuses.995 In that 
respect it is submitted that TARP has been explicitly used to support and prop-up ‘massive 
transfer of tax-payers’ money to the management and shareholders of well-connected 
institutions’.996 In view of this, it can be argued that these measures were simply not the right 
solutions to the problems confronting the American economy and the stability in the financial 
markets.997 It is therefore, a major policy mistake to bail out banks without reforming the 
dysfunctional financial system and corporate governance regime which overemphasises 
shareholder primacy and market fundamentalism.998  
In response, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was passed and signed into law by President Barrack 
Obama to rectify some of these shortcomings.999 The next section examines the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, its evolution, strengths, weaknesses 
and asks whether it addresses the underlying cause of the GFC. 
4.4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 
As already explained, the US sought to prevent the crisis from developing into a full-scale 
recession, by enacting the Economic Stimulus Act. This Act established the $700 billion relief 
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package under the Troubled Assets Relief Programme1000 (TARP) which was later followed by 
an additional $787 billion economic stimulus through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.1001 The failure by these earlier legislations to resolve the governance and 
regulatory issues made a compelling case for a new legislation that would help stabilise the 
situation, address the underlying cause of the GFC and the losses that followed. These massive 
losses with the attendant disruptions in the finance industry put political leaders under intense 
pressure to enact radical reforms and regulatory changes to meet the challenges posed by the 
crisis.1002  Reflecting the mode of the country at the time, an editorial in the New York Times 
called for drastic measures to effect changes in the governance and regulation of the financial 
services industry. According to the Paper, ‘anything less than a new rule-based regime would 
be inadequate for the task of restoring confidence and eventually, reviving the economy’.1003 
The situation preceding the enactment of Dodd-Frank as Ludwig explains, was one of ‘political 
urgency and economic anxiety’.1004 Also Senator Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Senate 
Banking Committee and one of the architects of the Act notes that: 
[T]he stakes are too high, and the American people have suffered far too greatly, for us to fail in this 
effort. The legislation will not stop the next crisis from coming; no legislation can, of course. But by 
creating a 21st century regulatory structure for a 21st century economy, we can equip coming generations 
with the tools to deal with the crisis and to avoid the kind of suffering we have seen in this country.1005 
 It was in this environment that congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act which was finally signed into law in July 2010 by President Barack 
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Obama. While proponents consider it as heralding the most dramatic changes in financial 
regulation and corporate governance since the Great Depression, critics view it as preserving 
and perpetuating much of the existing failed corporate governance regime and regulatory 
architecture.1006  Given the magnitude, complexity and importance of the Act, it is crucial to 
explore the relevant sections that address the issues of corporate governance and regulation in 
the financial industry. This entails a critical examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
act with the view to answering some of the unanswered questions. 
The financial GFC that led to the enactment of Dodd-Frank reveals several flaws and systemic 
problems in the financial services industry and how they are governed.1007 There was near 
universal consensus among legislators, regulators and to a large extent, the public that corporate 
governance failures were to blame for the crisis. For instance, a study commissioned by the 
OECD attributes the crisis to the ‘failure and weaknesses’ in corporate governance.1008 
Similarly, the Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009 expressly states that ‘the central cause’1009 
of the GFC is the result of widespread failures of corporate governance. Consequently, most of 
the reforms in Dodd-Frank seek to address the corporate governance failures as perceived by 
legislators and policy makers.1010 Against this backdrop, several provisions dealing specifically 
with issues relating to corporate governance have been incorporated into the Act in response to 
the GFC and the reforms that need to be undertaken. 
4.4.1 Strengths of Dodd-Frank 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act is primarily concerned with financial regulation, it nonetheless 
contains important provisions likely to have significant impact on corporate governance 
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practices in the US.1011  The corporate governance and disclosure provisions in Dodd-Frank 
seek to promote increased accountability, transparency and more importantly, regulate the 
compensation practices that fuelled excessive risk-taking which eventually triggered the 
GFC.1012 The major corporate governance reforms introduced by Dodd-Frank include: 
shareholder vote on executive compensation also known as ‘say-on-pay’, shareholder proxy 
access, recovery of erroneously awarded compensation (claw-backs) and the establishment of 
independent compensation committees.1013 These provisions constitute the core aspects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in terms of corporate governance and form the focus of the subsequent 
discussion. 
4.4 .2 Shareholder Vote on Compensation  
Executive compensation in public corporation is a controversial issue that raises a lot of 
emotions on all sides of the debate. While critics contend that it is excessively high and set by 
unaccountable and captured boards, supporters on the other hand argue that it reflects a well-
functioning market.1014 Commentators including Cotter et al argue that it creates perverse and 
to some extent dangerous incentives.1015 On the other hand, scholars including Bainbridge argue 
that if properly structured, it can serve as a reward for doing the right things.1016  In recognition 
of these challenges, congress incorporated the say-on-pay provision into the Act.1017  The idea 
of say-on -pay is not new;  in fact, it dates to 2002 in the UK and was later adopted in the US 
in 2006 through the actions of  shareholder activists. According to Feri and Maber, Australia 
adopted it in 2004 while the Dutch did so in 2005; but the Dutch law calls for a binding rather 
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than a mere ‘advisory’ role.1018 The purpose of the say-on-pay principle is to give shareholders 
an advisory role in determining the pay of the company’s top five executives.1019 
4.4.3 Say-on-Pay 
Say-on-Pay refers to an agreement where shareholders are granted a non-binding vote in respect 
of executive remuneration.1020  Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires public companies 
to include a non-binding shareholder vote on the compensation arrangements of named 
executive officers.1021 This vote, as provided for in the Act is expected to take place not less 
than once in every three years. The Act further requires companies to hold a non-binding 
shareholder vote at least once every six years to determine whether say-on-pay vote should be 
held on annual, biannual or triennial basis. Both votes and the frequency of their occurrence 
must to be included in the Company’s proxy statement during the first annual or other 
subsequent meetings of shareholders.1022 
The effectiveness of say-on-pay as a means of resolving the corporate governance failures and 
by extension the financial crisis is highly contested.1023 A report by the Senate Committee notes 
that the UK’s experience regarding say-on-pay has been very optimistic and suggests that say-
on-pay legislation would have a positive impact on corporate governance in the US. The report 
admits however, that while the two legal contexts may not be identical, there is nothing to 
suggest that the ‘differences would turn what would be a good idea in the UK into a bad one in 
the US’.1024 
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 It can be argued, however, that the UK experience with say-on-pay has been saddled with its 
own problems which render it a ‘dubious choice’.1025 First, individualised review of 
compensation schemes of companies exacts a heavy cost that will probably force institutional 
investors to focus on a narrow range of compensation programmes that are akin to ‘a one-size-
fits all’ approach.1026 Second, because most institutional investors tend to rely on proxy 
advisory firms, a very minute number of Gatekeepers will end up exercising undue influence 
in matters of compensation.1027  Moreover, as earlier indicated, corporate governance is path-
dependent, as a result the UK’s experience cannot be transplanted whole sale to fit into the US 
context in view of the vast differences in institutional arrangements, societal norms and cultural 
practices. 
4.4.4 Say on golden parachutes 
Another important innovation of the Dodd-Frank Act is the introduction of the ‘golden 
parachute arrangement’. Under these new rules, companies are required to make additional 
disclosure in respect of compensation arrangements with executive officers regarding mergers, 
acquisition, consolidation, proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all assets.1028  
This requires disclosure of all agreements and understandings that have been reached between 
the acquiring companies, target companies and the executive officers of both entities.1029 The 
shareholder approval must disclose in clear and simple terms any compensation arrangements 
that have been reached and should encompass the aggregate total of all such compensation that 
may be paid. The ‘golden parachute’ concept also applies to other transactions including, going-
private transactions as well as third-party tender offers. This is to ensure that information is 
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made available to shareholders irrespective of the structure of the transaction.1030  It should be 
stressed, however, that the shareholder vote is not binding on a company’s board of directors 
and a negative vote cannot overrule any decision of the board.1031  Consequently, the Act does 
not change or create any fiduciary duties for the company or the board1032 even though 
shareholders are allowed to submit executive compensation proposals for inclusion in the 
company’s proxy materials.1033  
Admittedly, the provisions on say-on-pay appears to be forward looking corporate governance 
reforms that can help minimise the effects of future financial crisis. The say-on-pay rule,  
provides shareholders of public companies with a mechanism to either support or oppose a 
company’s pay policies and practices.1034 The expectation is that company boards and 
compensation committees will be inclined to consider and possibly response to the shareholder 
vote on executive compensation packages.1035 This, arguably, promotes transparency and 
accountability which would in the final analysis lead to greater efficiency, improvement in 
corporate governance and reduced risk.1036 
It is further argued, that with the introduction of say-on- pay under Dodd-Frank, shareholders 
would be in a better position to identify companies with poorly-designed pay packages and vote 
against them. The policy rationale is that giving shareholders a say on executive compensation 
packages would invariably strengthen the relationship between pay and performance, and thus, 
reduce the payment of excessive bonuses and incentives in the future.1037 
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Moreover, it has been argued the provision on say-on-pay would result in shareholder 
empowerment. According to this school of thought, it would strengthen the hands of boards by 
enabling them to negotiate pay packages with CEOs more effectively on behalf of 
shareholders.1038 This is critical in view of the general consensus that unrestrained and excessive 
compensation packages paid to executives of public corporations have been some of the major 
triggers of the GFC.1039  
In its Annual Report of 2010, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) identifies excessive 
pay as some of the structural weaknesses pertaining to the GFC.1040  According to the Bank, 
apart from being grossly misaligned, the pay and incentive packages are ridiculously 
excessive.1041  In this respect, it is submitted that the introduction of say-on-pay which seeks to 
address some of these structural weaknesses is a welcome development. 
4.4.5 Recovery of Wrongly-Awarded Compensation (Claw-backs) 
Following the GFC, one issue that gained prominence is the excess payments received by 
executives in the form claw-backs. Fried and Shilon define claw-back as the recovery of certain 
payments made to executives based on financial results which turn out to be false and require 
a restatement.1042 
To address the public outrage concerning executive compensation, section 954 of the Dodd-
Frank Act specifically requires public corporations to adopt a policy that ensures the recovery 
from current and former executive officers any excess compensation that have been erroneously 
awarded.1043 The Act compels the affected firms to recover payments made to executives on 
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the basis of financial results that eventually turn out to be false and needs restatement.1044  The 
ability to recoup, however, requires that two major hurdles must be overcome; namely the 
misconduct requirement and the restatement requirement.1045 
Interestingly, although Dodd-Frank removes the misconduct requirements, majority (67 per 
cent) of S&P 500 firms with such policies do not require a claw-back in the absence of 
misconduct on the part of the executive. For example IBM’s 2010 claw-back policy states that 
the company will recoup any bonus or incentive paid to an executive under the following 
conditions (a) if the amount paid was based on the achievements of financial result that were 
subsequently the subject of restatement (b) the board determines that the officer concerned 
engaged in misconduct resulting in the obligation to restate and (c) lower payments would have 
been made to the officer based on the restated financial results.1046 From this, it becomes 
obvious that IBM commits itself to recouping inflated bonus and incentives only if the misstated 
financial outcomes were a result of misconduct.1047  In the absence of a stated misconduct, the 
executive would be permitted to get away with the excess payment.1048 
Other companies have more stringent regimes which make it even harder to claw back excess 
pay. Another example is 3 M’s proxy of 2010 which adopts a policy requiring the 
reimbursement of excess pay if the executive’s intentional misconduct caused the need for the 
restatement.1049 In effect, the recoupment of excess pay under this policy can only be triggered 
upon prove of intentional misconduct.1050 Hence, a 3M executive who engages in unintentional 
misconduct is free to keep the excess pay.1051  
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 Notwithstanding these deficiencies, it may be argued that the provisions in section 9541052 are 
necessary to avoid imposing costs on the company and its shareholders.1053 Indeed, the receipt 
of excessive pay whether accidental or results from misconduct, has the effect of value 
diversion and value destruction.1054 Mintzberg goes beyond the value destruction and value 
diversion hypothesis and puts it rather bluntly that;  ‘Executive bonuses, especially in the form 
of stock and option grants represent the most prominent form of legal corruption that has been 
undermining our large corporations and bringing down the global economy’.1055 
This became evident during the GFC when several brand names such as Lehman Brothers, 
Citigroup, Bear Sterns and Royal Bank of Scotland witnessed an unprecedented destruction of 
the value of those firms. Against this backdrop, it is submitted that the claw-back provision in 
Dodd-Frank is an important but very minor step towards addressing the problem of excessive 
compensation.1056  
It is however, doubtful whether this provision alone is enough to prevent the several instances 
of excessive compensation payments and the subsequent restatements witnessed prior to the 
GFC. Arguably, having the provision in the statute books is not an antidote because the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which was enacted following the Enron scandal, contains similar 
provisions in section 304.1057 But that alone could not avert the excesses witnessed and the 
subsequent crisis that occurred in 2008.1058 In that respect, it is submitted that no fundamental 
difference exists between Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank in terms of recovering excess 
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executive compensation. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank executive compensation provisions simply 
revisit several of the rules enacted in the wake of the corporate scandals of 2000-2001.1059 
Much as this argument may have some merit, it is equally true that Dodd-Frank differs from 
the Sarbanes-Oxley excess executive compensation recovery provisions in two important 
respects.1060  First, under Dodd-Frank, each firm is required to recover excess pay/compensation 
while the Sarbanes-Oxley claw-back provisions can only be invoked by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC).1061  Second, the SOX claw-back provision can be triggered only if the 
restatement arises from misconduct which is not the case in Dodd-Frank.1062  Clearly, the claw-
back provisions in the two Acts are not the same but differ in many aspects; as such the 
weaknesses or limitation of SOX is not enough justification to dismiss Dodd-Frank. Indeed, the 
issue is not about having these well-meaning provisions on the statute books but rather the 
question is whether the executives and corporate boards have the will and the courage to ensure 
the effective implementation of the policies adopted.  
Questions have also been raised regarding government’s rationale for imposing what is 
considered unnecessary claw-back requirements on publicly-traded companies.1063 Such 
mandatory policies, the argument goes, is an undesirable intrusion into the internal 
compensation arrangements of these firms.1064  Private ordering, they claim, will lead to better 
outcomes1065   pointing out that over 80 per cent of Fortune 100 firms had voluntary claw-back 
policies prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank.1066  In that respect, the enactment of similar 
provisions under Dodd-Frank is, in effect, unnecessary and redundant.1067 
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While acknowledging that the claw-back requirements under Dodd-Frank represent an 
improvement in the compensation arrangements of public firms, there are concerns that the 
provisions do not go far enough.1068  The requirements in the Act fail to provide for the 
mandatory recovery of all types of excess pay but limited to one or two elements of a particular 
incentive plan.1069 Therefore, its scope of application, is to a very large extent  rather restricted; 
a situation which makes it extremely problematic to recover excess payment made under such 
questionable circumstances.1070  
A vital weakness of the provision is that it is conditional and does not compel firms to recover 
excess pay from executives until a restatement is required.1071 In practice, the enforcement of 
this provision is dependent on a restatement; the absence of which renders it unenforceable and 
of no effect. In addition to the above defects, the Act also fails to provide for the recovery of 
excess payment made in respect of the sale of company stock at inflated prices arising from 
errors.1072  Such important omissions cast doubts on the legislative intent of congress in enacting 
these provision and questions whether the Act is a sincere effort to address the problem of 
excessive pay or a mere attempt to appease public outrage and discontent. 
There are also concerns as to how the claw-back provisions would affect corporate governance 
practices in the way envisioned by its proponents.1073 According to Bainbridge, the Dodd-Frank 
claw-back policy is ‘unfairly penalizing executives’1074 describing such provisions, along with 
the entire Act as ‘corporate governance quackery’.1075  
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Apart from the inherent contradictions and lack of consistency, section 954 of the claw-back 
provision is over-inclusive as it covers all executive officers irrespective of their responsibility 
or lack thereof for the financial statement in question.1076 As a result ‘some innocent’ 
executives, it has been argued, would be compelled to forfeit significant amount of pay.1077 At 
the same time section 954 is also under-inclusive in that the definition of an executive officer 
is very narrow and includes the ‘president, any vice president…..in-charge of a principal 
business unit, division or function…., any other officer who performs a policy making 
functions’.1078  The Senate Banking Committee acknowledges this limitation and notes that ‘the 
policy therefore applies only to a very limited number of employees’.1079  Similarly, Bhagat and 
Romano argue that the danger with this limitation is that actions and decisions of some 
individual proprietary trader, who may not necessarily be an executive officer as stipulated in 
the Act, can nonetheless, adversely affect or even implode a firm.1080 
Beyond the self-contradictory nature of the Act, there is an added risk in terms of the unintended 
consequences arising from the ambiguity and the apparent lack of clarity of section 954. As 
Heinemann rightly observes, there are ‘many ambiguities in the legislative language which will 
have to be clarified by the SEC in implementing the regulation’.1081 For instance, the SEC will 
have to provide clarification as to whether the claw-back is to be retroactive, how to calculate 
the amount to be recovered and the dates during which the recovery must be sought.1082 The 
fear and indeed, danger is that giving the SEC the power to interpret and also regulate could 
possibly lead to abuse which in the end defeats the very purpose of the Act.1083 
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A key and perhaps, the most important ambiguity in the claw-back policy relates to whether 
misconduct by persons other than the CEO or CFO could trigger the application of the 
provision.1084 This issue came up for adjudication before a federal district court in SEC v. 
Jenkins.1085 In that case CSK Auto Corporation of which Mr Maynard Jenkins was the CEO 
was obliged to restate its financials following the discovery of massive fraud by some senior 
officials. Consequently, the SEC initiated legal proceeding asking the court to apply the claw- 
back provision to the respondent’s (Mr Jenkins) pay. In its ruling, the court agreed with the 
SEC stating ‘the misconduct of corporate officers, agents, or employees acting within the 
agency or employment is sufficient misconduct to meet the elements of the statute.’1086 
Although Mr Jenkins was not charged or fund guilty of any misconduct, the SEC nonetheless, 
was able to invoke the claw-back provision and the Respondent’s pay was eventually clawed 
back.  
Unsurprisingly, this decision was heavily criticised because it encompasses all executive 
officers without considering their level of involvement/responsibility in respect of the financial 
restatement in question.1087 In effect, what the Act does is to impose strict liability on executive 
officers in the event of a restatement. The unintended consequence arising out of this legislative 
misjudgement is that some innocent executives will have to forfeit a significant amount of well-
deserved pay.1088 
4.4.6 Governance of Credit Rating Agencies 
As earlier mentioned, CRAs have been widely criticised for their role in the GFC.1089  Questions 
have been raised concerning the quality and clarity of rating data, particularly the misaligned 
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incentives and the conflicts of interests which led to poor lending standards. Against this 
backdrop, the US congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act containing several useful provisions 
that seek to reform the governance and regulation of CRAs.1090 The provisions focus largely on 
the structure, oversight, and liability of CRAs.1091 Consequently, Dodd-Frank specifically 
creates a new SEC Office of Credit Ratings to administer SEC rules, examine nationally 
recognised statistical rating organisations (NRSRO) and issue a report. Under this arrangement, 
the report is required to identify any material deficiencies and state if previous SEC 
recommendations have been complied with or not. 
A key component of the new provision focuses on the organisational structure of the rating 
agencies which must have a board of directors, half of whom should be independent. The board 
is charged with an oversight role in respect of policies and procedures for determining ratings, 
compensation and promotions as well as managing conflicts of interest within the organisation. 
To full fill this mandate, the Act requires CRAs to adopt ‘an effective internal control structure 
governing the implementation of and adherence to policies, procedures, and methodologies for 
determining credit rating’.1092 Another vital governance provision is the requirement that CRAs 
establish procedures to determine the existence of conflict of interests in respect of persons 
doing the rating who later become employee of the issuer, sponsor or underwriter as the case 
may be.1093 The Act per this provision, empowers the SEC to revoke the registration of a CRA 
if it turns out that ‘sales and marketing considerations’1094 influenced the agency’s ratings. 
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4.4.7 Private Right of Action against Credit Rating Agencies 
Another innovation of the Dodd-Frank is the changes it introduces in the SEC Act which makes 
it possible for CRAs to be held liable for their ratings. Following the GFC, it was recognised 
that shareholder litigation could play a vital role in reforming some of the deceptive practices 
associated with CRAs but for which they could not be held accountable.1095 Consequently, 
Dodd-Frank repealed Rule 436(g) of the Securities Act which hitherto exempted CRAs from 
liability under section 11 of the Securities Act.1096 The repeal of this exemption clause,  
effectively means that statements made by CRAs are subject to liability in the same manner as 
accountants and investment analysts under the federal securities laws.1097 In addition to the 
strict liability, the Act also reduces the pleading standards in section 10 (b) and Rule 10(b) 5 of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).1098  Under the new regime, a plaintiff 
must plead with ‘particularity of facts giving rise to a strong inference’ that the defender acted 
with scienter which was not the case under the previous arrangement.1099  The new provision 
only requires a Plaintiff  to state the facts giving strong inference that a particular CRA 
knowingly and recklessly failed to exercise due diligence in the conduct of its ratings in respect 
of the elements relied upon and the methodology used in the evaluation process.1100  Second, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the rating agency failed to obtain reasonable verification of 
such factual elements. Moreover, Dodd-Frank subjects CRAs to section 18 of the Exchange 
Act by holding persons liable for filing false and misleading statements with the SEC.1101 
Consequently, false and misleading ratings are now actionable under the Exchange Act. This is 
very significant because the absence of strict liability as obtained in the past meant that CRAs 
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had no compelling reason to exercise extra caution and due diligence in issuing their ratings.1102  
Against this backdrop, it is submitted that with a credible threat of liability, the new regime 
tends to be more effective in compelling CRAs to be more vigilant and avoid negligent and 
reckless practices as was the case prior to the GFC.1103 
Further, Dodd-Frank streamlines the filling process by requiring CRAs to provide 
comprehensive information covering performance measurement in the data over short, medium 
and long-term. It also includes the policies adopted, their implementation, the organisational 
structure and the absence or presence of code of ethics.1104  This marks a significant departure, 
because in the past CRAs were not subjected to such a stringent regime. Previously, CRAs had 
to only furnish certain information to the SEC and that was enough to be registered as a 
nationally recognised rating agency.1105 In this respect, it is stands to reason that the corporate 
governance provisions relating to CRAs represent an ambitious attempt to address one of the 
major triggers of the GFC. Obviously, the changes introduced by Dodd-Frank increase internal 
controls and provide greater procedural transparency in respect of CRAs.1106 
Admittedly, Dodd-Frank makes some positive contribution towards the regulation and 
governance of CRAs. But it is equally true that Dodd-Frank ultimately fails to address a 
fundamental problem peculiar to CRAs which contributed immensely to the crisis. The 
legislation either by design or omission fails to alter the ‘issuer pays’ model of rating 
agencies.1107 Under this model the issuers themselves are the very entities that pay for the 
securities to be rated. This inevitably raises issues about potential conflict of interests and 
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probably that of possible corruption. Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank does not address this issue 
which is at the heart of CRAs business model and central to the GFC.1108 
Also, the current credit rating system is something of a paradox and remains in the words of 
Schwarz, ‘one of capitalism’s strangest hybrids’.1109 Indeed, this strange arrangement has 
enabled profit-making entities to perform what is essentially a regulatory role.1110 The Dodd-
Frank Act therefore achieves very little in addressing these inherent weaknesses in the credit 
rating system. Instead of a complete overhaul of the present defective system, the Act simply 
calls for research on the independence and alternative business model for CRAs without 
providing specifics as to how this is to be achieved.1111 
4.5 An Evaluation 
Financial crisis provides an opportunity for major reforms to be undertaken as such ‘good crisis 
should never go waste’.1112  US financial history confirms this assertion and the passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were all in response to the 
Great Depression of 1929.1113 Similarly, the collapse of Enron in 2001, WorldCom in 2002 and 
other corporate failures prompted the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).1114  
In the same vein the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
was enacted to remedy the weaknesses in the US governance and regulatory system that 
triggered the recent GFC.1115 
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Obviously, Dodd-Frank is primarily concerned with addressing the challenges facing the 
financial system. Nonetheless, it introduces important changes that impact on corporate 
governance.1116  The broader question, however, is whether Dodd-Frank resolves the problem 
of shareholder primacy, which arguably, underpins the GFC. To answer this question requires 
an evaluation of the major corporate governance-related provisions in Dodd-Frank and to what 
extent they constitute the necessary and appropriate response. Such an evaluation forms the 
next section of this thesis. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, arguably, represents the most sweeping change in financial regulation 
and how corporations are governed and controlled in the US.1117 It is a legislative response 
which seeks to restructure the financial system, reform the governance of corporations and 
restore investor-confidence in the US economy.1118 There is no doubt that Dodd-Frank  
heightens prudent standards and enhances a more transparent disclosure regime capable of 
constraining excessive risk-taking, thereby, making the financial system more stable.1119 A 
critical look at the Act reveals however, that at best what it does is to preserve much of the 
existing regulatory architecture and governance system. Consequently, it is argued that Dodd-
Frank would only diminish but cannot eliminate the likelihood of future crisis for the following 
reasons.1120 
First, almost all provisions of Dodd-Frank depend on other agencies and regulatory bodies for 
enforcements and implementation. For instance, section 971 authorizes the SEC to adopt rules 
permitting the use of proxy access material by shareholders.1121 This arrangement renders 
Dodd-Frank an imperfectly-designed Act and makes it difficult and to some extent, impossible 
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to implement. A greater problem is that, it relies heavily on administrative implementation 
which more often can be frustrated by ‘equivocal agency rule-making, judicial hostility and 
timid under-enforcement regime’.1122  
This is further complicated by what Olson describes as the logic of collective action and interest 
group politics.1123 According to Olson, smaller, better organised groups tend to dominate larger 
but more diffused groups with much greater membership when it comes to influencing the 
implementation of legislation or regulatory policy.1124 At the stage of implementation, the more 
organised groups, with their huge financial resources and political influence are able to extract 
concessions, exemptions or outright repeal.1125 Arguably, the decision by congress to delegate 
the implementation to administrative bodies is a major defect which effectively enables 
powerful group of policy entrepreneurs to pursue an agenda that tends to undermine the efforts 
aimed at the effective implementation of the Act.1126  Hence, rather than idealising this 
legislation, it must be acknowledged that some of its reforms are flawed, inconsistent and fail 
to provide the remedies that would prevent future crisis.1127  Of course, like most legislations, 
parts of the Dodd-Frank provisions may be inconsistent, poorly designed or ill-conceived. 
Nonetheless, it must be recognised that in the real world, legislations will always be incomplete 
and imperfect and often require administrative bodies to ensure implementation.1128  It is 
therefore, fair to say that the Dodd-Frank Act is no exception and should therefore, not be 
viewed differently. The authorities in the US consistently maintain that the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is an attempt to contain the damage and minimise the effects of future crisis 
by adopting governance rules with much wider implications for both Wall Street and Main 
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Street corporations.1129 In that respect, Dodd-Frank appears to be far more ambitious than 
previous legislations. 
A critical weakness, however, is that it seeks to revise the financial regulation and governance 
regime in its entirety without due regard to the peculiarity of each corporate entity.1130  As a 
result, the Act mistakenly adopts a ‘one size fits all’ approach to corporate governance, which 
analysts admit, is a serious policy flaw. This is  because the corporate governance challenges 
facing Main Street and Wall Street companies differ significantly in terms of solutions.1131  The 
business model of financial institutions often entails complex lending, underwriting 
arrangements and complicated investments which differ from other publicly-traded entities.1132 
Consequently, management of financial institutions are tasked with managing the risk exposure 
that these sophisticated transactions entail.1133 Unfortunately, the response of Dodd-Frank to 
the GFC clearly shows an overreliance on the ‘one size fits all’ approach which does not address 
the unique governance needs of the different corporate entities.1134  
Moreover, the GFC shifted the corporate governance game into a new playing field, created a 
new environment in which new players have come to prominence.1135  Prior to the crisis, new 
financial instruments such as credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) were developed and marketed to the extent of ‘dwarfing the real economy’.1136  This, 
inevitably, calls for a legislative measures and a governance regime capable of responding to 
the needs and requirements of these new financial products and the corporate entities.1137  
                                                          
1129 ibid 
1130 ibid 
1131 Coffee (n 1112). 
1132 Kristin N. Johnson, ‘Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight 
Obligations.’ (2011) 45(1) University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 56. 
1133 ibid 
1134 ibid 
1135 Bainbridge (n 105)12. 
1136  Thomas Clarke, ‘Rethinking Corporate Governance ‘in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds), 
Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (CUP 2012) 37. 
1137 ibid 
Chapter 4 
192 
 
Dodd-Frank however, fails to provide the necessary legislative and regulatory response to the 
new exotic financial instruments that triggered the GFC. In that regard, Dodd-Frank is bound 
to achieve only minimal success because ‘the risk is that such poorly designed governance 
approach may make the next crisis more likely and potentially more severe’.1138  This is because 
the conditions that enabled financial innovation to outpace legislative prowess have not been 
addressed by the Act.1139 
The Dodd-Frank Act, is undoubtedly a bold initiative which seeks  to  reform the dysfunctional 
corporate governance system that triggered the GFC.1140 In adopting Dodd-Frank, congress 
took the view that shareholder empowerment was the preferred option to reduce agency costs 
and perhaps, more importantly, address the underlying cause of the GFC.1141 It is however, 
unclear whether such an approach remotely appreciates and indeed, provides any answers to 
the fundamental cause of the GFC.1142  As mentioned earlier, shareholder primacy considers 
profit maximisation for shareholders to be the primary objective of the corporation.1143 In 
practice the principal sphere of the activities of corporate management is defined by their 
obligation to shareholders.1144 All other responsibilities ‘are very much secondary or 
derivative’.1145  Against this background, it is submitted that rather than providing solutions, 
the corporate governance reforms in Dodd-Frank1146 have themselves become the problem as 
they tend to strengthen and empower shareholders.1147 Although, the Act introduces some 
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positive reforms, they are unlikely to mean much because of the continuous adherence to the 
shareholder primacy concept.1148 
Viewed from another perspective, the non-binding nature of the provision regarding say-on-
pay is largely driven by the attempt to protect executive compensation, high leverage and 
managerial discretion.1149 Thus, the non-binding nature of the provision effectively makes it a 
‘tooth- less bull dog’1150 that can only back but cannot bite. Indeed, of what use is a legislative 
Act that can neither be enforced nor has any legally binding effect?  In answer to this question, 
one can only state that the reforms reflect the reinforcement of the more shareholder-centric 
status quo.1151 From that perspective, it is submitted that Dodd-Frank has failed to respond to 
and provide an antidote to a vital aspect of the corporate governance defects underlying the 
GFC. 
A further interrogation of the Dodd-Frank Act makes very interesting and important revelation 
with respect to how the legislation was enacted and passed. Although the crisis erupted in 2007, 
it took almost three years and the collapse of major US corporations before the government 
could enact Dodd-Frank.1152 Giving the initial ad-hoc and inconsistent responses, it may be 
argued that Dodd-Frank is more a belated reaction to the GFC than a genuine attempt to 
confront the fundamental flaws in the US corporate arrangements.1153  This is not surprising 
because legislators and policy makers were in fact reacting ex-post to the crisis rather than a 
conscious effort aimed at preventing it ex- ante.1154 
Even more troubling is the fact that Dodd-Frank was enacted following the media clamour for 
action driven mainly by populist anti-corporate sentiments and emotions. Of course, when 
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reform is rushed and hastily framed under intense political pressure as was the case under Dodd-
Frank, two outcomes can be expected.1155 First, the policy formulation is often frustrated by  
suspect policy entrepreneurs whose arguments may not necessarily be clear or helpful.1156 
Second, it discourages taking time to conduct careful cost/benefits analysis of the legislation as 
witnessed during the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.1157  Unsurprisingly, little attention was 
paid to the critical analysis of the underlying cause of the crisis due to the mounting pressure 
exerted by financial industry lobby groups.1158 This effectively renders Dodd-Frank a rather 
weak legislation that merely focused on the symptoms instead of the causes of the GFC. 
Apparently, vital corporate governance provisions in the Act became weakened and downsized 
at the implementation stage because; (a) advocates of radical corporate governance reforms had 
no natural allies among the major political players and (b) the high implementation cost to the 
financial industry led to a watered down version of the Act.1159  For the above reasons, the profit 
maximising interests of the financial industry were well aligned in opposing the needed 
corporate governance reforms as initially envisaged by congress.1160  
Proponents however, advocate for the need to consider the power struggle that usually 
characterises the passage of reform legislations.1161 This arguably, is understandable and to 
some extent unavoidable in the real world where policy makers come under immense pressure 
to satisfy different and often competing interests.1162  In fairness to Dodd-Frank, it is submitted 
that although it was an imperfectly-designed piece of legislation, it cannot be said be 
exceptionally unique when it comes to interest group influence and pressure politics on 
legislation in the US. 
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Another promising corporate governance reform introduced by Dodd-Frank is contained in 
section 955 which specifies the structure and composition of the board of directors.1163  This 
provision seeks to alter board organisation and composition including requiring boards to 
appoint compensation, governance and audit committees made up of independent members. 
The new rules requiring board of directors of listed companies to be independent of 
management, is intended to improve corporate governance and minimises some of the risk 
factors that triggered the GFC.  There is, however, little evidence to suggest that director 
independence is the solution to the ills of corporate governance.1164 A study conducted by 
MacAvoy concludes that board composition did not in any way affect firm performance and 
profitability.1165 Similarly, Klein in his research found no evidence of a link between firm 
performance and board composition.1166 Another study by Bhagat and Black in 1999 also 
concludes that ‘there was no convincing evidence that firms with a majority of independent 
directors outperform other firms’.1167 For her part, Fairfax disputes the proposition that the 
appointment of independent directors leads to better corporate governance outcomes.1168  The 
reason, she argues, is that the definition of independence has remained ‘elusive as cognitive 
biases limit directors’ ability to act so as to make decisions in a manner consistent with a 
theoretical perception of independence’.1169 
Apart from the lack of empirical evidence to justify the proposition regarding director-
independence, the provisions in Dodd-Frank are arguably, redundant at best.1170  This is because 
prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, similar rules were already in existence in the National 
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Security Exchange regulations which require publicly listed companies to have independent 
directors. In fact, all three major exchanges namely: the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
NASDAQ1171 and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) had provisions requiring a majority 
of the board of directors of listed companies to be independent. Section 303A of the NYSE1172 
Companies Manual requires listed companies to appoint only independent directors. In the same 
vein, section 5605(d)1173 of the NASDAC’s listing standards require listed companies to appoint 
independent directors. But, the appointment of independent directors per se was not enough to 
avert the corporate failures involving WorldCom, Enron and the GFC from occuring.1174  
Against this backdrop, it is submitted that the Dodd-Frank provision which seeks to make the 
appointment of independent directors the centre piece of corporate governance reform is not 
only redundant but an exercise in futility. First, the appointment of independent directors is a 
mechanism that tends to strengthen the position of shareholders and protect their interest at the 
expense of other constituents.  Second, the problem that led to the collapse of corporate entities 
in the early 2001, 2002 and 2008 goes beyond the appointment of independent directors as such 
these provisions cannot, by any measure, be the appropriate remedy or response to the GFC. 
Moreover, the ‘fetish for independence’1175 in fact contributed to the recent GFC. Apparently, 
the strict adherence to conflict of interest rules as contained in the definition of independence 
makes it difficult for financial institutions to attract and maintain directors with the requisite 
expertise in that industry.1176 This lack of expertise renders such boards ineffective in 
performing the monitoring role that could have otherwise averted some of the questionable 
governance practices that triggered the GFC. In that regard, it seems fair to suggest that more 
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expert boards would have been better placed to identify the weaknesses and challenges in the 
system.1177      
4.6 Conclusion 
The recent GFC not only revealed the dysfunctional nature of the financial system but also 
prompted the reconsideration of a new corporate governance approach.1178 In responding to the 
threats posed by the crisis, the US government embarked on a series of actions including bank 
bailouts which turned out to woefully inadequate.1179  
Realising that additional measures were required to deal with the rapidly deteriorating situation, 
the US authorities enacted the Economic Stimulus Act which received by-partisan support and 
finally became law in October 2008. This was subsequently followed by the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act 2008, the American Recovery and Investment Act 2009 and the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which was considered far more ambitious than previous legislations. 
Admittedly, Dodd-Frank governance rules tend to be much broader in application as it covers 
both Wall Street and Main Street public corporation. As this chapter demonstrates, Dodd-Frank 
provides the tools that seek to strengthen corporate governance and stabilise the financial 
system.1180  In that respect, it is submitted that Dodd-Frank is very likely to have some positive 
impact on corporate governance in the US.1181 
Extensive as the Act may seem, it is doubtful just how effective it has been in addressing the 
fundamental problem of shareholder primacy.1182 In fact, some of the provisions in the Act seek 
to empower shareholders in financial and non-financial public companies. This is based on the 
mistaken assumption that it would enable shareholders to contain reckless managers and align 
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the interest of shareholders with that of managers.1183 For example the corporate governance 
provisions and executive compensation provisions, all of which purport to emphasise and 
promote transparency and accountability, are in fact emblematic of shareholder protection.1184  
As Horn rightly notes, the legislative responses and governance reforms have ‘mainly aimed at 
increasing the information and control of shareholders over management’.1185  
Furthermore, the proxy access provisions, together with the advisory role on executive 
compensation constitute an empowering device for shareholders which inevitably impacts on 
how corporations are directed and controlled. In effect, Dodd-Frank’s provision and for that 
matter the other legislative measures introduced post 2008 in the US have become mechanism 
through which shareholder power is ‘reproduced and perpetuated’.1186  Against this backdrop, 
the conclusion can be drawn that the reform programmes undertaken by the US in response to 
the crisis have themselves become the problem rather than the solution to the underlying cause 
of the GFC. According to Brunner, the corporate governance reforms post 20008 are ‘an 
ambitious attempt to empower shareholders and give meaning to the shareholders’ claim to 
ownership of the company’.1187 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, the unquestioned belief in the prevailing shareholder 
primacy theory, with its short-termist approach is what has created the worst GFC in recent 
times.1188 There is, however, no indication that policy makers and legislators in the US and 
indeed, elsewhere have learnt any lessons. Rather, congress through various legislative 
measures especially in Dodd-Frank, seem determined to continue to do ‘business as usual 
perhaps with a few cosmetic tinkering but not fundamental reform’.1189  This is not surprising 
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because policy makers in the US continue to look at the crisis from the perspective of principal-
agent conflict which can be resolved by aligning the interest of shareholders and managers. 
They tend to achieve this through governance arrangements such as independent boards, audit 
committees, remunerations committees, transparency and accountability, all of which tend to 
give practical meaning to the shareholder primacy theory. These measures are adopted in the 
expectation (albeit false) that they would constraint excessive risk-taking by corporate 
managers for short-term profits. The reality, however, remains that ‘there is little point in fixing 
executive short-termism if we don’t fix shareholder short-termism’.1190  In the face of these 
glaring defects in the reform agenda, it is submitted that the Dodd-Frank Act and the other 
legislations may actually make the next crisis more likely and potentially more severe.1191 
Although it is impossible to predict with certainty when this will occur, one thing that is certain 
is that driving this reform process is the same perverse incentives, short-term management 
approach, market pressure for higher leverage and greater risk-taking, all in the name of  
maximising profits to satisfy shareholder interest.1192 In conclusion, while they provide 
immediate and temporary solution to the GFC, the legislative and governance reforms left intact 
the problem of how to deal with the issue of shareholder primacy in the long term. The reforms 
did not alter the pre-crisis position but tend to tilt strongly towards compelling corporate 
executives and board of directors to focus on satisfying shareholder interests. In view of this, it 
is submitted that policy makers, governments and legislatures need to reconceptualise the 
shareholder-centric model of corporate governance and recognise that other models with 
different underlying assumptions in which social values and long-term relationship get more 
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attention exist.1193 The next chapter considers how authorities in the UK responded to the crisis 
in terms of the legislative, regulatory and governance reforms. 
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Chapter Five 
UK Government’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis  
5.1 Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapters, even though the 2008 GFC originated in the US, its effects 
were very severe and global. Consequently, designing an effective and relevant policy response 
became the number one priority of governments and policy makers around the world.1194  Like 
other countries that have been similarly affected by the GFC, the UK government introduced 
several policy responses to prevent the financial sector from imminent collapse and curtail the 
downward spiral of the entire economy. 1195 
The problems of financial institutions, particularly in the banking sector had a severe impact on 
the country’s economic prospects, prompting immediate government intervention.1196 These 
government interventions have raised questions about many of the ideas that have been 
advocated in the last decade regarding the self-regulating nature of the market. These ideas have 
turned out to be untenable and in need of revision or replacement, because as the current GFC 
demonstrates, financial markets do not always manage risk effectively on their own.1197   
Following the recent GFC, scholars and policy makers have sought to debate the most effective 
policy tools capable of addressing the challenges posed by the GFC. Several critical issues have 
come to the fore in respect of the causes of the GFC and the optimum regulatory and governance 
responses needed to minimise or possibly prevent future occurrences.1198  
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Against this backdrop, section one (1) of this chapter examines the corporate governance regime 
in the UK prior to the crisis with the view to contextualising how and why the crisis occurred.  
The central argument is that the GFC has been caused not by corporate governance failures per 
se but by a management theory that has developed and served ‘the intellectual and moral 
bulwark for shareholder primacy’.1199 This was made possible by an array of institutional 
arrangements including: the legal, social and political institutions which together oriented 
managers towards shareholder value maximisation and short-termism.1200 Section two (2) 
considers the immediate and short-term fiscal policy responses initiated by the UK government 
and the rationale behind them. Section three (3) argues that the legislative/regulatory responses, 
which on the surface seem progressive, have failed to address the fundamental cause of the 
crisis. Apparently, most of the reforms tend to tilt strongly towards compelling corporate 
executives to focus on maximising shareholder value rather than on all other stakeholders. 
Section four (4) offers some concluding remarks and recommends that the focus should rather 
be on redefining the corporate purpose beyond the shareholder primacy theory which arguably, 
has been the underlying cause of the GFC. 
5.2 Foundation of UK Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance systems are often tightly coupled with path-dependent regulatory and 
legal traditions.1201 It is therefore, difficult to isolate corporate governance systems from other 
institutional arrangements, particularly within the area of banking law, labour law and 
competition law.1202 Such institutional arrangements are directly related to the way 
governments and firms respond to crisis, formulate business strategies and compete in the 
global economy.1203 
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The current UK corporate governance model emerged from a specific social, economic, 
ideological and law making (regulatory) tradition. It has since been under constant evolution 
reflecting the needs and challenges confronting companies in the process.1204  Starting from the 
1980s, corporate governance in the UK has witnessed a dramatic shift from a system of 
managerialism to the shareholder-oriented system.1205 The market-driven approach encouraged 
management to further the interests of shareholders, made possible through the instruments of 
stock options and the maximisation of company’s share price.1206 Following the relentless 
emphasis on the importance of the shareholder value, the broader stakeholder concerns of the 
1980s were overshadowed and relegated to the background.1207 In its place, the market-driven 
and growth-oriented attitudes engineered by the economic policies of Reagan and Thatcher 
became the dominant policy options.1208 
The drive to turn state-owned enterprises into profit-maximising entities became the 
justification for the outright sale and privatisation of strategically important state-owned 
enterprises such as Rail, Gas, Electricity and Water.1209 Advocates of the market-driven policies 
of the Thatcher era argue that the UK has a well-developed market with a diverse shareholder 
base made up of institutional investors, financial institutions and individuals.1210 Contrary to 
these assertions, the corporate governance regime in the early 1990s started showing signs and 
weaknesses associated with the separation of ownership and control of a company ( the agency 
problem).1211  Indeed, the numerous corporate failures that characterised the late 1990s and the 
early part of 2000 attest to the inherent dangers and difficulties that the agency problem poses 
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to corporate governance. These weaknesses became evident in corporate failures such as the 
Polly Peck1212  Robert Maxwell Communications1213 and BCCI.1214 
The evolution and subsequent development of the next phase of corporate governance in the 
UK was initially, and to a large extent, driven by these corporate failures and financial 
scandals.1215 Indeed, the Pension Act 1995 (C.26)1216 was enacted to review and improve the 
governance of the Pension Scheme following the Mirror Group Pension scandal. This case 
highlights directors’ duty of care and further illustrates the importance of the ‘proper purpose 
doctrine’1217 as it applies to the powers of directors and management of companies. 
Similarly, the PPI crisis was one of the main corporate failures that triggered the Cadbury 
Report which now forms the foundation of the modern UK corporate governance regime.1218  
In response to the PPI failure, the Cadbury report recommended the separation of the roles of 
the chairman and the CEO and advocated for a majority of non-executive directors.1219  
As already indicated, the development of corporate governance in the UK has its roots in the 
work done by various committees starting with the Cadbury (1992)1220 Committee through to 
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the Greenbury Report of 19951221 the Hampel Report of 19981222 and the Combined Code of 
1998 which embodies the finding of the three reports.1223  One common thread that runs through 
these reports is the preference for the principle-based approach to corporate governance and the 
options for companies to ‘comply or explain’.1224  This concept has since become the hallmark 
of UK’s governance regime and epitomises a broadly Anglo-American tradition which seeks to 
minimise as much as possible, government involvement in the regulation of the markets.1225 
More significantly, the UK deliberately chose the market-based approach to regulation and thus, 
created a governance model under which corporations have been encouraged and allowed to 
regulate themselves (light-touch regulation) in conformity with economic, political and 
ideological preferences.1226  
Three reasons explain the UK’s continuous obsession with the light-touch and self-regulatory 
approach to corporate governance.1227 First, the ideological belief in the inherent superiority of 
self-regulation and the laissez- faire economic thinking became deeply entrenched in both 
public and private sectors. This created a situation where effective public oversight, supervision 
and monitoring of financial markets were undermined.1228 The second reason is that due to this 
ideological inclination, the need for government to engage in the monitoring of these markets 
was relegated to the background. Consequently, most financial institutions and other corporate 
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entities in the UK enjoyed what Young and Thyil aptly describe as a ‘regulatory holiday’ prior 
to the GFC.1229   
Third, the role of politics cannot be discounted because the political imperative to develop 
London as a major financial centre meant that political pressure could be brought to bear against 
intrusive legislation or regulation.1230  Indeed, the City of London had powerful political allies 
including the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr Gordon Brown to champion its cause by 
reaffirming the ‘light touch’ regulatory environment that London provides for both local and 
international businesses to grow and flourish. Asserting the success of this regulatory model, 
Mr   Brown in his 2007 Mansion House Speech stated: 
[I] have been able year by year to record how the City of London has risen by your efforts, ingenuity, 
and creativity to become a new world leader. Now today over 40 per cent of the world’s foreign equities 
are traded here, more than New York… So, in celebrating the success of the talents, innovations and 
achievements of the City let us look forward to working together for even greater success in the 
future.1231 
Ironically, the Chancellor made these remarks in 2007 on the eve of the financial crisis.  Just 
three weeks after this speech, the weaknesses of the system became apparent with the collapse 
and subsequent nationalisation of several renowned British financial institutions.1232 Notable 
among them were Northern Rock Plc, Bradford & Bingley, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and 
Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS).1233  
The Chancellor was not alone in demonstrating this exuberant and optimistic attitude. Both 
government and the business community have come to accept that allowing businesses to 
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operate with minimal government intervention was more efficient and produce better results. This, 
self-regulatory approach, it has been argued, explains why London continues to attract investors 
globally.  
On the other hand, the political appeal of hosting a major financial centre such as London 
without an effective regulatory framework has its own risks and challenges. Arguably, the risks 
created by the excesses in these financial centres often lead to the imposition of financial 
burdens on taxpayers as the GFC illustrates.1234 As witnessed during the GFC, the UK 
government had to intervene with taxpayers’ money to rescue failed financial institutions with 
the justification that the survival of these systematically-important institutions was essential to 
maintain the stability of the financial markets.1235  
There may be good reasons for adopting this optimistic attitude. But it is important to recognise 
that an effective corporate governance regime depends on the commitment of the corporate 
players to adhere to the appropriate governance standards and values as part the corporate 
culture.1236 Just as it would be unrealistic to depend solely on the markets, it is equally important 
to ensure that the role of government is not reduced to a passive bystander or ‘a cheer leader on 
the side lines of the market place’.1237  
 Notwithstanding the preponderance of the supposedly inherent rationality of markets, some 
critical voices began to denounce the deregulatory movement, the laissez-faire rhetoric and the 
efficient market hypothesis.1238  Minsky,1239 Kindleberger1240 and A liber have argued without 
success, that financial markets are prone to certain inherent weaknesses which make them 
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susceptible to failures especially in times of speculative boom.1241 According to Minsky, the 
over reliance on  private sector bodies such as CRAs and other professional Gatekeepers as 
alternatives to governmental regulation creates additional problems due to possible conflict of 
interests.1242 It is further argued, that the failure by CRAs and other professional Gatekeepers 
to undertake a critical evaluation of financial products and restraint abuses was key in triggering 
GFC.1243  
It becomes apparent that the UK corporate governance model was largely influenced and 
shaped by an unquestioned belief in shareholder primacy with its focus on efficient market 
hypothesis that has been largely driven by ideological and political considerations. The self-
regulatory model of corporate governance relied on companies to self-regulate using the 
concept of ‘comply or explain.’ The next section examines the evolution of the concept and 
how it has shaped corporate governance thinking and practice in the UK.  
 5. 3 Comply or Explain 
The corporate failures of the early 1990s that were triggered by excesses on the part of corporate 
entities led to a loss of public confidence in the ability of these corporations to self-regulate. 
For many observers, the history of corporate governance and the need to regulate corporations 
can best be described as a contest between two opposing ideas.1244 On the one hand, there are 
institutional investors, shareholders and management favouring the preservation of operational 
flexibility while the state on the other hand, strives to ensure public accountability of 
corporations.1245 The tension between these two regulatory goals  becomes obvious in the way 
publicly listed companies are regulated in the UK.1246  Predictably, the UK, with its history of 
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encouraging free trade and good corporate governance, adopted a self-regulatory regime which 
emphasises the application of principles to suit the individual and distinct circumstance of each 
corporate entity.1247 As a result, the system resisted attempts by government to exercise control 
over corporate affairs while relying on the private regulation of such corporations through the 
use of codes and principles.1248 
At the heart of this regulatory model is the Combined Code on Corporate Governance with the 
comply-or-explain principle as its central element.1249 The concept was originally proposed by 
the Cadbury Committee set up in 1992 to examine and make proposals in respect of the financial 
aspects of corporate governance.1250 The UK authorities viewed the work of the committee as 
a practical means of establishing a code of corporate governance while avoiding an inflexible 
one size fits all approach.1251  
The Code has over the years been reviewed at regular intervals to reflect the changing 
circumstances and challenges of the times. For instance, the Greenbury Report1252 of 1995 was 
established to identify good practice in determining directors’ remuneration and prepare a code 
of practice for UK public listed companies, while the Hampel Report in 1998 examined both 
the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports which eventually led to the setting up of the Combined 
Code.  
Since assuming responsibility for the Combined Code, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
has undertaken regular reviews including: the Myers Review, Vickers Report, the Higgs 
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Review and the Turner Review.1253 Following the adoption of the comply-or-explain model, 
the UK has been able to preserve a set of corporate governance norms and practices that are 
legally non-binding in form and relatively broad-based in substance.1254 Because this 
governance model is principle-based, codes of corporate governance principles and indeed, 
good practices are the main determinants of board responsibilities not the rigid application of 
laid down rules and regulations.1255  
Keay defines codes as ‘non-binding set of principles, standards or best practices, issued by a 
collective body and relating to the internal governance of corporations’.1256 Under this 
arrangement, companies are required to demonstrate compliance with the governance principles 
as specified in the code or explain why they have not done so.1257 This explains why the model 
is referred to as comply-or-explain.1258 Self-regulation remains the underlying principle while 
compliance is voluntary. The model is characterised by the ease and regularity with which these 
reviews are carried out and underscores the flexibility of this approach. Arguably, this 
flexibility would have been impossible if a statutory approach had been adopted.1259  This is 
because finding the legislative time to amend statutory provisions is often very difficult and 
time consuming. There is also a greater risk that political considerations often exert undue 
influence particularly, when the proposed changes involve high profile issues affecting 
powerful interests.1260 
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The principle of comply-or-explain pioneered by the original Cadbury Code in 1992 has 
developed certain features and characteristics that distinguish it from other governance models. 
First, although the code insists on voluntary compliance with certain norms and practices, it is 
also backed by a mandatory disclosure regime as contained in the UK Listing Rules.1261  These 
rules encourage all registered companies in the UK to comply with the provisions of the code 
covering important governance issues relating to the board of directors, non-executive directors, 
executive directors, reporting and controls.1262  Presently, the code contains more than 50 
provisions and gives over 110 instances of guidelines for companies.1263  Yet such companies 
are not required by law to comply with these provisions, as a result, companies can  ignore them 
provided they are able to explain the non-compliance.1264 
Secondly, the provisions emanating from the comply-or-explain principle have now become 
the central features of the corporate governance system in the UK.1265  Examples include: the 
separation of the roles of the chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the appointment 
of a senior independent directors, the nomination of remuneration committees among others. 
All these evolved from, and have, in fact, become entrenched in UK corporate governance 
thinking and practice following the advent of the comply-or-explain concept.1266 
A third crucial feature of comply-or- explain is that the rationale is not simply about having no 
requirements. Rather, this approach recognises that alternative to the provision is justified so 
long as it achieves the goal of good governance and companies can demonstrate 
transparency.1267 As the FRC notes, departures from the code provision do not constitute or 
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presumed to be breaches because the accompanying explanation should provide some insights 
into the reasons and justification for the non-compliance. 
Finally, the concept of comply-or-explain is not applied in isolation, but often used alongside 
other approaches and co-exists with codes and principles that need to be applied in all 
circumstances. Accordingly, UK Company law contains provisions regarding certain aspects 
of corporate governance. For instance, section 172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006 sets out the 
duties of the directors by stating ‘a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole’.1268 
The purpose of all governance codes, whether they apply comply-or-explain principle or not, 
is to promote good governance.1269 The same is true for all corporate governance legislations 
and regulations. It is, therefore not enough to claim that the benefits of the concept lie in its 
ability to promote good governance.1270  Following this line of reasoning, it can be argued that 
the justification for comply-or-explain should be premised on the specific advantages it has 
over alternative governance models.  
The strength of the UK corporate governance regime stems from its constant evolution which 
arguably, can be attributed to the concept of comply-or-explain.1271 This flexibility, arguably,   
allows companies to choose between complying with the principles and explaining why they 
cannot and thus, underscores the robustness and adaptability of the model.1272 As Seidi et al 
argue, the concept emphasises the possibility of deviation from what they describe as situation-
specific reasons such as company size and structure.1273  Thus, it avoids blind compliance with 
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the code without taking cognisance of the peculiar needs and circumstances of the company in 
question.1274 The merits of such a flexible approach are thought to lie in its ability to encourage 
companies to comply with the spirit of the code rather than the letter.1275  Indeed, the Hampel 
Committee which reviewed the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports, stresses that: ‘Good corporate 
governance is not just a matter of prescribing particular and complying with a number of hard 
and fast rules. There is the need for broad principles. All concerned should then apply these 
flexibly and with common sense to the varying circumstances of individual companies’.1276 
Advocates of comply-or-explain, opine that because companies operate in a rapidly changing 
environment, the model avoids ideologically fixed rules. Instead, it takes into account the 
concerns of other cultures, the different constituents and other choices, hence, the need for 
flexibility.1277 It is further argued, that the model dismisses passionate ideologies and opts for 
the adoption of a corporate governance regime that will shape the governance environment 
compatible with social values that may not necessarily  fit all companies at all times.1278  In this 
context, it is submitted that the flexibility associated with the UK corporate governance model 
has driven innovation particularly, in the development of board evaluation and in the area of 
the separation of the position of the chairman from that of the CEO. 
Moreover, the concept of comply-or-explain has been recognised as a pragmatic corporate 
governance tool in the UK, as obtains in the business judgement rule which states that directors 
cannot be held liable so long as they act in good faith without clear malfeasance.1279 Judges in 
the UK have affirmed this doctrine which virtually allows directors to enjoy unfettered 
discretion to determine the corporation’s goals. In Sheffield and South Yorkshire Permanent 
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Building Society v. Aizlewood, the court ruled that: ‘Directors are not trustees in the ordinary 
sense of the word but are commercial men managing a business for the benefit of themselves 
and other members. Absent an abuse of discretion, their judgement will be respected by the 
courts’.1280 
Proponents insist that the flexibility it provides has brought remarkable improvement in 
corporate governance without the need for the often inflexible, sometimes burdensome and 
needless rules, laws or regulations.1281 This flexible approach that characterises comply-or-
explain, enhances business efficacy, according to its proponents. 
Critics counter-argue that the doctrine gives corporate executives too much discretion, which 
is potentially dangerous, as almost every decision can be justified because it benefits or protects 
the interests of the corporation.1282  Hence, the proposition that the comply-or-explain concept 
enhances business efficacy appears largely inaccurate and unpersuasive upon closer 
examination. 
Apparently, an initiative that began as a response to corporate failures in the UK during the 
1990s, has become a global phenomenon.1283  Over 32 countries across the world have adopted 
the comply-or-explain concept albeit with slight variations to suit local circumstances.1284 
International organisations including the EU and the OECD have also adopted some of the 
principles and ideas espoused by the comply-or-explain concept. The universal appeal of the 
concept can be explained by the flexibility it encourages, the adaptability it provides and the 
innovation it promotes.1285 
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The principle of comply-or-explain has generally received positive acclamation in the UK over 
the past three decades. But serious questions remain as to whether the central premise of the 
flexibility and the purported capacity to ensure ‘the efficient balance of flexibility and 
innovation has been achieved in practice’.1286  Four key weakness and limitations of the concept 
have been identified including: (a) poor explanations (b) limited shareholder engagement (c) 
differences of opinions between management and shareholders (d) different views as to the 
right approach.1287 
A major weakness of the comply-or-explain concept is the inadequacy of the explanations that 
are often offered. Research by Seidi et al. of 257 listed companies in the UK regarding their 
compliance and explanations offered for the deviation only goes to confirm this position.1288 
The study reveals that a significant number of the explanations analysed were either not 
justified1289 or were justified based on principled objection.1290  The research also found that 20 
per cent of the companies studied failed to offer any explanation for their non-compliance. Even 
more disturbing is the revelation that the companies that did not comply but claimed to have 
done so ‘did not do a good job in providing explanation’.1291 
The most likely reasons for these failures are twofold. First, either the shareholders did not 
attach much importance to the explanations or they were content with them.1292 The conclusion 
that can be drawn is that companies do not use comply-or-explain to fine tune1293 their 
governance arrangement, hence the argument that the comply-or-explain principle contributes 
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to good and effective management of corporation seems suspect. Second, without adequate 
explanation in the event of non-compliance, it becomes difficult to ascertain if the deviation is 
justified.1294  Against this backdrop, it is submitted that when applying the principles of comply-
or-complain, it is important to emphasis the quality of the explanations provided.1295 
Another defect of comply-or-explain is that it is overly subjective. This level of discretion 
enables directors to comply with what they deem appropriate and necessary and only give 
reasons for non-compliance.1296 Consequently, a lot depends on the discretion of the board, 
which is understandable to some extent since the board requires some level of independence in 
the exercise of its authority.1297 The danger, however, is that because management determines 
the explanation to be given, accountability is to a large extent compromised. The reason being 
that the adequacy, or otherwise, of an explanation is purely discretionary and highly 
subjective.1298 Also, the lack of a prescriptive definition against which the code may be applied, 
implemented and enforced raises questions about the viability of the code to constitute an 
effective corporate governance mechanism.1299 
Furthermore, the complain-or-explain principle is explicitly founded on shareholder primacy 
and relies on shareholders and private regulation for enforcement.1300 The challenge, however, 
is that the dispersed ownership structure in the UK constitutes a major hindrance that makes it 
difficult for shareholders to play this enforcement role.1301 This stems from the limited 
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monitoring role of shareholders as evidenced by coordinating problems, monitoring costs and 
the different incentives for intervention.1302 Consequently, it is doubtful whether the capacity 
to ensure innovation can in reality be achieved through comply-or-explain.1303 
Moreover, because comply-or-explain is founded on the principle of shareholder primacy and 
private regulation of corporations,1304 it is effectively a subtle mechanism for the perpetuation 
of shareholder primacy. This explains why the concept is often described as the ‘hand maiden’ 
of light-touch regulatory approach that has been allowed to overshadow clear rules that can be 
enforced with no exception.1305 Obviously, a corporate governance strategy based totally on 
persuasion as pertains under comply-or-explain failed to work because it has been exploited by 
companies based on ‘economic rationality’.1306  Despite these obvious weaknesses, the UK 
remains wedded to the concept, as a result of which firms have been allowed to self-regulate in 
conformity with political preferences supported by economic theories developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s- notably the efficient market hypothesis.1307 
As earlier explained in this chapter, governance practices are mediated by domestic politics, 
economic theories and ideological leanings among other factors.1308 In that respect, it is 
submitted that the UK corporate governance model (comply-or-explain) emerged from specific 
economic beliefs, political tradition and legal and regulatory environment.1309 It is therefore, 
not surprising that the corporate governance reforms witnessed in the UK post the 2008 GFC 
are replete with evidence of how domestic political, economic and passionate ideological 
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considerations have shaped the responses and the eventual outcomes.1310 This reflects the path-
dependent nature of corporate governance models based on social power relations that are 
inherently shareholder-oriented.1311 The next section examines the salient policy and regulatory 
measures undertaken by the UK government in response to the crisis. 
In responding to the GFC no single means of intervention is likely to succeed.1312 Indeed, 
containing a crisis of this magnitude inevitably requires an equally complex and multifaceted 
approach and response in view of its severity.1313 As Leaven and Valencia admit, ‘there has 
been very little agreement on what constitutes best practice or even good practice’1314 vis-a-vis 
addressing the challenges posed by the crisis. Within the context of heightened uncertainty 
about the financial sector and the larger economy, the UK authorities were expected, and indeed 
required, to initiate policy responses and remedies that would be most effective.1315 In trying to 
find the appropriate response, the U.K government was confronted with several pertinent 
questions such as: 
(a) How quick and aggressive should the policy actions be? 
 (b) How much weight should government place on macroeconomic and financial sector 
policies? 
 (c) What specific form should the responses take in view of the legal, political, economic and 
other constraints?  
                                                          
1310 ibid 
1311 Fligstein and Freeland (n 59). 
1312 ibid 
1313 ibid 
1314 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘Systemic Banking Crisis: A New Database’ (IMF Research Working Paper 
No. WP/12/163, June 2012) <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12163.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015  
1315Malcolm Sawyer, ‘The Tragedy of UK Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis’ (2012)36 (2) 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 206. 
Chapter 5 
219 
 
Thus, designing an efficient and effective policy response to the crisis became the pre-
occupation of policy makers in the UK, notably the FSA, BoE and the Treasury Department.1316 
These three bodies were established to manage, supervise and regulate economic and financial 
activities in the UK under a tripartite arrangement introduced through the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in 1997  and later revised in 2006.1317 The individual authorities 
collectively contribute to the financial stability of the UK by playing their respective roles and 
fulfilling their responsibilities.1318 Accordingly, the Treasury is responsible for the structure of 
legislation, regulation and oversight of the financial system while the BoE is charged with three 
crucial but closely related roles that include: (a) ensuring financial stability through its monetary 
policy function, (b) monitoring the payments system, and (c) providing emergency liquidity 
support.1319 The role of the FSA is that of a regulator, and it does so by monitoring and 
supervising the financial institutions.1320 
5.4 Policy Responses 
In responding to the GFC, the UK government employed a combination of measures including 
both private and public, first to contain it and second to restore confidence in the market. As 
Singh rightly observes, ‘the ultimate goal of the wide-ranging central bank and government 
intervention was to address the fragility of the banking system and restore confidence in the 
financial market’.1321 The measures introduced to support the Banking industry in the face of 
declining public and investor confidence include: Blanket Guarantees, Recapitalisation (Rescue 
Package), Special Liquidity Scheme (SPS), Assets Protection Scheme (APS) and the setting up 
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of the United Kingdom Financial Investment Limited (UKFI).1322  These reforms went beyond 
the use of emergency liquidity assistance that the BoE provided to Northern Rock at the onset 
of the GFC.1323  
Apart from the fiscal and financial measures, the UK authorities also embarked on some 
important legislative and policy initiatives aimed at tackling the loss of confidence in the 
financial system.1324 These are: The Turner Review, the Walker Review and the Banking Act 
2009.1325 This section now examines each of these measures to ascertain whether and to what 
extent they individually or collectively address the underlying cause of the GFC. 
5.4.1 Blanket Guarantees  
A critical challenge that confronted the UK Authorities following the GFC, particularly after 
the run on Northern Rock, was how to stabilize the financial system and minimise further 
damage to the real economy.1326 First, the UK authorities adopted a piecemeal approach that 
focused on conventional policy initiatives and ad hoc interventions including blanket 
guarantees.1327 A blanket guarantee is the explicit government guarantee on all, or a substantial 
fraction of bank liabilities.1328 Typically, it covers both deposits as well as non-deposit liabilities 
and can either be firm-specific or applied system wide.1329  In the case of the UK, the blanket 
guarantee facility was extended to only specific institutions notably Northern Rock, RBS, and 
HBOS that were about to collapse following the GFC.1330  Thus, the UK Authorities’ first 
                                                          
1322 Peter Yeoh, ‘US and UK Legal Reponses to the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 30 (4) Business Law Review 86. 
1323 William Buiter, ‘Bank of England Has Acted Like a “Paper Tiger” on Northern Rock’. The Telegraph 
(London,14 September 2007)   
1324 ibid 
1325 ibid 
1326 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crisis’ (2012)31(5) Journal of 
International Money & Finance 221. 
1327 David Furceri and Annabelle Mourougane, ‘Financial Crisis: Past Lessons and Policy Implications’ (OECD  
Working Paper Preliminary Version, 23 January 2012) 
< www.oecd.org/eco/monetary/42037145.pdf> accessed 29 August 2015 
1328 Laeven and Valencia (n 1326) 221. 
1329 ibid 
1330 ibid 
Chapter 5 
221 
 
response was to announce a blanket guarantee which would in the short-term, help contain the 
effects of the crisis and also prevent a further deterioration.1331  To ensure the stability of the 
banking sector and avoid a longer recession, a £250 billion debt guarantee scheme was 
introduced to support banks facing liquidity problems.1332 In addition, government also 
increased the threshold of deposit insurance from £ 35,000 to £50,000 as part of the measures 
to encourage inter-bank lending and stimulate the economy.1333   
The blanket guarantee programme has been hailed in government circles as a timely policy 
intervention that has provided considerable support for the UK banking industry by bringing 
some order and relief to the retail and wholesale banking sectors at a very critical period.1334 
The benefits, according to this school of thought, lie in the impact it has on public confidence 
as it eliminates the incentive to withdraw deposits.1335 Indeed, a successful blanket guarantee 
reduces runs on banks as deposit withdrawal subsides and liquidity pressure on banks 
decreases.1336 In their study of bank behaviour in the EU, Gropp and Visalia conclude that 
blanket guarantee can in fact reduce banks’ incentive to engage in excessive risk-taking.1337 
Arguably, such government guarantee, accompanied by close monitoring and supervision  
invariably reduces the level of excessive risk-taking behaviour associated with the pre-crisis era 
in the UK.1338 
It is further argued that blanket guarantee provides the trust and confidence required to avoid 
future runs and thus, benefits the entire economy. Evidence suggests that blanket guarantee can 
                                                          
1331 ibid 
1332 ibid 
1333 ibid 
1334 Singh (n 1321) 906. 
1335 ibid 
1336 ibid 
1337 Reint Gropp and Jukka Vesala, ‘Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring’ (2004) 8 (4) 
Review of Finance 571 
1338 John D. Wagster, Robert Edmister, Edward J. Kane and Richard Sweeney ‘Bank Capital and Implicit 
Government Support: Sources of Stability for Canadian Banks during the Great Depression.’ (FMA Working 
Paper, 20 April 2009) 
Chapter 5 
222 
 
be effective in slowing down the deterioration in public confidence often associated with 
financial crisis. This is because the introduction of that facility tends to assure depositors that 
government will come to the assistance of banks experiencing liquidity problems.1339 For 
instance, the runs on Northern Rock and the subsequent effect on the UK banking sector was 
due to lack of public trust and confidence in the bank to meet its financial obligations.1340 The 
caveat, however, is that the effectiveness of such a policy depends on the credibility of the 
guarantee.1341 
The perceived benefits of and justification for the blanket guarantee has not gone unchallenged. 
The measure has, however, been criticised in many quarters as inappropriate and inadequate 
policy response in view of the gravity of the GFC. According to Kane and Kliengebiel, blanket 
guarantees have often been unsuccessful in improving public confidence during crisis.1342 A 
study by Demirgüc and Detragiache confirms this proposition. From their study of 61 countries 
in the period spanning from 1980-1987, they conclude that contrary to popular perception, 
blanket guarantees actually increase risk-taking incentives and consequently compound the 
likelihood of further banking crisis.1343 Similarly, Duan et al posit that the establishment of 
guarantees in the UK has led to ‘bank risk-shifting behaviour’.1344 In this scenario, banks are 
incentivised to engage in more risky business practices as more generous blanket guarantees 
create bigger incentives for such banks to shift their risks to the guarantor/issuer.1345 
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From the policy perspective, it can be argued that rather than helping to address or resolve the 
GFC, blanket guarantees have in fact led to a substantial increase in the fiscal cost of the crisis. 
A greater proportion of the fiscal costs stems from the fact that the measure was introduced 
after liquidity support had almost reached the point of exhaustion, as a result, fiscal costs tend 
to be higher. Apart from the higher fiscal cost implications, blanket guarantees also create a 
potential moral hazard because banks that have been given such guarantees often develop a 
tendency where they no longer feel disciplined by depositors to avoid excessive risk-taking. 
Moreover, once granted this facility, it often becomes attractive for such banks to engage in 
risky activities. In this regard, it is submitted that rather than reducing risks, blanket guarantees 
rather encourage and perpetuate higher risk-taking behaviour that has the potential to trigger 
yet another crisis. 
5.4.2 Recapitalisation 
Recapitalisation is an important policy measure used in the resolution phase of a financial crisis 
to restore sanity in the banking industry.1346 This became one of the major policy tools 
employed by governments forced to bail out financial institution so as to avoid further economic 
deterioration.1347  Recapitalisation, therefore, become  a strategic option adopted by the UK 
authorities to manage the crisis, restore the solvency of the banking system and to enable a 
return to profitability in the shortest possible time.1348 
In the process of recapitalising the banks, the UK authorities first made an initial capital 
injection of £37 Billion to ensure the stability of banks and avoid a long recession.1349  This, 
was  followed by a special £ 200 Billion liquidity facility, purposely to enable the banks to start 
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lending again. Although, the government’s response to the crisis through the capitalisation 
process was considered appropriate, the participating banks were unable to take advantage of 
the facility.1350  In fact, the participating banks, notably, RBS, HBOS and Lloyd TSB, failed to 
recapitalise through the private sector due to lack of investor-confidence.1351 As a result, 
government was compelled to intervene by acquiring 58 per cent stake in RBS and 43 per cent 
in Lloyd TSB.1352  
 First, the UK authorities argue that public recapitalisation of banks are designed to prevent 
bank failure, a breakdown of the financial system, bank runs and loss of confidence.1353 
Secondly, UK authorities maintain that, but for the timely intervention through recapitalisation, 
economic stagnation would have continued much longer than it did during the GFC. Third, 
proponents contend that failure to embark on recapitalisation would have put the UK economy 
at a much greater risk and the associated distress. Moreover, supporters of the recapitalisation 
scheme maintain that such public intervention tend to align banks’ incentives in terms of risk. 
This is largely because such policy interventions allow government increased regulatory 
oversight and more stringent monitoring of the rescued banks.1354 Lastly, authorities in the UK 
argue that unlike in earlier crisis situations, the recapitalisation programme in the 2008 crisis 
have been implemented much faster than in the past.1355 Overall, the recapitalisation of UK 
banks during the GFC, it may be argued, has been successful in saving the banks and the 
economy and to a very large extent helped to avoid further job losses.1356 
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It is however, doubtful whether the stated aim of recapitalization- which is to make the system 
safer has been achieved.  The contrary has happened as, Brei and Gadabecz reveal in their study 
of 40 rescued-banks and 47 non-rescued banks between 2006 and 2010.1357 They conclude that 
there was ‘significantly more risk in the loan books of rescued banks than of non-rescued banks 
before, during and after the crisis ’.1358  Moreover, empirical studies undertaken to investigate 
the link between government support in the form of recapitalisation and bank risk also point to 
a direct correlation.1359 Arguably, the expectation of financial support in the event of a crisis 
has an adverse influence on banks’ incentive to take more risk.1360 Often, the justification for 
granting this support is premised on the institution’s systemic importance or its likely adverse 
impact on the functioning of the system as a whole. Merton describes this concept as ‘adverse 
incentives’1361 which refers to a situation where banks are not penalised for taking increased 
risk but are in fact encouraged to take higher risk with the expectation of getting support in 
times of difficulties.1362 
Apparently, the evidence presented by these researchers seems to undermine the effectiveness 
of recapitalization as a means of achieving a safe banking system. The study reveals that banks 
that were later rescued during the crisis took on higher risk ex-ante than non-rescued banks.1363 
Unsurprisingly, rescued banks’ lending behaviour was much riskier than non-rescued banks.1364 
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In effect, the recapitalisation programme created a situation which allowed some banks to 
consciously take advantage of the implicit bail-out policy of the UK government.1365  
Bank recapitalisation, as a policy intervention, whether it is system-wide or targeted, comes 
with an associated distortionary effect.1366 The distortion stems from the fact that it signals the 
authorities’ willingness to accommodate excessive risk-taking by the banks which eventually 
reduces the credibility of regulators in the future.1367 It not only signals the authorities’ 
willingness to accommodate excesses in risk-taking but that such authorities cannot realistically 
commit to not supporting these banks in the face of an impending failure.1368 In view of this, 
the recapitalisation programme adopted by the UK authorities is effectively, a form of disguised 
subsidy contrary to what proponents of the efficient market hypothesis have been propagating 
for some time now. Arguably, the overall effect of this policy intervention is largely ambiguous 
and highly suspicious because such a policy tends to encourage some of the very practices that 
triggered the GFC. 
5.4.3 Assets Purchase 
In the early part of 2009, the UK government became concerned that despite the introduction 
of blank guarantees and recapitalisation measures, the economy still looked unlikely to record 
any significant recovery. It became obvious that the policy measures in place were insufficient 
to revive the ailing UK economy.1369 Thus, the BoE and the Treasury opted for other policy 
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interventions leading to the introduction of the Asset Purchase Facility (APF)1370- a new policy 
designed to stimulate the economy.1371 
Driving this policy was the unwillingness of investors to retain such assets because of the low 
interest yield they provide following the GFC.1372 This is because under the current 
circumstances, investors prefer to reinvest in other assets such as corporate bonds and 
shares.1373 As a result, a total of £375 billion was spent on the Asset Purchase Facility in three 
tranches.1374 The first purchase of £200 billion worth of assets took place between March and 
November 2009.1375 A further £75 billion in October 2011, £50 billion in July 2012 and £50 
billion in February 2013 were purchased.1376 These were spread over several months and across 
bonds of different maturity so as to avoid any distortionary effect in the market.1377 
The aim of the Asset Purchase Facility is to inject money into the economy to boost spending, 
achieve the projected 2 per cent inflation target and stabilize the economy. The policy objective 
is the expectation that sellers of the assets, including commercial banks would be more inclined 
to use the cash received to create loans. At the same time, the purchase of significant amounts 
of traded bonds is expected to lead to a reduction in average loan costs and make it easier and 
cheaper for companies to access credit.1378 In that respect, the £ 375 billion allocated to the asset 
purchase facility represents a significant injection of liquidity designed to stimulate borrowing, 
increase confidence and thus generate economic activity.1379 A BoE report reveals that the first 
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£200 billion asset purchase boosted the level of economic activity from 1.5 per cent to 2 per 
cent,1380 which ‘suggests that in the absence of the asset purchase programme, the UK recession 
would have been even deeper’.1381 
A counter argument is that the Asset Purchase Programme has negatively affected savers and 
pensions while the benefits of the programme to the wider economy are doubtful.1382 For 
instance, the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) points out that pension funds are 
deeper in red than ever, following the introduction of the asset purchase programme.1383 
According to the NAPF, this has forced businesses to divert resources from job creation and 
investment into filling the shortfalls in their pension funds.1384  NAPF insists that pension funds 
would prefer a stronger economy and are in principle not against the APP adding ‘we would 
like to see more evidence that it is working’.1385 
There are also concerns that the BoE does not seem to have an exit strategy, which has 
understandably, created uncertainty as to when the programme will finally come to an end.1386 
The worry is that the greater the asset purchase facility becomes, the harder it will be to exit.1387 
In view of the dangers associated with the APP it has been argued that the programme has not 
achieved much by way of addressing the causes of the GFC but merely deferring the crisis.1388  
Clearly, the APP is more concerned with protecting the interest of financial institutions and 
their shareholders in view of its obsession with the value maximising principles underlying 
corporate governance in the UK. 
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5.4.4 Nationalisation 
The mortgage delinquencies1389 and the subsequent crisis that emerged in the US quickly spread 
to UK with Northern Rock as the first casualty.1390 Consequently, Northern Rock sought and 
obtained emergency financial support from the BoE.1391 This measure was however, not enough 
to stop the panic-stricken customers from withdrawing their savings estimated to be over £I 
billion over a period of three days.1392  To stem the panic, the UK government further announced 
a full guarantee of depositors’ saving under a new deposit guarantee scheme which eliminated 
a provision whereby only 90 per cent of an amount between £2000 and £35,000 was guaranteed. 
The new scheme provided a 100 per cent guarantee and increased the threshold to £50,000.1393 
Having exhausted all options without success, government on the advice of the FSA, 
nationalised Northern Rock on February 2008 and insists the bank was still solvent.1394 
Justifying the government position, the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that the bank 
will go into ‘a period of public ownership’1395 but ‘as a bank on commercial basis with complete 
autonomy for their decisions’.1396 According to the Chancellor, the government had three 
objectives for nationalising Northern Rock. The first, is to ensure financial stability under the 
prevailing circumstances where serious risk exists which could destabilise parts and possibly 
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the entire banking system in the UK.1397  Accordingly, government intervention was right and 
necessary in view of the urgency of the situation and the need to preserve financial stability in 
the face of the GFC.1398 Second, the intervention albeit unconventional, underscores 
government’s attempt to safeguard depositors’ money by instituting guarantee arrangements 
that can also restore confidence in the banking sector.1399  The third objective is to protect the 
interests of the tax payer because ‘under public ownership the government will secure the entire 
proceeds from the future sale of the business in return for bearing the risks in this period of 
market uncertainty’.1400 A report by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 
supports this proposition. After a comprehensive analysis of the options available, the report 
concludes that public ownership represents the best alternative.1401 This rather positive and 
optimistic portrayal of the nationalisation programme later turned out to be unfounded and to 
some extent misleading as the subsequent discussion demonstrates.  
Following the arguments favouring nationalisation, the House of Commons proceeded to enact 
the Banking (Special Provisions) Act that nationalised Northern Rock on 22 February 2008.1402 
The Northern Rock Transfer Order was also made the same day and came into force that very 
day after it had received the Royal Assent.1403 It is important to note that in 2010 the bank was 
split up into Northern Rock Plc to engage in retail banking and Northern Rock Asset 
Management (NRAM) to handle the bad debts.1404 
As already indicated, one major criticism against the nationalisation was that the bank’s initial 
plan approved by the Treasury was over-optimistic especially on future changes in property 
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prices.1405 This becomes more evident when compared to the publicly- available forecasts and 
figures at the time.1406  For instance the reported losses for the six months to the end of June 
was £585 Million which is £314 Million more than what has been projected and presented to 
the Treasury for approval.1407 
The nationalisation is further criticised because at the time of implementation, the Treasury 
knew very little about what it was taking on.1408 Indeed, the House of Commons Committee on 
Public Accounts notes that in nationalising Northern Rock, the Treasury was taking on huge 
risks on behalf of the taxpayer without due diligence on the quality of the bank’s loan books.1409  
The Treasury’s failure to understand the complexities of nationalisation and take the necessary 
action, prompted the establishment of the UK Financial Investment (UKFI).1410 This body was 
set up to manage taxpayer’s shares in Northern Rock and other banks that received emergency 
support from the Treasury. UKFI took over Northern Rock Plc in 2010 but the retail bank still 
made substantial losses in 2011.1411 In line with the stated policy of returning it to private 
ownership, Northern Rock was finally sold to Virgin Money in 2011 at the price of £931 which 
is £469 million less than the £1.4 billion government injected into that bank at the beginning of 
the crisis.1412 This figure could rise to £650 million according to the telegraph;1413 a position 
collaborated by both the BBC and the Guardian Newspaper.1414 It is uncertain whether the 
Treasury will ever fully recoup the public funds (nearly half a billion pounds) provided to 
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Northern Rock.1415 In this regard, it is submitted that nationalising Northern Rock was not a 
viable policy option but a policy failure that delivered increased public debt by making the 
taxpayer a compulsory shareholder in a failed bank.1416 
5.5 Regulatory Response 
Failures in bank governance coupled with the poor management of risks as noted earlier, 
contributed to the severity of the financial crisis in the UK.1417 Thus, it became imperative for 
the UK tripartite authorities to design both macroeconomic and financial sector policy measures 
as well as legislative and regulatory responses to address the critical legal and regulatory defects 
that have been identified. Thus, in addition to the bailout and economic stimulus packages, 
several legislative and regulatory initiatives were undertaken in the UK following the GFC.1418  
Having examined the various macroeconomic and financial policy responses, the next section 
turns to the legislative and regulatory responses adopted by the UK authorities. Several 
legislative and regulatory measures were introduced but for the present purposes, the focus is 
on the Turner Review, the Walker Review and the Banking Act of 2009 in view of their 
relevance to the discussion.  
5.5.1   Turner Review 
The Turner Review which was set up to examine the global banking crisis published its report 
on March 18, 2009. According to the FSA, the aim of the review is ‘to provide a report on the 
origins of the financial crisis with an assessment of the regulatory deficiencies that arose and 
make recommendation for reform.’1419 Accordingly, the Turner Review examines the 
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background to the GFC, the causes and more importantly the key regulatory lessons that can be 
drawn.1420 In analysing the causes of the crisis, the review identifies significant 
‘macroeconomic imbalances over the last decade, the increased complexity in the securitised 
credit model, rapid expansion of credit in the USA and UK, increased leverage and an 
underestimation of bank and market liquidity’  as the  main causes.1421 
The Turner Review then makes some recommendations to serve as a blue print for future 
prudential regulation of banks and financial institutions.1422 The measures outlined in the 
recommendations seek to address the regulatory and supervisory defects that have been exposed 
by the GFC1423 and also ensure that the factors that triggered the current crisis are minimised if 
not avoided.1424 The recommendations include: the extension of coverage of bank regulation 
based on economic substance rather than on legal form, improved capital positioning, enhanced 
liquidity regulation and  improved supervision of CRAs.1425 The review also recommends codes 
covering remuneration in order to limit incentives for excessive risk-taking and adopt a 
centralised clearance system for trade in collateral debt securities (CDS).1426 
The crisis has necessitated a fundamental re-evaluation of the assumptions that under pine 
current regulatory practice.1427 The Turner Review challenges the proposition that the principle-
based and self-regulatory regime is a better regulatory option. Subsequently, the Review 
advocates a fundamental change in global regulatory policy.1428  By focusing more on macro-
economic policy, systemic risk, shadow banks and capital buffers, the recommendations herald 
a fundamental shift in terms of how banks and other financial institutions are regulated in the 
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UK.1429 This becomes evident in terms of capital requirements, systemic regulation and the 
restructuring of the future architecture of international prudential regulatory policy.1430 In 
general, the recommendations reinforce the key rationale for setting up the Turner Review- 
which is to ensure a shift towards a more systemic approach to regulation.1431 
Although the recommendations look comprehensive and impressive, it is however, doubtful if 
a change in regulatory approach alone is enough to resolve the defective governance system 
that defines corporate purpose in terms of satisfying shareholder interest. Arguably, the Review 
introduces nothing substantially new but merely re-echoes many of the changes and principles 
already in circulation within the international community.1432 For example most of the 
recommendations have already been made by international organisations including the OECD 
and the Corporate Governance Institute (CGI).1433  Moreover, most of the shortfalls identified 
in the FSAs regulatory regime, particularly the principle-based philosophy of regulation 
remains unresolved.1434  In that respect, it is submitted that the regulatory philosophy espoused 
by the shareholder primacy thinking continues to shape and influence governance policies even 
post the GFC. 
Another criticism is that the scope of the review is so wide that many of the recommendations 
tend to hinge on international agreement and co-operation for implementation.1435 The need for 
swift action in the face of seeking consensus, especially among different nations with varying 
interests raises questions about the feasibility of implementing the Turner recommendations.1436 
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This is because the international process of rule-making and subsequent implementation is 
notoriously slow and suffers from serious bureaucratic hurdles that are likely to frustrate 
immediate and effective implementation.1437 In view of these practical challenges, it is 
submitted that for the recommendations to have any meaning, regulators must consider 
substituting what Shaw describes as the ‘forensic approach’1438 for a more aggressive stance, 
which in this context refers to a corporate governance system that is more prescriptive, rule-
based and takes a long-term approach.1439  
It worth noting that corporate governance reforms cannot just occur in a vacuum, but they are 
often supported and facilitated by effective and enforceable rules and regulations.1440 In that 
respect, the introduction of enforceable rules and regulations are necessary components of 
governance as they strengthen disclosure, transparency and accountability.1441 Indeed, it is the 
lack of strict enforceable rules and regulations, coupled with the reliance on the self-regulatory 
regime of comply-or-explain which provided the fertile grounds that triggered the GFC.1442 
Moreover, the Turner Review fails to address the issue of splitting banks into ‘utility’ (high 
street institutions) and ‘casino’ banks.1443  As noted earlier, failure to regulate these ‘casino’ 
banks played a critical role in the events leading to the GFC. Therefore, the decision by the 
Turner Review not to split the banks is a regrettable omission because such institutions 
eventually had to fall on taxpayer-bailouts in times of failure.1444  But supporters of the Turner 
Review cite the benefit of having a ‘one-stop shop’ for all forms of financing as the justification 
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for taking that position. Critics including Vince Cable, Economic Spokesman for the Liberal 
Democrats however, sees it differently and states: 
     [T]he review completely fails to call for the separation of low-risk high street banking from high-
risk banking. Banks should be safe places for people’s savings, not huge roulette wheels. Banks that 
act like gamblers in a casino, taking massive risk for big returns, cannot be allowed to come begging 
to the taxpayer when things go wrong in the future.1445 
The Turner Review is no doubt an important milestone in the regulatory history of the UK. 
Although it focused primarily on the reform of banking regulation, it nonetheless has wider 
implications as it also examines the causes of the financial crisis and makes recommendations 
for consideration by the international community to avoid a recurrence of the 2008 GFC. 
The Turner Review sparked a substantive discussion on many of the issues regarding regulation 
which effectively creates a new intellectual basis for post-crisis reform agenda and regulatory 
debate.1446 This is significant because prior to the Turner Review, the regulatory philosophy of 
the FSA was premised on the assumption that markets develop self-correcting mechanism and 
that market discipline is a more effective tool to ensure the strategic and financial soundness of 
a firm.1447 This eventually led to a regulatory and supervisory approach that focused on (a) the 
supervision of individual institutions rather than the system as a whole (b) gave priority to 
systems and processes rather than challenging business models and strategies (c) placed 
emphasis on the regulation of business conduct rather than prudential regulation.1448 
As already mentioned, the Turner Review was established to address these critical issues, but a 
critical appraisal of what the Turner Review set out to do as against what it achieved tends to 
suggest that much remains to be done in terms of reforming how banks and other financial 
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institutions are regulated in the UK. This is not surprising because the post-crisis reform agenda, 
of which the Turner Review is an important part, is still embedded in the shareholder value 
maximising concept that continues to define institutions and policy responses.1449 The 
shortcomings identified in the Turner Review prompted the establishment of the Walker 
Review which forms the next section of the discussion. 
5.5.2 Walker Review  
The decisions by boards and senior management within their corporate governance frame work 
were key drivers of the GFC.1450 Indeed, ensuring good governance is a key element in 
increasing the probability that good decisions will be made whilst poor governance is a strong 
indicator of more problems.1451  In recognition of this, the Walker Review set out to provide a 
response from the corporate governance perspective to the GFC that had pushed the UK 
banking industry to the brink of collapse.1452 In that respect, the Walker Review remains a   
significant government intervention in corporate governance since the onset of the GFC.1453 
Published in November 2009, the Walker Review for the first time enacted many unique 
corporate governance rules and principles applicable to banks and other financial 
institutions.1454 In total, the Review makes 39 recommendations to be implemented on a 
comply-or-explain basis.1455 The recommendations and the subsequent innovation it introduces 
falls into three categories.1456 
                                                          
1449 Ioannis Glinavos   Redefining the Market-State Relationship: Responses to the Financial Crisis and the Future 
of Regulation (Routledge 2013) 24. 
1450 FSA, ‘Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations’ (26 November 2009)  
1451 ibid 
1452 ibid  
1453 ibid 
1454 Andreas Kokkinis, ‘Rethinking Banking Prudential Regulation: Why Corporate Governance Rules Matter’ 
(2012) 7 Journal of Business Law 612. 
1455 Walker Review (n 1450).  
1456 Kokkinis (n 1454) 620. 
Chapter 5 
238 
 
First, the review recommends specific rules regarding time commitment, expertise and the 
induction of bank directors.1457 The most radical step relates to the introduction of minimum 
time requirement for non-executive directors whereby such directors are required to invest at 
least 30-36 days annually in their work as members of NED.1458 The Review further 
recommends that majority of NEDs, in addition to possessing the relevant experience in 
finance, should be  required to undergo induction and regular training that are individually 
tailored for the performance of their duties.1459 
The review also introduces new procedural and substantive rules relating to the remuneration 
for directors and senior managers.1460 In this respect it recommends a procedure that sets out 
the scope and remit of the Remuneration Committee including all high-end-employees.1461 It 
further recommends that in a situation where the director’s remuneration report fails to obtain 
75 per cent support of votes in a resolution passed by shareholders at the (AGM), the chairman 
of the remuneration committee should be compelled to stand for re-election at the next general 
meeting.1462  The reasoning is that such a vote indicates a failure on the part of the chairman, 
hence there is the need for the affected NED to seek a renewal of his/her mandate.1463 The 
review also provides substantive guidance on the structure and design of executive 
remuneration packages including the requirement that (a) half of an officer’s performance-
based remuneration should take the form of a long-term scheme (b) under which half is vested 
in no less than three years and the remaining half in five years.1464 
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Another notable innovation in the Walker Review is the emphasis it places on risk governance 
through the creation of a new risk committee whose functions would not just be confined to 
compliance risks and other risks that are marginal to the bank’s business but now includes risks 
intrinsic to the core activities of banks.1465 Under these arrangements, boards are required to 
undertake three major risks functions.1466  These include shaping the risk appetite and tolerance 
in a more progressive manner, focusing on the management of prudential risks especially 
liquidity, leverage and counter-party risk and  exercising due diligence in strategic transactions 
during acquisitions and disposals.1467 
Admittedly, the Walker Review has been helpful in bringing about changes in how banks are 
governed and regulated in the UK. According to Myners, ‘the report sets a new bench mark for 
best practice both nationally and internationally’.1468  Similarly, the Institute of Directors (IOD) 
welcomes it as a positive development that will improve the effective functioning of UK 
corporate governance both in the financial and non-financial sectors.1469  
But are these changes capable of resolving the fundamental misalignment of corporate 
governance and banking regulation that triggered the financial crisis? Arguably, the changes in 
the Walker Review are by no means the appropriate response to GFC mainly because of the 
failure to tame the problem (shareholder primacy) that underscores the GFC.1470 The following 
reasons explain and justify this proposition. 
First, the recommendations are rather limited in terms of effecting any meaningful changes in 
the governance of banks. This is because it fails to propose a new theoretical framework that 
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provides a basis for ‘a fundamental re-evaluation’1471 of how banks are directed and 
controlled.1472 Essentially, the recommendations still remain embedded within the traditional 
agency cost paradigm that has characterised corporate governance practice and thinking since 
the Cadbury Report.1473 In this respect, it is submitted that the Walker Review introduces 
nothing new or dramatic but rather it ‘preserves the shareholder primacy and the resulting 
objective of profit maximisation at the heart of bank’s corporate governance model’.1474  
Moreover, the Walker Review goes to reaffirm the shareholder oriented corporate governance 
model already embedded in (s172) of the Companies Act 20061475 which provides clear 
guidance as to whose interest directors are expected to promote and serve. According to this 
provision ‘A Director of a company must… promote the success of the company for the benefits 
of its members as a whole’.1476 A critical analysis of this provision reveals that promoting 
shareholder-interest remains the paramount object and purpose.1477 This statutory provision 
creates a situation which cannot easily be altered by soft-law, hence any changes in that regard 
and particularly, in respect of banks, must necessarily be done through statutory 
amendments.1478 
 It is further argued that, the recommendations are ‘soft law’ in nature and compliance is 
voluntary and discretionary. By their construction, these recommendations raise questions 
about their effectiveness since their application is purely voluntary in accordance with the 
comply-or-explain principle. This often, leads to a box-ticking exercise where corporate 
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executives tend to abide by procedures (the letter) but do not comply with the spirit.1479  In view 
of this shortcoming, the effectiveness of the Walker recommendations in addressing the causes 
of the financial crisis remains insignificant if not questionable. 
Another criticism is that the recommendation on the regulation of executive remuneration does 
not seem robust enough.1480 This is because the nature and structure of performance-based 
remuneration encourages perverse and excessive risk-taking by managers as manifested in 
management practices prior to the GFC.1481 Arguably, performance-based remuneration has 
been the main source through which profit maximisation continues to influence managerial 
behaviour and consequently threatens the entire financial system not just the banking sector.1482 
Moreover, the provision requiring with-holding a quarter of executive remuneration for three 
years and the rest for another five years do not go far enough since periods of economic booms 
often last longer. Consequently, the perverse incentives which the recommendations seek to 
avoid will continue to persist.1483 In the face of such obvious defects, it is submitted that the 
recommendations of the Walker Review are not just insufficient but inappropriate to deal with 
the corporate governance weaknesses and regulatory failures that characterised bank 
governance and regulation in the UK before and during the GFC.1484  
The overriding message from these reviews and reports is the urgent need for a more holistic 
regulatory approach to the banking industry and the entire financial system.1485  Clearly, bank 
failures, and the GFC in general have strengthened the case for a rethinking of bank corporate 
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governance. This forms an integral part of a broader restructuring of the corporate governance 
model underpinned by a managerial norm shaped and determined by shareholder primacy.1486 
The reality, however, remains that apart from a few cosmetic changes; most of the reforms in 
the reports and reviews seek to maintain the status quo as they demonstrate no appetite or desire 
to introduce any radical changes that question the pre-eminence of the shareholder primacy 
theory. 
Moreover, there is now a widespread recognition that ‘soft laws’ (codes and principles) alone 
are not enough to deal with the crisis in the banking sector.1487 Obviously, the severity of the 
crisis in the banking industry calls for a more rule-based approach to regulation as opposed to 
the current principle-based regime. In response to this new reality, the UK authorities 
introduced several legislations to address the issues raised. One of such legislative initiatives is 
the Banking Act of 2009 which forms the next section of this chapter.  
5.6 Legislative Response 
5.6.1 The Banking Act 2009 (Banking Act) 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US and the failure of Northern Rock in the 
UK, governments, central banks and regulatory authorities were compelled to re-evaluate the 
regulation of banks.1488  After the run on Northern Rock, it became obvious that the existing 
regulatory regime in the UK was inadequate to deal with banks in distress or on the brink of 
collapse.1489 The failure of Northern Rock underscores the inadequacies in the current regime 
which undoubtedly, needs urgent reform.1490 The problem with the current regulatory regime is 
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that it places a moratorium on depositor’s rights to access their funds for a considerable 
period.1491 Obviously, such delays are bound to cause considerable unease among depositors 
and panic in the market as happened in the case of Northern Rock.1492 
The fact that the FSA was unable to intervene and take control of Northern Rock from the 
shareholders when it was still solvent, provides further justification for a new regulatory 
regime.1493 Arguably, the failure of Northern Rock exposes the lack of an effective legal regime 
to deal with failing banks.1494 An earlier intervention, it may be argued, could have minimised 
the magnitude of the losses incurred by the public when the bank was finally nationalised.1495 
 Also, the current legislations, particularly, the Enterprise Act 20021496  and the Insolvency Act 
19861497  seek to protect creditors’ interest and rescue the company as a going concern, but did 
not apply to building societies.1498 This is a vital omission because building societies including 
Bradford & Bingley were among the worst affected entities during the GFC.1499 In the face of 
these developments, it became obvious that a new legal regime was required to address these 
pertinent issues. 
After a series of consultations, and guided by the experience from the Northern Rock collapse, 
the Banking Act of 2009 was passed in February 2009.1500 The Act for the first time creates a 
more comprehensive statutory regime which provides the BoE, the FSA and the Treasury with 
early and timely intervention powers.1501 These early intervention powers are contained in 
seven main provisions dealing with insolvency procedure, bank administration procedure 
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(partial transfer of assets) financial service compensation scheme, strengthening the powers of 
the tripartite authorities to respond to problems arising from the inter-bank payment scheme. 
Other equally important provisions cover the governance of central banks, the establishment of 
stability committee and the modification of financial assistance to building societies. Arguably, 
the Banking Act constitutes the most radical reform of banking regulation1502 in the UK since 
the enactment of the FSMA 2000.1503  Indeed, early intervention in failing banks is a regulatory 
and supervisory imperative because ‘a key component of maintaining financial stability is to 
intervene in banks in distress before they fail’.1504  In effect, such early intervention mechanism 
has become crucial to minimise the harmful disruption to the economy. 
The reforms introduced by the Act have five main objectives including: (a) strengthening the 
stability and resilience of the UK financial system, (b) reducing the likelihood of individual 
banks facing difficulties (c) ensuring effective protection of depositors in the event of a bank 
failure and (d) strengthening the Bank of England and (e) ensuring effective coordinated actions 
by authorities, both in the UK and internationally.1505 To achieve these objectives, the Act 
introduces the Special Resolution Regime comprising three stabilisation options (private sector 
takeover, the setting up of a bridge bank, temporary nationalisation). These pre-insolvency 
arrangements introduced by the new regime are meant to provide financial stability by 
intervening in distressed banks before they fail.1506  These arrangements form the next section 
of the discussion. 
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5.6.1.1 Special Resolution Regime (SRR) 
The SRR under the Banking Act empowers the Treasury, BoE and the FSA to make use of one 
of the stabilisation powers or alternatively initiate bank insolvency or a bank administration in 
the ‘situation where all or part of the business of a bank has encountered or is likely to 
encounter, financial difficulties’.1507  This provision raises two important issues. First, the 
definition of a bank as a deposit-taking institution incorporated and regulated by FSA is 
problematic because it fails to include investment banks.1508  This failure to recognise the role 
of investment banks in the crisis is a significant omission by the SRR. 
Moreover, the definition of financial difficulties seems rather too broad and thus, allows the 
tripartite authorities too much discretion which can be subject to abuse.1509 In practice, the 
decision to deploy any of the tools provided under the SRR can only become effective after 
intense consultation between the Treasury, BoE and the FAS. Apart from reasons of 
accountability, the purpose is to further ensure that each institution fulfils its responsibility in 
accordance with its mandate and expertise.1510 
The Banking Act makes provision for three stabilisation options under the SRR, namely private 
sector purchase, bridge bank and temporary public ownership. But before triggering any of 
these options, the Act requires that certain conditions are fulfilled. 
5.6.1.2 The exercise of stabilisation powers 
As already indicated, the use of the stabilisation powers depends on the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. Section 7 of the Act provides that two general conditions must be met before the 
stabilisation powers can be exercised.1511  But before deploying any of the stabilisation tools, 
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the FSA must satisfy itself that without financial support from the Treasury or BoE, the affected 
bank would be unable to survive.1512 
Generally, two conditions must be met before the process can be triggered. The first general 
condition is that the bank is failing or likely to fail or has failed to satisfy the threshold 
conditions as contained in section 41(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act.1513 A failing 
bank as defined in the Act refers to a bank that has failed or is failing to meet its threshold 
conditions and in the circumstance is ‘not reasonable likely to turn its fortunes around so that it 
meets its threshold conditions’.1514  The terms ‘fail’ and ‘failing’ have been broadly defined in 
section 7(2) to mean ‘fault or shortcoming’  ‘a weakness’ ‘in default’  ‘unsuccessful’ or ‘become 
insufficient’. 1515  The broad definition coupled with the normative interpretation of a ‘failed or 
failing’ bank underscores what Singh refers to as ‘the wide spectrum of problems and financial 
difficulties a bank could experience between solvency and insolvency’.1516 The problem with 
such a wide interpretation is that it becomes difficult for a bank to predict how it will be 
judge/assessed by the FSA in the circumstances. Secondly, considering the timing and other 
relevant factors, it is unlikely that action will be taken by the FSA in respect of satisfying the 
threshold conditions as provided for in the FSMA without the exercise of the stabilisation 
powers.1517  
In addition to the general conditions already mentioned, the act requires the FSA to consult with 
the BoE and the Treasury before deciding whether the threshold conditions have been met or 
not1518 It is only then that the BoE or Treasury may proceed to make use of the stabilisation 
powers. The exercise of these stabilisation powers as Mayes and Wood explain is to be done 
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within certain defined legal limitations.1519 Indeed, section 76 of the Act restrains the BoE from 
exercising its stabilisation powers where such action is likely to contravene UK’s international 
obligations.1520 On the other hand, the Treasury under the Act can request the BoE to take 
specific action to comply with the UK’s international obligations.1521 
5.6.1.3 Procedure for exercising the stabilisation options 
The Banking Act prescribes three stabilisation options taking into consideration which of these 
tools can best help achieve the optimal results while ensuring that they remain compatible with 
their legal obligations.1522 Consequently, the Act provides that these options ‘may only be 
exercised in respect of UK incorporated deposit-taking institutions’.1523 It should be added that 
this also applies to building societies and credit unions subject to the necessary 
modifications.1524 
Before exercising any of the above options, the BoE and the Treasury must ensure that the 
public interest test and considerations have been fulfilled.1525  The three crucial factors that 
should inform the exercise these options are; information regarding the state of the balance 
sheet, the operational details of the bank concerned and the known interest of third parties.1526  
Furthermore, the Act sets out the procedures for triggering the use of the stabilisation options 
and assigns to each member of the tripartite authority specific responsibilities at every stage of 
the process.1527 Accordingly, the FSA is charged with the responsibility of initiating the special 
resolution regime. The caveat, however, is that the FSA must first, satisfy itself that the bank 
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is, or is likely to fail to meet the ‘threshold’1528 conditions and that the bank is not capable of 
taking steps to rectify the situation. When this general condition is fulfilled, the BoE in 
consultation with the FSA and the Treasury then decide whether a private sector purchase, a 
bridge bank or public ownership (nationalisation) would be the most appropriate course of 
action. The BOE may only exercise these powers where it is deemed necessary to protect the 
stability of the UK financial system, protect public interest, promote public confidence in the 
system or protect depositors.1529 The decision regarding public ownership and the use of public 
funds to support a failing institution fall under the Treasury. The Treasury exercises these 
powers with the consent of the BoE where it can be demonstrated that these mechanisms are 
necessary for the protection of public interest. It is important to note that these options can be 
used singly or in combination, but it requires consensus building and agreement between the 
Tripartite Authority- BoE, FSA and the Treasury.1530 Having examined the procedure for 
triggering the resolution regime, the next section turns to the various options prescribed by the 
Banking Act 2009.  
5.7 Stabilisation options 
5.7.1 Private Sector Purchase 
Section 11 of the Banking Act 20091531 establishes the private sector purchase as the first 
stabilisation option under which all, or part of the business of the bank is sold to another party 
usually a commercial purchaser. The BoE orchestrates and executes the process using two 
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instruments namely share transfers 1532or property transfer instruments.1533  The sale of parts of 
Dunfermline Building Society to Nationwide was executed under the private purchase option 
following the conclusion by the FSA that Dunfermline was unlikely to meet the threshold 
conditions as the company could no longer continue as a going concern.1534 Once the share 
transfer has been made, the BoE is required to notify the other relevant authorities, the bank 
concerned and other interested parties.1535 
The share transfer instruments under the Act enables the BoE and the Treasury to exercise very 
wide-ranging powers  including the removal of a director of a specified bank, variation of 
service contract, termination of service contract of a director of specified bank and the power 
to appoint a director of a specified bank under sections 82 and 83.1536 These provisions attracted 
stiff opposition from the banking industry for being too draconian, intrusive, and in violation 
of privately negotiated contracts.1537  
The BoE and the Treasury justify these provisions on two grounds. First, the authorities argue 
that there is a need to make a ‘clean break’ from the previous regime that failed the shareholders 
and creditors of the bank.1538 The second justification is the punitive purpose that will be served 
by that action as the public will want to see some sort of punishment imposed on such 
directors.1539  With respect to the transfer of share or property to a private sector purchaser, the 
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Act requires the Treasury to make a compensation scheme order1540 to carter for the interest of 
third parties and the payment of such compensation is to be determined by an independent 
valuer. The private sector purchase solution is considered by UK authorities as the option of 
first resort hence it is important that the acquiring bank is solvent. Thus, ‘the bank taking over 
the failed bank must itself be in a sufficiently good position to be able to acquire the failed 
institution’.1541 
5.7.2 Bridge Bank 
The second resolution mechanism under the Banking Act 2009 is the bridge bank option. The 
bridge bank option is a temporary solution allowing the authorities enough time to orchestrate 
a buyer for the bank in distress.1542  Furthermore, it allows prospective buyers ample time to 
undertake the necessary due diligence. Under this option the BoE issues one or more property 
transfer instruments including property, rights and liabilities acquired or arising before, between 
and after the date of transfer.1543 These also include property outside the UK as well as rights 
and liabilities under the law of a country or territory outside the UK.  To give meaning and 
effect to the bridge bank share transfer instrument, section 30 (2) provides for two options.1544 
The property, rights and liabilities of the bridge bank can either be transferred to a company 
wholly owned by the BoE or a company wholly owned by the Treasury.1545 In effect, the bridge 
bank is not an institution simply designed for the purposes of holding bad assets, but it should 
be managed as a going concern.1546 
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As mentioned earlier, a bridge bank is a short-term measure that seeks to address an immediate 
need and therefore exists until a permanent solution is found by way of a private sector 
purchaser.1547  It should however, be noted that in a situation where it is not feasible for part or 
all of a bridge bank’s business to be transferred to the private purchaser, the bridge bank will 
either be wound up or taken into temporary public ownership.1548 This should only be done 
after giving due consideration to the objectives of the SRR and the interests of creditors.1549 
Some commentators suggest that creditor interest consideration is what informed the decision 
to transfer part of Dunfermline business relating to social housing to a bridge bank called DBS 
Ltd.1550 
The bridge bank option, is arguably, as a major innovation that has helped in dealing with failing 
banks either through private sector purchase or public ownership. Commenting on the 
advantages of the Bridge bank option, LaBrosse argues that ‘notwithstanding its limited use, it 
certainly provides the authorities with another option for dealing with banks in distress’.1551  
The bridge bank option has, however, been criticised for lack of clarity in terms of the private 
sector transfer or transfer to public ownership.1552  This lack shortcoming poses some 
difficulties for the BoE with respect to competition and management.1553  For instance, how 
does the management of the bridge bank distinguish between being competitive to preserve the 
value of its franchise while at the same time ensuring that it is not granted a competitive 
advantage against other banks?  The governance of the bridge banks also throws up some 
dilemmas regarding whom the directors are answerable to. Is it the BoE or the company? As in 
any other company, the duty presumably would be owed to the company as a whole as stipulated 
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in section 172 of the Companies Act 2006.1554 The difficulty, however, is how to fulfil the 
legislative requirement under the Companies Act while at the same time meeting the objectives 
and conditions attached to the bridge bank.1555 To overcome such a dilemma, it is submitted 
that the company would have to be guided by the reasons for its existence – that is to provide a 
temporary respite to resolve the challenges of the business for which it has assumed 
responsibility.1556  
5.7.3 Temporary Public ownership 
Temporary Public ownership is the third resolution technique applied when all other options 
have failed. It is considered the last resort under sections 13 and 821557 of the Act which 
mandates the Treasury to transfer the failing bank into temporary public ownership or 
temporary nationalisation.1558 To achieve that purpose, the Treasury may make an order  
transferring the failing bank to a nominee of the Treasury or a company wholly owned by the 
Treasury.1559 In that case, the Treasury assumes ownership of the bank on behalf of the state as 
happened in 2008 when Northern Rock and parts of Bradford & Bingley were nationalised.1560 
After it was taken into temporary public ownership, Northern Rock was restructured into two 
separate entities namely; Northern Rock Plc and Northern Rock Asset Management.1561 The 
NRAM was later handed over to UK Asset Resolution Company, a holding company wholly 
owned by the Treasury. 
Proponents of nationalisation argue that because the state had a vested interest in these 
institutions, it becomes imperative for the state to intervene by nationalising them to prevent 
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complete failure.1562  It has been argued, that amidst the serious liquidity problems confronting 
the bank, state intervention was necessary and reasonable.1563 Indeed, nationalisation allowed 
banking services to continue by ensuring that customers had access to their bank accounts. From 
this perspective, it is submitted that no other response was likely to have been significantly 
better than nationalisation.1564 
The caveat, however, is that nationalisation is only possible after one of the two conditions have 
been fulfilled. First, the Treasury must establish that the exercise of the stabilisation power is 
necessary to resolve or reduce a serious threat to financial stability in the UK.1565  Second, it 
must demonstrate that the exercise of that power is necessary for the protection of ‘the public 
interest’ where the Treasury has provided financial assistance to the troubled bank.1566  In such 
circumstance, the Act requires prior consultation between the tripartite authorities before the 
Treasury can decide if the conditions provided for in section 9(4) have been met.1567 Thus, the 
procedure under the Banking Act requires consensus between the different constituents of the 
tripartite authority.1568 To assist in the decisions and interpretation of these provisions a code 
of practice has been drawn up by the Treasury under section 5 of the Act.1569 The purpose is to 
provide general guidelines regarding the management of banks taken into temporary public 
ownership.1570  In a situation where all the stabilisation options have failed, the Act provides 
for bank insolvency procedure (BIP) and bank administration procedure (BAP). 
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5.8 Critique of the Special Resolution Regime 
At the heart of the Special Resolution Regime (SRR) is the desire to engineer a policy shift such 
that a more permanent and comprehensive bank resolution tools are made available to 
regulators. The need for a SRR for banks became more evident following the collapse of 
Northern Rock.1571 Consequently, these tools are designed purposely to avoid the fate that befell 
Northern Rock and to ensure that creditors bear the burden of bank failures not the tax payer.1572 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the resolution tools introduced by the Banking Act 20009 in 
their present form are not only insufficient but seem to be the wrong response to the GFC for 
the following reasons.  
First, the prescribed solutions tend to be more suited to the resolution of smaller domestic 
institutions but inadequate for dealing with failures in large multinational financial 
institutions.1573 For instance, it is extremely difficult to transfer complex individual functions 
of a bank to a private sector purchaser or a bridge bank.1574 These problems become 
compounded when the transfer is to be completed within a short time frame and between 
different jurisdictions1575 Furthermore, the stabilisation option makes it possible for liabilities 
to be transferred or left with the insolvent banks thereby defeating the very purpose of the 
resolution tool. Viewed from this perspective, it is submitted that in the present situation, the 
Act fails to provide any effective mechanism for imposing losses on creditors or equitizing 
existing creditor claims.1576 
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Also, the SRR raises serious governance issues regarding the sweeping powers it grants the 
BoE and Treasury. The concerns are mainly about the provisions contained in section 77 of the 
Act which grants the Treasury unrestrained powers to amend the law for purposes of exercising 
the SRR powers.1577 This includes; the power to change any legislation, provision or contract 
in relation to the exercise of power under the Banking Act.1578 As Walker explains, this 
provision enables the tripartite authority to circumvent the oversight role of parliament.1579  For 
instance, although the actions of the tripartite authority can in theory be subjected to 
parliamentary scrutiny, the fact still remains that any act done preceding parliamentary approval 
will always stand. As a result, the right of parliament to perform an oversight role through 
parliamentary scrutiny and approval have been circumvented.  
The Treasury however, sees this anomaly differently and argues that ‘in the absence of such 
powers there are real and significant risks that the authorities may be unable to fully effect a 
transfer’.1580 This, could arguably, have serious adverse implications for the public interest, 
financial stability and the protection of depositors’ funds.1581 
Moreover, the Banking Act allows the tripartite authority to set aside contracts, interfere with 
legal and commercial relationships between the residual bank and the commercial purchaser or 
bridge bank.1582 The exercise of this unrestrained power against a UK subsidiary of a foreign 
bank could have the undesirable consequences of harming relations between the UK and the 
home country of the affected bank.1583.  
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The unrestrained powers of the authorities have also raised concerns about the lack of 
accountability. This is particularly important when the BoE makes transfer orders in the context 
of a bridge bank option.  Arguably, it is a form of temporary public ownership, but such transfer 
orders remain outside parliamentary scrutiny, hence parliament is unable to hold the authorities 
accountable for their actions. In this respect it is contended that the arrangement represents what 
Engelen et al. consider ‘a critical institutional move in sheltering the operations of the publicly 
owned institutions from democratic control’.1584 The removal of political control over these 
institutions is a significant policy and regulatory failure because it is the taxpayer who will be 
called upon to bail out these institutions in times of failure.1585 
Also, the tripartite arrangements introduced by the Act have been heavily criticised for lack of 
clear leadership structure and information flow.1586 Even though there have been some attempts 
to define the role, function and responsibilities of each authority, the turf war that has 
characterised the UK regulatory landscape continues to undermine the effective performance 
and collaboration between the various agencies. The situation is further compounded by the 
overlapping nature of these functions and the ineffective information flow; all of which militate 
against the effective implementation of the SRR. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Following the GFC of 2007/2008 governments and central banks across the globe were 
compelled to initiate policy responses to contain the ongoing crisis and possibly prevent a 
recurrence. In the UK, the government’s initial response was to provide bailouts and fiscal 
stimulus packages which enabled it to acquire stakes in Northern Rock, RBS, HBOS and Lloyd 
TSB.1587 
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 As the crisis developed, it became evident that the government lacked effective legislative and 
regulatory tools to deal with these systemically important financial institutions.1588 
Subsequently, government introduced many regulatory and legislative reforms aimed at 
instituting a robust regulatory framework that will help correct the legislative deficiencies 
exposed by the GFC.1589  
This chapter started by providing an over view of the evolution of the corporate governance 
system in the UK which is founded on comply-or-explain principle. The comply-or-explain 
principle is often credited with not just the flexibility it provides but that it also avoids 
ideologically fixed rules and burdensome laws and regulations.1590 Its main weakness however, 
is the inadequacy of the explanations often provided and that such explanations are in most 
cases, very subjective. In effect, a lot depends on the discretion of the companies concerned; a 
situation which often compromises accountability. 
 Admittedly, these wide discretionary powers which are underpinned by the philosophy of self-
regulation and the failure to hold companies accountable were significant contributory factors 
to the GFC. Consequently, it is submitted that notwithstanding the regulatory and legislative 
reforms, corporate governance thinking and practice in the UK post the 2008 GFC has not 
changed. Instead, it has remained embedded in the complain-or-explain principle despite the 
weaknesses and shortcomings identified in that model. In fact, the status quo remains as the 
previous discussion demonstrates. 
In addition to the governance reforms, the UK authorities also introduced significant   private 
and public measures including: recapitalisation, blanket guarantees, asset purchase and 
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nationalisation. These were meant to allay market fears about the stability of individual 
financial institutions and the soundness of the entire financial system.1591 
Admittedly, the bailout and rescue package have largely helped in minimising the extent and 
severity of the crisis, but they do not constitute the appropriate long-term solution to the GFC. 
Clearly, the initial decision to bailout institutions was an ad-hoc measure which changed from 
‘nationalisation by default to nationalisation by choice’.1592 It is equally remarkable that this 
happened within a period of just eight months in UK, the heart of capitalism where the narrative 
for the past three decades has been an unquestioned belief in the ability of the markets to self-
correct. Against this backdrop, it becomes difficult to understand and even questionable, how 
the market failed to provide the self-regulatory and efficiency mechanisms when it mattered 
most.1593 While acknowledging that systemic problems like the banking crisis demand 
comprehensive solutions, the scale of the socialisation of the banking sector by the UK 
authorities came as a surprise when viewed against the alleged superiority of free market system 
as espoused by the shareholder primacy theory. 
By these arrangements, the UK taxpayer became ‘a reluctant shareholder’1594 in failed banks 
which must be first managed, and thereafter sold off in a way that maximises shareholder 
value.1595 Against this backdrop the conclusion can be drawn that the bailouts, particularly 
nationalisation, has either by design or accident, allowed the doctrine of shareholder primacy 
to remain supreme ‘without recognising that shareholder primacy is what got us into this 
mess’.1596  It effectively, discredits the pre-crisis claim that markets in general and financial 
markets in particular were uniquely designed and equipped to manage and minimise risks.1597 
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 Moreover, in responding to the GFC, the UK authorities failed to realise that the deficiencies 
in banks prior to the crisis were more due to inappropriate patterns of herd behaviour 
underpinned by the desire to maximise profit for the shareholder.1598 In that respect, the bailout 
and stimulus packages seemed at best inadequate and at worst misguided in the sense that these 
solutions are not based on a full explanation as to the causes of the GFC. 
Obviously, the policy responses were not limited to bailouts and rescue packages to contain the 
crisis.1599 They have also entailed a series of regulatory and legislative measures following 
which many laws, rules and guideline were enacted. Although several legislative and regulatory 
initiatives were introduced, the discussion in this chapter focused on the Turner Review, the 
Walker Review and the Banking Act 2009.  
The Turner Review examines the Global banking crisis and makes recommendations to correct 
the regulatory shortcomings that led to the financial crisis. In that respect the Review provides 
a blue print for future prudential regulation of banks and other financial institutions by 
addressing the defects in the regulations and supervision that have been exposed by the GFC. 
Unsurprisingly, the FSA hails the Turner Review as heralding a fundamental shift from a light-
touch and principled-based approach to a more intensive rule-based regulatory regime.1600  
Critics however, argue that the Turner Review provides only a partial and rather hasty 
understanding of the causes of the crisis. Consequently, the recommendations fail to recognise, 
let alone necessitate a fundamental re-evaluation of the assumptions that underlie current 
regulatory practice; especially the theory that markets function in a rational and efficient 
manner. Arguably, because the causes of the crisis have been misdiagnosed, the solutions that 
have been suggested by way of recommendations turned out to be inappropriate. It is, thus, 
                                                          
1598 ibid 
1599 Jacine Alt Sahalia et al. ‘Market Response to Policy Initiatives during the Global Financial Crisis’ (2012) 87 
Journal of International Economics 162, 165. 
1600 FSA (n 5) 5. 
Chapter 5 
260 
 
submitted that the Turner Review does not represent any radical changes to the existing 
regulatory style but rather works within the established FSA approach that is characterised by 
the light-touch and self-regulatory regime in which the efficient market hypothesis reigns 
supreme.1601 
As part of the effort to address the governance issues raised by the GFC, the UK government 
set up the Walker Review to examine corporate governance in the banking industry and make 
the necessary recommendations.1602  It was premised on the idea that there was a need for a 
rethinking of corporate governance in banks as part of a broader restructuring process in 
response to the crisis.1603 The Review identifies five key areas that require immediate and 
radical reforms. These areas are: The Combined Code (comply-or-explain) approach, patterns 
of board behaviour, low level engagement in terms of supervision and monitoring, poor risk 
management as evidenced by high risk appetite and tolerance.1604  In the end, the Review makes 
39 recommendations ranging from board composition, functions, time commitment, risk 
management, remuneration policies like claw-back clauses and the regulation of CRAs.1605 The 
Review, is therefore, represents the most significant government-sponsored review of UK 
corporate governance in recent times.1606  According to Walker, the review provides a response 
from the corporate governance perspective in respect of the factors that pushed the financial 
sector to the brink of collapse.1607 
Apparently, the Walker Review may seem comprehensive and impressive but the question that 
remains is whether these changes are capable of resolving the fundamental misalignment of 
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corporate governance and banking regulation.1608 First, it is submitted that the Review seems 
to be offering more of the same thing because it specifically approves and reaffirms the comply-
or-explain approach to corporate governance.1609  Further, the Review ignores the fact that the 
internal governance of banks is a crucial factor of financial stability, a cause of bank failures 
and by extension a source of systemic risk.1610 Although the recommendations seek to alleviate 
some of these tensions, the faithful adherence to the orthodox shareholder-centric corporate 
governance model remains intact and untouched.1611 In that respect it is fair to state that the 
Walker Review does not address the root cause of the GFC despite its good intentions. 
A further attempt to stabilise the economy in the wake of the crisis came with the enactment of 
the Banking Act.1612 The purpose of the Act as already noted is to establish a permanent and 
more coherent resolution regime for failing banks.1613 But it became obvious that the Special 
Provisions Act 20081614 was incomplete and did not constitute a permanent measure as it was 
intended to elapse after one year.1615 Hence, the Banking Act which became effective from 
February 2009 creates for the first time, the Special Resolution Regime and puts it on a more 
permanent basis. The SRR comprises a stabilisation procedure, bank administration procedure 
(BAP) and bank insolvency procedure (BIP).1616 The responsibility of exercising the 
stabilisation powers is shared between the FSA, BoE and the Treasury.1617 By this arrangement, 
the FSA decides whether a particular bank has fulfilled the general conditions to bring the SRR 
into effect while the BoE implements the SRR except in cases of temporary public ownership 
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where the Treasury takes charge.1618 In deciding whether to use the resolution powers, the 
tripartite authority takes into account the need to stabilise the UK’s financial system, protect 
public funds and avoid interfering with property rights.1619 
Admittedly, the Banking Act is a significant legislative initiative that seeks to resolve some of 
the issues confronting the banking system in the UK.1620  Arguably, the SRR has broadened and 
strengthened the range of tools available to resolve the problems of failing banks in an orderly 
manner. This is achieved by deploying the stabilisation options such as private sector purchase, 
bridge bank or temporary public ownership.1621 Indeed, the SRR marks a major policy shift 
because this new regime ensures that banks, creditors and shareholders bear the burden of bank 
failure and not the taxpayer.1622 
Furthermore, the Act strengthens the powers of the tripartite authority by giving it the mandate 
to respond promptly to the inter-bank payment scheme to prevent harmful disruption to entire 
industry.1623 Other provisions cover the governance of financial institutions and the 
modification of assistance to be given to building societies. These new range of powers which 
the Act confers on the authorities are deemed necessary to deal with the problems of failing 
banks, restore confidence and mitigate the effects of the GFC. From this perspective, it can be 
argued that the Banking Act provides an appropriate and reasoned response to the shortcomings 
that emerged in the banking sector during the GFC.1624 
There are, however, concerns over some aspects of the Act and its effectiveness as a regulatory 
tool capable of responding to the GFC.1625  First, the tripartite authority has been criticised for 
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lack of clear leadership structure with the attendant overlapping of functions and 
responsibilities.1626 Such overlaps often lead to conflicts between these authorities and thus, 
create problems for both regulators and regulated entities.1627   
In evaluating the UK government responses to crisis, this chapter analysed the various policy 
options ranging from bailouts and rescue packages to regulatory and legislative initiatives. It 
became evident that these measures alone did not provide answers to the causes of the GFC. 
For example, bank bailouts per se are an inadequate response to the crisis because bailouts are 
simply ad-hoc measures that can only mitigate but do not address the fundamental cause of the 
crisis. Indeed, the problems that beset the financial system which eventually caused the 
financial crisis cannot be resolved without a radical change in the defective business model 
which emphasises the managerial norm of shareholder value maximisation and short-term 
profits.1628 Thus, the defects and deficiencies that led to the crisis were the result of 
inappropriate patterns of governance and a misguided business model underpinned by a desire 
to maximise profits for shareholders in the short-term.  
As the above discussion makes clear, the policy responses by the UK authorities did not lead to 
any fundamental change in the basic regulatory, legislative and governance philosophy.1629 
Indeed, most of the responses and their underlying philosophies rest upon a distorted conception 
of the role and purpose of the corporation in society. This distorted conceptualisation defines 
corporate purpose in terms of profit maximisation, shareholder-empowerment and the 
protection of shareholder interest as the sole and legitimate purpose of the corporation.1630 
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Clearly if you define your mission as to maximise profit at the expense of all others, all others 
will treat you as a problem as was the case prior to the GFC.  
Despite the widespread recognition that shareholder primacy is indeed, the problem, the 
prescriptive agenda at the heart of this governance model remains central to the corporate 
governance discourse and the policy response following the GFC.1631 This is evidenced in the 
Turner Review and the Walker Review both of which contain provisions advocating an 
increased shareholder-role in the appointment, remuneration and audit committees of company 
boards. 
Also the post-crisis responses in the UK still maintain the distinctive light-touch and principle-
based approach to regulation.1632 This approach, as mentioned earlier, emphasises self-
regulation and supervisory engagement instead of being an enforcement-led regulatory regime 
with a more robust approach to serve as a credible deterrent.1633 Against this backdrop, it is 
submitted that the policy responses and interventions in the UK only provide immediate and 
temporary relief to the GFC but leave intact the problem of how to deal with the issue of 
shareholder primacy. Apparently, the reforms do not constitute a radical departure from past 
governance and regulatory practices. Instead, they reinforce existing corporate governance 
model characterised by self-regulation, comply-or-explain and adherence to the shareholder 
primacy theory and its propositions; profit maximisation, short-termism and market 
fundamentalism.1634  Understandably, the process of corporate governance cannot be isolated 
from the contextual issues that have shaped it. In the UK context, the corporate governance 
framework is based on social power relations that are inherently capitalist and champions the 
market as the most effective means of regulating corporate behaviour.1635 Consequently, the 
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idea that financial markets should be kept from political control to enable shareholders to reap 
maximum profit dominated market actors and politicians alike. 
Arguably, the reform initiatives post the GFC, fail to address the underlying issues that have 
shaped the current corporate governance regime. Rather, they are more about tweaking the 
existing system than changing it in any significant manner. In that respect, it is fair to conclude 
that these reforms are simply addressing the symptoms and not the causes of the GFC.1636  
The next chapter undertakes a comparative study of the responses in the US and the UK with 
the view to exploring what accounts for such differences and similarities. More importantly, it 
interrogates why authorities in both jurisdictions failed/ refused to recognise that at the heart of 
the financial crisis lies the shareholder primacy theory and short-termism. In that respect, any 
response short of addressing the issue of shareholder primacy and the short-termist approach 
corporate governance is, at best, an exercise in futility. 
                                                          
1636 Seabrooke and Tsingou (n 329) 320. 
Chapter 6 
266 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE US AND UK RESPONSES 
6.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapters, both the US and the UK embarked on several institutional 
and regulatory changes in response to the GFC.1637 These institutional changes and policy 
responses, arguably, underscore the weaknesses of the current corporate governance system 
and more importantly, provide an opportunity and an impetus for major reforms.1638 
Accordingly, this chapter makes a comparative analysis of the responses in the two jurisdictions 
by reviewing the institutional, legal and regulatory changes that occurred on both sides of the 
Atlantic following the GFC.1639 Consequently, this section explores the differences and 
similarities with respect to the rescue packages (recapitalisation, bank guarantees, assets 
purchase and nationalisation) and other measures that sought to slow down the crisis and 
eventually prevent the threat of a deeper recession. 
The second section compares some of the legal and regulatory initiatives undertaken in the US 
and the UK since the advent of the GFC. Important legislations particularly, the Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act1640 and the UKs Banking Act 20091641 will be examined. 
Obviously, context is very critical to an understanding of why governments in the US and UK 
responded the way they did. Therefore, in explaining the differences, the institutional 
arrangements including the particular structural characteristics of the economy, the legal 
system, political considerations and ideological inclinations are vital to the discourse because 
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these factors eventually shape the policy responses and outcomes.1642 Section four concludes 
that while there are obvious similarities and major differences in terms of the responses, one 
thing that remains unchanged is the continuous attachment to the shareholder-oriented 
governance model. 
6.2 Initial Responses 
In responding to the financial crisis, governments in the US and UK first employed similar ad-
hoc measures to arrest the economic decline and reduce the systemic dangers that have been 
presented. Bailouts of various forms, including huge injection of central bank liquidity, 
recapitalisation, bank guarantees, direct asset purchase solutions and nationalisation were 
introduced. 
6.2.1 Stabilisation  
Following the panic that ensued after the failure of Lehman Brothers in October 2008, the US 
government came under immense pressure to initiate measures to stabilize the economy.1643  In 
response, the US authorities injected $700 million into purchasing troubled assets to stabilise 
the financial system and minimise the systemic dangers posed by the GFC.1644 Similarly, the 
BOE and the FSA sought to slow the impact of the crisis by injecting £500 billion into the UK 
economy. Following from this, the country’s eight largest banks- Abbey, Barclays, HBOS, 
Lloyds TSB, Nationwide Building Society, RBS, Standard Chartered and several building 
societies were saved from collapse by this initiative.1645 
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The approaches of the US and UK authorities in respect of the initial responses seemed to 
converge, as their toolkit was largely similar.1646  Initially, there were no significant legislative 
initiatives; instead the existing tools were used to combat the problem as and when it appears. 
But the process in the UK was much slower and took longer than in the US. This can be 
explained by the UK’s membership of the European Union.1647 Under EU regulations, financial 
support for banks and other financial institutions require prior approval of the European 
Commission so as avoid breaching EU competition and state aid rules.1648  Obviously, in such 
circumstances, implementing effective remedies are bound to take longer in the UK. Even 
though the US system has its own complexities, the UK faced more constraints in implementing 
financial reforms than the US. 
6.2.2 Bailouts 
Following the outbreak of the crisis, the US Congress proposed the purchase of troubled assets 
to stabilise the financial system and the entire economy. As a result, TARP which became the 
centre piece of the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act 2008 was enacted.1649 But a few 
weeks after the passing of this legislation, attention quickly shifted to recapitalising banks 
through the purchase of preferred stock. Subsequently, the US authorities unveiled the capital 
purchase programme (CPP) within TARP. Under the CAP, a total of $200 billion was 
earmarked for recapitalisation of which $145 billion was allocated to nine major American 
banks.1650  The caveat, however, was that these beneficiary financial institutions were subjected 
to strict stress test and given target capital levels to attain.1651  Some of the banks that received 
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capital assistance were allowed to repay while others either resold assets or issued equity.1652 
This strict stress test approach which compelled financial institutions to repay the capital 
received from the public purse is noticeably absent in the UK.1653 
In addition to recapitalising banks, the US authorities provided the troubled-auto industry with 
$ 55 billion to enable this critical industry to stay afloat.1654 Consequently, government took 
direct control of the management of these companies by appointing the ‘auto czar’ to supervise 
the management.1655  In all 591 institutions/companies benefited directly from this facility. 
Just like the US, the authorities in the UK recapitalised financial institutions to the tune of £578 
billion as part of a programme which included £250 billion to guarantee debt and other 
securities that banks were unable to sell.1656 The introduction of the government debt guarantees 
had the immediate effect on inter-bank risks premium and facilitated lending between banks. 
Unlike in the US, recapitalisation programme in the UK had to be approved by the EU to 
minimise the negative effects of spill-over on financial competition within the Union.1657 Also 
EU guidelines exclude insolvent financial institutions from the recapitalisation and credit 
guarantee programmes. This explains why the UK government nationalised Northern Rock 
instead of recapitalising it.1658 The UK programme also differed from what pertained in the US 
where the initial bailout had a specific time frame lasting till 2009. In the case of the UK, the 
programme was meant to be a short-term measure that must be reviewed, approved and 
extended on regular basis by the European Commission. Consequently, the programme was 
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first approved on October 13, 2008, extended on December 2008 and April 15, 2009 
respectively. 
Furthermore, the American rescue plan was primarily devoted to purchasing mortgage-backed 
securities but failed to address the fundamental solvency problems facing the banking sector.1659 
In effect, the US approach can be considered short-termist because it was mainly aimed at 
tackling the immediate funding shortfall.1660 The UK package on the other hand, invested in 
banks through the purchase of shares as well as guaranteeing bank debts. Against this 
background, it can be argued that the rescue plan in the UK adopted a dual approach by 
addressing both the solvency and funding challenges facing the banks.1661 
It should be noted, however, that this taxpayer-funded rescue plan comes with very stringent 
conditions under which these rescued-banks were required to abide by many restrictions. First, 
they were barred from paying dividends to ordinary shareholders until the preference share 
(government shares) have been fully redeemed.1662 Second, the government restricted the 
payment of bonuses and executive remunerations. Thirdly, banks were required to continue 
lending to small businesses and homeowners at competitive prices; preferably at the pre-crisis 
levels.1663 Finally, government acquired a say in the appointment of new board members by 
being the largest shareholder in these banks. Contrary to the situation in the US where similar 
restrictions met very little resistance, the restrictions in the UK faced serious opposition from 
different quarters.1664 While investors pondered the likely impact of these restrictions, the share 
prices of the three affected banks fell further largely due to the restrictions on the payments of 
                                                          
1659 ibid 
1660 Hoshi and Kashyap (n 879). 
1661 ibid 
1662 Hall (n 1374). 
1663 ibid 
1664 ibid 
Chapter 6 
271 
 
dividends. The drop in the share price of RBS was 8 per cent, 14 per cent for Lloyds TSB and 
27 per cent for HBOS.1665 
The UK and the US also differ in their approach to the implementation of the recapitalisation 
programmes. In the US the government adopted a uniform and more authoritative approach 
towards the beneficiary banks. As a result, recapitalised-banks were compelled to supplement 
their eroded capital systems by issuing new equity.1666 But in the UK, the authorities were not 
only flexible but also bought a combination of ordinary shares and preference shares in affected 
banks. More importantly, the amount and proportion of the stakes acquired in the affected banks 
was negotiated with the individual bank. Thus, the extent to which different banks participated 
varied according to their needs. Indeed, this flexible approach enabled HSBC, Barclays, Abbey, 
Nationwide, Standard Chartered and Clydesdale to opt out of the recapitalisation programme 
leaving RBS Lloyds TSB as the only major recipients.1667  
Obviously, these procedural disparities underscore the differences in the corporate governance 
systems in the two jurisdictions. The American corporate governance system emerged from a 
specific legal tradition prone to limiting the activities of banks. Consequently, its approach is 
rule-based and inherently prescriptive. By contrast, the UK corporate governance system is   
principle-based which allows for flexibility and consensus. It can be argued, therefore, that 
these differences in approach account for how each of the two countries responded to the crisis 
in the banking industry. 
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6.2.3 Stimulus Plans 
It became obvious that the bailout packages in the US and the UK were necessary but not 
sufficient to ensure economic recovery.1668  Instead, the crisis demanded more proactive 
policies by way of economic stimulus package. In response, the US government adopted the 
stimulus package under ARRA of 2009 while the UK authorities introduced a similar 
programme to stimulate the sluggish economy. In terms of size, the US government passed a 
far larger fiscal stimulus plan by providing $787 billion for the package representing 5.5 per 
cent of GDP.1669 This, is in sharp contrast to the £25 billion ($37.5 billion)1670 allocated to the 
stimulus plan in the UK; a figure which fails into insignificance when compared to the founding 
the US government committed into its stimulus package. This disparity can be explained by the 
fact  that the UK has been constrained in its ability to devote more resources to the stimulus 
plan due to the significant burden that bank bail-outs have put on public finance.1671  A report 
by the OECD confirms that bank bail-outs in the UK increased the budget deficit by £175 billion 
representing 12.4 per cent of GDP in 2009/2010.1672  In that respect, it becomes obvious that 
the UK was confronted with greater fiscal strains than the US in view of the higher UK budget 
deficit as a proportion of its GDP.1673 Against the backdrop of increasing budget deficit, it was 
not surprising that the size of the package adopted in the UK was very modest as compared to 
that of the US.1674  
The size of the packages adopted in the two jurisdictions is only one consideration. Further 
differences exist between the policies pursued in the two countries in terms of time distribution 
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and the programmes to be funded. US policy makers took a long-term view of the stimulus plan 
and based their projections on a longer time frame. Hence, more than a third of the entire 
stimulus spending was allocated to 2010.1675 Moreover, well over 40 per cent of the total 
stimulus funding went into expenditure projects in line with a deliberate policy choice that 
sought to focus on infrastructure projects, educational expansion and innovation to boost 
American competitiveness.1676 
In contrast, UK authorities pursued a short-term approach and concentrated almost all the 
projected stimulus funding on 2009.1677 As a result, subsequent years, especially 2010 
witnessed prolonged period of fiscal tightening and retrenchment to recoup earlier spending. 
This was made clear during the 2009/2010 pre-budget report which sought to reduce borrowing 
to 3.2 per cent of GDP. A further policy difference relates to the target areas of the stimulus 
plans. Whereas the US allocated over 40 per cent of the total stimulus money to expenditure 
projects, the UK devoted almost all the stimulus funding to tax concessions which benefited 
mainly large corporations.1678 
Obviously, questions have been raised as to (a) why the US adopted far larger fiscal stimulus 
than the UK (b) why the UK committed itself to fiscal retrenchment in 2010 whereas the US 
allocated the largest share of stimulus funding to that year and (c) why did the UK reject 
spending on infrastructure projects while they constituted a sizeable proportion of the US total 
expenditure on the stimulus.? 
Answers to these questions require careful consideration of the political preferences of the 
political actors. First, there was an assumption that the left-leaning labour government of Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown would focus on capital expenditure projects to stimulate economic 
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growth in line with its core ideological beliefs. But this expectation turned to be unfounded and 
failed to materialise due largely, to New Labour’s reluctance to align itself with a specific 
economic theory. This makes it rather difficult to determine the reasoning that goes into shaping 
its policies.1679  
Also, significant disagreements were said to have existed between the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling as to the nature, scope and extent of the stimulus 
plan. Whereas the Prime Minister is said to have advocated for large scale stimulus package, 
the Chancellor successfully sought and obtained a stimulus package that was limited in terms 
of scope and resource commitment.1680 
Similarly, political developments in the US influenced the adoption of the stimulus package on 
such a large scale due to political instincts and personality factors. Arguably, the election of 
Barack Obama as President in the November polls inevitably led to shift and indeed, reordering 
of policy priorities.1681 This dramatic policy shift culminated in the enactment of ARRA of 2009 
which provided the legal basis for the $787 billion stimulus package. 
Admittedly, personality-based explanations have their limits and hence, not sufficient to explain 
the process of policy decisions. Other factors such as the thinking of political actors played a 
vital role in shaping the formulation and eventual implementation of the stimulus packages in 
both jurisdictions. In the US, Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke openly backed the use 
of the stimulus policies as part of an economic programme that sought to mitigate the effects of 
the crisis and re-invigorate the larger economy.1682 The US government also received the 
backing of another important institutional actor- the US Chamber of Commerce which argued 
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that the 2008 stimulus would ‘spur business investment, consumer spending, increase 
productivity and lead to economic recovery in the US’.1683 
Interestingly, whilst the stimulus package in the US received the full backing of two important 
institutional players, the situation in the UK was the reverse. The Governor of the BoE, Mervin 
King opposed further stimulus plan when he warned publicly against an expanded fiscal 
stimulus in the face of greater strains and budget deficits in the UK.1684  The BoE governor told 
the House of Commons Treasury Committee that ‘given how big those deficits are, I think it 
would be sensible to be cautious about going further in using discretionary measures to expand 
the size of those deficits’.1685 
Furthermore, the Bank’s reluctance to endorse expansionary policies (stimulus) had the support 
of some powerful voices within the Treasury as well as the Confederation of British Industries 
(CBI). The CBI was far less sanguine about the calls for fiscal expansion through stimulus. In 
a statement prior to the pre-budget statement, the CBI called for a fiscal boost to address the 
challenges facing the UK economy. The fiscal boost advocated by the CBI was, however, 
confined to tax cuts for companies, incentives to small and medium-sized enterprises and a 
time-limited stimulus. Nonetheless, the CBI was not oblivious to the huge deficit and national 
debt. It notes that; ‘given the poor state of public finances, fiscal stimulus package will need to 
go hand in hand with credible framework for getting back on track’.1686 According to the CBI, 
such an approach would ‘prevent future generations being burdened with huge levels of 
debt’.1687 
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As the above discussion shows, political exigencies and debt levels only provide part of the 
answers to the differences and similarities in respect of the stimulus package. Institutional 
arrangements, economic actors, were to a very large extent, critical in moulding the stimulus 
strategies adopted by the UK and US and the subsequent regulations that emerged after the 
GFC. 
6.3 Regulatory Response  
The shortcomings of the pre-crisis regulatory regime compelled regulators in both countries to 
introduce many regulatory reforms.1688  In view of the multiplicity of the regulatory initiatives, 
it would be impossible to compare and discuss all the reform measures. Consequently, the 
comparison of the regulatory responses focuses on two key areas namely: bank resolution and 
credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
6.3.1 Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) 
Credit Rating Agencies are key governance entities in both the domestic and international 
regulatory architecture.1689 These institutions are perceived as having contributed significantly 
to the GFC and thus, triggered regulatory changes in both the UK and the US. For these reasons, 
governments in these two jurisdictions introduced more stringent regulatory regimes to control 
the activities of CRAs.1690 Effectively, the broad policy objectives of the regulatory reforms in 
terms of credit rating agencies in the UK are very much like those in the US. 
First, there is the recognition in both jurisdictions that CRAs played a critical role in triggering 
the GFC.1691 There was a general consensus in the UK and US that the conduct and practices 
of CRAs created three major and inter-related problems namely; (a) the risk of overreliance on 
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credit rating by financial market participants (b) the high degree of concentration in the rating 
market (c) a defective business model (issuer-pay model) and (d) the absence of civil liability 
of credit rating agencies vis-à-vis investors.1692  Arguably, these conduct and practices stifled 
competition in the industry and placed an inherent conflict of interest at the heart of the business 
model which was central to the financial crisis.1693 
Second, in response to the GFC both the UK and the US adopted legislations designed to 
regulate the governance and operations of CRAs.1694  In the US the authorities passed the Dodd-
Frank Act 2010,1695  which provides for the regulation of CRAs. Similarly, in the UK, CRAs 
have been subjected to a new regulatory regime governed by EU Regulation 1060/20091696 
(CRA) as amended by Regulation 513/2011.1697  
Generally, the regulations in the UK and US are aimed at achieving greater transparency, 
improving the accuracy and integrity of the rating process and by extension ensuring stability 
in the global financial markets.1698 Arguably, while there is no consensus on a single set of 
reforms, the objectives are similar in that they are aimed primarily at introducing direct 
government oversight to replace the self-regulatory regime that existed before the GFC.1699 
Admittedly, the UK and the US share certain common principles like transparency, 
organisational requirements concerning conflict of interests and good corporate governance. 
Moreover, the legislations in both jurisdictions tend to have similar aims.  A closer examination, 
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however, reveals that the means of achieving the set objectives differ significantly between the 
two countries. An exploration of these differences follows in next section of the discussion 
As earlier indicated, CRAs in the US are regulated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.1700  It was 
an attempt to redress the pertinent issues highlighted by the governance and regulatory failure 
of CRAs.  The Act provides for ‘improvements to the regulation of credit rating agencies’,1701 
and thus, establishes an entirely new framework to govern and regulate CRAs.1702 Section 
9311703 spells out the aims of the Act which include: reducing the reliance on credit ratings, 
enhancing competition and supporting due diligence and accuracy in the rating process.1704  It 
is important to point out that Dodd-Frank only provides the broad legal framework and allows 
the SEC to give ultimate effect to the provisions.1705 Thus, the SEC through the office of rating 
agencies is required to write rules and conduct further studies for future legislations as the need 
arises.1706 Consequently, the regulatory intervention in respect of CRAs in the US will be 
undertaken through ad-hoc intervention as opposed to what pertains in the UK where CRAs are 
regulated by well-defined and legally binding EU Regulations. 
Unlike in the US, CRAs in the UK are not regulated by domestic law but by EU regulations in 
view of the country’s membership of the European Union.1707 EU Regulation 1060/2009 
(CRA)1708 as amended by EU Regulation 513/20111709 is the main legal instrument governing 
the regulation of CRAs in the UK.  In 2011 regulation 513/2011 amended regulation 1060/2009 
and transferred the responsibility of regulating CRAs from national authorities to a new 
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European agency- the European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA).1710  In so doing, the 
new regulation revoked any domestic laws that are inconsistent with the new regulation or no 
longer required.1711 
Functionally, regulation 513/2011 vests the ESMA with information gathering powers as well 
as the enforcement of sanctions and penalties.1712  In addition, the ESMA is entrusted with the 
exclusive supervisory powers of registering CRAs in the EU. This also includes the European 
subsidiaries of well-known CRAs such as Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. The changes 
introduced by the new regulation mean that CRAs in the UK (EU) would operate in a much 
simpler regulatory environment than their American counterparts.  
Moreover, users of CRA services will enjoy better protection as result of a centralised EU 
supervisory regime.1713 This is in sharp contrast to the American system where several agencies 
are involved in administering rules, establishing guidelines, ensuring enforcement and 
reviewing existing regulations.1714 Apart from the SEC, several other agencies at both the 
Federal and State levels are engaged in one way or the other in the regulation of CRAs. Given 
the complexity of this relationship and the turf war that it breeds, the need for a simpler and 
more transparent system becomes inevitable.1715 
Civil liability of CRAs vis-à-vis investors is another area where considerable differences exist 
between the UK and US. Previously, CRAs have successfully argued that ratings are opinions 
and not recommendation to purchase, sell or hold any security.1716 In the US for example, the 
assertion was that the status of CRAs was the same as financial Journalists and therefore enjoys 
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the same protection under the First Amendment which guarantees freedom of expression.1717  
This together with rule 436(g) Act 19331718 and section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act 19341719 have shielded CRAs from investor litigation (civil liability) and until recently, 
prevented direct regulation of their operations.1720 Under section 10 (b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934, the standard of plea was very high and the plaintiff had to plead with 
‘particularity of facts giving rise to a strong inference that the CRA misrepresented or omitted 
to disclose material information with scienter.’1721 Scienter is here defined as a ‘mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud’.1722 
The enactment of section 933(b) of Dodd-Frank lessened the pleading requirement in private 
actions against CRAs.1723 The changes introduced by section 933 (b) only require the plaintiff 
to establish particular facts giving rise to a strong inference that a CRA knowingly, or recklessly 
failed to (a) conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security in respect of the factual 
elements relied upon by its methodologies for evaluating the credit risk or (b) obtain reasonable 
verification that such an investigation was undertaken by an independent source.1724 By 
lessening the pleading requirements, the Dodd-Frank Act makes it possible for CRAs to be held 
liable for their faulty judgements and ratings. Arguably, the threat of civil liability will 
ultimately strengthen due diligence, improve internal controls and enhance good corporate 
governance. Incidentally, the pleading requirements in the UK regarding civil liability of CRAs 
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has become more onerous and demanding as compared to the US due to the influence of EU 
law. 
CRAs in the UK are regulated by Regulation 1060/2009 as amended by Regulation 513/2011. 
Article 35 (a) is very relevant as it deals with the liability of CRAs in the EU. Due to its 
membership of the EU and in keeping with section 2 (2) of the European Communities Act 
1972,1725 the Treasury Department enacted the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) 
Regulations 20131726 to give meaning and effect to Regulations 1060/2009 and 513/2011.1727 
In terms of incurring liability, the regulation is very explicit as to when and under what 
circumstances a CRA will incur liability for its ratings. Under Article 35(a) CRAs can only be 
held liable when they commit intentionally, and with gross negligence any of the infringements 
listed in Annex 111 to the Regulation. The infringements include: (a) failure to disclose conflict 
of interest (b) failure to adopt measures to ensure ratings are based on thorough analysis (c) 
issue credit ratings that do not comply with published methodologies (d) failure to notify ESMA 
of intended material changes to existing rating methodologies.1728 
Of critical importance is the provision that CRAs will not incur liability for simple negligence 
or merely because they have issued an incorrect rating and that the infringement must have 
(had) an impact on the rating.1729  The regulation further requires the plaintiff (investor) to 
establish that he reasonably relied on the rating agency on two conditions. First, that the reliance 
was in accordance with Article 5(a) (1)1730 of the regulation and second, he exercised due care 
in respect of the decision to invest, hold on or divest from a financial instrument covered by the 
                                                          
1725 European Communities Act 1972, s 2 (2). This Act empowers a designated Minister or Department to make 
regulation for implementing any community obligation, or enabling such obligation to be implemented. 
1726  The Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulation 1637/2013 
1727 The Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulation 1637/2013 
1728 EC Regulation 1060/2009, amended by Regulation 513/2011 Annex 111 
1729 Bruyne (n 1692) 88. 
1730 EU Regulation 513/2011 s 5(a) (1) 
Chapter 6 
282 
 
rating.1731 It is only when these conditions have been fulfilled that an investor may then claim 
compensation from the CRAs for the losses suffered1732. From the above discussion, it becomes 
obvious that a higher standard of proof is required to bring civil liability claims against CRAs 
in the UK than their US counterparts. It can be argued that failure to reduce the pleading 
requirements in the UK/EU is not just a missed opportunity to sanitise the CRA industry, but it 
also sends the wrong signal to CRAs that the likelihood of being held liable for their actions is 
either minimal or non-existent 
The role of CRAs in the GFC has never been in doubt in the two jurisdictions. But the regulatory 
approach remains an area of fundamental divergence between the two economic blocks. 
Further, the two positions differ as the U.K (EU) approach relies on strict surveillance of the 
methodology of the rating regime. In this respect, Article 11(a) of Regulation 513/2011 requires 
registered CRAs to furnish ESMA with rating information such as rating outlook of the rated 
instrument, the type of rating action, date and time of publication.1733 In addition to the above, 
Article 14(3)1734 of the Regulation requires CRAs to notify the ESMA of its rating 
methodologies, key rating assumptions and any intended changes to the rating methodologies. 
Arguably, the above prescriptions together with the emphasis on detailed registration 
requirements tend to preserve the status quo by raising the barrier to entry. This, in effect has 
the unintended consequence of stifling competition and turning the credit rating industry into 
an oligopoly.1735 
In contrast, the Dodd-Frank1736 provisions render the SEC impotent regarding the basis of the 
ratings, their underlying assumptions, procedures and methodologies. Although the Act 
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empowers the SEC to conduct on-sight inspection of CRAs and to take disciplinary action, it 
nonetheless prohibits the SEC from interfering in the rating procedure and methodology 
used.1737  Consequently, the regulatory approach in the US relies on the CRAs themselves to 
self-regulate on the basis that such an approach is a better regulatory option as compared to the 
strictly rule-based regulation.1738  Authorities in the US justify this approach by arguing that the 
introduction of competition in the rating industry would compel CRAs to improve their 
methodologies and ratings. Following from this, the SEC granted NRSRO status to eleven (11) 
CRAs since 2008 to increase the number of such agencies so as to reduce the current 
dependence on a few-select CRAs.1739  
Realising that external ratings alone are not enough, the US government introduced the use of 
internal credit ratings that allow large financial institutions to carry out their own risk 
assessment. According to US authorities, this practice encourages competition which they 
contend, remains the best regulatory mechanism to improve transparency, accuracy and 
integrity of the rating process.1740 In effect, the regulation of CRAs in the US involves minimal, 
informal public oversight that relies on market acceptance rather than regulatory standards. 
Hence, whereas UK authorities seek to promote accountability and transparency in the rating 
industry through effective supervision and a clear-cut regulatory regime, the authorities in the 
US prefer market discipline through transparency and competition.1741 
6.3.2 Bank Resolution Regimes 
The need for early intervention remains one of the most contested issues regarding the reform 
of financial regulation following the GFC.1742 Authorities in the US and UK recognised that the 
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present insolvency regimes are inadequate to deal with banks in distress particularly, after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock.1743 Therefore, the policy rationale is the 
realisation that a key component of maintaining financial stability is through early intervention 
in distressed banks before they fail.1744 This is because formal structured intervention 
mechanism avoids the risk of the authorities hesitating when the need arises to make decisions 
about banks in financial difficulties.1745 
Consequently, the issue of early intervention became an integral part of the regulatory responses 
adopted in the two jurisdictions although the history of such interventions differs remarkably. 
While the UK was exploring the need for early intervention, the focus of the US was on the 
nature of the intervention. As opposed to the UK where such intervention is quite novel, early 
intervention has been part of the US system since 1991 under the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act 1991(FDICA).1746 The FDICA empowers regulators to take 
‘prompt and corrective action’1747 to rectify the problem of insufficient capital before it reaches 
the point of insolvency. The restructuring of the regulatory discretion through the principle of 
prompt corrective action seeks to limit regulatory forbearance and allows a significant level of 
discretion deemed necessary to mitigate bank risk.1748  It is worth noting that prior to enactment 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, insolvent deposit-taking institutions and bank resolution mechanisms 
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were dealt with under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (FDICA).1749 In fact, 
Dodd-Frank only came to strengthen the scope and application of this existing legislation.1750 
As compared to the US, the situation in the UK was very different. Prior to the SRR under the 
Banking Act 2009, insolvent banks in the UK were subject only to the normal corporate 
insolvency law.1751  Insolvency is here defined as the inability to pay debts as they mature, or 
as obligations become payable. The insolvency process, particularly in respect of banks deemed 
systemically important has the potential to generate wider costs or negative externalities for 
society far beyond the losses to the bank’s own creditors.1752 The principal problem with the 
existing insolvency regime relates to its negative impact on depositors’ right to access funds 
during that period, creating delays which eventually cause further panic in the financial sector. 
Moreover, the existing insolvency regime did not apply to building societies like Bradford and 
Bingley although these entities experienced massive problems before and during the GFC. 
These problems, coupled with the failure by the FSA to take control of Northern Rock while it 
was still solvent, and ensure a quick and efficient payment of depositors, made the introduction 
of the new legislation necessary.  
Also, the political climate in the UK post the Northern Rock failure changed dramatically and 
the move towards a SRR was initiated following these developments. Therefore, as compared 
to the US, the SRR in the UK is considered a new mechanism as the country had no pre-existing 
resolution or special insolvency regime. Against this backdrop, it is submitted that SRR in the 
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US and the UK evolved along different paths although the circumstances necessitating their 
introduction seem similar.1753  
6.4 Funding 
Another area where the US and UK differ is in terms of how to fund the SRR. The US legislation 
expressly prohibits the use of public funds to support distressed financial institutions. It 
therefore, established the resolution fund to be financed by the systemically-important financial 
institutions themselves.1754 This is to ensure that the financial institutions rather than the public 
bear the cost of the resolution mechanism.1755 Furthermore, compelling financial institutions to 
pay for the resolution process makes them interested parties in the design of such a mechanism, 
and has the potential to reduce the moral hazard problems associated with bailouts.1756 An added 
advantage is that making the institutions responsible for the process generates cross-monitoring 
which in turn provides the incentive to encourage each other and avoid unnecessary risk-
taking.1757 
This approach is, however, fraught with two obvious problems. First, it relies on financial 
institutions to fund the resolution process. In the event of these institutions being unable to 
provide the needed funding would mean the end of the entire project. The second problem is 
how to determine the appropriate focus of the measures introduced under the new SRR in view 
of the difficulty in identifying a ‘systemically important’ institution. Although various 
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definitions have been provided, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the body 
charged with overseeing the resolution mechanism is yet to provide a clear-cut definition.  
On the other hand, the UK adopts a different approach in respect of funding the SRR. This 
process, be it partial transfer, bridge bank or nationalisation does not provide for the 
establishment of a fund to pay for the cost of the resolution. In fact, the Banking Act stipulates 
the use of public funds to support troubled banks and financial institutions with the approval of 
parliament. The Treasury is however, empowered to pledge public funds without parliamentary 
approval if it is determined that the need is ‘too urgent to permit arrangements to be made for 
the provision of money by parliament’.1758 The reliance on the Treasury for funding and the 
FSCS to cover the depositor guarantee were evident in the case of RBS and Lloyds-HBOS.1759 
Arguably, such government discretionary support through the Treasury, invariably gives an 
implicit guarantee to financial institutions limited only by the nation’s own balance sheets.1760 
Indeed, far from limiting insurance to only depositors, the regime actually insures all creditors 
fully at the expense of the tax payer.1761 Obviously, such implicit taxpayer-funded insurance 
tends to provide incentives to some of the systemically-important institutions to engage in 
excessive risk-taking as witnessed prior to the GFC. From this perspective, it is submitted that 
some of the very governance and regulatory practices that triggered the financial crisis have 
resurfaced under the UK special resolution regime. 
6.5 Transparency 
In terms of transparency, the two approaches differ with respect to the decision-making process 
with the UK approach being the very opaque and grants the Treasury Secretary more 
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discretionary powers. This is made possible by the adoption of a code of practice, ostensibly to 
clarify the provisions of the Act under the pretext that ‘the concepts at issue are too complex to 
be reduced to hard-edged statutory definition’.1762 Consequently, the code spells out the 
responsibilities of each authority but fails to explain how these bodies should work together to 
design a solution to define a failing bank. For example, the BoE in consultation with the FSA 
decide on the viability of the first two options, namely private sector transfer and bridge bank. 
The Treasury only plays a role when the preferred option is nationalisation, when the use of 
public funds and the need to protect public interest becomes imperative.  
The overlapping responsibilities and lack of clarity is further compounded by the separation of 
the FSA into two regulatory entities. The inclusion of two additional regulatory bodied makes 
an already complex process more complicated and renders it rather opaque. Apparently, this 
opaqueness is a direct result of the less prescriptive character of the Act following the adoption 
of the code of practice.  
In another breadth, the less prescriptive approach or principle-based model seem advantageous 
because it allows banks enough time to deal with the issues confronting them. An example is 
the decision by the FSA to allow the Icelandic bank Kaupthing adequate time to resolve its 
liquidity problems before triggering the powers of administration.1763 
The resolution regime in the US tends to be more explicit, rule-based and allows no room for 
ambiguity by strictly adhering to the provisions contained in the FDICA 1991 and the Dodd-
Frank Act. In keeping with this prescriptive approach, legislations in the US empower 
regulators to insist on strict compliance and allow minimum discretion to limit regulatory 
forbearance.1764  
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This prescriptive approach enables the regulators to embark on specific actions if it is 
determined that the capital position of a financial institution is deteriorating. The specific 
actions include requesting the firm to (a) submit a plan explaining how it intends to recapitalise 
(b) capital restructuring plan and (c) impose restriction on bonuses by requesting directors to 
agree with the regulations on the payment of bonuses, commissions, severance and 
remunerations.1765 Arguably, this prescriptive and rule-based approach in the US is possibly 
appropriate and more efficient given the large number of bank failures and closures experienced 
during the GFC.1766 
Indeed, early intervention policy on its own is not an antidote to bank failures and the 
subsequent GFC that followed. The success, to a very large extent, depends on the experience 
and judgement of the regulators making the right choices as acknowledged by the FSA in 
respect of the Northern Rock failure. 
Similarly, although the prompt corrective action (PCA) mechanism has been in existence in the 
US since 1991, that alone could not prevent bank failures in that jurisdiction. This seems to 
suggest that the concept of early intervention regime as a means of resolving bank failures has 
been oversold and that a re-examination of the governance model of banks is what is required 
to avoid banks falling into crisis. Above all, the weaknesses identified in both jurisdictions 
relate not to whether the intervention is rule-based as in the US or principle-based as obtains in 
the UK. Indeed, they can be explained by the fact that both the US and UK adhere to a 
governance model founded on the principle of shareholder primacy which advocates private 
regulation, market fundamentalism and profit maximisation for short-term purposes. 
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6.6 Analysis 
 As earlier discussed, corporate governance tends to operate within the parameters set out by 
national laws, regulations, economic goals and expectations of the dominant interest group. 
Therefore, to understand the approaches to the reforms, it is necessary to look beyond the labels 
and to consider the current context underlying the approaches to corporate governance. 
Admittedly, the US and UK may differ in their responses to the crisis but a careful analysis of 
observed patterns indicates the same kind of reform arguments are dominant in both 
countries.1767 These relational  similarities identified in the two jurisdiction can be explained  
by how problems and solutions are defined and how risk is perceived.1768 In line with this 
hypothesis, it is not surprising that the two jurisdictions advance similar arguments that use the 
crisis to push a reform agenda that reflects not just their definition of the problem and solution 
but also tends to enhance the shareholder primacy theory. 
Indeed, the GFC affected the UK and the US differently in many respects, but the subsequent 
reforms in both countries look similar mainly because large UK financial institutions adopted 
essentially the same business model as those operating in the US. The ‘originate to distribute’ 
business model replaced the ‘originate to hold’ model that has been in operation until recent 
times. The ‘originate to distribute’ is a process that allows financial institutions to expand their 
lending seemingly without violating the underlying capital requirements set by the regulators. 
The model generated instruments such as collateralised debt obligation (CDO) mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and credit default swaps (CDS).1769 In fact, the use of these 
instruments to exploit the weaknesses of the regulatory system was common in US and UK. 
The over-reliance on this inappropriate business model eventually led to the failure of the 
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regulatory structures on both sides to enforce the capital requirements that would have 
otherwise mitigated the impact of the GFC.1770  Consequently, it can be argued that the adoption 
of similar business models in these jurisdictions shaped the policy response and reforms 
initiatives. Generally, however, the reforms in both jurisdictions do not constitute a radical 
departure from past practice, building instead on the existing business model that sparked the 
GFC.1771 
Another factor that explains the similarity in response is how authorities in both countries 
perceive and define the causes of the financial crisis. Authorities in the US and UK identify the 
causes as an agency problem that can be resolved by aligning the interest of managers with that 
of shareholders. As a result, it became imperative for policy makers in the two countries to 
design post-crisis responses that are essentially similar in content.1772 The solutions contained 
in these reforms have internal as well as external elements. The internal elements focus on 
strengthening the internal governance of corporations through the appointment of non- 
executive directors (NED) to monitor management. The reforms in the two jurisdictions also 
mandate management to fulfil higher reporting and disclosure requirements to ensure 
transparency and accountability. Much as these measures may seem to improve corporate 
governance, they are in fact empowering devices that tend to strengthen the position of 
shareholders at the expense of other corporate constituents. 
Externally, both Dodd-Frank and the Banking Act contain provisions that seek to regulate the 
conduct of financial and non-financial institutions. Subsequently, the two legislations provide 
for bank resolution regimes that ensure the early rescue of banks in financial distress or allow 
for the orderly liquidation of such banks. 
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In addition to the above, the deregulatory experiences of the two countries find expression in 
their policy responses to GFC. Since the early 1980s, the neoliberal administrations in the US 
and UK embraced the rhetoric of deregulation ostensibly to address economic failures.1773 This 
was based on the assumption that neoliberal economies produced the best possible out comes 
in terms of efficiency; hence, it was essential to decentralise and assign the regulatory functions 
to private regulatory bodies.1774  This approach emphasises private ordering as the best means 
of promoting economic efficiency and allowed firms/corporations to regulate themselves in 
conformity with political preferences supported by economic theories developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s: notably the efficient market hypothesis.1775  In both the US and UK, this ‘light touch’ 
regulation was marked by very limited role for government and the dismantling of control, 
monitoring and surveillance in the name of deregulation. At the same time, the approach relied 
heavily on private market operators to determine the form and content of regulation. Clearly, it 
was a strategy based totally on persuasion, shaped by entrenched political and economic 
interests and mediated by ideological considerations.1776 Against this background, it can be 
argued that the subsequent reform agenda adopted post the GFC has largely been shaped by 
these developments. Moreover, there is now a growing recognition that, this passive approach 
to financial regulation is no longer sustainable. As a result, regulatory intervention has become 
inevitable because the GFC has challenged established understanding and expectations that had 
dominated the era of ‘light-touch’ regulation of the early 1990s in the US and UK.1777 
Notwithstanding the factors already mentioned, the adoption of Anglo-American corporate 
governance paradigm with its underlying assumptions provides the most cogent reasons for the 
similar responses in the US and UK. The Anglo-American corporate governance model as 
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explained earlier is characterised by the shareholder primacy, unquestioned belief in the 
efficiency of the markets, short-termism, dispersed ownership and unitary board of directors 
with a chairman separate from the CEO. 
Following the adoption of this shareholder-oriented model, an array of economic and legal 
institutions emerged to serve the purpose of orienting corporate managers towards increasing 
share price and ultimately creating shareholder value.1778 As Davis explains, the outcome of 
this development is that the managerial market, boards of directors and the take-over markets 
all compelled corporate managers to focus on their companies’ share price as the sole and 
legitimate purpose of the firm. This was further reinforced by the practice of tying executive 
compensation to share price through devices such as stock options.1779 
Furthermore, the external managerial markets saw a dramatic increase as companies sought to 
recruit outside CEOs rather than from within their own organisations.1780 Accordingly, 
managers seeking to attract outside investments often include a number of safeguards to 
demonstrate their commitment to the protection of shareholder value.1781 On the other hand, 
those who fail to show sufficient devotion to shareholders are likely to be subjected to take-
over moves and eventually suffer by way of higher cost of capital.1782  Indeed, by the 1990s, 
few executives both in the US and the UK had any doubts that their companies exist to create 
shareholder value as evidenced in the mission statements of several international brands 
including Coca Cola.1783 The mission statement of Coca Cola states that the company exists to 
create value for its share owners on a long-term basis by building a business that enhances the 
Coca Cola trade mark. 
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In the US the idea that corporations exist to serve shareholder interest attained pre-eminence at 
the time of President Ronald Reagan. The corporate governance framework during this era has 
been shaped by what Davis refers to as ‘Reaganomics’.1784 It is a version of market 
fundamentalism that has been influenced by neo-classical economic thinking in which 
management is driven and determined by the free market ideology.1785 Indeed, faced with 
formidable competition from Japan and the newly-emerging economies of Asia, the over-
bloated Anglo-American conglomerates were compelled to adopt a governance model that 
allows them to remain competitive.1786 Consequently, managers resorted to down-sizing, less 
investment in research and development and relocating to countries with lower labour costs all 
in an attempt to maximise shareholder value.1787 Through the invisible hand of the market, 
corporations in America have come to be structured to serve shareholder interest as advocated 
by the Reagan administration which provided an impetus to the free market economic 
theory.1788 In this context, it may be argued that the corporation has, more or less become an 
institutional reflection of the principles of laissez-fare capitalism driven by a neo-liberal 
agenda.1789  
As the GFC demonstrates, the notion that the free market economic system produces better 
outcomes and thus, be kept from political control and left to market actors has proven be flawed 
in many respects. Indeed, the last two decades have witnessed several corporate failures 
including the Enron fraud, the WorldCom scandal in the 2000s and the costly taxpayer-bailouts 
of financial firms in 2008. Apparently, the markets did not function and government 
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intervention with public money became the only viable alternative.1790 Thus, the excessive faith 
placed in the market as a self-correcting mechanism and fear of government intervention in the 
economy have all turned out to be misplaced. Arguably, ‘the markets may fear big government, 
but governments are now beginning to fear big markets’.1791 The reason, as the GFC illustrates, 
is that financial markets pose a greater risk to the economy, the state and taxpayers than the 
state can ever pose to the markets.1792  Indeed, the fundamental problem is that markets, left 
unto themselves have the tendency to distort the economy by the creation of excessive public 
debts as happened in the recent crisis. Across the advanced economies, the overall bailout 
constitutes about 3 per cent of GDP, the full cost of the crisis is estimated to be much bigger 
while public debt has increased by 34 per cent.1793  Moreover, living standards have fallen 10 
per cent below pre-crisis levels.1794 
A similar neo-liberal economic model was adopted by the Thatcher government in the UK since 
1979 under the guise of privatisation. Privatisation under the Thatcher-led conservative 
government was part of a neo-liberal agenda that sought to roll back the public sector by selling 
parts of the nationalised industries, opening them up to greater competition and contracting out 
public services to the private sector.1795  It is estimated that over fifty companies including: 
British Gas, British Telecom, Water and Electricity were privatised under the pretext that state-
run companies were not only badly managed but also stifled competition.1796 Hence, 
privatisation was seen as fundamental to improving UK’s competitive edge and overall 
economic performance.1797 
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Apparently, the rational for privatisation was not clearly spelt out by its proponents except to 
state that it is intended to ensure a property-owing democracy in which individuals at all levels 
would own a stake in the economic success of the UK. The ex-post justification for the 
privatisation suggests however, that the overriding motivation for the programme was more 
ideological than economic.1798 This explains why the privatisation programme  has often been 
dismissed as ‘a product more of political opportunism than an economic theory’.1799 In fact, the 
neo-liberal agenda as evidenced by privatisation fails to deal with the discontents and 
contradictions so ubiquitous in the market-based economy.1800 First, the philosophical 
foundation of privatisation rests upon a rather distorted and incomplete conceptualisation of the 
purpose of the corporation in society and the ability of the market to act as a self-correcting 
mechanism.1801  Second, it can be argued that privatisation programme is also flawed for its 
reliance on profit-oriented corporations to perform what is effectively a public function in the 
form of regulation.1802  Obviously, such profit maximising entities are bound to put their private 
corporate interest above and beyond the wider public interest. It is, therefore, no coincidence 
that the GFC of 2008 was preceded by management practices that portrayed profit maximisation 
for the benefit of shareholders as the sole and legitimate goal of the corporation. Thus, a 
corporate governance model founded on shareholder primacy, the efficient market hypothesis, 
short-termism and private regulation emerged in response to political preferences and economic 
theories of this era.1803 Since then, corporate governance in the UK has been subjected to the 
rather rigid template of shareholder primacy, the flawed concept of market efficiency and the 
unquestioned adherence to the comply-or-explain principle.1804 
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It is important to remember that the age of deregulation was also an age of privatisation during 
which authorities in the US and the UK gave meaning and effect to market fundamentalism.1805 
In so doing, both the US and UK adopted the neo-liberal doctrine of the self-correcting market 
mechanism on the assumption that unfettered free markets provide optimal outcomes when they 
are not distorted by government intervention. Authorities in the two countries justify this 
doctrine by arguing that it was conducive to stability and wealth creation. This ideology, with 
its emphasis on shareholder primacy, however, proved to be a source of financial instability and 
the cause of the GFC. 
Moreover, the same logic that drove the neo-liberal agenda in the early 1980s- the willingness 
to allow ideology and political preferences to blind governments to the risks posed by 
unregulated markets continues to shape the responses to the crisis. While there are obviously 
some differences in the two countries, major similarities exist in terms of the philosophies 
underlying the interventions; the challenges posed by the crisis and perhaps more importantly 
the adherence to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. It is therefore, submitted 
that these factors, to an appreciable extent account for the similar but flawed responses adopted 
by the US and the UK to the GFC. 
6.7 Conclusion  
A comparison of the post crisis responses in the US and UK reveal several differences as well 
as major similarities which eventually shaped the nature and content of the legislative and 
regulatory responses. Policy responses in the US and UK post the GFC mainly consists of three 
types of interventions: bank bailouts, stimulus package and regulation of financial 
institutions.1806 As part of the initial response, some financial institutions considered ‘too-big-
to fail’ were taken into public ownership through bailouts and subsequent nationalisation in 
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both jurisdictions.1807 This became evident when Treasury Departments were obliged to replace 
the limited depositors guarantee with state guarantees by using public money to guarantee all 
depositors in failing banks such as Northern Rock, RBS and TSB Lloyds. 
 A similar response occurred in the US where financial institutions including Bear Seams, AIG 
were nationalised and mortgage-providing firms like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac taken into 
public ownership.1808 This huge extension of public ownership and the extensive underwriting 
of the financial industry represents the single most important policy intervention, and arguably, 
a dramatic policy reversal that questions the long-established assumptions about the efficient 
market hypothesis.1809 These developments, led to the ‘politicization’ of the markets whereby 
politicians on both side have become actively engaged in the management of the financial 
system. For instance, the nationalisation programme and the stimulus package signalled a 
dramatic shift as well as an increase involvement of the political class in financial matters. This 
new-found role effectively empowered Treasury officials to become involved in the detailed 
management of troubled financial institutions, determined which banks needed to be rescued; 
taking into consideration factors such as size, interconnectivity and relevance to the economy. 
In addition to the initial bailout and stimulus packages, authorities in both countries recognised 
the need for a more stringent approach to financial regulation. It became apparent and indeed, 
evidence abounds to suggest that the current model of banking regulation and resolution have 
failed and need substantial reforms.1810 Consequently, governments in the US and UK tightened 
the legal and regulatory controls by enacting major legislations namely the Dodd-Frank Act 
2010 and the Banking Act 2009 respectively. 
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 On the face of it, these legislations seem forward looking as they tend to tilt towards the more 
stringent and prescriptive regulatory approach embedded in the American regulatory 
culture.1811 In that context, they appear to be the most appropriate response to the regulatory 
failures and corporate governance deficiencies exposed by the GFC.  
The purported ‘success’ of these legislations however, obscure the reality that several aspects 
of the regulatory approach have not changed. Some provisions of these legislations, in fact, tend 
to defend the free market ideology and uphold a corporate governance system ‘whose substance 
is the promotion of shareholder value’1812 as evidenced by the increasing economic power of 
institutional shareholders. Unsurprisingly, institutional shareholders have assumed more power 
and have become an integral part of the governance process post these reforms.1813 This echoes 
the view that although, some of the regulatory issues have been addressed and corporate 
governance improved, the fundamental mode of conceptualising the corporation as profit-
oriented vehicle purposely established to satisfy shareholder interest remains untouched.1814  On 
the basis of the above analysis, it is submitted that with the exception of some minor differences, 
the response of the US and UK governments to the GFC are fundamentally similar. 
The sources of these similarities are complex and deeply rooted in several factors including: 
the unquestioned belief in the Anglo-American corporate governance model with its emphasis 
on shareholder primacy, efficient market hypothesis, deregulation and financial innovation 
which in turn, reflects the neo-liberal agenda. Driven by the neo-liberal agenda, corporations 
shifted from ‘originate to hold’ to ‘originate to distribute’ business model with its attendant 
risky business practices under the guise of financial innovation. Apparently, this business model 
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which became the hall mark of the global financial system transformed banking institutions into 
‘unscrupulous gambling houses’.1815  The proliferation of these risky financial products in the 
form of credit default swaps, collateralised debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities 
dominated the financial systems of these jurisdictions.1816  
Perhaps, more crucial is the strict adherence to the rhetoric of the shareholder primacy as 
underpinned by the Anglo-American school of corporate governance. This model is 
characterised by flexibility, deregulation, excessive faith in the market and the presumption that 
the model represents the future of capitalism itself.1817 The emergence and the eventual 
predominance of the shareholder-oriented model in the US and UK is closely linked with the 
neo-liberal agenda that began in the early 1960s and later pursued by the Reagan and Thatcher 
regimes.1818 Decades of market-based economic policies in the name of privatisation and 
deregulation allowed firms to regulate themselves in conformity with political preferences that 
consider the corporation a vehicle for capital accumulation with the state acting as a 
facilitator.1819 It should be stressed that the process by which the state plays this facilitator role 
is inherently political which reaffirms the path-dependent nature of corporate governance 
models.1820 
Indeed, the reasons for the similarities in the post-crisis reform agenda in the US and UK run 
deeper and derive from a shared belief in the free market economy, a reliance on the shareholder 
primacy as the ideal model of governance to which all other states must aspire.1821  The 
combination of these factors resulted in the unique similarities of the responses in the two 
                                                          
1815 Hill and Painter (n 1800)73. 
1816 De Vogli (n 333) 2. 
1817 Engelen et al. (n 1226)168. 
1818 ibid 
1819 Hupkes (n 1790) 86. 
1820 Fligstein and Freeland (n 59). 
1821 Douglas M. Branson, ‘The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance’ in 
Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 272. 
Chapter 6 
301 
 
jurisdictions. The central message, therefore, is that despite some differences, the response to 
the crisis in the US and UK are very similar both in approach and outcomes. These outcomes 
as earlier discussed, point to an abysmal failure to address the problem of shareholder primacy 
and short-termism, although the underlying assumptions have been forcefully taken apart.1822 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 7. 1 Introduction  
 
What started as a subprime mortgage problem in the US quickly turned into a global financial 
crisis with far-reaching social, economic and political ramifications.1823 In response, 
governments across the world including the US and UK introduced several legislative, 
regulatory and governance reforms. The thesis set out to explore whether the corporate 
governance reforms introduced in the US and UK post the financial crisis address the 
underlying causes or merely treating the symptoms. The study argues that because the causes 
of the crisis have largely been misunderstood and misdiagnosed, the subsequent responses have 
tended to address the symptoms and not the underlying causes. Against this back drop, this 
concluding chapter discusses the nature and outcomes of the response, the conclusions that can 
be drawn, makes some recommendations to minimise the effects of future crisis and suggests 
areas for further research. 
7 .2 Analysis 
 Following the crisis, the debate about the causes began in earnest with various schools of 
thoughts adopting different positions.1824 While some attribute the crisis to corporate 
governance failures, others argue the crisis was not in any way related to corporate governance. 
Yet a third school of thought insists the crisis stems from ineffective implementation of existing 
corporate governance rules, codes and principles.1825  
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The findings of this study, however runs counter to all these propositions. At best corporate 
governance failures, as has been forcefully argued, merely acted as triggers and cannot be 
blamed for causing the crisis. The underlying cause of the crisis as this study argues, is the 
mistaken idea that the sole and legitimate purpose of the corporation is to maximise shareholder 
value in the shortest time possible.1826 This single dimensional conception of shareholder 
primacy proved unrealistic and dysfunctional as evidenced by the massive corporate frauds at 
Enron, WorldCom, Pamalat in the early part of 2000 and the subsequent taxpayer-funded 
bailouts of some of the largest financial institutions in 2008.1827 
The philosophical foundation of shareholder primacy rests on the mistaken claims that (a) 
shareholders ‘own’ the corporation, (b) shareholders are the residual claimants of the profits 
and (c) they are principals who hire and control the directors and executives to act as their 
agents.1828  Contrary to this narrative, a critical examination of shareholder primacy reveals that 
the ideological legitimation underlying the shareholder primacy- namely the prudential claim, 
the moral claim and the functional claim have all been debunked and rejected. 1829 
First, shareholders as the study shows, only own shares in the company which should not be 
confused with the ownership of the company itself.1830  Their rights visa-vis the company are 
restricted and limited to non-binding votes that can be ignored by management under the 
business judgement rule.1831 The actual exercise of power and control over the corporation 
remains the prerogative of management and not shareholders.1832  It is therefore, misleading to 
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characterise shareholders as owners based on assumptions that are inherently inaccurate and 
unsustainable. 
Also, the perceived superiority of the shareholder value maximisation approach cannot be 
substantiated. So far, no persuasive empirical evidence exists to suggest that corporations run 
along the shareholder-oriented approach are more efficient or perform better than those that are 
not.1833 Indeed, if shareholder value thinking was good for shareholders as is being claim, then 
governance structures and business practices would have greatly improved investor returns over 
the past two decades.1834 A closer look at this proposition reveals however, that the exact 
opposite has happened. The shareholder primacy approach with its emphasis on share price and 
the use of stock-based compensation schemes became more of a problem due to its short-term 
approach to the governance of corporations.1835 
As explained earlier, the shareholder primacy theory is an artificial construct that produced not 
just poor shareholder value, but it also destroyed shareholder value before and during the 
GFC.1836 Thus, this thesis takes the position that the cause of the recent GFC can be traced not 
to flawed individuals or flawed regulations but to a flawed idea which advocates that 
corporations are only managed well when they maximise share price to satisfy shareholder 
interests and demands.1837 Apparently, the emergence of the shareholder primacy thinking as 
the dominant governance theory under the Anglo-American corporate governance cannot be 
viewed in isolation. Rather, it is part of a broader discourse about the corporate purpose dating 
back to the Berle-Dodd debate and thus, reflects the different perceptions of the role and 
purpose of the corporation in society.1838 Despite the initial reservations and objections, Berle 
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had, by the close of the debate, finally conceded that the corporation is a public institution 
whose purpose is to serve the larger societal interests.1839 
That notwithstanding, the perception that corporation exists solely to maximise shareholder 
returns continues to hold sway on corporate governance thinking and practice. This has been 
made possible by academics who provided the intellectual justification and policy entrepreneurs 
who successfully pushed through significant corporate governance regulations designed to 
make managers more focused on promoting shareholder interest.1840 
The shareholder value thinking was further entrenched by international organisations 
particularly the IMF, World Bank and the OECD.1841 These institutions often advocate, and 
sometimes, mandate corporate governance practices and structures conducive to shareholder 
interest. It is important to stress that, although ,the OECD may lack the coercive powers of the 
IMF and World Bank, it nonetheless plays a crucial role in defining what constitutes good 
corporate governance and also legitimises this social construct through the appearance of 
consensus building.1842 These institutions often, equate good corporate governance with the 
Anglo-American model which emphasises market efficiency, deregulation whereby the 
corporation is primarily an instrument for achieving the goal of maximising shareholder 
value.1843 
As the study shows, shareholder value maximisation is not a ‘natural’ by-product of market 
forces, rather it is attributable to the strong bargaining power of interests groups able to preserve 
a legal and institutional regime conducive to their financial interest.1844 Indeed, the choice of 
corporate governance practice in any country expresses the interaction of economic preferences 
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and social power relations.1845 It signifies a power struggle that is fuelled by the different 
perception and understanding of the nature and purpose of the corporation in society. 
Consequently the adoption of a corporate governance model founded on shareholder primacy 
reflects political and economic preferences that are inherently neo-liberal.1846 This echoes the 
earlier definition of corporate governance as the practices that define and reflect the power 
relations within the company and the way, and for which purpose it is run.1847 Thus, the 
emergence of the shareholder primacy as the dominant governance theory in the US and UK 
reflects a neoliberal agenda constructed by social forces embedded within the political struggle. 
Admittedly, some aspects of the reforms have been very positive in terms of improving 
governance practices, ensuring transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, the overall 
reform measures did not represent a significant departure from past practices, building instead 
on the existing shareholder-oriented corporate governance model that triggered the GFC.1848  
Unsurprisingly, the responses in both the US and UK reinforce the shareholder primacy 
proposition by focusing mainly on measures that seek to improve the existing governance   
regime without changing the fundamentals. As a result, the reforms tend to focus on 
restructuring the composition and functions of boards of directors, advocate shareholder 
empowerment and align the interest of management with that of shareholders.1849 Apparently, 
the introduction of stricter rules on disclosure, executive compensation, risk management and 
regulation of CRAs are all geared towards maintaining the status quo and protecting shareholder 
interest. 
From this perspective, it stands to reason that these measures alone are acutely inadequate as 
they fail to address the issue of shareholder primacy thinking, short-termism and the larger 
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question of what constitutes the corporate purpose and whose interest the corporation exists to 
serve.1850  The remedies contained in the reforms have failed to recognise and resolve these 
three fundamental issues, but chose to focus on the symptoms rather than the underlying cause 
of the crisis. Consequently, it is submitted that, the corporate governance reforms in the US and 
UK following the GFC do not by any means constitute a radical departure from the shareholder-
oriented corporate governance model. If anything, they are, but a modest refinement of the 
prevailing governance theory that has created the worst global financial crisis since the Great 
Depression.1851 
The defects of these reforms become evident in the continuing recurrence of corporate failures 
since 2009 which suggests that the world is not yet ready to avert the next crisis.1852  Apparently, 
corporations, particularly financial institutions, seem determined to return to business as usual, 
perhaps, with a few cosmetic changes, but no fundamental reform in way they perceive and 
define the corporate purpose and the governance practices they adopt.  
7.3 Recommendations 
In view of the defects identified in the shareholder primacy model, the study suggests an 
alternative model of corporate governance with different underlying assumptions in which the 
interest of the larger society and long-term relationship define the purpose of the corporation. 
7.3.1 Reconceptualise and Redefine Corporate Purpose 
 A fundamental reform of the present dysfunctional system starts with a reconceptualization 
and redefinition of the nature, purpose and role of the corporation in society. This necessarily 
requires radical changes in how business and economics are taught in law schools, business 
schools and economics departments. This is because the emphasis schools and training 
institutions put on certain values or approaches will reverberate for decades as happened with 
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the shareholder primacy theory.1853 The values espoused in these institutions will determine 
how business leaders and lawyers behave, professional association standards are set, and 
policies are adopted.1854  
 In this regard, there is an urgent need for a new approach that will emphasise an alternative 
model, which in theory and practice recognises that the purpose of the corporation is to advance 
the interest of society. This is achieved by finding the right balance between the competing 
claims of various groups and assigning to each group its due share. Under this inclusive model, 
corporations are obliged to be responsible to the interest of society and not merely accountable 
to shareholders.  
What is being proposed here is the concept of common good so that corporate executives have 
a single target, but one that includes all corporate constituents not just shareholders.1855 The 
proposed model draws on the African philosophical concept of Ubuntu which denotes 
coexistence, consensus and consultation.1856  The common good in the context of Ubuntu is 
defined as ‘the sum of the interests of the several members who compose of the community’.1857 
This concept emphasises the collective interest where the success of one person depends to a 
very large extent on the success of all others- the community.1858  Its main attributes includes; 
community, consensus, interdependence, solidarity and long-term relationship.  Consequently, 
this approach renders the exclusive focus on shareholder primacy almost impossible and 
unattractive because all aspects of governance practices, goals and objectives are geared 
towards realising these values for the common good on long-term basis.1859  It is, therefore, 
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critical that these values permeate all aspects of governance and be demonstrated in actions and 
decisions of the corporate entity.  
Obviously, the concept of Ubuntu is not static but capable of evolving and adapting to the 
changing social conditions, which makes it applicable to relationships other than those of the 
traditional setting in which it was developed.1860 In this respect, it may be argued that this non-
western concept and cultural experience can contribute to the corporate governance discourse. 
As Justice Makoro rightly notes ‘the strength of Ubuntu lies in its potential as a tool for aligning 
the interests of the entire community’.1861  Justice Sachs echoes this in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers when he states that Ubuntu is part of the cultural heritage in 
an evolving society that stresses the need for interdependence, respect and concern for 
others.1862 Similarly, in The City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties Ltd, the South African 
Constitutional Court held that the essence of Ubuntu is ‘the capacity to express compassion, 
reciprocity, harmony and humanity in the interest of building, maintaining and strengthening 
the community; it speaks to our humanity and responsibility to each other’.1863 Clearly, these 
rulings remind the entities involved that the interest of other members of the community cannot 
be ignored but should be factored into the decision making process, governance and business 
practices. 
It is worth noting that the Ubuntu concept differs from the stakeholder approach in that the 
stakeholder theory focuses on how individuals with conflicting group interest can live in 
relationship with the same organisation. The Ubuntu idea on the other hand, stresses the 
common good where managers have single target that is inclusive of all constituents of the 
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corporation not only shareholders.1864 Arguably, the proposed model will help prevent the 
excesses, greed and persistent corporate failures associated with shareholder primacy because 
it is underpinned by the values of interdependence and responsibility towards the community 
and not just markets and individuals.1865 
7.3.2 Formalise Worker Participation 
As part of the consensus building agenda envisaged under the new governance model, this study 
advocates for the inclusion of workers representatives on the board of directors like the co-
determination model found in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.1866 Arguably, worker-
participation engenders high level of stability and trust between the interest of capital and labour 
thereby creating the basis for more consensual industrial relations framework.1867 
Moreover, the knowledge workers bring to board level deliberations make both sides more 
realistic in their expectations concerning critical issues affecting the firm. In practice, collective 
participation through information, consultation and co-decision-making ensures that the interest 
and voice of labour are not ignored but considered in strategic maters such as mergers, 
acquisitions, layouts or relocation. It has been argued that the resilience of the German economy 
for the past three decades is partly attributed to the efficiency of this model as it takes a long-
term approach to governance practices and decision-making.1868 
The inclusion of workers on the board of directors recently received a boost from the British 
Prime Minister Theresa May, who expressed discontent with the current model of corporate 
governance in the UK. The Prime Minister argues that the practice of drawing the supposedly 
independent non-executive directors (NED) often from the same narrow social and professional 
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background just as the executives is counter-productive. According to her, this practice 
invariably renders the system ineffective as it limits the scrutiny they are expected to 
provide.1869 Her suggestion that workers and consumers be given a role in the governance of 
corporations is very significant because it indicates a tacit admission at the highest level of 
government that the current corporate governance model in the UK is defective and needs a 
radical overhaul. 
7.3.3 Covenant Governance 
The study further recommends the introduction of strict personal liability into the governance 
of major corporations particularly the banking industry under the principle of ‘covenant 
banking’.1870 This is to ensure that executives are held contractually liable from their personal 
assets for portions of the losses of the companies (banks).1871 Arguably, such a regime will 
compel senior officials to provide personal guarantees against losses enforceable under the law 
of contract with strict liability, where proof of fault is not required.1872    
This has become more compelling when viewed against the backdrop of the defects identified 
in the current bank regulatory regime, especially under the Banking Act 2009 and Dodd-Frank 
Act 2010.1873 Like previous legislations, neither the Bank Act 2009 nor Dodd-Frank is deterrent 
enough to avert the excessive risk-taking that characterised management practices just before 
the crisis. This may well be because those ultimately responsible for the reckless risk-taking 
behaviour did so with money that is not their own but belongs to someone else.1874 The cure, 
therefore, is to introduce personal liability, first, to serve as a deterrent and avoid the kinds of 
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behaviour that triggered the 2007/2008 GFC and second, to ensure that bankers do not take 
refuge in the entity shield to avoid personal liability.1875 
Moreover, this new model will serve as a constant reminder to corporate executives, particularly 
bankers be guided by the long-term interest of the corporation and pay heed to the broader 
social consequences of their actions. Viewed from this perspective, the strict liability regime 
must not only stress the responsibilities of company executives but also society’s way of making 
people take responsibility for their actions.1876 
7.3.4   Adopt Stringent, Rule-Based Regulatory Regime 
To forge a new corporate governance model, the current light-touch regulatory approach must 
give way to a more stringent regime.1877 Evidently, the passive approach to regulation is no 
longer sustainable and government intervention has thus, become inevitable against the 
backdrop of the recent GFC.1878 Moreover, government intervention with taxpayer-funded 
bailouts reflects an explicit rejection of the private ordering of the markets and the philosophy 
that champions the efficient market hypothesis and deregulation.1879  Clearly, in circumstances 
where the markets have failed and government intervention becomes inevitable, a more 
stringent regulatory system remains the most realistic strategy to avert excessive risk, corporate 
abuse and possible crisis. 
The central argument, first, is that because corporations have amassed so much power and 
influence over society, it is critical that their activities are regulated by the state. Indeed, 
corporate power has become very ubiquitous and the influence of the corporation so pervasive 
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that without regulation, these corporations would pursue their own interest regardless of the 
often-harmful consequences to others. 
Secondly, the huge social and financial cost arising from the corporate failures following the 
GFC which compelled governments to intervene with bailouts, strengthens the arguments in 
favour of a stringent regulatory regime. The fact that society had to bear the cost of the crisis in 
terms of job losses, home repossessions and taxpayer-funded bailouts, makes it imperative for 
society to demand that a new regulatory regime is devised to compel corporations to serve, 
promote and be accountable to the broad domains of society. Given the severity of the GFC, 
the size of the bailout/stimulus packages and the burden imposed on society, it is not 
unreasonable to demand a robust financial regulatory regime for taxpayers.1880 
Finally, the corporation, as a creature of the state has always been regulated in one way or the 
other. Thus, the question is not whether the state should regulate or not but how and in whose 
interest, it does so.1881 Despite the ferocity of the deregulatory movement in the last three 
decades, a case can be made that there was still some form of regulation; except that the regime 
was not sufficiently stringent enough. This is not surprising because it was an approach 
designed purposely to satisfy shareholder demands and expectations. Against this backdrop, it 
is submitted that a more stringent regulatory system will help minimise some of the 
consequences of imprudent behaviour arising from the light-touch regulatory regime of the last 
three decades. It is also instructive to note that whatever one thinks of governments, they 
remain, to a very large extent, publicly accountable institutions that constraint the tyrannical 
and unaccountable power of corporations through regulation.1882 Consequently, effective 
government regulation and enforceable laws therefore must be at the heart of the new corporate 
governance model to curtail the abuse of corporate power. 
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7.4 Implications 
The study has significant theoretical and practical policy implications in terms of the definition 
and conceptualisation of the corporate purpose. First, it addresses the key philosophical 
question surrounding an important corporate governance issue dating back to the Berle-Dodd 
debate. In so doing, the study provides useful insights regarding the nature and purpose of the 
corporation and moves beyond the constraints of traditional mode of thinking that perceives 
shareholder value maximisation as the sole and legitimate purpose of the corporation. 
Secondly, the study explores new directions regarding the underlying cause of the GFC and 
consequently, provides a clearer understanding of not just how but why the 20007/2008 GFC 
occurred. From this perspective, the crucial implication of the study is the extent to which it 
renders obsolete the mistaken assumptions of the shareholder primacy and how the concept has 
been rendered untenable in the face of the evidence provided and arguments advanced in this 
study. 
7.5 Contribution 
An original contribution of this research is that it provokes a reconceptualization of the 
corporate purpose and the possible emergence of a new governance model that defines the 
corporate purpose in terms of its ability to meet the competing demands of the different 
corporate constituents. This new model should also focus on taking a long-term view of 
corporate governance instead of the short-term approach. Thus, the research provides important 
insights and answers an important question that has confronted corporate governance 
practitioners, researchers and students for the past three decades.  
Moreover, the reconceptualised governance model suggested in this study is intended to 
encourage policy makers and business managers to adopt policies and business practices to 
ensure that the corporation is run in the best interest of all stakeholders for the benefit of the 
entire society.  
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7.6 Avenue for Future Research 
The study undoubtedly, provides critical insights on what is, arguably, the most important issues 
pertaining to the corporate governance discourse and its theoretical and policy implications. A 
crucial omission however, is the failure to address the international dimension of the crisis but 
only focused on the US and the UK. Obviously, the increasing interconnectedness of financial 
institutions, a surge in cross- border lending and the threat of domino effect made the GFC more 
acute and globally synchronised. From this perspective, the shortcoming identified in this study 
provides an opportunity to conduct further research into the international dimension of the GFC 
and the policy responses that followed.  
7.7   Concluding Remarks 
The GFC of 2007/2008 and the debate surrounding its causes raised questions about the 
presumed superiority of the shareholder primacy theory that has characterised corporate 
governance in the US and UK. As this study reveals, it is time to discard the tyranny of 
shareholder thinking because its philosophical legitimation is based on mistaken assumptions 
and assertions. 
In a determined pursuit to maximise shareholder value, corporations adopted executive 
compensation schemes based on share price, cut back on research and development as well as 
employee benefits just to meet estimates for quarterly earnings. Moreover, regulatory changes 
in the early 1990s marked an important turning point that brought the US and UK closer to the 
shareholder –oriented model of governance. But the main driving force, and perhaps, the most 
important factor is the unquestioned belief and wholesale acceptance of the shareholder primacy 
by the business world. 
It is however, refreshing to note that the shareholder dogma is witnessing a decline as various 
scholars and critics have begun questioning its theoretical and philosophical foundations and 
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gradually leading to the emergence of new concepts and paradigms. This new thinking on 
shareholder value as the research demonstrates, also goes to resolve the age-old debate on the 
purpose of the corporation. The corporate purpose, this research argues, should entail 
‘balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a 
portion of the income stream since public policy rather than private cupidity’.1883 Indeed, it is 
the failure to get the balance right that has led to the GFC. The study submits that any post-
crisis corporate governance reform, whether legislative or regulatory that does not lead to a 
reconceptualization of the corporate purpose will remain an exercise in futility. 
                                                          
1883 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation & Private Property (10th edn. Transaction 
Publishers 2009) 313. 
Bibliography 
317 
 
Bibliography 
Books 
Admati A.R, and Hellwig M, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and What 
to Do about It (Princeton University Press 2013)  
Aliber R, and Kindleberger P.C, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crisis (5th 
edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 
Augur P, The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism: The Rise and Fall of London’s Investment Banks 
(Penguin Books 2001)  
Banakar R, and Travers M, Law and Social Theory (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2013)  
Bainbridge S, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (OUP 2012)  
Bakan J, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Power (Constable 2004) 
Berle A. A.Jr, ‘Foreword’ in Edward Mason (ed), The Corporation in Modern Society (Harvard 
University Press 1960)  
Berle, A.A. Jr, and Means, C.G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MacMillan 1932) 
Berle, A.A.Jr, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Passim 1954) 
Blackstone W, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago University Press 1979) 
Blair M, ‘Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century’ 
in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 
Bloomfield S, Theory and Practice of Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach (CUP 
2013)  
Branson D.M, ‘The Uncertain Prospects of “Global Convergence “in Corporate Governance in 
Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004)  
Cable V, The Storm: The World Economic Crisis and What It Means (Atlantic Books 2009) 
Chandler A.D. Jr, ‘The Managerial Revolution in American Business’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), 
Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance 
(Routledge 2004) 
Clarke A, and Kohler P, Property Law: Commentaries and Materials (CUP 2005) 
Clarke B, ‘Where was the ‘Market for Corporate Control” When We Needed It?’ in William Sun, 
Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 
2011) 
Bibliography 
318 
 
Clarke T, and Chanlat J.F, European Corporate Governance: Readings and Perspectives 
(Routledge 2009) 
Clarke T, Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate 
Governance (Routledge 2004)  
Coffee J.C. Jr, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be 
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated (OUP 2013)  
Coffee J.C. Jr, Gatekeepers: The Professionals and Corporate Governance (OUP 2006)  
Coffee J.C. Jr, ‘What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s’ in 
Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004)  
Cobbaut R, and Lenoble J, Corporate Governance: An Institutionalist Approach (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 
Clerc C, ‘Questioning the Legitimacy of Shareholder Power’ in Jean-Philippe Tuffout et al. (eds), 
Does Company Ownership Matter?  (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009)   
Dallas G, Corporate Governance and Risk: An Analytical Handbook for Investors, Managers, 
Directors and Stakeholder (McGraw-Hill 2004)  
Davis F.G, Managed by the Markets (OUP 2009)  
Davies P and Worthington S, Principles of Company Law (Kindle 2012)  
Darbellay A, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Edward Elgar 2013) 
Deeg R, Finance Capital Unveiled (University of Michigan Press 1999)  
Demb A, and Neubauer F, The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes (OUP 1992) 
Easterbrook F, and Fischel D, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University 
Press 1996)  
Engelen E, et al, After the Great Complacence (OUP 2011)  
Foster J. B, and Magdoff F, The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (Monthly 
Review Press 2009)  
Fleckstein F, Greenspan’s Bubble: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve (McGraw-Hill 
2008) 
Freeman E, Strategic Management: A shareholder Approach (Pitman 1984)  
Galbraith J.K, The New Industrial State (Pelican 1967)  
Geertz C, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology (Basic Books 1983)  
Bibliography 
319 
 
Gevurtz F, ‘The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflection on In Re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation’ in P. M Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), 
Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Edward Edgar Publishing 2012)  
Gladwell M, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Little, Brown & 
Company 2002) 
Glivanos I, Defining the Market-State Relationship: Response to the Financial Crisis and the 
Future of Regulation (Routledge 2013)  
Gordon J.N, ‘What Enron Means for the Management and Control of Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflection’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance 
(Routledge 2008)  
Gourevitch P, and Shin J, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of 
Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press 2007)  
Gyekye K, Traditional and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience (OUP 
1997)  
Hillman A.J, Cannella A. Jr, and Paetzold R.L, ‘The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate 
Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to Environmental Change’ in 
Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Theoretical Foundations of 
Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 
Hill C, and Painter R, Better Bankers, Better Banks (Chicago University Press 2015)  
Honore A.M, ‘Ownership’ in Alf G. Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 
1961)  
Horn L, Regulating Corporate Governance in the EU: Towards a Marketization of Corporate 
Control (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 
Hoecke M. V, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011)  
Hsu J.C, and Moroz M, ‘Shadow Banks and the Financial Crisis of 2007’ in George N. Gregoriou, 
(ed), The Banking Crisis Handbook (2009) 
Hutchinson T, Reading and Writing in Law (3rd edn. Reuters Thomas 2010)  
Jensen M.C, and Fama E, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories 
of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge 
2004)  
Bibliography 
320 
 
Johnson S, and Kwak J, 13 Bankers: Wall Street Takeover, the Next Financial Meltdown (Pantheon 
2010)  
Kagan R, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Harvard University Press 2001)  
Kay J, ‘The Shareholder Corporation’ in Gavin Kelly (ed), Stakeholder Capitalism (Macmillan 
1997) 
Kendal N, and Kendal, A. Real World Corporate Governance: A Programme for Profit-Enhancing 
Stewardship (Pitman Publishing 1998)  
Kindleberger C, and Aliber R, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crisis (5th edn. 
Palgrave Macmillan 2005)  
Kothari U, and Minoque M, Theories of Development: Critical Perspectives (Palgrave 2002)  
LaBrosse R.J, ‘International Experience and Policy Issues in the Growing use of Bridge Banks’ in 
LaBrosse et al. (eds), Financial Crisis Management and Bank Resolution (Routledge 2009)  
Lonick W, and O’Sullivan M, ‘Maximising Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate 
Governance’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 
Mackendrick E, Contract Law, Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn. OUP 2014)  
Amlin C, Corporate Governance (OUP 2010)  
Mayer C, Firm Commitment (OUP 2013)  
Mayes D, and Wood G, Reforming the Governance of the Financial Sector (Routledge 2012)  
McKinley V, Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts (The Independent Institute 2012)  
McQueen R. A, Social History of Modern Company Law: Great Britain and the Australian 
Colonies 1854-1920 (Ashgate 2009)  
McConvile M, and Wing H.C, Writing Research Methods for Law (Edinburg University Press 
2007)  
Minsky P. H, Stabilizing the Unstable Economy (McGraw Hill 2000)  
Monks R.A.G, and Mino N, Corporate Governance (4th edn, Willey & Sons 2007) 
Mosley F, ‘The Focus of Regulatory Reforms in Europe after the Global Financial Crisis: From 
Corporate to Contract Governance’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard, (eds), 
Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (CUP 2011) 
Nordberg D, Corporate Governance: Principles and Issues (Sage Publications 2009)  
Olson M. Jr, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press 1965)  
Bibliography 
321 
 
Parson T, The System of Modern Societies (Prentice Hall 1971)  
Patterson D, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2nd edn. OUP 2011)  
Pennington R, Company Law (6th edn. Butterworth’s 1990)  
Perez R, Finance, ‘Governance and Management: Lessons to be Learnt from the Current Crisis’ in 
William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global 
Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (CUP 2011)  
Pound R, Social Control through Law (Transaction Publishers 1942)  
Porter R, ‘Theories, Strategies and Ideologies of Development’ in Vandana Dissoi and Robert 
Porter (eds), The Companion of Development Studies (2nd edn, Holder Education 2008) 67 
Rezone Z, Corporate Governance Post Sarbanes-Oxley (John Willey & Sons 2007)  
Regling K. and Watson Max, A Preliminary Report on the Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis 
(Government Publications Office 2010) 
Rhodes M. and Apeldoorn V. B, ‘Capital Unbound?’ The Transformation of European Corporate 
Governance’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004)  
Rather L. I, Evaluating the Basis of Corporate Governance in the Post, Post-Enron Era in P.M. 
Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), Corporate Governance After the Financial Crisis (Edward 
Edgar Publishing 2012)  
Zaidi N, ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic Finance Industry and Mitigation of Risk Post the Global 
Financial Crisis’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and 
the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2011)  
Regling K, and Watson M, A Preliminary Report on the Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis 
(Government Publications Office 2010) 
Rostov, E.V, “To Whom and For What End is Corporate Management Responsible?” in Edward 
S. Mason (ed.) Corporation in Modern Society (Athenaeum 1973) 
Shiller R.J, International Exuberance (2nd edn. Random House 2000)  
Shin J, The Great Recession’s Impact on Global Corporate Governance’ in William Sun, Jim 
Stewart and David Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: 
International Perspectives (CUP 2011)  
Shinn J, and Gourevitch P, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Politics of Corporate 
Governance (University of Princeton Press 2005)  
Bibliography 
322 
 
Schwarz S.L, ‘Information Asymmetry and Information Failure: Disclosure Problems in Complex 
Markets’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds), Corporate Governance and the 
Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2011)  
Smits J.M, ‘What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal Dogmatic Research’ in 
Rob Van Gestel, Hans W. Micklitz and Edward L. Rubin (eds), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A 
Transatlantic Dialogue (CUP 2017) 207 
Smits J.M, Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007)  
Soederberg S, The Politics of the New Financial Architecture (ZED Books 2004)  
Stout L, The Shareholder Value Myth (Berget-Koehler Publishers 2012)  
Sun W, Stewart J, and Pollard D, (eds), Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis (CUP 
2011)  
Talib, N. N. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Random House 2007) 
Talbot L, Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge 2014)  
Tomasic R, ‘The Failure of Corporate Governance and the Limits of Law: British Banks and the 
Financial Crisis’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard(eds), Corporate Governance and 
the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2011)  
Touffout J.P, (ed), Does Company Ownership Matter? (Edward Elgar 2009)  
Tricker B, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (2nd edn. OUP 2012)  
Vasudev P.M and Watson S, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar 
2012)  
Waldron J, The Right of Private Property (OUP 1988)  
Walter M, Social Research Methods (2nd edn. OUP 2010)  
Walker G, ‘Bank Crisis Resolution: The Banking Act 2009’ in John Raymond et al (eds), Financial 
Crisis Management and Bank Resolution (Routledge 2009)  
Wood G, ‘Towards a Coherent Crisis Resolution Mandate’ in John Raymond et al, (eds), Financial 
Crisis Management and Bank Resolution (Informal Law 2009)  
Webley L, ‘Qualitative Approach to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M. 
Kritze, (eds), The Oxford Book of Empirical Research (OUP 2012)  
Wheeler S and Thomas P.A, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in David J. Hayton (ed), Law’s Future (Hart 
Publishing 2002)  
Bibliography 
323 
 
Young S and Thyil V, ‘A Holistic Approach to Corporate Governance: Lessons from the Financial 
Crisis and the Way Forward’ in Thomas Clarke (ed), Corporate Governance and the Global 
Financial Crisis (CUP 2011)  
Journal Articles 
J. E. Abugu, ‘Primacy of Shareholder Interest and the Relevance of Stakeholder Economic 
Theories’ (2013) 12 (7) Company Law 202 
R. B. Adam, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 12 (1) International Review of Finance 
7 
V. Apeldoorn and L. Horn, ‘The Marketization of Corporate Control: A Critical Political Economy 
Perspective’ (2007) 12 (2) New Political Economy 211 
A. Arora, ‘The Corporate Governance Failings in Financial Institutions and Directors’ Legal 
Liability’ (2011)32(1) The Company Lawyer 3   
A.A. Lachlan and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation’ (1972) 
62 American Economic Review 777 
K.A. Alice, ‘Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure’ (2009) 33 (4) Seattle U.L 
Rev. 792 
E. Avgouleas, ‘Banking Supervision and the Special Resolution Regime of the Banking Act 2009: 
The Unfinished Reform’ (2011) 4 (2) C.M.L.Y 201 
D. Bayazitova and A. Shivdasai, ‘Assessing TARP’ (2012) 25 (2) Review of Financial Studies 377 
G. Baber, ‘A Critical Examination of the Legislative Response in the Banking and Financial 
Regulation to Issues Related to Misconduct in the Context of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009’ 
(2013) 20 (2) Journal of Financial Crime 237 
E. Baker, ‘Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech’ (1977-1978) 25 UCLA.L. Rev 914 
G.P. Barker, M.C. Jensen and K.J. Murphy, “Compensation and Incentives” (1988) 43 (3) Journal 
of Finance 593 
J.B. Baskin, ‘The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States 
1600-1914: Overcoming the Asymmetric Information’ (1988) 62 Business Law Review 199 
M. Barr, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Path to Reform’ (2012) 26 Yale Journal on Regulation 92 
A.A. Berle Jr, ‘Protection of Non-Voting Stock’ (1924) 4 Harvard Business Law Journal 264 
F. Black and M. Sholes, ‘The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities’ (1973) 8 Journal of 
Political Economy 637 
Bibliography 
324 
 
F. Black, ‘The US as ‘Reluctant Shareholder’ Government, Business and Law’ (2010) 5 (2) 
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 561 
J. Benford et al. ’Quantitative Easing’ (2009) 49 (2) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 91 
G.J. Benston, ‘Public (US) Compared to Private (UK) Regulation of Corporate Financial 
Reporting’ (1976) 5 The Accounting Review 483 
J. Biffal, ‘The Subprime, the Credit Crunch and Bank Failure’ (2009) 17 (4) Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance 927 
J.D. Bruyne, ‘Liability of Credit Rating Agencies: Regulatory Changes and Tendencies in Case 
Law following the Financial Crisis’ (2015) 27 (3) International Company & Commercial Law 87 
M. Blair, ‘Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of Income’ (2010) 30 
Review of Banking and Financial Law 225 
P. Burnham, ‘Class, Capital and Crisis: A Return to Fundamentals’ (2010) 8 (1) Political Studies 
Review 231 
Lee Buchheit, ‘We Made it Too Complicated’ (2008) International Financial Law Review 24 
S. Bewick, ‘The Special Resolution Regime: What Happens in Practice?’ (2011) 4 (3) C.R.I 139 
S. Bhagat and R. Romano, ‘The Promise and Peril of Corporate Indices’ (2008) 108 Columbia Law 
Review 201 
S. Bhagat and R. Romano, ‘Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to 
Long-Term’ (2009) 26 Yale Journal of Regulation 359 
S. Bhagat and B. Black, ‘The Uncertain Relationship between Board Compensation and Firm 
Performance’ (1999) 54 (3) The Business Lawyer 921 
W.W. Bratton, ‘Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn’ (2001) 26 (3) Journal of 
Corporation Law 738 
W. W. Bratton, ‘Shareholder Primacy’s Origin: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation’ (2008) 
22 Journal of Corporation Law 11 
M. Brunnermeier, ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008’ (2010) 23 J.E.P 77 
C.M. Bruner, ‘Corporate Governance in a Time of Crisis’ (2011) 36 Journal of Corporation Law 
309 
R.S. Carnell, ‘A Partial Antidote to Preserve Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act’ (1993) 
Annual Review of Banking Law 317 
C. Coors, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Too Big to Fail?’ (2012) 27 (1) Journal of Regulation 27 
Bibliography 
325 
 
C. W. Calamari and U. Khan, ‘An Assessment of TARP Assistant to Financial Institutions’ (2013) 
29 (2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 53 
B.R. Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Market Meltdown?’ (2009) 65 
(1) The Business Lawyer 17 
Q. Cheng and T. Warfield, ‘Equity Incentives and Earnings Management’ (2005) 80 (2) The 
Accounting Review 44 
J. Chuan et al. ‘Fixed Deposit Insurance and Risk- Shifting Behaviour of Banks’ (1992) 16 (4) 
J.B.F. 715 
T. Ciro and M. Longo, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Implications for Future Regulation 
Part 1’ (2009) 24 (12) Journal of International Banking Law & Regulation 599 
J.C Coffee Jnr, ‘A theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S.A and Europe Differ’ (2005) 21 (2) 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22 
M. Cross et al. ‘The Banks Balance Sheet During Crisis’ (2010) 50 (1) Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin 34 
J. Crotty, ‘Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the New 
Financial Architecture (2009) 33 (2) Cambridge Journal of Economics 563 
J. Coiter, A. R. Palmiter and R.S. Thomas, ‘The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An 
Empirical Analysis’ (2013) 8 (3) George Washington Law Review 969 
R. Cotterell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociological Studies’ (2002) 
29 (4) Journal of Law and Society 633 
T. Conley and Bill Dupor, ‘The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: Solely Government 
Jobs Programme?’ (2013) 60 (5) Journal of Monetary Economics 535 
L.L. Dallas, ‘Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance’ (2011) 37 (2) 
Journal of Corporation Law 267 
G. Davis and M. Dobbler, ‘Bank Resolution and Safeguarding the Creditors Left Behind’ (2011) 
3 Bank of England Quarterly Report 52 
S.M. Davidoff and David Zaring, ‘Regulation by Deal: The Government Response to the Financial 
Crisis’ (2009) 61 (2) Administrative Law Review 463 
R. Debadji, ‘Dodd-Frank: Towards First Principle’ (2011) 15 (1) Chapman Law Review 79 
F.J. Degree and C.A. William, ‘The Intellectual Foundation of the Global Financial Crisis:  
Analysis and Proposals for Reform’ (2009) 32 (2) U.N.S.W Law Journal 390 
Bibliography 
326 
 
K.A. Demerged and E. Deracinate, ‘Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? 
An Empirical Investigation’ (2002) 47 (7) Journal of Monetary Economics 1373 
C. Deutschmann, ‘Limits of Financialization:  Sociological Analyses of the Financial Crisis’ (2011) 
52 (3) European Journal of Sociology 347 
M.E. Dodd, ‘The Modern Corporation, Private Property and Recent Federal Legislation’ (1941) 54 
Harvard Law Review 927 
M.E. Dodd, ‘For whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 (7) Harvard Law Review 
1148 
D.W. Diamond and R.G. Rajan, ‘Credit Crisis: Conjectures about the Causes and Remedies’ (2009) 
99 (2) American Economic Review 606  
M.E. Drew, ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis’ (2010) 
19 (1) Griffith Law Review 1 
K. Eggert, ‘The Great Collapse: How Securitisation Caused the Subprime Meltdown’ (2009) 41(4) 
Connecticut Law Review 1257 
D.H. Erkens, M. Hung and P. Matos `Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: 
Evidence for Financial Institutions World-Wide’ (2012) 18 Journal of Corporate Finance 389 
M. Erickson et al. ‘How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings that Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes 
Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings’ (2004) 79 (2) The Accounting Review 387 
E. Fama, ‘Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 
288 
L.M. Fairfax, ‘The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis’ (2009) 6 (5) BYU Law Review 1571 
N. Fligstein and R. Freeland, ‘Theoretical Comparative Perspectives on Corporate Organisation’ 
(1995) 21 Annual Review of Sociology 21 
F. Ferdi and D. Maber, ‘Say-on-Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence form the UK’ (2013) 
17 (2) Review of Finance 527 
J.E. Fish, ‘Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’ (2006) 31 
Journal of Corporation Law 637 
P. Fisher, ‘An Unconventional Journey: The Bank of England’s Asset Purchase’ (2014) 43 (8) 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulleting 192 
M. Fox and D. Lane, ‘Lessons from the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis’ (2008) 23 (9) Journal of 
International Banking and Regulation 449 
Bibliography 
327 
 
J. Fried and N. Shilon, ‘Excess Pay Claw back’ (2011) 36 (4) Journal of Corporation Law 721 
J. Fried, ‘Hands Off Options’ (2008) 61 Viand. L. Rev 453 
A. Gamble and G. Kelly, ‘Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK’ (2001) 9 (2) 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 110 
G.H. Garcia, ‘Failing Prompt Corrective Action’ (2010) 11 (3) Journal of Banking Law 17 
A. Georgical, ‘The Revision of the FSA’s Approach to Regulation: An Incomplete Agenda?’ 
(2010) 7 Journal of Business Law 599 
S. Ghosh and S. Mohamed, ‘The Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) and Its Limitations: 
An Analysis’ (2010) 52 (6) International Journal of Law and Management 124 
J. Goddard, et al. ‘The Crisis in the UK Banking Sector’ (2009) 29 (5) Public Money and 
Management 277 
J. N. Gordon, ‘Say-on-Pay: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Shareholder 
Option’ (2009) 46 Harvard Journal of Legislation 323 
 R. Grantham, ‘The Doctrinal Bases of the Rights of Company Shareholders’ (1998) 57 (3) 
Cambridge Law Journal 569 
R. Gropp and J. Vesala, ‘Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring’ (2009) 8 (4) 
Review of Finance 571 
H. Hakenes and I. Schnabel, ‘Banks without Parachutes: Competitive Effects of Government Bail-
Out Policies’ (2010) 30 (6) Journal of Financial Stability 156 
J.B. Hall, ‘The Subprime Crisis, the Credit Crunch, and Bank “Failure”: An Assessment of the UK 
Authorities’ Response’ (2009) 17 (4) Journal of Financial Regulation & Compliance 427 
J.B. Hall, The Six Challenges of Equity-Based Pay Design’ (2003) 15 (3) Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 59 
R. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown 
Law Review 439 
 I. Hardje and D. Howard, ‘Die Krise but Not La Crise: The Financial Crisis and the Transformation 
of German and French Banking Systems’ (2009) 47 (5) Journal of Common Market Studies 1017                     
M.B. Hemraj, ‘The Role of Public Policy in Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the US and EU: 
Potential Drawbacks’ (2015) 36 (9) The Company Lawyer 288 
M. Hristova, ‘Dodd-Frank’s Corporate Governance Reform’ (2010-2011) 30 (2) Review of 
Banking and Financial Law 516 
Bibliography 
328 
 
P. Hillyard, ‘Law’s Empire: Socio-Legal Empirical Research in the Twenty-first Century’ (2007) 
34 (2) Journal of Law and Society 266 
C. Huong, ‘The Right to Health in an African Context: The Role of Ubuntu in the Realisation of 
the Right to Health with Special Reference to South Africa’ (2013) 57 (2) Journal of African Law 
165 
N.C. Howson, ‘When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” Financial Firms’ (2009) 10 (8) 
Michigan Law Review 44 
T. Hoshi and A.K. Kashyap, ‘Will US Bank Recapitalisation Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan’ 
(2009) 97 (3) Journal of Financial Economics 398 
N.G. Houston, ‘When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” Financial Firms: The Limits 
of Private Law’ (2009) 108 Michigan Law Review 44 
R. Huang and L. Ratnovski, ‘The Dark Side of Bank Whole Sale Funding’ (2011) 20 (2) Journal 
of Financial Intermediation 248 
D. Hudson and D. Abet, ‘UK Economic Policy and the Global Financial Crisis: A Paradigm Lost’ 
(2009) 47 (5) Journal of Common Market Studies 281 
D. Hudson and L. Quaglia, ‘European Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis: An Introduction’ 
(2009) 47 (5) Journal of Common Market Studies 940 
E. Hupke, ‘Resolving Crisis in Global Financial Institutions: The Functional Approach Revisited’ 
(2009) 17 (3) Journal of Financial Regulation & Compliance 277 
T. Hutchinson and N. Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ 
(2012) 17 (1) Deakin Law Review 86 
P. Ireland, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth’ (2005) 68 (1) The Modern Law 
Review 48 
P. Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) The Modern Law 
Review 32 
M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost 
and Capital Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 
K.N. Johnson, ‘Addressing Gaps in Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight 
Obligations’ (2011) 30 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 56 
N. Johnson, ‘Does the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Meet Local Need?’ (2009) 41 
(2) State & Local Government Review 125 
Bibliography 
329 
 
A. Johnston, ‘After the OFR: Can Shareholder Value Still Be Enlightened?’ (2006) 7 (4) 
E.B.O.R.843 
M. Joyce et al. ‘The UK’s Quantitative Easing Policy: Design, Operation and Impact’ (2011) Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin 200 
C. Jungian, ‘The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board 
Systems: Evidence from the UK and Germany’ (2006) 3 (4) ECFR 426 
E. Kane and D. Klingebiel, ‘Alternatives to Blanket Guarantees for Containing Systemic Crisis’ 
(2004) 1 (1) Journal of Financial Stability 31 
A. Keay, ‘Comply-or-Explain in Corporate Governance Codes: In Need of Greater Regulatory 
Oversight’ (2014) 32 (4) Legal Studies 279 
A. Keay, ‘Risk, Shareholder Pressure and Short-termism in Financial Institutions: Does 
Enlightened Shareholder Value Offer a Panacea?’ (2011) 5 Law & Financial Markets Review 791 
A. Keay, ‘Getting to Grips with the Shareholder Value Theory in Corporate Law’ (2010) 39 Comm. 
L World Review 256 
A. Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 577 
T.A. Kuchen and S.A. Rubinstein, ‘Towards a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn 
Partnership’ (2000) 11 (4) Organisation Science 367 
A. Kokkinis, ‘Rethinking Banking Prudential Regulation: Why Corporate Governance Rules 
Matter’ (2012) 7 Journal of Business Law 611 
W. Kickers, ‘State Responses to Fiscal Crisis in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands’ (2012) 14 
(3) Public Management Review 299 
A. Klein, ‘Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure’ (1998) 41 Journal of Law & 
Economics 275 
R.M. Lastra and G Wood, ‘Response to the Financial Crisis’ (2011) 27 (7) Journal of International 
Banking Law & Regulation 307 
S. Letta et al. ‘Corporate Governance Theorising: Limits, Critics and Alternatives’ (2008) 17 (2) 
International Journal of Law & Management 23 
L. Laeven and F. Valencia, ‘The Use of Bank Guarantees in Banking Crisis’ (2012) 31 Journal of 
International Money & Finance 221 
Bibliography 
330 
 
R. Levine, ‘The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Financial 
Crisis’ (2012) 12 (1) International Review of Finance 40 
D. T. Llewellyn, ‘The Northern Rock Crisis: A Multi-Dimensional Problem Waiting to Happen’ 
(2007) 16 Journal of Financial Regulation & Compliance 35 
M. Lodge and K. Wegrich, ‘Arguing about Financial Regulation: Comparing National Discourses 
on the Global Financial Crisis’ (2011) 44 (4) Political Science & Politics 721 
L.M. LoPucki, ‘The Myth of Residual Owner: An Empirical Study’ (2004) Washington University 
of Law Quarterly 1134 
E.A. Ludwig, ‘Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation: Strengths, Challenges and 
Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System’ (2012) 29 (1) Yale Journal of Regulation 181  
D.W. Lutz, ‘African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management’ (2009) 84 Journal of Global 
Ethics 313 
J.C.C. Macintosh, ‘The Issues, Effects and Consequences of the Berle-Dodd Debate, 1933-1932’ 
(1999) 24 Accounting, Organisation & Society 139 
 J. Mukwiri and M. Siems, ‘The Financial Crisis: A Reason to Improve Shareholder Protection in 
the EU’ (2014) 41 (1) Journal of Law & Society 56 
I. MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 11 (4) E.B.O.R 483 
J. Mark, P.J. Jackson and C.Gonzalez, ‘The Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act of 2008: An 
Overview’ (2008) 4 Pratt’s Journal of Bankruptcy Law 675 
D.G. Mayes, ‘Did the Recent Experience of a Financial Crisis help in Coping with the current 
Financial Turmoil? The Case of the Nordic Countries’ (2009) 47 (5) Journal of Common Market 
Studies 997 
H.G Manne, ‘Mergers and Markets for Corporate Control’ (1988) 73 Journal of Political Economy 
110 
R. Martins, ‘Fixing the Game: Bubbles, Crashes and what Capitalism Can Learn NFL’ (2011) 
Harvard Business Review 12 
R. Maser, ‘Reforming Financial Systems after the Crisis: A Comparison of the EU and the US’ 
(2010) 63 (2) P.S.L. Quarterly Review 298 
H. McVea, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, the Subprime Mortgage Debacle and the Global Governance: 
The EU Strikes Back’ (2010) 59 (3) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 701 
Bibliography 
331 
 
R. McCormick, ‘Towards a More Sustainable Financial System: The Regulation, the Banks and 
Civil Society’ (2011) Law & Financial Review 45 
D. Milton, ‘Shareholder Primacy in Classrooms after the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 8 (1) J.BUS & 
Tech. Law 17 
V. McKinley, ‘Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts’ (2012) The Independent Institute 
R. Merton, ‘An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees’ (1977) 
1 Journal of Banking & Finance 
D. Mohan, ‘Financial Crisis in Historical Perspectives: Comparing the US and the UK Monetary 
Policy Responses to the Crisis of 1929 and 2008’ (2014) 8 (1) World Review of Business Research 
196 
M. T. Moore, ‘The End of “Comply-or-Explain” in the UK Corporate Governance’ (2013) 60 (1) 
N.I.L.Q 86 
M. T. Moore, ‘Why UK Company Law Must Face Up to the Political Realities of Economic World’ 
(2011) International Company & Commercial Law Review 34 
M.T. Moore, ‘The Evolving Contours of Risk Management Function in UK Corporate 
Governance’ (2010) 10 J. Corp. L. Studies 279 
M.T. Moore, ‘Averting the Over-prescription of UK Corporate Governance Norms’ (2008) 2 (1) 
Journal of Securities Law, Regulation & Compliance 23 
R. Moulton and N. Higgs, ‘Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions’ (2013) 109 Compliance 
Officer Bulleting 9 
M.H. Nemeroff, ‘Dodd-Frank: Frankly an Inefficient form of Corporate Governance’ (2012) 23 U.  
Fla. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 431 
K. P. V. O’Sullivan and T. Kennedy, ‘What Caused the Irish Banking Crisis?’ (2010) 18 (3) Journal 
of Financial Regulation & Compliance 224  
J.A. Parker, N.S. Souleles, D.S. Johnson and Robert McClelland, ‘Consumer Spending and the 
Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008’ (2013) 103 (6) American Economic Review 2530  
D. Parker, ‘The Privatisation of Public Enterprises in the UK’ (2010) 11 C.R.N.I 121 
C.K. Prahalad, ‘Corporate Governance or Corporate Value Added? Rethinking the Primacy of 
Shareholder Value’ (1994) 6 (4) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 404 
R. Pennington, ‘Can Shares in Companies be Defined?’ (1989) 10 (7) Company Lawyer 144 
Bibliography 
332 
 
R. Posner, ‘Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline’ (1998) 38 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 333 
W. Poole, ‘Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008’ (2009) 33 (2) Harvard 
Journal of Law & Policy 421 
P. Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns: Path Dependency and the Study of Politics’ (2009) 94 (2) The 
American Political Science Review 245 
P. Praet and G. Nguyen, ‘Overview of Recent Policy Initiatives in Response to the Crisis’ (2008)4 
(4) Journal of Financial Stability 368 
M. J. Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the United States’ 
(1993) 102 (8) The Yale Law Journal 1929 
T. Rötheli, ‘Causes of the Financial Crisis: Risk Misconception, Policy Mistakes and Banks 
Bounded Rationality’ (2010) 39 Journal of Socio-Economics 119 
G.J. Rossouw, ‘Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Africa’ (2006) 91 Journal of 
Business & Society 916 
L. Rutkov, ‘Should Corporations Serve Shareholders or Society? The Origins of the Debate’ (2007) 
29 Cardoso Law Review 660 
J.A. Sohaila et al., ‘Market Responses to Policy Initiatives during the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2012) 87 Journal of International Economics 162 
J.W. Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance and the New Century’ (2004) 25 (3) Company Lawyer 69 
M. Sawyer, ‘The Tragedy of UK Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 36 
(1) Cambridge Journal of Economics 205 
D. Seidi, P. Sanderson and J. Roberts ‘Applying the “Comply-or-Explain” Principle: Discursive 
Legitimacy Tactics with Regard to Codes of Corporate Governance’ (2013) 17 (3) Journal of 
Management & Governance 791 
V. Schmidt, ‘Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change Through Discursive 
Institutionalism as the Fourth New Institutionalism’ (2010) 10 (1) European Political Science 
Review 1 
A. Schleifer and R. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance.’ (1997) 52 (2) Journal of Finance 
737 
S. Schwarcz, ‘The Private Ordering of Public Market: The Rating Agency Paradox’ (2002) 1 
University of Illinois Law Review 1 
Bibliography 
333 
 
L. Seabrooke and E. Tsingou, ‘Responding to the Global Financial Crisis: The Politics of Financial 
Reform’ (2010) 12 (2) British Journal of Politics & International Relations 313 
C. Sheerwood, ‘Schemes Struggle as Bond Yield Falls’ (2013) 311 Occupational Pension 8 
H. Short, ‘Corporate Governance, Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel: A Review’ (1999) 7 (1) 
Journal Financial Regulation & Compliance 246 
M. M. Siems and D. M. Sithig, ‘Mapping Legal Research’ (2012) 71 (3) Cambridge Law Journal 
651 
D. Singh, ‘The UK Banking Act 2009, Pre-Insolvency and Early Intervention: Policy and Practice’ 
(2011) 1 Journal of Business Law 22 
J. Stiglitz, ‘Moving Beyond Market Fundamentalism to a More Balanced Economy’ (2009) 80 (3) 
Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics 345 
J. Stiglitz, ‘Capital Markets, Liberalisation, Globalisation and the IMF’ (2004) 20 (1) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 57 
L. A. Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 Southern 
California Law Review 1189 
G. Swanson, ‘Jhering’s Influence on the Development of Comparative Legal Method’ (1971) 19 
(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 215 
R. Tomasic and F. Akinbami, ‘Towards A New Corporate Governance after the Global Financial 
Crisis’ (2011) 22 (8) International Company & Commercial Law 237 
R. Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk-Taking in Northern Rock Part 1 (2008) 29 
(10) Company Lawyer 297 
R. Torres, ‘Incomplete Crisis Responses: Socio-economic Costs and Policy Implications’ (2010) 
149 (2) International Labour Review 227 
V. V. Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi To Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ 
(2004) 4 (2) Global Jurist Frontiers 11 
J. Velasco, ‘Shareholder Ownership and Primacy’ (2010) University of Illinois Law Review 897 
R.D. Vogli, ‘The Financial Crisis, Health and Health Inequities in Europe: The Need for 
Regulations, Redistribution and Social Protection’ (2014) 55 (13) International Journal for Equity 
in Health 1 
C. Vitello, ‘The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 and What It Means for Joe and Jane Consumer’ 
(2010-2011) 23 (1) Loyola Consumer Law Review 102 
Bibliography 
334 
 
G. Walker, ‘Financial Crisis: UK Policy and Regulatory Response’ (2010) 44 (1) International 
Banking Law 732 
G. Walker, ‘Credit Crisis, Bretton Woods 11 and a New Global Response’ (2009) 2 Journal of 
International Banking & Financial Law 7 
G. Walker, ‘Credit Crisis: Regulatory and Financial Systems Reforms’ (2007) Journal of 
International Banking & Financial Law 567 
R.L. Watts and J.L. Zimmermann, ‘The Demands for and Supply of Accounting Theories: The 
Market for Excuses’ (1979) The Accounting Review 135 
N.E. Watson, ‘Government Ethics, and Bailouts: Past, Present and Future’ (2011) 95 Minn. L. Rev. 
1525 
P. White and T. Yorulmazer, ‘Bank Resolution Concepts, Trade-Offs, and Changes in Practice’ 
(2014) BRBNY Economic Policy Review 231 
R. Weidenhammer, ‘The Accountant and Securities Act 1933’ (2000) 8 Accounting Law Review 
272 
A.E. Wilmarth, ‘The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the “Too Big to Fail” 
Problem’ (2011) 89 Oregon Law Review 951 
A.E. Wilmarth, ‘The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Sub-Prime 
Financial Crisis’ (2009) 41(4) Connecticut Law Review 1042 
P. Yeoh, ‘US and UK Legal Responses to the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 30 (4) Business Law 
Review 86 
Y. Alt-Sahalia, J. Adritzky, A. Jobst, S. Nowak and N. Tamirisa, ‘Market Response to Policy 
Initiatives during the Global Financial Crisis’ (2012) 87 Journal of International Economics 162 
D. Zandstra and T. Bennett, ‘Stabilisation Take Two: The UK Bail-In Provisions’ (2014) 47 CRI 
137 
J. Zhao, ‘Prompting More Socially Responsible Corporations through UK Company Law After the 
2008 Financial Crisis: The Turning Point of the Crisis Compass’ (2011) 22 (9) International 
Company & Commercial Law Review 275 
Reports 
Bank for International Settlements, 80th BIS Annual Report 2009/10 (28 June 2010)  
<www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2010e.html > accessed 20 July 2015  
Bibliography 
335 
 
Cadbury Committee, Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (December 1992) 
<www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf > accessed 16 September 2015  
Commission of European Communities, Economic Forecast for Spring 2009 (March 2009) 
<www.ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication15048_en.pdf>accessed 20 
October 2015 
Central Bank of Ireland, Financial Stability Report (January 2009)  
<www.bankofireland.com/fs/doc/publications/investor-relations/annual-report-2009.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2016 
Congressional Oversight Panel, Foreclosure Crisis: Working Towards a Solution (6 March 2009) 
 <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg47888/pdf/CHRG-111shrg47888.pdf> accessed 29 
September 2015 
Council of Australian Law Deans, CALD Standards for Australian Law Schools (17 November 
2009)<www.cald.asn.au/docs/CALD%20-%20standards%20project%20-%20final%20-
%20adopted%2017%20November%202009.pdf > accessed 20 August 2015 
European Commission, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration  
Policies (Commission Green Paper 2010/284, 2 June 2010) 
< www.ecgi.org/commission/documents/green_paper_com2010_284_en.pdf> 20 September 2016  
European Commission, Bank Resolution Funds. Final Communication 2010/254 (26 May 2010)  
<www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/crisis-management/funds/com2010_254_en.pdf> 
accessed 30 July 2015  
Hampel Committee, Final Report on Corporate Governance (January 1998)  
< www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf > accessed 16 September 2015 
HM Treasury, Bank of England & Financial Services Authority, Financial Stability and Depositor 
Protection: Further Consultation (Financial Stability Report Presented to Parliament in July 2008) 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243379/7436.pdf> 
accessed 20 June 2015  
Financial Services Authority, Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial 
Industry Entities: Final Recommendations (26 November 2009) 
Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking 
Crisis (March 2009) <www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf > accessed 20 Sept.2016 
Bibliography 
336 
 
Financial Stability Forum, Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience: Update on 
Implementation (Basel, 2 April 2008) 
< www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0904d.pdf?page_moved=1 > accessed 20 September 2016 
Financial Reporting Council, What Constitutes an Explanation under Comply-or-Explain? 
(February 2012)<www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a39aa822-ae3c-4ddf-b869-db8f2ffe1b61/what-
constitutes-an-explanation-under-comply-or-explain.pdf> accessed 20 June 2015   
Financial Reporting Council, Response to the European Commission Green Paper on EU 
Corporate Governance Framework (2011)   
<www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-
framework/public-authorities/frc_en.pdf> accessed 28 July 2015  
Financial Reporting Council, Corporate Governance Codes in the UK (September 2012)  
<www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e322c20a-1181-4ac8-a3d3-1fcfbcea7914/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-(September-2012).pdf > accessed 20 June 2015 
Financial Reporting Council, The UK Approach to Corporate Governance Final (November 2006)  
 Greenbury Report, A Report on Directors’ Remuneration (July1995)  
<www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf > accessed 16 September 2015 
Grant Kirkpatrick, ‘Corporate Governance: Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ Report Compiled 
for the OECD (Paris, 2009) <www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42229620.pdf > accessed 7  
March 2014 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance and 
Pay in the City (Ninth Report of Session 2008-09)  
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/519/519.pdf >accessed 28 
June 2015 
Treasury Department, Special Resolution Regime: Safeguards for Partial Property Transfers  
 (November 2008)  
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238682/7497.pdf> 
accessed 30 July 2015  
House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock (Fifth Report of Session 2007-
2008) < www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56ii.pdf> accessed 
13 September March 2015 
Bibliography 
337 
 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of UK Banks 
(Seventh Special Report of Sessions 2008-09)  
< www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/416/416.pdf > 20 June 2015 
House of Lords, Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee Report (First Report on 
Banking Bill, No 2 H.L, 18 December 2008) 
IOSCO, Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies (25 September 
2003) <www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf > accessed 28 June 2015  
IBM, Notice of Annual General Meeting and Proxy Statement (2010) schedule 14A at 36 
IMF Report, Germany 2008: 2008 Article 1V Consultation (2008) Country Report No 09/1 
3M, Notice of Annual General Meeting and Proxy Statement (2010) schedule 14 A at 52 
OECD Report, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages 
(29 June 2009) 
<www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf>accessed 17 February 
2014 
OECD Interim Report, Economic Outlook: The Effectiveness and Scope of Fiscal Stimulus (24 
March 2009) <www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/42421337.pdf > accessed 25 February 2015 
OECD Report, Report on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004)  
<www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf>accessed 20 May 
2015 
Anthony Reyes, The Financial Crisis Five Years Later: Responses, Reform and Progress (13 
September 2013) <www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/FinancialCrisis5Yr_vFINAL.pdf> 
accessed 29 March 2015  
Katie Jones, Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives (14 May 2015) 
<www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40210.pdf > accessed 19 May 2016 
Jonathan Kratz, Emanuel Salinas and Constantinos Stephanous, Credit Rating Agencies: No Easy 
Regulatory Solutions (World Bank Crisis Response Policy Brief No. 8, 6 October 2009) 
<www.ssrn.com/abstract=1485140 > accessed 20 July 2015 
House of Lords, Banking Bill Committee Report (HL,3RD Report of Session 2008-09, 4 November  
2008)<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/19/19.pdf> accessed 20  
August 2016   
 
Bibliography 
338 
 
Newspaper Articles 
Lynn Adler, ‘Foreclosures Soar 81 percent in 2008’ Reuters (London, 15 January 2009) 
Luis Amistrad, ‘Northern Rock Sold to Virgin Money at a Loss’ The Telegraph (London,17 
November 2011) 
Edmund L. Andrews and Peter Baker, ‘AIG Planning Huge Bonuses after $170 Billion Bailouts’ 
The New York Times (New York, 15 March 2009)  
<www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html> accessed 21 May 2015  
Edmund L. Andrews, ‘Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization’ The New York Times (New York, 
15 January 2009) <www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/16banking.html>accessed 20 May 
2015 
Christian Broda and Jonathan A. Parker, ‘The Impact of the 2008 Rebate’ Voxex (London, 15 
August 2008) 
Marion Dakers, ‘Warren Buffett Issues a Fresh Warning About Derivatives “Timebomb” The 
Telegraph (London, 1 May 2016)  
Willem H. Buiter, ‘Bank of England Has Acted Like a “Paper Tiger” on Northern Rock’ Daily 
Telegraph (London, 14 September 2007) 
Charles Casey, ‘Corporate Governance and Reform: The Impact of the Dodd-Franck Act’ 
WHOSWHOLEGAL (London, June 2011)  
Simon Caulkin, ‘Corporate Apocalypse’ Management Today (London, 1 January 2009) 
<www.managementtoday.co.uk/corporate-apocalpse/article/870435 > accessed 20 July 2016  
Sewell Chan, ‘Reform Bill Adds Layers of Oversight’ The New York Times (New York, 6 March 
2010)   
David Cho and Brady Dennis, ‘Bailout King AIG Still Pay Millions in Bonus’ Washington Post  
(Washington, 12 May 2009)  
Edmund Conway, ‘IMF Puts Total Cost of Crisis at £7.1 Trillion’ The Telegraph (London, 8 
August 2009)   
Marion Dakers, ‘Warren Buffett Issues a Fresh Warning About Derivatives’ The Telegraph 
(London, 1 May 2016) 
Deal Book, ‘Bank of America to Repay $45 Billion From TARP’ The New York Times (New York, 
2 December 2009)  
Bibliography 
339 
 
Larry Elliot, ‘Poly Peck: The South Sea Company of the 1980s’ The Guardian (London, 22 August 
2012)<www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/22/polly-peck-asil-nadir-analyisis> accessed 14  
December 2015 
Editorial, ‘Starting the Regulatory Work’ The New York Times (New York, 8 January 2009)  
Mathew Ericson, Ellaine He and Amy Schoenfeld, ‘Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout’ The New 
York Times (New York, 3 February 2009)  
Editorial ‘Starting the Regulatory Work’ The New York Times (New York, 7 January 2009) 
<www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/opinion/08thu1.html > accessed 14 June 2015 
Editorial, ‘Summary of the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act of 2008’ The Washington 
Times (Washington, 28 September 2008) 
Editorial, ‘The End of Wall Street’ BusinessWeek (London, 28 September 2008) 
Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ The New York 
Times (New York, 13 September 1970) 
‘The UK Chancellor’s Statement on Northern Rock’ The Guardian (London,17 February 2008) 
<www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/17/northernrock.banking> accessed 27 September 
2015 
Stephen Fidler, Joana Slater and Matthew Cowley, ‘UK’s Brown Denies G-20 Stimulus Split’ The 
Wall Street Journal (Washington, 26 March 2009) 
 <www.wsj.com/articles/SB123797598592936463> accessed 17 March 2016 
Zachary A. Goldfarb, David Cho and Binyamin Appelbaum ‘The Treasury to Rescue Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac’ Washington Post (Washington, 7 September 2008) 
<www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090602540.html>   
accessed 10 July 2015 
Natalie Glanvill, ‘Northern Rock Bailout to Cost UK Taxpayers Billions’ The Commentator 
(London, 16 November 2012)   
James L. Gattuso, Auto Bailout Leaves a Dangerous Legacy’ The Heritage Foundation 
(Washington, 23 February 2012)  
<www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/commentary/auto-bailout-leaves-dangerous-legacy> 
accessed 23 May 2015  
Andrew Grice, ‘£850 Billion: Official Cost of the Bank Bailout’ The Independent (London, 4 
December 2009)  
Bibliography 
340 
 
Michael Grunwald, ‘How the Stimulus is Changing America’ Time Magazine (Washington, 26 
August 2010)  
Andrew Ward, ‘Frank Moves to Tighten TARP Aid’ Financial Times (London, 9 January 2009)  
Bernard W. Heineman Jr, ‘Making Sense of Clawbacks and Holdbacks’ Bloomberg (London,13 
August 2010) 
<www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-13/making-sense-of-clawbacks-and-holdbacks> 
accessed 10 June 2016  
Bernard W. Heineman Jr, ‘Boards Fail Again’ BusinessWeek (London, 26 September 2008)        
David M. Herszenhorn, ‘About those Charges of Bailout Bias’ The New York Times (New Yok, 7 
November 2008) <www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/news/07iht-07herszenhorn.18454794.html >   
accessed 25 May 2016 
Whitehouse Press, ‘Obama’s Remarks on the G.M Bankruptcy’ The New York Times (New York 
1 June 2009) <www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/us/politics/01obama.text.html >accessed 20 October 
2016 
Phillip Inman, ‘Northern Rock Sale to Virgin Money Leaves Taxpayers with £400 Million Bill’ 
The Guardian (London, 17 November 2011) 
 <www.theguardian.com/business/2011/nov/17/northern-rock-virgin-money-taxpayer > accessed 
30 September 2015 
David Jolly, ‘$ 2.5 Billion is Added to Bailout for Iceland’ The New York Times (New York,   
12 November 2008) <www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/business/worldbusiness/21icebank.html> 
accessed 17 November 2014  
James Kirkup, ‘Banks Bailout: Taxpayers May Take Shares in Barclays and HSBC’ The Telegraph 
(London, 18 January 2010) 
Mark Kleinman, ‘Financial Crisis: UK Government Unveils Bail-out of UK Banks’ The Telegraph 
(London, 8 October 2008)   
Jeffrey S. Klein and Nicholas J. Pappas, ‘New Clawback Requirements for Listed Public 
Companies’ New York Law Journal (New York, 4 October 2010)     
Paul Krugman, ‘The Destructive Centre’ The New York Times (New York, 8 February 2009) 
<www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/opinion/09krugman.html > accessed 17 March 2016  
Bibliography 
341 
 
James Kwak, ‘Why Did the Bank of America Pay Back the Money?’ The Baseline Scenario (New 
York, 4 December 2009) <www.baselinescenario.com/2009/12/04/why-did-bank-of-america-pay-
back-the-money> accessed 29 May 2015 
David Labanyi, ‘Ireland to Receive €85 Billion Bailout at 5.8% Interest Rate’ The Irish Times 
(Dublin, 28 November 2010) <www.irishtimes.com//news/ireland-to-receive-85-billion-rate-
1.868001 > accessed 10 July 2015   
Frank Millar, ‘British Money Set to be Lured by Guarantee of Irish Banks’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 
3 October 2008)<www.irishtimes.com/business/british-money-said-to-be-lured-by-guarantee-of-
irish-banks-1.890854 > accessed 30 June 2015 
Henry Mintzberg, ‘No More Executive Bonus’ Wall Street Journal (Washington, 30 November 
2009)   
Eric Schurenberg, ‘Did TARP Really Pay Off   For Taxpayers?’ CBS News (Washington, 20 
October 2010) <www.cbsnews.com/news/did-tarp-really-pay-off-for-taxpayers> accessed 21 May 
2016  
Deborah Solomon and Jon Hilsenrath, ‘Bank Capital Gets Stress Test’ Wall Street Journal 
(Washington, 26 February 2009) <www.wsj.com/articles/SB123557705225772665> accessed 20 
June 2015 
Stefan Stern, ‘No More Business as Usual’ Financial Times (London, 10 August 2009)  
Ruth Sunderland, ‘King Not Only Culprit in Royal Mess’ The Observer (London, 23 September 
2007) < www.theguardian.com/business/2007/sep/23/8 > accessed 23 August 2015 
James Thomas, ‘Fears Rise of Box-ticking Approach to Governance’ Financial Times ( London,  
2 May 2011)<www.fnlondon.com/articles/fears-rise-of-box-ticking-approach-to-governance-
20110502> accessed 28 October 2015 
Jack Torrance, ‘Theresa May Reveals Radical Plans to Shake-Up Britain’s Boardrooms’ 
Management Today (London, 11 July 2016)  
Graeme Wearden, ‘Turner Review: The Key Recommendations’ The Guardian (London,18 March 
2009) <www.theguardian.com/business/2009/mar/18/banking-regulators >accessed 22 October 
2015 
Working Papers 
Diarmaid Addison-Smyth, Kieran McQuinn and Gerard O’Reilly, ‘Estimating the Structural 
Demand for Irish Housing Market’ (Central Bank of Ireland Technical Paper No. 1/RT/ 08/2008)  
Bibliography 
342 
 
Edward Ashbee, ‘Fiscal Policy Response to the Economic Crisis in the United Kingdom and the 
United States: A Comparative Assessment’ (Working Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Institute of Political Science Association, Seattle WA 1-4 September 211) 
Sridhar Arcot and Valentina Bruno ‘In Letter But Not in Spirit: An Analysis of Corporate  
Governance in the United Kingdom’ (LSE Working Paper No. 031, November 2006) 
<www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/research/RICAFE/pdf/RICAFE2-WP31-Arcot.pdf >accessed 20 June 2015 
Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate Governance Round 11’ (U.C.L.A School of 
Working Paper No. 10-12-2010) 
<www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Bainbridge_PDF.pdf > accessed 10 
June 2015  
Michael Brei and Blaise Gadanecz, ‘Public Recapitalisations and Bank Risk: Evidence from Loan 
Spreads and Leverage’ (BIS Working Paper No. 383, July 2012)<www.bis.org/publ/work383.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2015  
Ray Barrell, Philip E. Davis, Tatiana Fic and Dilruba Karim, ‘Is there a Link from Bank Size to 
Risk Taking?’ (NIESR Working Paper No. 367, 19 July 2011) 
<www.researchgate.net/profile/Tatiana_Fic/publication/229003626_Is_There_a 
_Link_From_Bank_to_Risk_Taking.pdf> accessed 30 July 2015  
Peter Brierley, ‘The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International Context’ 
(Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 5, 14 August 2009)  
Julia Black, ‘Managing the Financial Crisis: The Constitutional Dimension’ (LSE Working Papers 
No.12/2010) 
Michael D. Bordo and Barry J. Eichengreen, ‘Crisis Now and Then: What Lessons from the Last 
Era of Financial Globalization’ (NBER Working Paper No. 8716-1/2002, January 2002) 
<www.nber.org/papers/w8716  > accessed 28 September 2015 
Adrian Cadbury and Irna Millstein, ‘The New Agenda for the International Corporate Governance 
Network’ (ICGN Corporate Governance Conference London, April 2005) 
<www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/Sir%20Adrian%20and%20Ira%20YB2005%20Article.pdf>   
accessed 5 November 2014 
Charles W. Calomiris, ‘How to Fix the Resolution Problem of Large, Complex, Nonbank Financial 
Institutions’ (Commentary E21, 23 March 2010)<www.economics21.org/html/how-fix-resolution-
problem-large-complex-nonbank-financial-institutions-190.html> accessed 30 July 2015   
Bibliography 
343 
 
James L. Gattuso, ‘Auto Bailout Bill: Nationalizing Detroit?’ (Heritage Foundation Working Paper 
No. 2164, December 2008) < www.heritage.org/taxes/report/auto-bailout-bill-nationalizing-detroit 
> accessed 23 May 2015  
Paul Fisher, ‘An Unconventional Journey: The Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Programme ‘(11 
October 2010) <www.bis.org/review/r101020e.pdf >accessed 27 September 2015 
David Furceri and Annabelle Mourougane,’ Financial Crisis: Past Lessons and Policy 
Implications’ (OECD Working Paper Preliminary Version, 23 January 2009) 
<www.oecd.org/eco/monetary/42037145.pdf > accessed 29 August 2015 
European Commission, ‘Corporate Governance in the Financial Institutions and Remuneration 
Policies’ (Green Paper No. COM 2010/284, 2 June 2010) 
<www.ecgi.org/commission/documents/green_paper_com2010_284_en.pdf> accessed 2 February 
2014 
FSA, ‘Disclosure of Contracts for Difference’ (Policy Statement No. 09/3PS09/3, March 2009) 
<www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/disclosure.pdf > accessed 10 February 2014 
Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. Kashyap,’ Will the US Bank Recapitalisation Succeed? Eight Lessons 
from Japan’ (NBER Working Paper No.14401, December 2011) <www.nber.org/papers/w1404> 
accessed 30 August 2016 
Akihiro Kanaya and David Woo, ‘The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and Lessons.’ 
 (IMF Working Paper No. 007/7, July 2000) <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0007.pdf 
> accessed 13 February 2014    
Karel Lannoo, ‘Comparing EU and US Response to the Financial Crisis’ (EGMI Policy Brief No. 
14/January 2010) <www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111350/014.pdf > accessed 23 November 2015 
Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘Systemic Banking Crisis:  A New Database’ (IMF Working 
Paper No. 08/224, 28 August 2008) <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08224.pdf>    
accessed 27August 2015 
John Mellor, ‘The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance and Its Application to Smaller 
Quoted Companies’ (20 November 2007) <www.foundationgre.com/IFA%20paper.pdf>accessed 
20 July 2016  
Peter O. Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis: Theory, Evidence, 
Reform’ (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 130/2009, August 2009) 
Bibliography 
344 
 
Ana Petrovic and Ralf Tutsch, ‘National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial 
Crisis’ (ECB Legal Working Paper Series No. 8/7/09, July 2009) 
<www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp8.pdf?23b81a456ecb550cfcd1b693d4f10685> 
accessed 20 June 2016 
Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, ‘The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About the Causes  
and Remedies’ (NBER Working Paper No. 14739, February 2009) 
 <www.nber.org/papers/w14739> accessed 22 July 2016  
Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, ‘Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy’ (NBER 
Working Paper No. 15197, July 2009) <www.nber.org/papers/w15197.pdf> accessed 20 July 2015  
Raghuram G. Rajan, ‘Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?’ (NBER Working 
Paper No. 11728, November 2005) <www.nber.org/papers/w11728 > accessed 7 March 2014  
John Samples, ‘Lawless Policy: TARP as Congressional Failure’ (Cato Institute Policy Analysis 
Paper No. 660, February 2010) <www.shareslide.org/lawless-policy-tarp-as-congressional-failure-
cato-policy-analysis-no-660 >accessed 20 October 2015  
Paul Myners ‘Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance’ (Paper Presented at the 
Association of Pension Funds Investment Conference, London 21 April 2009) 
Hector Saint, ‘The Financial Crisis: The Role of Investors’ (Paper Presented at NAFT Investment 
Conference, London 11 March 2009) 
Jan M. Smits, ‘What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal Dogmatic Research’ 
(EPLI Working Paper No. 2015/06, June 2015)  
<www.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cmf?abstract_id=2644088 > accessed 28 April 2016 
John B. Tailor, ‘The Financial Crisis and Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went 
Wrong’ (NBER Working Paper No.14631, 20 January 2009) <www.nber.org/papers/w14631> 
accessed 20 October 2014 
Jennifer S. Taub, ‘Enablers of Exuberance: Legal Acts and Omissions that Facilitated the Global 
Financial Crisis’ (Draft, 4 September 2009) <www.fliphtml5.com/fsrz/xrki/basic/51-69> accessed 
7 March 2014 
Stavros Vourloumis, ‘Reforming EU and Global Financial Regulation: Crisis, Learning and 
Paradigm Shifts’ (ECPR Working Paper Presented at the 4th Biennial Conference 27- 29 June 2012) 
 
 
Bibliography 
345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
